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Contentious Subjects: Spatial and Relational Perspectives 
on Forced Migrant Mobilizations in Berlin and Paris 
 
Political mobilizations by ‘forced migrants’ for rights and recognition have proliferated 
worldwide in the last two decades. Yet, these contentious practices have rarely received 
widespread public attention. They contrast with a dominant portrayal of marginalized migrants 
as either passive, needy and ideally grateful objects of government or civil society 
humanitarianism or stigmatized outsiders and intruders in a national order. Also the academic 
reflection on the issue has started only relatively recently, particularly in critical migration and 
citizenship studies, and far less so in social movement studies. According to dominant movement 
theories, (forced) migrants are unlikely subjects of mobilization due to legal obstacles (including 
‘deportability’), limited economic and social capital and closed political and discursive 
opportunities.  
 Against this background, my thesis explores diverse processes of political mobilization 
by forced migrants with a view to provide theoretical refinements and empirical complements to 
the body of literature in social movement studies. Given the volatile and fragmented nature of 
forced migrant mobilizations, the research draws from recent innovations in contentious politics, 
highlighting ‘micro-interactions’ in specific arenas, as well the concrete spatial underpinnings of 
such practices. The key guiding interest evolves around the question of how protest by forced 
migrants emerges and unfolds through interactions among diverse players in specific arenas. I 
analyse the making and unmaking of social ties by forced migrants, as well as the spaces they 
enact and embody in processes of mobilization. With a view to integrate knowledge obtained in 
other disciplines, the research is furthemore informed by critical migration studies, particularly 
the notions of ‘acts of citizenship’ under precarious conditions in exclusive migration regimes. 
Designed in the tradition of ‘political ethnography’, the project both homes in on specific 
interactions in deleneated arenas and adds a comparative element by contrasting various arenas. 
The project investigates four protest arenas in two European capitals, Berlin and Paris. It therefore 
scrutinizes and contrasts processes of mobilization in two distinct legal, relational and spatial 
contexts. In adding a diachronic comparison in each location, the research aims at the tentative 
identification of relational and spatial patterns in forced migrant mobilizations. The research 
shows how marginalized actors temporarily overcome structural obstacles through interactions 
with more powerful actors and by appropriating spaces with avantageous relational qualities. 
Moreover, the research documents the fragility of ties that are made and unmade both among 
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Paris, 2 May 2008: several hundred sans-papiers mainly from Mali, Senegal, Mauretania 
but also Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey occupy the iconic Bourse du Travail of the leftist 
trade union CGT in the 11 district of the French capital. The protesters claim their 
regularisation, freedom of movement and solidarity from trade unions and civil society 
organizations. The protest event will last for more than a year. 
Berlin, 6 October 2012: around 70 asylum-seekers from Iran, Afghanistan, 
Turkey, Eritrea and Somalia reach Berlin after a 600 kilometre foot march. On banners, 
they claim the abolition of ‘Residenzpflicht’ (a German law regulating the physical 
mobility of asylum-seekers), ‘Lagerpflicht’ (the general rule of collective 
accommodation, often in remote areas) and deportations. With the support of local anti-
racist groups and neighbours, the protesters set up a protest camp at ‘Oranienplatz’ in the 
heart of the district of Kreuzberg. Hundreds of other asylum-seekers and migrants with 
precarious status will join the protest camp during its two years of existence.  
Brussels, 23 June 2014: several dozens of forced migrants set up a protest camp 
in Brussels after a 500 kilometre foot march from Strasbourg in France, via Schengen in 
Luxemburg to the headquarters of the EU institutions. Banners read ‘Freedom not 
Frontex’, ‘Stop Dublin’ or ‘No Camps’. The protesters are asylum-seekers and sans-
papiers from various European cities including Berlin and Paris. 
Berlin, 6 February 2016: At an iconic former border post in Berlin, once 
separating US-American and Soviet tanks, around 50 migrant and non-migrant activists 
gather for a sit-in. Banners read ‘Stop war on migrants’, and ‘Freedom not Frontex’, 
photographs of dead bodies and mourning crowds at a sea shore are displayed on the 
sidewalk. The flyers distributed announce simultaneous events for this action day in 
Morocco, Spain and Berlin.  
Paris, spring 2015: Hundreds of forced migrants including asylum-seekers and 
undocumented migrants set up makeshift camps underneath metro bridges for very basic 
shelter. Their precarious situation and visibility attracts solidarity from the adjacent 
neighbourhoods, spurs countless protest events and leads to repeated evacuations 
organized by the state. A highly contentious wave of dozens of tent camps and evictions 












Introduction: Researching Political Mobilizations by Forced 
Migrants 
 
‘I was [politically] active in Soudan, this is the reason why I had to leave. 
When I came to France, I did not want to be political. When I found the 
situation here - it was not endurable - I realized that I had to continue fighting 
to get back at least our dignity, our basic rights. It is very important. Anywhere 
you go, no one can ensure your basic rights unless you stand for your rights. I 
found that it works, to let people know that our rights are abused in Europe 
and of course in Africa and elsewhere.’  (Interview P30) 
 
1.1.  Introduction 
The empirical vignettes in the prologue illustrate diverse instances of forced migrant 
claims-making in the public sphere. Instead of remaining at the margins of society, these 
individuals constitute themselves as political subjects and claim rights and recognition. 
Such mobilizations by a specific type of marginalized actors are considered anomalies in 
most theories of political mobilization. In this dissertation, I therefore explore how such 
dynamics of political mobilization by forced migrants unfold in two European capitals, 
Berlin and Paris. This introductory chapter sets the stage and locates the project in its 
academic and social context. For this purpose, section (1.2.) recalls the development of 
forced migrant mobilizations and traces the academic engagement with the topic. In doing 
so, the section identifies considerable gaps in the literature, which illustrate the academic 
relevance and build the starting point of this project. Subsequently, section (1.3.) outlines 
the theoretical and methodological perspective, from which the issue of political protest 
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by forced migrants is approached in this dissertation.1 It furthermore narrows down the 
specific scope, clarifies key concepts, introduces the guiding research questions and 
justifies the selection of cases. In the tradition of an ‘engaged social science’, section 
(1.4.) argues how this dissertation contributes to key social questions of our time beyond 
a mere academic relevance. Eventually, the concluding section (1.5.) provides an outlook 
on the structure of the dissertation to guide the reader through this manuscript. 
1.2.  Setting the Stage: Marginalized (Forced) Migrant Subjectivity 
In the ‘age of migration’ (Castles, Haas, & Miller, 2014), cross-border movements of all 
kinds have reached a historic peak. Such patterns of migration include a wide range of 
forced migrants leaving their countries of origin for reasons of war, individual or group-
based persecution and poverty (Betts, 2013; Carling, 2015). In response, various countries 
in the so-called Global North have, particularly since the 1980s, reacted with tightened 
immigration policies (de Genova, 2002; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016), including stricter 
border controls, increased deportations and widespread encampment of those deemed 
‘unwanted’ (Agier, 2011; Boswell, 2003; de Genova, 2017; Schuster, 2004).2 Recent 
years have furthermore witnessed an intensified selection and differentiation of forced 
migrants into ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘legitimate’ and 
‘illegitimate’, and ultimately ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ (Gibney, 2014; Neumayer, 2005b). In 
this process of securitization and differentiation of migration, the international norm of 
asylum is no exception, but has also been gradually curtailed in most countries in Europe 
(Crépeau, 1995; Fassin, 2012; Noiriel, 1999; Oltmer & Bade, 2005a, 2005b; Steinhilper, 
2016).  
The presence of migrants has ever since led to heated social and political 
controversies between conservatives and multiculturalists about migrant reception in the 
Global North, national conceptions of citizenship and legitimate motives of migration 
(Balibar, 2009; Benhabib, 2004; Betts & Loescher, 2011; Ghosh, 2000; Isin, 2012). 
Migrant rights movements have gradually emerged in various countries in North America 
and Europe from the late 1970s onwards and organized multiple campaigns at the local, 
national and transnational level (Giugni & Passy, 2001; Monforte, 2014; Nicholls & 
Uitermark, 2016). 
                                                 
1  Separate theory (2) and method (3) chapters will further expand on the respective perspectives. 
2  The so-called ‘long summer of migration’ 2015 constituted a temporary exception, but in its aftermath 
this general trend was confirmed (Hess et al., 2017). 
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Yet, the last two decades are a turning point insofar as migrants themselves have 
systematically engaged in struggles over rights and recognition. Political mobilizations 
by migrants of the kind illustrated in the introductory paragraphs have proliferated on all 
continents in the last two decades (Anderson, 2010; Ataç, Rygiel, & Stierl, 2016; Nicholls 
& Uitermark, 2016; Tyler & Marciniak, 2013). Therefore, Imogen Tyler and Katarzyna 
Marciniak speak of ‘an explosion’ (Tyler and Marciniak 2013: 143) of migrant and 
migrant solidarity activism in this period; Ilker Ataç et al. observe a ‘new era of protest’ 
(Ataç, Kron, Schilliger, Schwiertz, & Stierl, 2015).3 Forced migrants’ claims range from 
the respect for human rights, freedom of movement, access to labour markets, a fair and 
humane asylum process, but also include protests against deportation and the failure to 
prevent migrant death at borders (e.g. the Mediterranean). 
The forms of mobilization and the characteristics of individuals involved are 
historically and geographically contingent. In Europe, the geographical focus of my 
research, widespread migrant mobilization was sparked in the 1990s, when 
undocumented migrants, self-identifying as ‘sans-papiers’4, engaged in occupations, 
hunger strikes and marches. Their political protest for the first time brought questions of 
migrant political subjectivity to the attention of a wider public (Cissé, 2002; Freedman, 
2004; McNevin, 2006; Siméant, 1998). The undocumented migrant movement quickly 
diffused to most big cities in France and subsequently inspired protests and activist 
networks in various other European countries including Switzerland, Italy, Spain, 
Germany and Greece (Tyler and Marciniak 2013: 143). Restrictive asylum policies have 
furthermore fuelled new kinds of mobilizations against detention of asylum-seekers, 
mandatory residence, exclusion from the job market, encampment in remote areas, 
suspension of family reunification, deportations etc. 
With radical actions such as sit-ins, hunger strikes, lip-sewing, occupation of 
public and private space as well as long distance marches migrants have constituted 
themselves as political subjects, leaving their attributed place at the margins of society 
and voicing claims for rights and recognition in the public sphere. 
Despite increasing frequency and a predominantly radical repertoire of action, 
                                                 
3  This is evidently not meant to ignore the multiple forms of migrant mobilizations such as migrant self-
help organizations and migrant worker strikes (Però and Solomos 2010: 2) which have a far longer 
history (see e.g. for France Gisti, 2014).  
4   Sans-papiers, French for ‘Without Papers’, is the self-identification adopted by the illegalized 
migrants’ movement in France. The term has rapidly proliferated and is still widely used in the 
Francophone world. 
 4 
such political mobilizations have so far rarely received resonance in both public discourse 
and academia. In addition to the proven disproportionally low representation of migrants 
in the mass media (Bleich, Bloemraad, & de Graauw, 2015), migrant mobilizations hardly 
correspond with the dominant public portrayal of (forced) migrants and established 
theories of political mobilization. Discursively, the figure of the forced migrant is either 
constructed as a passive victim and needy object of (non-)governmental humanitarianism 
(Fassin, 2012; L. Malkki, 1996) or as a stigmatized outsider and intruder in a national 
order of things (Bigo, 2003; Nicholls, 2013b). Migrants’ claims in the public sphere are, 
hence, considered to be disturbing ‘noise’ rather than legitimate ‘voices’ (Nicholls, 
2013b, 2013c).This results in migrants being both ‘casualties of care’ (Ticktin, 2011) and 
casualties of ‘excessive governance’ (Stierl, 2017). Indeed, forced migrants can be 
understood as ‘subalterns’, given their widespread exclusion from discourse, (political) 
power, and material wealth (see e.g. Fadlalla, 2009; Harindranath, 2007). 
 Not least for these reasons, migrant agency has been largely downplayed, both in 
public discourse and in academia. Systematic academic reflection on the issue has started 
only relatively recently - particularly in critical migration and citizenship studies, and to 
some degree in social movement studies. Other strands of political science, such as 
international relations, have largely focused on migration governance ‘from above’. I will 
briefly outline these strands with a view to identifying gaps and to locating my own 
research:5 
In political science, the issue of migration has predominantly been addressed from 
a top-down perspective. While the context of European integration has become a 
laboratory for supranational asylum policy and academic reflection on its repercussions 
(Boswell, 2003; Moravcsik & Nicolaidis, 1999; Truong & Maas, 2011), it is striking that 
most of this literature concentrates on the question of how migration could be effectively 
governed or, in its critical turn, how governmentality impacts the lives of migrants 
(Balzacq, 2008; Bigo, 2003). Similarly, international relations have largely ignored 
migrant agency (for an excellent overview see Rother, 2013). Given the dominant top-
down approach, few contributions exist in this strand of literature on the perceptions and 
acts of emancipation of migrants as well as mobilizations by migrant solidarity 
organizations. This bias is not only normatively problematic but also empirically 
                                                 
5  For a more extensive discussion on theories on migrant mobilizations, see section 2. on the theoretical 
framework of this research project. 
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questionable as ‘[…] migrants are not just passive objects but active shapers of their social 
world’ (Faist, Fauser, and Reisenauer 2013: 13).  
Bottom-up and transnational perspectives have been developed extensively in 
social movement studies (della Porta & Caiani, 2008; della Porta & Mattoni, 2014b; della 
Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Monforte, 2014). For some reason, however, the issue of migration 
has received comparatively little attention in this strand of literature (Eggert & Giugni, 
2015; Menjívar, 2010). Whereas Emily Gray and Paul Statham (2005), Ruud Koopmans 
et al. (2005), Sieglinde Rosenberger and Jakob Winkler (2013), Manlio Cinalli (2007; 
Cinalli & Nasri, 2009) and Pierre Monforte (2014) have provided important contributions 
to national and transnational (Europeanized) dynamics of migrant solidarity activism, 
research on political mobilizations by migrants themselves remains scarce. In social 
movement studies, migrants have long been considered least-likely cases of mobilization 
due to ‘weak interests’ (Schröder, 2016) (heterogeneous group), legal obstacles including 
‘deportability’ (de Genova, 2002), limited economic and social capital and stigmatising 
discourses. Given the dominant focus on ’resource mobilization theory’ and ‘political 
opportunity structures’, social movement studies have generally – with some important 
exceptions (Chabanet & Royall, 2014a; Piven & Cloward, 1979) – devoted less attention 
to ‘resource-poor’ movements. Even compared to other marginalized and weakly 
resourced social groups (such as the unemployed, the disabled, the mentally ill etc.), 
migrants were expected to be less inclined to mobilize as the public discourse on 
membership in a society organized as a nation state is strongly biased towards formal 
citizens of a polity: ‘The nation state may proclaim equality for all, but equality of rights 
is only reserved for its core members’ (Nicholls 2013c: 171). Cinalli has even argued that 
asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants as ‘weak immigrants’ are ‘passive 
protagonists’ and ‘incapable of speaking on their own behalf’ (2008). When migration 
was addressed by social movement scholars at all, the focus remained on pro-
beneficiaries or ‘political altruism’ (Passy, 2001). 
Most seminal contributions explicitly addressing migrant activism derive from the 
US-American context, where particularly the spectacular protests in 2006, with 
millions of undocumented migrants in the streets, triggered research on political 
mobilizations of (undocumented) migrants and their recognition as legitimate voices 
in the US-American public sphere (Nicholls, 2013c; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016; 
Pulido, 2006; Voss & Bloemraad, 2011; Zepeda-Millán, 2017). Particularly Walter 
Nicholls and his several co-authors have enriched social movements studies with an 
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explicit spatial lens on protest by migrants (Nicholls, Miller, & Beaumont, 2013b; 
Nicholls & Vermeulen, 2012; Uitermark, Nicholls, & Loopmans, 2012). For the 
European context, Johanna Siméant’s ‘La cause des sans-papiers’ significantly advanced 
social movements studies’ interest in marginalized actors (Siméant, 1998), particularly 
theorizing the role of ‘hunger strikes’ in protest by undocumented migrants. In more 
recent scholarship, Pierre Monforte and Pascal Dufour have investigated the cultural 
dimension of migrant activism (2011, 2013), Teresa Cappiali the fragile relations with 
pro-beneficiaries (Cappiali, 2016), and Nicholls the ‘niches’, rather than political 
opportunities, in which migrants mobilize (Nicholls, 2013a, 2014). All of these 
contributions focus on the particular context of political activism by undocumented 
migrants. Empirical analyses of protest by asylum-seekers are almost non-existent.6 
The discipline of migration studies has at least in its sociological coinage ever 
since been sensitive to migrant experiences (Faist et al., 2013; Vertovec, 2009; Wimmer 
& Glick-Schiller, 2003). However, this strand of literature largely neglected the 
contentious side of transnational migration. A growing body of literature, commonly 
referred to as ‘autonomy of migration’ (Forschungsgruppe Transit Migration, 2008; 
Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013; Tsianos & Karakayali, 2010), has stressed the inherent 
subversion in international migration, yet has largely avoided an empirical analysis 
of the trajectories and conditions of political mobilizations by migrants. The most 
explicit contribution to understanding migrant agency has been made in critical 
citizenship studies, where Engin Isin introduced the notion of ‘acts of citizenship’ 
(2008). He conceptualizes citizenship as social practices, also performed by marginalized 
migrants acting ‘as if’ they were entitled with citizenship rights (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). 
Along these lines, a burgeoning literature has emerged which aims at thinking migration 
politics ‘from below’. The seminal edited volume ‘Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the 
Politics of Movement’ by Peter Nyers and Kim Rygiel (Nyers & Rygiel, 2012), but also 
subsequent contributions from the same theoretical angle (Ataç et al., 2015, 2016; Stierl, 
2012) have stressed the transformative effects of migrant agency on macro-institutions 
such as citizenship. However, the community of scholars has cultivated a profound 
scepticism towards social movement studies (see for example Stierl, 2012), which is why 
a bridge to the canon of social movements studies has rarely been built. 
                                                 
6  A notable exception in this regard is the research by Ilker Ataç on the ‘refugee protest camp Vienna’ 
(2016). 
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As this cursory overview shows, the academic reflection on migrant mobilizations 
remains still relatively scarce, scattered across various disciplines and poorly integrated.7 
Despite recent progress (see for example Monforte and Dufour 2013; Nicholls 2013a; 
Nicholls and Vermeulen 2012), Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni note in their chapter in 
the 2015 ‘Oxford Handbook of Social Movements’: ‘Work on migrants’ movements is 
particularly necessary, as this represents one of the main blind spots in the extant 
literature’ (Eggert & Giugni, 2015: 168). The scarcity is certainly not owed to ‘a lack of 
‘raw material’ (Eggert & Giugni, 2015: 169) but rather to a misfit of dominant theories 
and a lack of dialogue across disciplines.  
1.3.  Exploring Forced Migrant Mobilizations 
The overarching heuristic interest of this thesis is located in the accentuated lacuna 
outlined above. It intends to empirically investigate how migrants themselves, as 
subaltern political agents, organize and perform political protest against their 
marginalization and stigmatization.  
A Terminological Note 
Due to the widespread terminological confusion and politicization of the terms ‘refugee’ 
and ‘migrant’ (Carling, 2015; Scheel & Squire, 2014), a brief specification of the key 
actors of this research is paramount. In this thesis I use the term ‘forced migrant’, defined 
by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in its 2000 ‘World Migration 
Report’ as any person who migrates  
‘to escape persecution, conflict, repression, natural and human-made disasters, 
ecological degradation, or other situations that endanger their lives, freedom or 
livelihood’ (International Organization of Migration, 2000: 8).  
This encompassing term is chosen for both analytical and normative reasons. Firstly, the 
mobilizations I am investigating include all kinds of individuals with biographies of 
involuntary migration. Their official label ranges from ‘illegal’ migrant, to ‘geduldet‘ 
[temporary exemption from deportation in German foreigner’s law], ‘asylum-seeker’ 
during status determination, ‘subsidiary protected’, ‘refugee’ recognized under the 
Geneva Convention or individuals who have obtained a permit to stay in the country of 
destination through other means (e.g. regularization). Indeed, it is more the rule than the 
exception that activists’ legal status change during the course of their activism. Some 
                                                 
7  For excellent overviews see Ataç et al., 2016; Cinalli, 2016; and Eggert & Giugni, 2015. 
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forced migrants apply for asylum, engage in activism, get legal refugee status granted and 
continue their activism. Others become activists as asylum-seekers and continue their 
resistance as illegalized migrants after their asylum claim has been rejected (Ataç et al., 
2015; Jakob, 2016; T. Müller, 2012).  
Secondly, the term ‘refugee’ has increasingly been used to distinguish ‘legitimate’ 
from ‘illegitimate’ reasons of migration, based on a legal definition which has been 
criticised widely. The Geneva Convention stipulates that the term ‘refugee’  
‘shall apply to any person who (…) owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it’ (UN General Assembly, 1967). 
Due to its focus on individual persecution and its exclusion of additional reasons of forced 
migration such as environmental degradation, extreme poverty, civil war etc., the 
convention and its underlying definition is considered anachronistic by various scholars 
(Betts, 2009, 2013; Fernández, 2015; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long, & Sigona, 
2014; L. H. Malkki, 1995b). As a matter of fact, the Geneva convention reaffirmed the 
Western bloc’s priorities by the time it was drafted. Given the ideological confrontation 
between liberalism and socialism, political rights were granted more importance than 
economic rights, and political violence was prioritized over economic violence. Hence, 
the term ‘refugee’ was never a neutral category, but depended on power dynamics and 
political interests (Fassin, 2016b).8 
The political nature of status attribution is also mirrored in the fact that, being 
granted ‘conventional refugee’ status on the basis of the Geneva Convention has become 
increasingly rare, 
‘which does not mean that the real causes of its attribution have disappeared, those 
pertaining to violence and chaos in the country of origin (…). What has changed 
is the migration policies of the countries in the North, and the control that they 
exert over those of the South (…), and over those individuals hailing from them, 
no matter what the situations of violence, chaos or distress that provoked their 
departure’ (Agier, 2011: 35). 
                                                 
8  Chapter 4 elaborates extensively on the politicization of forced migration in Germany and France. 
 9 
In consequence, a plethora of temporary, less protected statuses have proliferated (Agier, 
2011).9 
Thirdly, the term ‘refugee’ has hence been increasingly used to distinguish 
‘legitimate’ from ‘illegitimate’ reasons of migration based on a legal definition, which 
ignores the slim line between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ migration (see for a good 
comment Carling, 2015). For these reasons, the term ‘forced migration’ has been 
introduced: 
‘To refer to ‘forced migrants’ is to highlight the extremity of conditions under 
which certain groups ‘decide’ to undertake the migratory journey. An emphasis 
on forced migration implies a series of factors such as political persecution, ethnic 
conflict, inequitable access to natural resources, declining living conditions, and 
chronic and pervasive human rights abuses marking a limited agency on the part 
of those migrating’ (Scheel & Squire, 2014). 10 
It is worth noting that there have been other attempts to re-appropriate the term ‘refugee’. 
A wide, political notion of the term has particularly gained prominence as a self-
identification of forced migrant activists (‘Refugee Strike Berlin’, ‘Berlin Refugee 
Movement’ etc.). Yet, for instance, in Paris, self-organized groups and migrant rights 
groups explicitly avoid the term ‘refugee’ for its exclusive use in mainstream discourses 
and speak of ‘exiled’ [exilé] instead. For the reasons outlined above, I use ‘forced 
migrant’ in this dissertation as an encompassing term for precarious migrants with various 
legal status. Only if the specific status is important for analytical reasons, I refer to 
‘undocumented migrant’, ‘asylum-seeker’, or ‘recognized refugee’. 
The Scope of the Research Project 
Given the continuous scarcity of contributions on migrant activism from an explicit social 
movement perspective, this thesis has a strong inductive and explorative component. Yet, 
in an abductive research tradition,11 it also draws from previous work on migrant activism 
                                                 
9  Wihtol de Wenden illustrates this development: ‘During 2014–15, Europe has been confronted with 
an unforeseen arrival of asylum-seekers from the Middle East: 625,000 asylum-seekers in 2014 and 
1.2 million in 2015, out of whom less than half got a refugee status (45 per cent), shedding light on 
the difficulties to enter in the categories of Geneva Convention of 1951 (individual persecution or fear 
of persecution)’ (Wihtol de Wenden, 2017: 433). 
10  Some authors also advocate for caution in using ‘forced migration’ as it maintains an illusionary 
binary between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migration (see for example Scheel & Squire, 2014). They 
suggest avoiding a qualifier altogether, using the encompassing term ‘migrant’. Yet, in my view, this 
risks masking the particular realities of precarious (forced) migrants, which are paramount to 
understand their respective processes of political subjectivation.  
11  See Chapter 3 for an extensive elaboration on the epistemological and methodological approach 
adopted in this thesis. 
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and theories of political mobilization more broadly. It is particularly informed by three 
strands of literature:12 
 Firstly, it approaches migrant activism from a ‘players and arenas’ perspective 
(Jasper & Duyvendak, 2014), which investigates processes of contentious politics ‘from 
the bottom-up’. In the light of the structural obstacles for the political subjectivation of 
migrants, the research studies the micro-interactions forced migrants engage in at the 
local level, with a view to investigating how niches for political mobilization are 
identified, appropriated, expanded, contested and lost. 
  Secondly, the research adopts an explicitly spatial perspective to contentious 
politics (Auyero, 2006; D. G. Martin & Miller, 2003; Nicholls et al., 2013b). Such an 
approach allows to scrutinize the patterns of spatial and social exclusion common for 
many forced migrants in Europe, and to investigate processes of ‘radical place-making’ 
(Mitchell & Sparke, 2017), including spatialized repertoires of action and the effects of 
certain spatialities on mobilization and demobilization. 
  Thirdly, the thesis intends to span insights drawn from critical migration and 
citizenship studies, which have so far been rarely integrated into social movement studies. 
These approaches have broadened the conceptualization of migrant agency to the 
everyday practices or ‘invisible’ resistances by migrants in almost all contexts of 
restrictive border regimes (Ataç et al., 2015, 2016). Furthermore, I draw from literature 
on transnational migration (Faist et al., 2013; Pries, 2001) to study how the transnational 
life worlds and networks that most migrants inhabit shape their political activism in the 
localities of destination. 
  Generally, research oriented towards an interactionist perspective entails a strong 
inductive attention to particular configurations. It hence asks rather broad and diverse 
questions to capture the complexity of fluid micro-moblizations (see Jasper 2014: 18).13  
                                                 
12  The theoretical perspective will be further discussed and justified in Chapter 2. 
13  For their seminal volume on an interactionist perspective, James Jasper and Jan Willem Duyvendak 
asked the contributors to consider the following set of questions ‘about their players’ relationships to 
other players and to arenas. How does this player interact with protest groups: what conflicts, 
cooperation, tensions, dilemmas? Does it tend to follow one strategy or many? Does it have one arena 
to which it is restricted, or in which its capacities are especially useful? How and when does it choose 
to enter an arena or exit from one? What is at stake? How well are the player’s goals and means 
understood by outsiders, especially by protestors? What are protestors’ images and expectations about 
the other player? What expectations does it have about the protestors with which it interacts? What 
schemas, stories, and stereotypes does it deploy? What capacities does it have for bringing other 
players into the engagement? When does it try to do this? When does it succeed? What are its primary 
allies? What types of outcomes are there? Do they lead to new arenas or end here? How are new 
arenas created?’ (Jasper, 2014: 18). 
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  The ultimate goal of my research project is to contribute to the understanding of 
how protest by forced migrants unfolds through interactions among players in arenas. 
As a result, my interest in processes of political mobilizations and demobilization is 
guided by the following three sets of questions: 
1. With what kind of players do forced migrants interact in contentious arenas? 
Along which lines are social ties made and unmade? What are ‘characteristic 
interactions’? How do ‘strategic dilemmas’ play out?  
2. How does space influence the making and breaking of relationships within 
contentious arenas? Which spatialized repertoires of action are employed? 
3. How do every-day experiences shape contentious arenas around forced 
migration? 
Selecting the Arenas under Investigation 
According to Kathleen Blee, ‘[m]uch of the salient context of grassroots activism is local 
(Blee, 2012, p: 15). This is especially true for migrant mobilizations, which have 
particularly proliferated in large urban centres, as these specific spaces provide more 
favourable conditions for creating weak and strong ties both within migrant communities 
and with native pro-migrant organizations such as human rights NGOs, faith-based 
groups, the radical left and trade unions (McNevin, 2006; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016; 
Nicholls & Vermeulen, 2012; Plöger, 2014).  
 This study hence focuses on urban mobilizations and more specifically on 
contentious interactions unfolding at the local level. I have opted to compare forced 
migrant protests in two urban settings, Berlin and Paris. This selection builds upon 
previous research on the two countries, which has identified a number of important spatial 
and relational differences in the issue area of (forced) migration14. According to Rogers 
Brubaker, France and Germany represent two ideal-types of modern citizenship regimes 
- the German ius sanguinis and the French ius solis (Brubaker, 1992b). Koopmans et al. 
have found that such seemingly abstract differences have an impact on political 
mobilizations by migrants (Koopmans et al., 2005). Furthermore, the countries represent 
distinct ‘borderline citizenship regimes’ (Monforte & Dufour, 2011), in which daily lives 
for undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers differ strongly. Whereas the German 
asylum system is characterized by accentuated isolation and undocumented migrants 
often remain strongly controlled by the state (‘Duldung’), the daily life of asylum-seekers 
                                                 
14  See also Chapter 4 for an extensive overview of key similarities and differences in the context of 
forced migration in the two localities. 
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and undocumented migrants in Paris has been less constrained due to fewer controls, and 
established ethnic networks as well as access to the job market in a larger informal 
economy (Monforte & Dufour, 2011). Monforte has also shown that not only political 
opportunity structures differ, but also the availability of pro-migrant allies. Whereas in 
France, social movement organizations involved in migration and asylum issues are 
deeply entrenched in society and highly concentrated in Paris, the German case is much 
more fragmented, since contention related with migration issues is dispersed throughout 
the federal polity (Monforte 2014: 17). Despite these contextual differences, both cities 
have witnessed waves of forced migrant contention: Paris is a crucial case in this regard, 
as it constitutes the cradle of the sans-papiers movement in Europe, with regular episodes 
of contention since more than two decades. Berlin on the other hand, can be considered a 
relevant case, as it has been the nucleus of the most active and visible forced migrant 
mobilizations in the last years in Europe (Plöger, 2014) and has witnessed the largest 
arrival of forced migrants in Europe in the course of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’.15 
Drawing from the tradition of abductive reasoning and cumulative knowledge 
production, this research is strongly informed by already existing scholarship on migrant 
activism in France and Germany, particularly the work of Siméant (1998), Monforte and 
Dufour (2011, 2013) as well as Nicholls and Uitermark (2016). Yet, it complements these 
contributions in various regards: Firstly, none of the previous contributions scrutinizes 
explicitly the political activism of asylum-seekers. Monforte and Dufour include German 
‘refugee’ activists in their analysis, yet treat them as ‘undocumented’ migrants. My 
research instead, intends to shed light on the particularities of asylum regimes and their 
impact on political activism as well as the overlap or non-overlap with undocumented 
migrants’ struggles. Secondly, in contrast to Nicholls and Uitermark, my research is not 
so much interested in the historical perspective of, and transformations in, migrant rights 
movements, but rather in the contentious interactions unfolding within specific arenas. 
By focusing on shorter time frames, I believe to add more specific insights into the spatial 
and relational patterns at play. Lastly, my research scrutinizes episodes of contention in 
time frames that have not been scrutinized so far. Uitermark and Nicholls’s analysis on 
France ‘fades out’ in the mid-2000s and hence misses two highly influential waves of 
contention – the occupation of the ‘Bourse du Travail’ 2008-2010 and the ‘La Chapelle 
arena’, unfolding from 2015 onwards. Monforte and Dufour’s comparison of Germany 
                                                 
15  For a more extensive discussion of ‘casing’ in qualitative research in general and the approach taken 
in this project, see also section 3. on methodology. 
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and France is limited to document analysis without extensive fieldwork studying the 
actors in their ‘natural’ setting. Besides, they do not cover the most disruptive and visible 
wave of contention in Germany, also referred to as the ‘Oranienplatz-movement’ from 
2012 until 2014. In the light of these lacunae, my research serves as both empirical and 
theoretical complements to previous contributions on (forced) migrant activism in the two 
countries while also expanding the body of knowledge on marginalized actors more 
broadly. It explores the relations forced migrants establish, as well as the spaces they 
enact and embody to contest the processes which lead to their marginalization, the denial 
of their subjectivity.  
In comparing contentious arenas in two urban (and national) settings, my research 
project adopts a specific type of case-oriented comparison.16 It scrutinizes and thickly 
describes processes of political mobilization by forced migrants in two locations, Berlin 
and Paris, on the basis of various dimensions – including an attention to interactions, the 
dynamics and quality of social ties and space. In line with an arena-approach to 
contentious politics, however, the unit of analysis is the contentious arena, not the city. 
The case-oriented comparison in my research consists of a total of four arenas, two in 
each location. From a comparison of processes in highly distinct contexts, as well as 
comparing arenas within one location, I intend to generate insights on the patterns of 
interactions and strategical dilemmas ‘typical’ to such kinds of political activism while at 
the same time pointing to the respective specificities of the cases at hand. Furthermore, 
my research also underlines that the arenas are not wholly independent: they are 
embedded in local contexts, in histories of interaction and in transnational social spaces 
of migration and contention (see e.g. Chapter 8). Thus, they tend to be ‘place-based’ – 
but not necessarily ‘place-bound’ (Massey cited in Blee, 2012: 15). 
Given that the issue of forced migrant activism remains in its infancy as far as 
academic research and knowledge production are concerned, the project is still located in 
the realm of ‘discovery’ (Keating and della Porta 2008: 271). Methodologically17, the 
research project therefore relies on a triangulation of different qualitative methods 
including in-depth interviews, participant observation, and document analysis. Besides 
its strength in studying novel phenomena, qualitative and particularly ethnographic 
                                                 
16  See also Chapter 3 for a more extensive discussion of this methodological perspective. 
17  Chapter 3 ‘How to study precarious interactions in contentious arenas around forced migration’ 
provides further explanations of the methodology adopted in this research, including a detailed 
description of methods used, the research process and ethical questions arising in research with forced 
migrants. 
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approaches are also useful for (and often the only way) to obtain information on 
vulnerable groups: elusive information can often only be obtained if research resembles 
more ‘normal communication’ and even more importantly if it can be adapted to the 
respective interview situation. Following the interactionist perspective outlined above, 
my research is based on data gathered on four contentious arenas (two in Berlin and Paris 
each), involving various players such as forced migrant activists but also their interaction 
with pro-beneficiaries, local politics and the media. 
While the respective results derive from these specific cases, the ambition of an 
interactionist perspective goes tentatively beyond that. One of the appeals of the ‘players 
and arenas’ approach is its focus on both the particularity of specific episodes of 
contention and ‘[grasping] the types of strategic interactions that can be considered 
“characteristic”’ (Duyvendak & Fillieule 2014: 312). This allows tentative propositions 
of regular interactions or ‘strategic dilemmas, typical of certain players in specific arenas’ 
(ibid). In this sense, I intend to describe the characteristic interactions within contentious 
arenas around forced migration in which forced migrants intervene as political subjects 
with rights and voices. Considering that my research includes a comparative and 
diachronic perspective, the ambition is to generate insights and theories of value (yet to 
be ‘tested’) beyond these two specific cases. 
1.4.  Toward an Engaged Social Science 
Above, I have provided ample arguments to support the academic relevance of this 
research. Yet, in my view, social scientists have furthermore a responsibility to contribute 
to understanding key social problems in order to inform potential paths forward. 
From this perspective, the proliferation of migrant mobilizations points to one of 
the key social questions of this time. Forced migrants embody the contradiction of our 
global situation. Poverty, war, exploitation, environmental degradation due to climate 
change, among others, remain unequally distributed at a global scale. Vastly disparate life 
and survival chances are importantly determined by the ‘lottery of birth place’ (Betts, 
2009; Gibney, 2014; Scherr, 2014). While root causes of forced migration are 
multifaceted, many have argued that they are importantly co- and re-produced by 
particular modes of production in a globalized capitalist economy with an unequal 
distribution of gains and losses (Brand & Wissen, 2012; Mezzadra, 2010; Zizek, 2015), 
post-colonial continuities and geopolitical patterns of domination and dependency (see 
eg. Hardt & Negri, 2000). In current times, according to sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, 
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‘mobility has become the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor’. The global 
elites are able to cross borders at will, while the poor are meant to stay at home: ‘the 
riches are global, the misery is local’ (Bauman, 1998: 9, 74). According to Thomas Faist, 
‘we live, materially speaking, in one [of] the most unequal worlds in all of human history, 
ever since the recording of income and wealth data in the early nineteenth century’ (Faist, 
2017: 19). 
(Forced) migration can be understood as a consequence of such global disparities 
and at times a subversive attempt to undermine their perpetuation. Consequently, the very 
presence of migrants is fundamentally political, as it highlights a global reality (and all-
time normality of cross-border mobility) and unmasks the social problem of global social 
injustice. It raises fundamental questions of freedom of circulation, legitimate reasons for 
migrating, the ethics of border controls and many other issues at stake. Numerous 
migration scholars have argued that a smooth ‘migration governance’ is illusionary and 
current border protection schemes are prone to human rights violations (Geiger & Pécoud, 
2010; Pécoud & De Guchteneire, 2006; Scherr, 2016a; Weinzierl & Lisson, 2007). They 
often deeply interfere with human dreams, opportunities and fundamental survival 
chances.  
For decades, global disparities and resulting human suffering have been answered 
with multiple practices of humanitarianism. Their positive effects for millions of 
individuals cannot be overstated. Yet, critical scholars have also pointed at the pitfalls of 
‘humanitarian reason’ (Fassin, 2012). A starting point for many of these contributions is 
the assumption that an emphasis on human suffering constitutes a prerequisite of 
humanitarian action. Miriam Ticktin (2011, p. 14), for instance, argues that the 
constitution of suffering victims serves as a moral impetus for action and a key ‘political 
device’ to create the conditions for care and compassion. However, such an incentive to 
act is blamed for its de-subjectifying qualities since it portrays migrants as ‘mute victims’ 
who are devoid of agency (see Rajaram, 2002). This reduces them to their basic biological 
needs, such as food and shelter, and constitutes them as ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998). 
According to Michel Agier,  
‘[t]he “vulnerability” of humanitarian language is the “bare life” of philosophical 
language (…): mere biological existence (zoè) without social existence (bios), life 
placed under a “ban”, i.e. a space of exception set apart from the common world 
but still under control’ (Agier, 2011: 147). 
As a consequence,  
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‘the only alternative offered [to forced migrants] can be summed up as either 
passive submission to humanitarian assistance or the quest for illegal solutions 
and channels. The passive refugee is the norm; the active refugee is a scandalous 
hypothesis’ (Agier, 2011: 155). 
Thus, at times unintentionally, recipients of humanitarian care are constituted as deficient 
‘others’ who are incapable of political speech and self-determination, thus, resigned to a 
place of inferiority and exclusion (cf. Johnson, 2014) – eventually, they are ‘denied the 
right to present narratives that may disturb the dominant truth on asylum’ (Sigona, 2014, 
italics in original). 
Political mobilizations by migrants claiming rights and recognition in the public 
sphere, hence, not only politicize their presence and by this, rub salt in the wound of a 
global reality of stratified rights and patterns of exclusion. They also constitute a public 
transgression of their assigned role as outsiders in nationally defined polities. In 
Rancièrian terms, political protest by ‘non-citizens’ constitutes a ‘rupture’ of the political 
order urging re-negotiations of rights and belonging (May, 2008; Rancière, 2010; 
Schwiertz, 2016). Migrant activists refuse to quietly accept structures of inequality, to be 
an object of seemingly smooth ‘governance of migration’ or humanitarian aid, and 
appropriate what Hannah Arendt has called the ‘right to have rights’ (1968). Building 
upon this Arendtian distinction between the pre-political ‘herstellen’ and the political 
‘handeln’, for Étienne Balibar, this ‘right to have rights’ is not legal, but essentially 
political, it is fundamentally a ‘right to politics’ (see Ingram, 2015: p.218), which itself 
aims at the invention of new rights, new inclusions and empowerments of marginalized 
populations. In speaking as subalterns against all odds, migrant mobilizations disrupt the 
established ‘order of things’, they provoke a (re-)action and foremost constitute a political 
subject, which has been governed, but whose voice has been muted. Forced migrant 
protests, thus, constitute what Isin has termed ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin, 2008). Instead of 
requiring a formal authorization, acts of citizenship are practices through which subaltern, 
marginalized groups enact rights, ‘as if they were citizens’.  
‘To investigate acts of citizenship [...] requires a focus on those moments when, 
regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens – or, 
better still, as those to whom the right to have rights is due’ (Isin, 2008: 18).  
It is for these contexts, which political mobilizations of forced migrants expose – indeed, 
embody - what Angela Davis, eminent figure of the US civil-rights movement, has called 
the ‘refugee movement (…) the movement of the 21st century’, as it is ‘the movement that 
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is challenging the effects of global capitalism, it's the movement that is calling for civil rights 
for all human beings.’18 
The actors involved are political subjects – neither victims nor heroes. Many of 
their practices are precarious and contradictory. Indeed, the fragmented nature of their 
actions and the multiple internal conflicts among them illustrate the structural difficulties 
of precarious actors to organize and be recognized as political agents demanding rights 
and recognition in the public sphere. Following these groups in greater depth helps us 
understand the obstacles of precarious activism and the contentious politics of 
marginalized subjectivity more broadly. 
1.5.  Outline of the Manuscript  
In the remainder of this short introductory chapter, I will provide an outline of this 
manuscript to orientate the reader. The dissertation is structured in three parts. 
After the introduction, Part I of this thesis is dedicated to an extensive discussion 
of the theoretical and methodological foundations of the research project. Chapter 2 
presents and justifies the theoretical perspective bridging social movement and critical 
migration studies. Chapter 3 clarifies epistemological positions and methodological 
choices, and points at practical challenges and ethical considerations emerging while 
conducting research with forced migrants. Chapter 4 concludes the first part of the 
manuscript by introducing comparatively the two ‘borderline citizenship regimes’ 
(Monforte & Dufour, 2011) in Germany and France. This contextualization of the 
empirical cases studied subsequently in part II shows that contentious arenas around 
forced migration in Berlin and Paris are embedded in highly distinct spatial, relational 
and administrative settings. 
Part II of this manuscript presents evidence on political mobilizations by forced 
migrants in Berlin and Paris. It draws from the fieldwork conducted (archival work, 
qualitative interviews and participant observation) in both Berlin (January –September 
2016, January-March 2017) and Paris (April-July 2017) and presents findings on the issue 
of political mobilizations by forced migrants in the two cities. As noted above, I focus on 
two contentious arenas in each locality, with a view to identifying spatial and relational 
patterns in forced migrant activism. Given the explorative nature of this PhD, the chapters 
are complementary and not strictly designed in a comparative manner. 
                                                 
18 Angela Davis during a meeting with self-organized forced migrant activists in Berlin on 14 May 2015. 
Statement recorded and accessible on Vimeo: https://vimeo.com/127986504. 
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Chapter 5 targets a highly influential contentious arena around forced migrants in 
the recent history of migrant mobilizations in France, the occupation of the ‘Bourse du 
Travail’, the Paris labour council, from 2008-2010. This chapter has a dual purpose: 
firstly, it exposes the interactionist dispositions for recent mobilizations, which evidently 
do not unfold in a vacuum but regularly relate to interactions during episodes of 
contention in the past. Secondly, in adding a diachronic perspective, the section 
contributes to the identification of ‘typical interactions’ in forced migrant activism. 
Chapter 6 scrutinizes the largest wave of contention around migration in 
Germany, the so-called ‘Oranienplatz’ or ‘O-Platz’-movement that developed in Berlin 
between 2012 and 2014. It traces the spatial and relational dynamics within this 
contentious arena and documents how it emerged and fragmented in consequence of 
complex interactions between various actors including the church, local and regional 
administration, various kinds of supporters and the forced migrants involved.  
Chapter 7 explores forced migrant activism Paris between 2015 and 2016, an 
arena of contention referred to as ‘the La Chapelle arena’. Focusing on the spatial and 
relational patterns in the most disruptive contentious arena involving asylum-seekers in 
the French capital, the chapter identifies specificities of asylum activism in France as well 
as cleavages between a well-established ‘sans-papiers movement’ and a ‘refugee 
movement’ in its infancy. 
Chapter 8 homes in on the active yet fragmented movement of forced migrant 
activism in Berlin between 2015 and 2016. Based on ethnographic fieldwork with an 
activist group, the chapter traces the making and breaking of social ties. It also points at 
forced migrant activism being both embedded in transnational biographies and rooted in 
social networks in Berlin. Interestingly, this chapter also hints at the existence of a 
transnational contentious space of forced migrants combining the sphere of asylum-
seeker activism in Berlin with that of ‘sans-papiers’ activism in Paris. 
The final Part III moves away from the specific arenas scrutinized in Part II to 
identify communalities and particularities in political mobilizations by forced migrants. 
This way, it clarifies the contribution of this work with regard to the existing theoretical 
literature on political activism by forced migrants. Chapter 9 outlines patterns of 
interaction, strategic dilemmas, and spatial configurations influential for forced migrant 
activism across space and time. It also lays out the core differences rooted in distinct 
contexts and locally specific histories of contention. Finally, the approach of comparing 
four contentious arenas around forced migration unveils that contentious arenas are both 
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place- and time-based but not place- and time-bound. Contentious arenas build upon 
histories of interaction and are (increasingly) connected in transnational contentious 
spaces. 
The concluding Chapter 10 recalls the key purpose of the project, explains its main 
contributions in theoretical and empirical terms, but also points to its limitations and 
potential areas of further research. In the annex, the interested reader can find an 







Chapter 2  
Theoretical Framework: Spatial and Relational Perspectives 
on Migrant Mobilizations 
 
‘The study of weakly resourced and less organized forms of protest, on its part, requires 
that we pay more attention to the sociological analysis of constituencies, the patterns of 
their immediate social environment and the disruptive activities embedded within them. 
The macroscopic pictures of political contentions need thus to be complemented by a 
microscopic analysis of the social fabric of disruptive practices.’ (Lahusen, 2014: 157) 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
In the last two decades, forced migrants have increasingly organized public protest 
against restrictive border politics and exclusion from rights and recognition in countries 
in the Global North. With highly disruptive public articulations of political claims through 
hunger strikes, marches, inner city protest camps, lip-sewing and squatting, many have 
opted against hiding in the shadow. Despite their precarious legal status, largely hostile 
contexts and limited social and cultural capital as newcomers in ‘host’ societies, forced 
migrants have appropriated niches to organize collectively, against all odds.  
 While the introduction set the stage and outlined the scope of this research project, 
I will in the following outline its theoretical framework in greater detail. Given the 
relative scarcity of academic literature on the issue, the project has a strong inductive and 
explorative component. Yet, it also embraces and combines existing literatures which 
touch upon the topic, including those on ‘weakly-resourced’ movements (Chabanet & 
Royall, 2014a), migrants’ activism (Ataç et al., 2016; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016; 
Zepeda-Millán, 2017) and ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin, 2017; Isin & Nielsen, 2008).19 As 
                                                 
19 For a similar approach, see the introductory chapter to the edited volume ‘Solidarity Mobilizations in 
the Refugee Crisis’. Contentious Moves‘ (della Porta, 2018a). 
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noted in the introduction, social movement studies have largely omitted activism of the 
resource-poor. Certainly, 
‘[t]his does not mean that there are no protests in moments of crisis when threats 
to the protestor’s very survival are more serious: Movements of the unemployed 
have emerged during peaks of economic recession and peasants have rebelled in 
times of famine’(Mattoni & della Porta 2014: 279). 
(Forced) migrant mobilizations in times of tightening migration policies constitute an 
important addition to this list: 
‘Given the hostile climate facing immigrants and governments’ frenzied attempts 
to secure their borders, one might have expected immigrants to adopt survival 
strategies that would allow them to remain hidden and under the radar. Engaging 
in assertive, highly visible and sometimes disruptive political actions like protests, 
occupations, and hunger strikes would seem counterintuitive at best and unwise 
at worst’ (Nicholls & Uitermark 2016: 6). 
Those working on movements of the marginalized have stressed that the established 
theoretical approaches in social movement studies ‘should not be considered as infallible 
tool-kits’ and need to be adapted to the specific characteristics of ‘weakly resourced’ 
challengers (Chabanet & Royall, 2014b) and migrant mobilizations (Ataç, 2016; 
Nicholls, 2014; Stierl, 2012; Zepeda-Millán, 2016). Amongst others, Nicholls has 
suggested studying small ‘niche openings’ rather than broad political opportunities, 
which rarely change significantly in short periods of time (Nicholls, 2014) in the realm 
of migration. Nicholls and Uitermark have furthermore underlined the role of grievances, 
arguing that restrictive and exclusionary measures against ‘real people who happen to be 
immigrants’ (2016: 8) produce multiple fissures and cracks in seemingly hermetic orders. 
Borrowing from Foucault, it is argued that ‘where there are borders, there are resistances’ 
(ibid). 
In this vein, my research draws from a combination of three relatively recent 
strands of literature in social movement and critical migration studies: Firstly, the 
‘relational turn’ in social movement studies has deviated from (or complemented) a 
dominant structuralism in previous theories such as the ‘political process’ perspective and 
drawn attention to the meso-level. Through this shift, concepts such as ‘networks’ (Diani 
& McAdam, 2003; Diani & Mische, 2015), ‘fields’ (Bottero & Crossley, 2011; Fligstein 
& McAdam, 2012) and ‘arenas’ (Jasper & Duyvendak, 2014) were (re)popularized. 
Particularly the most recent discussion on ‘players and arenas’ has stressed the role of 
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interactions (within the movement and with foes and allies) for amorphous and fluid 
social forms such as social movements (section 2.2.). 
  Secondly, the research is informed by an in-depth scrutiny of the spatialities of 
contention (Daphi, 2017; della Porta, Fabbri, & Piazza, 2013; Nicholls, 2008; Nicholls et 
al., 2013b) in which the specific geographies of control and contestation of the actors 
involved are studied in greater detail. As Nicholls has explored in various contributions, 
the local level and particularly the urban context can serve as an incubator for breeding 
political protest of precarious residents, due to the relational qualities of specific places 
(Miller & Nicholls, 2013; Nicholls, 2008, 2009) (section 2.3.).  
  A spatial sensitivity bridges to the third area of inspiration for this project: 
transnational migration and citizenship studies (section 2.4.). The extant literature on 
transnationalism has pointed to a widespread ‘methodological nationalism’ (Levitt & 
Glick Schiller, 2004; Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003) in the social sciences and has 
urged scrutiny of the ‘transnational social spaces’ (Faist, 1998; Faist et al., 2013; Pries, 
2001). Furthermore, numerous studies precisely on the topic of migrant mobilizations 
have been produced in the tradition of ‘autonomy of migration’ and ‘critical citizenship 
studies’ (for an excellent overview see Ataç, Rygiel and Stierl, 2016). These strands of 
literature have pointed to the inherent transgressive quality of human mobility and the 
everyday practices of resistances by migrants in almost all contexts of restrictive border 
regimes (Ataç et al., 2015, 2016).  
  In combining various strands of theory, this project capitalizes on a ‘historic 
strength’ of political science, namely ‘its eclecticism’ (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). Such an 
approach is rather common in social movement studies, which have ever since profited 
from a combination and cross-fertilization of various strands of literature in sociology 
and political science (della Porta, 2014c). Concretely, I argue that in combination, these 
three literatures help to bring forward the agency of migrants that is often hidden in many 
contributions on migration as well as in social movement studies. I will subsequently 
outline the above-mentioned three strands of literature in greater detail. 
2.2.  A Dynamic Relational Perspective 
Relational Approaches and ‘Weakly-Resourced’ Actors in Social Movement Studies 
Quotes such as ‘contentious politics is nothing if it is not relational’ (Tarrow, 2011: 14) 
and ‘networks matter’ (Passy, 2003) are unequivocal proof that the relevance of networks 
and interactions for political mobilizations has become uncontested in the field. While 
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the literature on the issue has considerably diversified in the last decade, adding cultural 
perspectives to the dominant structuralist core (Diani & Mische, 2015; Jasper & 
Duyvendak, 2014), the roots of a relational approach to social movements date back to 
the 1970s. Proponents of the ‘resource mobilization theory’ to social movements 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977) had already argued that networks provide important resources 
for social movement actors. Social movement literature has since then widely 
demonstrated that certain resources such as recruits, money and trust are indispensable 
for transforming sparks of resistance into sustained mobilizations (della Porta & Diani, 
2009; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Mark Granovetter’s work on ‘weak ties’ 
(Granovetter, 1973) has strongly inspired research on the role of brokers and the diffusion 
of material and cognitive resources within a movement space.20 Building upon 
Granovetter, Alessandro Pizzorno (1986) and also Florence Passy (2003) have 
demonstrated that not only weak ties, but particularly strong ties are important for the 
participation in social movements in situations of uncertainty as they provide individuals 
with trust. Trust is for evident reasons even more important for high-risk activism, in 
which heavy repression is considered a realistic and often real consequence.21 In a recent 
synthesis of existing scholarship on the role of networks, Nicholls argues that  
‘different types of networks perform different functions in coordinating activists: 
weak ties help circulate information to different activists, and strong ties enable 
activists to contribute their scarce resources to risky collective struggles’ (2009: 
83). 
Networks including weak and strong ties are of particular importance for resource-poor 
actors structurally depending on the support of more established players to compensate 
their lack of economic, social and cultural capital (Chabanet, 2001; Chabanet & Royall, 
2014b; Nicholls, 2013c; Passy, 2001). Cinalli has proven in his contributions on political 
altruism and pro-beneficiary activism how resources can travel from the more resourceful 
to the less resourceful (Cinalli 2016).22 In line, Siméant has noted in her research on 
undocumented activism, that ‘the mobilizations of the sans-papiers, to be precise, are 
never exclusively mobilizations of sans-papiers. They are always complemented by some 
parts of the population that we will qualify as ‘“supporters”’ (Siméant, 1998: 25, author's 
translation from French). While native allies are considered indispensable for immigrant 
                                                 
20  For an excellent overview see also Miller (2013). 
21  See also Doug McAdams work on the ‘Freedom Summer’ in the US South (1986). 
22  For a general overview on pro-beneficiary movements and ‘political altruism, see also Giugni & Passy 
(2001). 
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mobilizations (Cappiali, 2016; Giugni & Passy, 2001; Voss & Bloemraad, 2011), 
research on networks of activism have also pointed out that the embeddedness in 
networks entails both opportunities and constraints (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Nicholls, 
2013a, 2013c). For the specific context of undocumented migrant activism, Nicholls has 
stressed the importance of ties to strong native allies in the US, whereas Cappiali has 
focused on the ‘obstructive’ effects of undocumented migrants’ embeddedness into 
networks of the radical left in Italy (2017). Indeed, these equivocal findings illustrate the 
ambivalence and sensitivity inherent in relationships between forced migrants, directly 
affected by exclusion and repression, and altruistic pro-beneficiaries. Departing from case 
studies of forced migrant activism in Berlin and Paris, I intend to unpack key mechanisms 
structuring such relationships beyond specific contexts. 
From Static Networks to Dynamic Interactions 
The bulk of scholarship on networks and social movements has adopted a structuralist 
perspective (Cinalli & Fuglister, 2008; Diani, 2000; Diani & McAdam, 2003; Parenti & 
Caiani, 2013). In a recent reconsideration, Mario Diani and Ann Mische have advocated 
for a tentative opening to relational approaches. Among the important blind spots of 
classical network research is their widespread ignorance of the meanings actors attach to 
social relations and how they change over time – hence a temporal (or dynamic) and 
cultural complement to the analysis of structural shapes of networks. 
‘[I]f collectivities are best theorized as complex bundles of multiple social 
relations, it is also necessary to look at the properties of the relational patterns that 
connect individual and organizational actors, as well as non-agentic elements such 
as events or cultural forms, and to examine their evolution over time. This in turn 
requires that we replace a view of movements as sets of discrete cases with one 
focussing on collective action fields. (…) We should note that the concept of 
‘field’ is both structural and cultural; it refers to how actors are positioned in social 
space by their relations and affiliations, as well as how they endow those relations 
with meaning through mutual orientation and discursive positioning’ (Diani & 
Mische, 2015: 307). 
Others have taken a much more decisive stance in criticising structural explanations of 
social movements in general: 
‘[S]tructuralist analyses have been particularly problematic for (the research on) 
social movements, since the latter are the least structural, the least routinized, the 
most challenging of everything fixed and stable’ (Duyvendak & Fillieule 2014: 
298). 
Jan Willem Duyvendak and Olivier Fillieule concisely summarize the growing unease in 
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social movement studies with the established structuralist toolkit of the discipline. The 
traditional variant of network approaches is included in this criticism, as they usually 
assume relatively stable shapes of networks in their quantitative empirical analyses. 
James Jasper is among the protagonists of a recent trend in theories of protest ‘toward the 
micro rather than the macro, and toward interpretive and cultural rather than materialist 
approaches’ (Jasper 2014: 9). Both in his single-authored monographs (1997, 2008) and 
collaborations (Goodwin, Jasper, & Poletta, 2009; Jasper & Duyvendak, 2014), Jasper 
has observed a fundamental misfit between relatively static theories and the highly fluid, 
amorphous and elusive social phenomena they intend to capture. In particular, the volume 
‘Players and Arenas’, co-edited with Duyvendak (Jasper & Duyvendak, 2014), outlined 
the contours of an interactionist perspective in social movement studies which highlights 
time, interaction and process, all of which are downplayed in more structural models of 
contention (Jasper 2014: 22). The seminal book describes social movements as complex 
micro-interactions of various actors (‘players’) within material and social spaces 
(‘arenas’) that are specific to the contentious issue at hand. These reflections both build 
upon and criticize the popular notion of ‘social field’ introduced by Pierre Bourdieu 
(1994), which had resonated strongly in the French social movement community and 
beyond (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Mathieu, 2012; Péchu, 2006). Despite the existing 
analogies in these two conceptualizations, particularly the focus on interactions, 
Bourdieu’s definition of field suggested relative stability in boundaries and actors within 
these social forms. In the conclusion to ‘Players and Arenas’, Duyvendak and Fillieule 
hence argue: 
‘[t]he sphere of social movement players does not seem sufficiently 
institutionalized, structured, and unified to correspond to Bourdieu’s definition 
(…) the notion of the field suggests fixed boundaries demarcating a finite list of 
competitors. Now, the particularity of protest struggles is that the spatial limits are 
both shifting over time and specific to the causes concerned’ (2014: 304).  
Despite their ad-hoc creation and fluidity, interactions between players in arenas do not 
unfold in a social vacuum. On the contrary, ‘dispositionalist interactionism’ (Duyvendak 
& Fillieule 2014: 295) conceives interactions as being rooted in established social norms, 
histories of interactions and identities of the players involved (Duyvendak & Fillieule 
2014: 299). Similar to social facts, these patterns of interaction can be relatively stable 
over time despite their social constructionist origin. 
An interactionist perspective deviates strongly from previous analytic lenses. 
Jasper claims that: 
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‘the main constraints on what protestors can accomplish are not determined 
directly by economic and political structures so much as they are imposed by other 
players with different goals and interests’ (2014: 9).  
Indeed,  
‘the goals of compound players are especially unstable, because factions and 
individuals are forever competing to make their own goals into the official goals 
of the team’ (ibid: 10).  
Dominant social movement perspectives tend to reify homogeneity, while its constituent 
parts often are highly heterogeneous – and full of internal contestation (ibid: 12). It is 
hence logical that compound actors (of which social movements are a particularly elusive, 
unstable variant) are always shifting, emerging, splitting, growing and shrinking.  
This makes an interactionist perspective particularly valuable for understanding 
mobilizations of forced migrants. If political protest by comparatively privileged actors 
(such as large numbers of the participants in the environmental and global justice 
movements) struggle to sustain organizational structures and continuity, the additional 
hurdles to leave the shadows and organize collectively in public are evident for 
marginalized challengers. Forced migrants are a highly heterogeneous group, diverse 
with regard to origin, religion, gender, age, class and ‘race’, to name but a few (Sigona, 
2014). Consequently,  
‘[t]here are a thousand multifarious refugee experiences and a thousand refugee 
figures whose meanings and identities are negotiated in the process of 
displacement in time and place’ (Soguk, 1999: 4). 
All these characteristics can provide additional obstacles for collective identity formation, 
and even more so, for sustained mobilizations (see also Schröder, 2016). 
Nicholls has accordingly underlined the importance of temporary ‘niche-
openings’ (2013) and small fissures in structurally hermetic environments, upon which 
immigrants act politically. By definition, such niches can only be occupied by small 
groups, which is why conflicts and divisions on strategies within collectivities of 
challengers (ibid) are at the core of such precarious mobilizations. Processes of 
mobilizations by forced migrants are for instance challenged by an accentuated ‘fractal’ 
process (Mische, 2014) due to highly different players involved in terms of class, race, 
gender and legal status amongst others. Players are hence also arenas in which each 
collective player can be broken into sub-players, each of whom can in turn be further 
subdivided, all the way down to individuals (Jasper 2014: 12). 
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An interactionist perspective is furthermore instructive, as resource-poor actors 
depend on the support with more powerful allies. The contentious acts of emancipation 
around forced migration are characterized by sensitive relationships between migrants 
and native allies such as human rights NGOs, as well as radical-left and antiracist 
grassroots-groups. Contentious arenas around forced migration are moreover strongly 
shaped by the interaction with state agents, trying to co-opt, pacify or repress protest, 
which disrupts the established order of things in exclusive citizenship regimes (see also 
section 2.4. on ‘acts of citizenship’). 
In contentious arenas, complex and volatile configurations of various players with 
different interests and identities play out. In this dynamic process, the political activities 
of excluded actors are determined. The concept of arenas appears therefore of particular 
heuristic value for the research endeavour at hand.  
2.3.  A Space-Sensitive Perspective 
The Relational Qualities of Place and Social Movement Spaces 
Almost simultanously with the relational turn, social movement studies have undergone 
a spatial turn (Leitner, Sheppard, & Sziarto, 2008; D. G. Martin & Miller, 2003; Nicholls 
et al., 2013b; Sewell, 2001; Tilly, 2000), relatively late compared to other disciplines:  
‘where the ‘spatial turn’ has transformed many areas of social and economic 
scholarship, research on social movements and contentious politics has generally 
downplayed the spatial constitution and context of its central concepts such as 
identity, grievances, political opportunities, and resources. As a result, this body 
of scholarship remains by and large aspatial (…)’ (Martin & Miller 2003: 143).  
Since then, significant progress has been made. Most importantly, Spaces of Contention, 
a volume edited by Walter Nicholls, Byron Miller and Justin Beaumont (Nicholls et al., 
2013b) provided a first systematic overview of the multiple spatialities and their co-
implications for contentious politics. Most analyses build upon Henri Lefebvre’s work, 
who has revolutionized the reflection on space with his claim of space being socially 
produced and constantly re-enacted in everyday life (Lefebvre 2000, 2003). According to 
Lefebvre, space is not a ‘neutral container, a blank canvas which is filled in by human 
activity’ (Hubbard & Kitchin 2011: 4) but instead a social product, made by social 
relations and social activity. It is hence inherently relational (Lefebvre 2000: 48, Schmid 
1998). Space is produced by a myriad of different actors in and through different 
dimensions, including material space, social space and symbolic space (Lefebvre 2000: 
48 f.). Informed by these insights, social movement scholars have distinguished four 
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spatialities and scrutinized their role for contentious politics: place, networks, scale and 
mobility (Leitner et al., 2008; Nicholls et al., 2013b). All investigate the interaction of 
geography and social relations:  
‘Space matters because it is relational. It is the medium through which all social 
relations are made or broken – and making and breaking relationships is at the 
core of all questions of collective action’ (Miller 2013: 286). 
It has been extensively shown that certain environments are more favourable for 
providing resources for political protest than others (Nicholls et al., 2013b; Sewell, 2001; 
Uitermark et al., 2012):  
‘Spatial location enables and constrains co-presence. In order for persons to 
interact with one another, they must be brought into each other’s presence, either 
personally and bodily or in some mediated fashion (…)’ (Sewell 2001: 57).  
Geographical proximity provides more opportunities for new connections and 
relationships to establish; ‘it reduces the costs and risks associated with making these 
links happen’ (Nicholls 2009: 83). As banal as it might sound: place sets the base for 
collective action to evolve. Face-to-face interactions are favourable for creating affective 
feelings among protesters: ‘(…) one of the strategic values of place is that it provides 
favourable geographic conditions for relatively strong-tie networks to develop between 
different activists’ (Nicholls 2009: 84). Furthermore, William Sewell and many others 
have shown that safe places 
‘of one kind or another are a sine qua non of social movements. Oppositional 
movements need to control spaces in order to organize their activities and to 
recruit activists without being subject to crippling surveillance and repression by 
the state (…)’ (Sewell 2001: 69, italics added by the author).  
Place is relevant not only in material, physical terms, but also in its symbolic dimension. 
For theorists such as Iris Marion Young (1990), Doreen Massey (1991, 2004, 2005), Tim 
Cresswell (2006) and Sewell (2001), places are an active medium through which 
identities are created and contested. Interactions taking place in and through concrete 
places are crucial to the construction of social identities. Sewell emphasises that by 
occupying symbolic locations, 
‘protest marches and demonstrations not only gain the public limelight but make 
a particular sort of statement – that the cause they represent belongs at the top of 
the national agenda. But while insurgent movements make use of the pre-existing 
meaning of places, they can also – either intentionally or unintentionally – 
transform the significance of protest locations’ (Sewell 2001: 65).  
Protesters regularly use symbolic places (e.g. public spaces including central streets and 
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squares, government buildings etc.) to underline their claims. Protest events organized in 
capital cities convey explicitly or implicitly a claim to centrality. Scholarship on 
memories and social movements (Zamponi, 2013) has shown how challengers 
strategically tailor claims to resonate with the ‘public memory’ (ibid: 1). In their account 
of three environmentalist campaigns in Italy, Donatella della Porta et al. demonstrate how 
the ‘symbolic contestation of the conception of space interacted with the physical 
occupation of some sites, that not only acquired high symbolic meaning but also had a 
strong effect on the protest itself, allowing for the development of intense relations up to 
the formation of shared (territorially based) identities’ (2013: 29). ‘Putting protest in 
place’ (della Porta et al., 2013) consequently requires to consider both the material and 
symbolic dimension of place. 
Taking these relational qualities of place seriously helps to understand why most 
social movements are formed around place-based hubs, in which personal, regular 
interaction feeds processes of up-shifting in scales. As noted above, in order to get heard 
and organize disruptive protest, marginalized actors need to build relationships with more 
established actors to access the resources urgently needed for protest, such as information, 
money, personnel, logistics etc. Not all places have these ‘relational qualities’ (Nicholls 
& Uitermark 2016: 11).  
In the tradition of spatial perspectives on collective action, a sub-strand of 
literature has emerged on the particular role of the urban context. Nicholls and his 
colleagues have amply demonstrated how the urban ‘breeds’ contention, both by creating 
grievances for a right to the city (Castells, 1983) and as an incubator for the realization 
of rights through the city (Nicholls & Vermeulen, 2012) that are not limited to the urban 
structure (such as immigrant rights, LGBTQI rights) (see also Miller & Nicholls 2013; 
Nicholls et al. 2013b; Nicholls 2009). It is more common to find vibrant social movement 
scenes and large migrant communities in cities, both important milieus for incubation of 
marginalized claims in by and large hostile political and discursive opportunity structures. 
Drawing from the context of undocumented migrant activism in the US, Chris Zepeda-
Millán has demonstrated that dense social networks among migrants can be, indeed, the 
‘weapons of the (not) so weak’, even if they have previously not been politicised (2016). 
Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie found that the level of migrant communities’ political 
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engagement is largely affected by the density of ethnic organisational networks (1999; 
2001; see also Eggert & Pilati 2014).23  
Beyond the specific analysis of the particular constellations in urban structures, it 
has been argued that for all kinds of movements, ‘the crystallization of a relatively 
permanent and coherent form of local organization, though not sufficient, is a necessary 
condition for broader kinds of political action’ (Harvey cited in Nicholls 2009: 80). As 
various studies have shown, social movements need ‘sufficient grounding in local 
milieus, in particular existing organizations and networks, if they are to mobilize 
resources’ (Anheier 2003: 53). Stressing relational qualitities of place hence entails 
understanding the local level as a crucial scale, specifically, but not only to study 
mobilizations of marginalized groups. 
Nicholls has argued that social movements are ‘uneven’ terrains, being 
asymetrically structured around some people and places (e.g. cities or neighbourhoods) 
(2011). The resulting movement ‘hubs’ often become magnetic, attracting activists based 
in other places to join hubs and by this reinforcing their importance and allowing for the 
sustainability of contentious activity. Understanding social movements hence requires not 
only an explicit analysis of concrete places, but also of how distant locations are 
connected into social spaces and how mobility is used in creating and sustaining social 
networks. Four key mechanisms have been identified in this regard: ‘brokerage’, the 
connection of formerly unrelated actors via individuals in structurally influential 
positions in a network (Caiani, 2014; Diani, 2003); ‘mobility’, both with regard to 
traveling activists (della Porta & Mattoni, 2014a; della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Romanos, 
2016) and mobile protest repertoires (Leitner et al., 2008); large ‘protest events’ 
assembling individuals from various localities serve as ‘contact points’ (Nicholls 2009: 
84) for further cooperation; ‘diffusion’, the proliferation of strategies, frames etc. without 
explicit senders and receivers; and ‘communication technologies’ (Bennett, 2005; 
Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). 
Most of these mechanisms occur in combinations: ‘new encounters may occur on 
the internet but rarely do these encounters develop into strong working partnerships’ 
(Nicholls 2009: 86). In the same vein, Nina Eggert and Elena Pavan argue: ‘Protest 
                                                 
23  For this study at the local level, the authors also found an effect of the political context: ‘where 
organisation around ethnicity is not encouraged, like Italy, Switzerland and Germany, ethnic civic 
communities do not seem to favour migrant organisations’ participation in the political sphere’ 
(Eggert & Pilati, 2014). 
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diffusion and deployment patterns are, therefore, not so much the result of a passive 
‘contagion’ that can be facilitated by the Internet infrastructure and rapid communication 
flows. Rather, they continue to stem from complex negotiations of motivation, attribution 
of meanings, and perceptions of opportunities and constraints for acting collectively’ 
(Eggert & Pavan 2014; for a similar argument see).24 As Manuel Castells has illustrated 
in his book on the Occupy movement, the cyber age has evidently added a ‘space of flows’ 
(Castells 2012: 168-169) in the Internet to a space of places. This space of flows is 
particularly important for marginalized actors with limited resources for moveability.  
Yet, Helga Leitner et al. have also demonstrated for the case of immigrant 
activism in the US, that mobile protests such as bus tours have proven to be effective 
tools for networking of isolated, often forcefully immobilized actors. It constitutes the 
crucial means for establishing social relations among dispersed populations, and for 
accessing unevenly distributed and scarce ‘safe spaces’ and advantageous political 
opportunity structures:  
‘The mobility of the Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride enabled activists of 
different backgrounds and from different locales to link-up with one another in 
the places where the buses stopped, constructing trans-local networks (…)’ 
(Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto 2008: 167). 
As these insights on mobility and the role of the locale/urban suggest, the notion of scale25 
has regained popularity in recent years. In this context notions such as strategic scale-
jumping - including domestication and externalization (della Porta & Tarrow, 2005) - in 
case of opening opportunities at a certain level have been put forward (della Porta & 
Tarrow, 2005; Leitner et al., 2008). More recently, an integrated approach has been 
increasingly advocated, arguing that in times of mobility and online diffusion of ideas 
contentious politics is situated in a complex multi-scalar context, in which political 
opportunities are used and identities and networks formed at various mutually dependent 
levels (Juris & Khasnabish, 2013; Leitner et al., 2008; Navrátil & Cisar, 2014; Price & 
Sabido, 2016). This has become particularly relevant in the context of a more recent 
attempt to overcome the widespread ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer & Glick-
                                                 
24  For a similar argument see (Mattoni & della Porta, 2014) In a moderating attempt, Pavan has 
suggested the concept of multidimensional networks with a view to overcoming the mostly artificial 
distinction between online and offline spaces, making ‘communication technologies endogenous to 
collective action networks’ (2014). 
25  Scale has been defined as ‘a ‘vertical’ differentiation in which social relations are embedded within a 
hierarchical scaffolding of nested territorial units stretching from the global, the supra- national, and 
the national downwards to the regional, the metropolitan, the urban, the local, and the body’ (Brenner 
cited in Marston et al. 2005: 416). 
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Schiller, 2003) - the ‘implicit assumption that the national arena is the most obvious 
container for political activity’ (Nicholls, Miller, and Beaumont 2013a: 17) – and to 
transnationalize social research. In this vein, Jeffrey Juris and Alex Khasnabish employ 
the term ‘transnational’ to refer to ‘a scale that transcends, yet also incorporates, other 
levels of analysis, including the local, regional and national’ (2013: 8). 
The Discouraging Effects of Space 
Evidently, not all sparks of protest grow into visible disruptions. ‘Seeds of resistance’, 
which are necessarily planted when states exclude human beings, can only grow into 
disruptive mobilizations, if certain spatial conditions are met: 
‘Not all places provide sufficient conditions to grow small seeds into big 
mobilizations. Immigrant detention centers and prisons, for instance, are 
important sites for producing seeds of resistance but these environments are not 
necessarily the best to transform early seeds into broad and sustained struggles. 
Detention centers in the Netherlands are homes for hundreds of hunger strikes 
each year but these strikes are largely ignored by the media, public, support 
groups, and politicians because they take place in environments that do not 
possess the full range of resources needed to nurture their growth and maturation. 
These resistances end up passing largely unnoticed, presenting only minor and 
uneventful disruptions in the circuits of state power. In other instances, early 
resistances may find more supportive and enriching environments, providing them 
conditions for further growth’ (Nicholls & Uitermark 2016: 10). 
While cities can have advantageous relational qualitities, sparks do not necessarily 
proliferate in every city, at every time. On the contrary, mostly they do not. Social 
movements are always the result of complex interactions between multiple actors, 
theories can never be deterministic. Part of this contingency is for instance the 
ambivalence of the urban structure: despite its relational qualitites, it is also true that the 
state has usually concentrated means in urban centers to challenge the protesters and 
intervene in the precarious relations they develop with allies. Furthermore, the density of 
supportive organizations has both an enabling quality, yet can also lead to competition 
among pro-beneficiary actors, favouring the fragmentation of players in arenas.  
In addition, states usually employ spatial strategies with the intention to disrupt 
the relational qualitities of proximity discussed above: 
‘[w]hile place can enhance the mobilization powers of activists by strengthening 
relations and building common mobilizing frames and identities, states may 
attempt to short-circuit and disrupt movements by enacting a range of place-based 
strategies’ (Nicholls et al. 2013a: 5). 
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Miller therefore argues that space should be understood in a Foucauldian perspective as 
technologies of power:  
‘Spatial technologies of power are particular types of technologies that shape the 
formation and breaking of relationships – technologies that are employed, 
counter-deployed, and altered in processes of social struggle. Such technologies 
may be employed by any actor – individual or collective, civil society or state 
(…)’ (Miller 2013: 289). 
In my research on forced migrant activism in Berlin and Paris, I therefore intend to show 
how specific relationships are knit together in urban centers and how these contexts can 
be both enabling and discouraging to the organizing efforts of migrants. I will therefore 
firstly demonstrate how specific geographies of state control - deliberate practices of 
isolation through encampment, mobility restrictions, work bans etc. - erect particular 
spatialized obstacles for political engagement including protest. Secondly, I will point to 
spatialized repertoires of contention, which aim at accessing advantageous relational 
qualitites of certain, often urban locations. 
2.4.  Bridging to Migration Studies 
While studies on migrant activism from an explicit social movement perspective remain 
scarce, a plethora of contributions on the issue has been produced in critical migration 
and citizenship studies. 
Both ‘autonomy of migration’ and critical citizenship studies ‘share a strong 
normative concern with reimagining political life from the margins, particularly in 
relation to those inhabiting mobile and precarious lives’ (Moulin and Thomaz, 2016). 
Autonomy of migration specifically underlines the subjectivity of migrants as an 
eminently political question and challenges sociology’s traditional overemphasis on 
‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors for providing explanations of migration (Mezzadra & Neilson, 
2013). Critical citizenship studies, particularly those stressing ‘performative citizenship’ 
(Isin, 2017) and ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin, 2008) more specifically, scrutinize processes 
of political subjectivation and transgression of established (citizenship) orders despite 
marginality. In a nutshell, they trace, ‘how resistant subjects enact and appropriate 
(citizenship) rights they may not officially hold and escape regimes of control through 
(excessive and imperceptible) movement’ (Ataç et al., 2016). Hence, both bodies of 
literature put dominant narratives upside down and take migrant agency as the starting 
point for their analysis. In doing so, these approaches are more sensitive towards 
capturing also seemingly ‘invisible’ (Ataç et al., 2015) acts of contesting restrictive 
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bordering practices. 
However, this body of literature has rarely been integrated in the highly 
differentiated body of social movement studies so far. In the following, I present various 
insights from migration and citizenship studies, both to frame my own research and to 
point to the potential for fruitful dialogue among the two disciplines.26 
Biographies of Exclusion and Every-Day Resistance 
Even though ‘grievances’ are indespensable for the emergence of social movements, for 
a long time, the root causes for mobilization - human suffering - have been largely 
neglected by theories on social movements. They were considered ‘ubiquitous’, of little 
variation, and hence of little explanatory power for political action, focusing instead on 
endogenous resources and exogenous opportunities (della Porta, 2018a; Jasper, 2014b). 
The case of migration, however, seems to require a readjustment of this dominant 
perspective. As many migration scholars recall, the tightening of border controls, the 
expansion of deportation regimes and the increased categorizing into ‘wanted’ and 
‘unwanted’ migrants has led to a proliferation of resistances by migrants, in the USA, 
Israel and many European countries (Ataç et al., 2015, 2016; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016; 
Zepeda-Millán, 2014, 2016). Ataç et al. hence argue: ‘In particular during the past three 
years, the border regime itself produced new migratory actors, subjectivities and forms 
of political articulation that are at once a manifestation and a consequence of the crisis’ 
(Ataç et al. 2015: 3). Similar to other recent contributions on mobilizations in times of 
crisis, it is hence argued that not only opportunities, but also threats can trigger protest 
(della Porta, 2015; Zepeda-Millán, 2016). Indeed, the countless restrictions against 
migrants, particularly the ‘deportation regime’ enacted against those deemed unwanted 
has planted multiple ‘seeds of resistance’ (Nicholls & Uitermark 2016: 9).  
Migration scholars have furthermore criticized the social movement community 
for exclusively addressing open acts of protest and as such downplaying ‘invisible’ forms 
of every-day resistance, which are not captured by ‘common regimes of visibility - they 
rather attempt to elude their gaze and seek to remain imperceptible’ (Ataç et al. 2015: 7). 
According to Uday Chandra, ‘[t]o resist is, in ordinary parlance, to oppose or fight off 
what is pernicious or threatening to one’s existence’ (2015). Thus, taking migrant 
struggles seriously, in this vein, entails considering openly articulated political claims to 
                                                 
26  For one of the attempts to bridge the two strands see (Ataç et al., 2016), which is, however, more 
grounded in the ‘critical migration’ tradition. 
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be just the tip of the iceberg. Agier argues, in contexts of extreme precariousness and 
marginality, ‘the only revolt that is logically possible, [is] embodying a politics of 
resistant life’ (Agier, 2011: 155). Indeed, the every-day practices of organizing a life in 
contexts of exclusion and repression are to be understood as continuous political acts. 
Dense networks of self-help are in many cases a prerequisite for survival on the way to 
Europe and within the context of destination. These latent ties can at times be activated 
for high-risk public protest (see e.g. Chapter 8 and Zepeda-Millán, 2016). Often, ‘strong 
ties’ of trust are, hence, established in everyday struggles. Ataç et al. even argue: ‘It is 
precisely through these less spectacular, often invisible everyday struggles, for example 
for employment, housing, and the freedom of movement that the status quo is called into 
question’ (Ataç et al. 2015: 7). These ‘acts of resistance’ dismantle existing power 
relations and make fundamental antagonisms visible and by this accessible to contentious 
scrutiny. Critical migration studies, thus, suggest that an analysis of migrant agency 
requires a shift from a somewhat narrow focus on disruptive social movements to a 
broader conceptualization of resistance. The ‘embodiment’ of resistance in the specific 
context of forced migrants is not only mirrored in practices of ‘every-day’ struggle but 
also in an embodied repertoire of protest, including hunger-strikes, lip-sewing, self-harm 
and, indeed suicide to avoid deportation. If other means are absent, what remains as a tool 
of protest is the body itself (Clochard, 2016; Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2005; Siméant, 1998). 
Despite its merits in reconceptualising resistance and opening up towards a more 
encompassing analysis of migrant agency, the literature tends to operate with a slightly 
overoptimistic and romanticising tone in the light of the multiple obstacles marginalized 
actors encounter, to visibly and sustainably disrupt exclusionary migration regimes and 
be recognized as political subjects with rights and voices. 
Embedded in Transnational Social Spaces 
Another important complement from migration studies to the canon of social movement 
studies is a focus on the particular transnational spaces most migrants are embedded in.27 
It is crucial to remember that ‘[a]s a matter of fact, migration flows are characterized by 
migrant networks’ (Faist, 1998). Hence, migrants’ social practices, including acts of 
                                                 
27  Due to the inherent transnationality of most migrants’ life worlds, transnationalism as a scientific 
subfield has particularly been advanced within the realm of migration studies (Faist et al., 2013; Pries, 
2001; Vertovec, 2009; Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003). Transnational linkages have been studied 
with regard to their role for political identities and senses of belonging (Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller, 
2003; Rother, 2013a), sources of economic and emotional support (Faist, 1998, 2000) as well as 
influences on so-called integration into host societies (Haug, 2010; Morales & Morariu, 2011). 
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protest, need to be understood in the light of their particular transnational biographies and 
networks. Various studies have shown that patterns of migration have brought about 
‘transnational social spaces’ (Faist et al., 2013; Pries, 2001; Vertovec, 2009) - ‘pluri-local, 
durable and dense configurations of social practices, systems of symbols and artefacts 
that span places in different countries’ (Pries 2001: i). These spaces are  
‘constituted by the various forms of resources or capital of spatially mobile and 
immobile persons, on the one hand, and the regulations imposed by nation-states 
and various other opportunities and constraints, on the other’ (Faist, 2006).  
For many migrants, the nation-state is a real but rather artificial container, as their life 
worlds span different localities in their everyday life, through contact with their families 
at home or in other countries, through identification with their country of origin or 
opposition with the government in power. Even though they are located in a specific 
country or city of destination, their life worlds are never purely local, but inherently multi-
layered. Saskia Sassen has observed this experience to be a general trend in globalized 
societies: 
‘one of the features of the current phase of globalization is that the fact that a 
process happens within the territory of a sovereign state does not necessarily mean 
it is a national process. This localization of the global, or of the non-national, in 
national territories undermines a key duality running through many of the methods 
and conceptual frameworks prevalent in the social sciences - that the national and 
the non-national are two mutually exclusive conditions’ (2001: 187).  
The social spaces in which many migrants are embedded and their transnational (mobile) 
biographies can under certain conditions provide important opportunities for political 
mobilizations. While relations to natives in localities of destination are inherently 
complicated by cultural, legal and linguistic differences, it is often the relationships 
among migrants with shared experiences and memories of violence and exclusion in 
transmigration and the locality of reception, which provide trust and set the basis for 
political mobilization (see e.g. Chapters 5, 6, 7 & 8). Many forced migrants also create 
social ties to activist environments and to fellow migrants on the move, which are often 
kept and can be activated for political protest (see e.g. Chapters 8).  
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework of the project, which draws from 
three strands of literature, combining social movement studies with (critical) migration 
studies. The relational approach has brought forward the discussion on ‘players and 
arenas’, which renders micro-interactions of multiple players quintessential for the 
 37 
development of contention. More specifically, the arena perspective has been introduced 
to capture the complexity of fluid mobliziations, which elude neat, stable or structural 
explanations. Therefore, the theoretical approach provides a compelling framework for 
the research project at hand. My research project intends to contribute to the 
understanding of how protest by forced migrants as a particular type of marginalized actor 
unfolds. Given the structural obstacles and the scarce resources, I am interested in 
investigating the making and breaking of social relations in direct interactions, including 
a wide range of players with at times overlapping and at times diametrically opposed 
interests. This results in asking questions such as: With what kinds of players do forced 
migrants interact and what qualities do the resulting social ties have? How do social ties 
develop over time and along which lines do they fall apart? Adding a spatial lense to this 
interactionist perspective I furthermore scrutinize the geographical underpinnings of 
these interactions. Drawing from insights in human geography, I investigate the 
‘relational qualities’ of spaces, both in their incubating and fragmenting effects. I 
furthermore investigate what kind of spatialiazed strategies players enact to advance, or 
curtail, political mobilizations of forced migrants. Finally, informed by critical migration 
studies, I expand the notion of resistance to ‘invisible’ practices in the every-day and their 
entanglement with visible disruptive protest. Furthermore, I scrutinize the particular 
constraints and opportunities entailed in migrants’ inherently transnational life worlds.  
In combining these three strands of literature, I attempt to draw attention to 
migrant agency, and more specifically, to processes of political subjectivation of forced 
migrants, which have, so far, received only marginal attention in the study of contentious 
politics. As contentious arenas do not unfold in a social vacuum, but are fundamentally 
situated in space and time, and furthermore structured by various macro-institutions, the 
subsequent Chapter 4 introduces the contexts of forced migration in both France and 
Germany. 
While the respective results are evidently derived from the four specific arenas 
studied in this thesis, the ambition of an interactionst perspective goes tentatively beyond 
that. One of the appealing elements of the ‘players and arenas’ approach lies in its focus 
on both the particularity of specific episodes of contention and ‘grasping the types of 
strategic interactions that can be considered “characteristic”’ (Duyvendak & Fillieule 
2014: 312). This allows preliminary propositions of regular interactions or ‘strategic 
dilemmas, typical of certain players in specific arenas’ (ibid). In this vein, and echoing 
the dual aspiration of ‘political ethnography’ (Schatz, 2009b), the empirical chapters 
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follow this logic. Whereas the four empirical Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 provide detailed 
descriptions of certain configurations and processes, Chapter 9 changes the focus with a 








Methods and Ethics: How to Study Contentious Arenas around 
Forced Migration? 
 
‘Taken together, the two parts of the term political ethnography thus imply a creative 
tension. Ethnography suggests a particularizing impulse, a desire to avoid premature 
empirical generalization, and a preference for inductive thinking. It implies attention 
to detail, to contextual factors, and to configurational thinking.
 Political suggests a 
willingness to bracket aspects of what we see, to simplify for analytic coherence, and 
to seek to produce generalizations. It implies attention to cross-case comparisons, to 
broadly occurring factors, and to the power of deductive logic. The phrase thus 
contains the potential for each impulse to perform a check on the other, in the process 
producing empirically grounded and theoretically stimulating research.’  
(Schatz, 2009b, italics in original) 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
Every kind of social scientific work requires a transparent description of how the results 
were obtained and which obstacles arose during the research (della Porta & Keating, 
2008b; Goffman, 2015). Hence, this methodological chapter is structured as follows: I 
will start out by justifying the epistemological perspective (3.1) and the triangulation of 
three qualitative methods I chose to scrutinize precarious interactions in contentious 
arenas around forced migration (3.2.). I will also describe the at times rough path of 
methodological practice (3.3.), which entailed repeated loops of serendipity. Eventually, 
I will reflect on the particular normative and ethical questions arising during research 
with subaltern actors in what I call ‘post-colonial encounters’ (3.4.). 
3.2.  An Abductive & Ethnographic Approach to Social Science 
As a ‘problem-oriented, rather than method-oriented’ (della Porta, 2014b: 3) discipline, 
social movement studies have become known for a pluralist perspective to social science 
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(della Porta & Keating, 2008a), including diverse (and not always complementary) 
epistemological perspectives and the application of a wide range of methods (della Porta, 
2014b). Given this variety, it is crucial to adapt the methodological choices consciously 
to the specific research interest at hand.  
 This project is located in the realm of ‘discovery’, exploring the spatial and 
relational foundations of political mobilizations of highly marginalized actors in 
contentious arenas around forced migration. A methodology adapted to such a research 
endeavour, hence, needs to take at least two aspects into account: firstly, the dynamic, 
interactive nature of the ‘making and breaking’ of social ties in contentious politics 
(fluidity) and secondly, the involvement of stigmatized and vulnerable actors 
(subalternity). 
Numerous scholars (Corbetta, 2003; della Porta & Keating, 2008a; J. Scott & 
Carrington, 2011; Tracy, 2012), have argued that qualitative and especially interpretative 
approaches are particularly useful for studying phenomena about which little is known 
and for grasping perceptions of social reality. Keating and della Porta argue that 
‘more interpretive approaches require “softer” methods allowing for ambiguity 
and contingency and recognizing the interplay between researcher and the object 
of research.’ (della Porta and Keating, 2008: 25 f.) 
Such a perspective is characterized amongst others by a) inductive elements, meaning a 
construction of the research problem during the process of empirical research, b) a holistic 
approach, treating cases as ‘interdependent wholes’, rather than breaking them down into 
variables, c) a strong sensitivity to cultural processes (meaning-making) and context, d) 
flexibility to adjust methods to the research process, e) an immersion of the researcher in 
the field rather than a strict separation between ‘objective observer’ and the ‘research 
object’. 
 Therefore, social movement scholars investigating contentious politics of small-
scale and emerging activism (Blee, 2012), weakly-resourced groups (Chabanet & Royall, 
2014a) and contentious interactions (Jasper & Duyvendak, 2014; Nicholls & Uitermark, 
2016) have all advocated for flexible qualitative approaches. Didier Chabanet and 
Frédéric Royall underlined: 
‘Many scholars may be looking too hard to find general, and often causal, 
explanations for protest events. In doing so, they may not fully appreciate just how 
complex and intertwined reality is. By insisting on processes or political 
mechanisms, some scholars have tended to ignore protesters and to pass over their 
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intentions, their motivations, their doubts, and their refined sociological 
assessments of protesters, since they are the ones who are at the coalface of all 
protests and who, in a certain way, give them meaning (…)’ (Chabanet & Royall 
2014b: 17). 
Blee argues that the inherent conceptual and practical challenges of studying precarious 
activism have prevented scholars from investigating them: 
‘Tiny and incipient groups are rarely the subject of scholarship. Scholars tend 
to prefer SMOs [Social Movement Organizations, author’s note] whose 
importance is clear and which are likely to endure over time. Fledgling groups 
are risky groups for study. They are likely to fall apart and disappear. They are 
unstable, sometimes radically changing focus or direction. (…) The fluidity of 
emerging groups makes it difficult to label them, to what any of them is “a case 
of”’ (Blee 2012: 6). 
Based on his criticism of the tendency in social movement studies to reify homogeneity, 
while its constituent parts often are highly heterogeneous – and full of internal 
contestation (Jasper 2014: 12) - Jasper advocates for detailed, yet dynamic and flexible 
techniques to generate data on such complex processes. In his view, for instance, social 
network analysis and other quantitative means are too static (Cosmos Talk, 18 May 2017 
at SNS Florence) to capture the fluidity of the shifting, emerging, splitting, growing and 
shrinking of (compound) players in episodes of contention. 
Besides its strength in studying novel phenomena, qualitative field research is also 
particularly useful in contexts in which fieldwork is most difficult. This includes 
populations that are marginalized or repressed, but also internal group dynamics 
(Malthaner, 2014: 173). In such contexts, the researcher is at times ‘at the mercy of 
events’ (ibid). Elusive information and valid data can often only be gathered if research 
resembles more ‘normal communication’ and even more importantly if it can be adapted 
to the respective interviewee, to build trust and adjust to the specific demands of the 
research context. Indeed, any attempt to ‘impose a formal interview structure, instead of 
letting the situation develop, can harm field relations’ (Malthaner, 2014: 188). 
Building upon these methodological reflections, the analytical narratives 
presented in this manuscript are rooted in a particular, qualitative research tradition that 
is both informed by existing theory (deduction) and inductive elements during fieldwork: 
‘[C]ollecting first-hand data entails the idea that progress in social movement 
theory needs to originate in a deep interaction between first-hand data and existing 
theory’ (Balsiger & Lambelet, 2014). 
Hence, the underlying epistemology is fundamentally ‘abductive’ (Schwartz-Shea & 
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Yanow, 2011; Swedberg, 2012), which in fact is the rule rather than the exception in most 
qualitative social movement research (della Porta, 2014a: 238). This way of conducting 
research is far from being linear and relies mostly on a circular, or rather spiraling way 
of proceeding, constantly moving back and forth between theory and empirical findings. 
In addition to being ‘abductive’, my research has been to a large extent 
ethnographic. At the core of most ethnographic research endeavours lies the immersion 
in a certain group, community or locale. The underlying rationale is that ‘the best way to 
study what people do, mean, think, or believe is to stay as close as possible to them’ 
(Balsiger & Lambelet, 2014). Ethnographic research is more than a specific technique to 
generate data (participant observation), with which it is often equated. Indeed, 
ethnographic research requires a certain ‘sensibility’ (Juris & Khasnabish, 2013; Schatz, 
2009a). It entails a particular interest in phenomena that are meaningful, dynamic and 
interactive, and a sensitivity to subjectivity, complexity and positionality (Bray, 2008). It 
therefore includes a strong normative element to get and keep ‘in touch with the people 
affected by power relations’ (Schatz, 2009: p.12).28 Ethnographic research presupposes 
an attention to detail and context and a flexibility to adjust to what unfolds in ‘the field’. 
Given these characteristics, ethnography in political research has been considered 
powerful if not indispensable for studying amongst others ‘overlooked’, ‘hidden’, 
‘inaccessible’ and ‘ambiguous’ manifestations and contestations of power (Kubik, 2009: 
49). Given the heuristic strength of ethnographic research, the approach appears 
particularly promising to explore precarious interactions of forced migrants in 
contentious arenas: the phenomenon has been largely overlooked (exploration), it is 
relatively inaccessible, focuses on interactive practices (making and breaking of social 
relations), is interested in meaning attributed to relations and engages with actors who are 
subaltern, fundamentally affected and marginalized by dominant power structures. 
Political Ethnography and Comparative Research 
Generally speaking, ethnography privileges the interest in the particular and specific over 
the generalizable. Yet, there is a growing body of ethnographic research with a 
comparative element and the tentative ambition to generate theory of heuristic interest 
beyond one specific case (Balsiger & Lambelet, 2014; Bray, 2008; Jørgensen, 2015). 
Edward Schatz, indeed, considers it an inherent productive tension of ‘political 
                                                 
28  See also section (2.4.) on normative and ethical questions arising in research with marginalized and 
vulnerable populations or ‘subalterns’. 
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ethnography’: 
‘Taken together, the two parts of the term political ethnography thus imply a 
creative tension. Ethnography suggests a particularizing impulse, a desire to avoid 
premature empirical generalization, and a preference for inductive thinking. It 
implies attention to detail, to contextual factors, and to configurational thinking. 
Political suggests a willingness to bracket aspects of what we see, to simplify for 
analytic coherence, and to seek to produce generalizations. It implies attention to 
cross-case comparisons, to broadly occurring factors, and to the power of 
deductive logic. The phrase thus contains the potential for each impulse to perform 
a check on the other, in the process producing empirically grounded and 
theoretically stimulating research’ (Schatz, 2009b, italics in original). 
Such an approach poses additional challenges. In contrast to the traditionally extensive 
fieldwork by anthropologists of usually one year or more in one specific locality, political 
ethnographers seek to study several cases and broader political processes. Hence, they 
tend to spend much shorter periods (months, rather than years) in a certain setting and 
triangulate insights generated through participant observation with a range of other 
techniques (Malthaner, 2014: 174). Nevertheless, they have to ‘gain access to networks 
and establish trust with participants in relatively short periods of time and in various 
locations’ (Malthaner, 2014: 178). As Schatz also points out, at times political 
ethnographers merge with (or immerse themselves in) a specific context retrospectively 
through historical reconstruction, adding as much information as possible through 
archival work and interviews (Schatz, 2009a). 
 In a strictly comparative social sciences perspective (King, Keohane, & Verba, 
1994; Lijphart, 1971), comparisons are highly demanding, requiring cases to be ‘unitary 
and bounded instances of a single underlying phenomenon, such as an ‘activist group’. 
Yet, as Blee notes, ‘activist groups are neither unitary nor bounded’ (Blee, 2012). Due to 
such practical challenges and building upon a vast body of small-N case study designs 
(for an overview see Gerring, 2007), della Porta suggests a ‘case-oriented’ rather than 
‘variable-oriented’ approach to comparison (della Porta, 2008). In such an approach 
similarities and differences between a small number of cases are presented in ‘thick 
descriptions’.  
‘This means that a few cases are analysed based on a large number of 
characteristics. Explanations are narrative accounts with limited interest in 
generalization. The degree to which the cases selected do belong to the same 
category, and therefore are comparable, is assessed in the course of the research 
itself’ (della Porta, 2008: 207). 
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Generalizations are, hence, temporarily limited to the case studies, yet mechanisms and 
patterns are relevant to a wider set of cases. Given the attention to context, case-oriented 
comparisons are particularly intriguing, when they take time as a factor into account, 
hence, adopt a both cross-spatial and diachronic perspective (Della Porta, 2008). 
 In a variant of this idea to both dig deep into cases and tentatively develop broader 
patterns, Michael Burawoy has suggested the idea of an ‘extended case method’ 
(Burawoy, 1998). According to Maren Klawitter, a Burawoy student, this method 
‘requires that ethnographers locate the ethnographic field by ‘extending out from micro 
processes to macro forces, from the space-time rhythms of the site to the geographical 
and historical context of the field’ (Klawiter, 2008).  
Broader conceptions of ‘comparison’ also take into account that in a globalized 
world, and even more so within the issue of migration, phenomena are ‘place-based’, yet 
not necessarily ‘place-bound’ (Massey, 1991b: 279). Sassen notes: 
‘one of the features of the current phase of globalization is that the fact that a 
process happens within the territory of a sovereign state does not necessarily 
mean it is a national process. This localization of the global, or of the non-
national, in national territories undermines a key duality running through 
many of the methods and conceptual frameworks prevalent in the social 
sciences - that the national and the non-national are two mutually exclusive 
conditions’ (Sassen 2001: 187).  
Hence, transnational phenomena, of which migration is an emblematic example (Faist et 
al., 2013; Pries, 2001) require ‘multi-site research rather than simply comparative studies’ 
(Sassen 2001: 189) to overcome the fallacies of ‘methodological nationalism’.  
I understand my research as a case-oriented comparison being located in the 
productive tension of ‘political ethnography’. It scrutinizes and meticulously describes 
processes of political mobilization by forced migrants in two locations, Berlin and Paris, 
on the basis of various dimensions – with attention to interactions, the dynamics and 
quality of social ties and space. In line with an arena-approach to contentious politics, 
however, the unit of analysis is the contentious arena, not the city. The case-oriented 
comparison in my research consists of a total of four arenas, two in each location. From 
a comparison of processes in highly distinct contexts, as well as comparing arenas within 
one location, I intend to generate insights on the patterns of interactions and strategical 
dilemmas ‘typical’ to such kinds of political activism, while at the same time pointing to 
the respective specificities of the cases at hand. Furthermore, my research also underlines 
that the arenas are not fully independent: They are embedded in local contexts, in histories 
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of interaction and in transnational social spaces of migration and contention (see for 
instance Chapter 8). The case-sensitive and comparative arena perspective appears to be 
suitable for capturing the duality of the phenomenon, being place-based, yet not ‘place-
bound’. 
3.3.  Triangulation & Data Analysis 
The analytic narratives in the empirical part of this manuscript are based on field-work in 
two cities, Berlin and Paris, and more specifically, on insights gained through 
interviewing individuals, participating and observing practices, and identifying and 
scrutinizing textual sources produced by movement actors or media outlets through 
(online) archival work. Each of these methods entails specific requirements, strengths and 
weaknesses. Capitalizing on advantages, while moderating shortcomings, lies at the base 
of triangulation in the social sciences (for an overview see Ayoub, Wallace and Zepeda-
Millán, 2014). Subsequently, I will layout why and how I triangulated qualitative data 
generated through three techniques, participant observation, qualitative interviews and 
compilation of documents. Following Schatz, these techniques, combined with my 
research approach, qualify as ‘political ethnography’ (Schatz, 2009b, 2009c). Given the 
immersion of the researcher in a field in ethnographic research, I will subsequently also 
reflect on my role in the research process. 
Participant Observation 
In some research projects, participant observation constitutes the methodological core. 
Others only sporadically use the technique for a very first exploration or to identify and 
access potential interlocutors (see also Balsiger and Lambelet, 2014). In this continuum, 
my project occupies a middle ground. Participant observation was used in both locations, 
Paris and Berlin, to access the field, identify interlocutors, but also to immerse with a 
group, in order to observe (political) practices and perceptions. 
Typical to social movements as fluid and fragmented entities, the boundaries of 
the ‘field’ are difficult to determine both spatially and temporally. Hence, most 
ethnographic social movement research is multi-sited and as ‘social movements are not 
active 24/7’, fields are ‘non-continuous’ (Balsiger and Lambelet, 2014: 153). In Berlin I 
participated between January-August 2016 and between January-May 2017 in dozens of 
activist events, including demonstrations, conferences and workshops. At the beginning, 
my approach was to map the terrain, trying to capture a wide range of events organized 
by different groups. In the large formats, my role was mostly relatively passive and 
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discrete – at times assisting ‘logistically’. This relatively shallow immersion (still, over 
time, I recognized more and more familiar faces regularly present during events) in many 
contexts and interaction with many people allowed me to identify patterns. In some cases, 
I used the participation in events to approach potential interlocutors (see section below 
on interviews). Subsequently, I also followed more informal events of migrant activist 
groups I encountered during public events. During every event, I took field notes, either 
during the event or directly after.  
With one group of activists, I spent much more time – over the course of 10 
months – in total several hundred hours in assemblies, informal meetings and protest 
events. The access was made possible by Mamadou29, a forced migrant activist I had met 
at a public protest event. He invited me to his place, we talked for two hours. I told him 
about my research and he told me about his activism, the countless negative experiences 
he had gathered with researchers during his activism. In the end, the clear message was: 
‘as long as you don’t exploit us, and get your interviews and disappear, you are welcome 
to participate’. He turned out to be a door opener to many other activists in Berlin and 
Paris.  
In Paris, given the shorter period of fieldwork (2,5 months) due to practical 
constraints, a deep immersion of the kind in Berlin was not feasible. Nonetheless, I 
engaged repeatedly with members of one group online and remained in contact after my 
departure from Paris. Hence, albeit to a lesser degree, I attempted to follow the design in 
Berlin to participate in various events and get a deeper understanding of practices and 
attitudes through deeper immersion with one group. Access to the group in Paris was 
facilitated by contacts previously established in Berlin.  
This immersion allowed me to scrutinize the making and breaking, as well as 
perceived role, of strong and weak ties. In the course of my participation, I shifted from 
a rather passive to a more active position within the group, adopting various functions, 
often as translator from and to English, German and French or in assisting during 
administrative procedures. Various personal relations have emerged from the research.  
Qualitative Interviewing 
For various reasons, participant observation in ethnographic research is usually 
                                                 
29  All names of interlocutors have been changed to guarantee their anonymity (see also section (2.4.) on 
the ethics of conducting research with vulnerable populations. 
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complemented with qualitative interviews of various kinds. A first set of reasons is 
practical: it is evidently only feasible to follow some activists for some time. In order to 
contextualize, or in Burawoy’s terms ‘extend’ from one case (or very few observations), 
it is indispensable to ask for past experiences. Conceptually, furthermore, in studying 
perceptions and subjective attribution of meaning to certain practices, it is useful to 
triangulate observed practices with interviewed explication. Very fundamentally, also 
‘people generally don’t talk about what they take for granted’ (Blee, 2012: 12). This 
requires unveiling practices and attitudes that are not explicitly addressed. Finally, 
interviews have a strong normative component. They ‘generate representations that 
embody the subject’s voice, minimizing, at least as far as possible, the voice of the 
researcher’ (Blee and Taylor, 2002: 96). This is particularly key in research with subaltern 
populations.  
Given these qualities, interviewing has become one of the most common 
techniques of data collection in social movement studies (for excellent overviews see 
Blee and Taylor, 2002; Blee, 2013; della Porta, 2014a). The specific type of interview 
and the selection of interlocutors depend on the research questions and the research 
environment. Usually, researchers either choose among or combine biographical 
interviews (‘life histories’), interviews on particular protest events in the past (‘oral 
histories’) or ‘key informant’ interview, involving a wider range of actors involved in 
contentious action (Blee, 2013; Bray, 2008; della Porta, 2014a). Among the important 
drawbacks of interviews is that ‘[a]ctivists have an interest in presenting themselves and 
the movement in a certain light’ (Blee, 2013). Yet this can be moderated by interviewing 
a wide range of actors and taking different narratives as evidence for heterogeneity and 
lines of fragmentation. 
While ethnographic and qualitative research more broadly do not align to the 
standards of representativity in quantitative research, the selection of interlocutors 
follows a theoretical purpose (therefore sometimes referred to as ‘theoretical’ or 
‘purposive’ sampling); yet, this is also dependent on access. Research on marginalized or 
stigmatized movements therefore usually relies on ‘snowball sampling’, asking initial 
interlocutors to suggest or contact others to be interviewed (Blee, 2013). Given the 
important role of the researcher or rather the influence of the complex relations between 
researcher and interlocutor, the data obtained in qualitative interviewing is never 
identically ‘replicable’ (Burawoy, 1998). It is crucial in this respect to obtain a certain 
level of transparency through recording (or elaborating later notes taken during a 
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conversation, where recording is not accepted) as well as a detailed description of the 
context in which the interview unfolded (Bray, 2008; della Porta, 2014a).  
For the purpose of my research, I conducted around 30 interviews in each city. 
The interviews lasted between 20 and 150 minutes and had different degrees of 
structuration. Due to the research interest in interactions among various actors engaged 
in relationships formed around forced migration in the four arenas, interlocutors included 
not only forced migrant activists, but also key informants from the immigrant rights 
movement, trade unions and politicians. Most interviews were organized around four 
main areas of interest – which I raised in a changing order depending on the flow of the 
conversation: the personal ‘path into protest’; the mobilization of resources through allies; 
the importance and qualities of social relations within the movement (the making of ties); 
and the fragmentation of the movement (undoing of ties). All interviews with forced 
migrant activists combined ‘oral- and life history’. The sample of interlocutors was 
generated through both snowballing and contacting key figures identified in previous 
desk work. Despite repeated attempts, I did not manage to gain access to various 
influential activists. Most interviews were recorded. When interlocutors did not consent 
to be recorded, I took extensive notes during and directly after the conversation. 
Interviews were conducted in English, German and French. 
In both participant observation and qualitative interviewing, the quality of the 
information ‘is influenced by the complex relations between interviewers and 
interviewees, in particular the interviewer’s capacity to stimulate participation, and 
careful listening’ (della Porta, 2014a: 258). This relation was much more multifaceted 
(and at times contested) during (first) interactions with forced migrants, where power 
disparities were at times explicitly problematized. One interlocutor told me: ‘I would feel 
more comfortable doing an interview if you were PoC [Person of Colour]’ (see also 
section (3.4.) on positionality and ‘postcolonial encounters’). 
Compiling Existing Textual Sources 
In addition to participant observation and interviews, the empirical section draws from 
existing textual resources that have been produced independently from the research 
project. Such texts include reports, comments and self-representations by forced migrant 
activists, but also allies and opponents in flyers, (online-)texts videos (transcripts) and the 
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media. The idea is not to analyse multifaceted discourses or frames30 but rather to 
complement first-hand data obtained through personal interaction with existing textual 
sources. According to Ruben Andersson, ethnographic research in secretive contexts and 
including marginalized actors requires this degree of eclecticism to compensate for the 
lack of access to relevant actors and to avoid excessive intrusion in at times 
‘overpopulated’ contexts inhabited by journalists, care workers, academic pioneers and 
state agents (2016: 286). Indeed, in difficult, yet particularly rewarding contexts of 
fieldwork (Malthaner, 2014), ‘the researcher is at the mercy of events’ (Malthaner, 2014: 
178). Given the constraints at hand, in these cases, fieldwork requires a (pragmatic) 
flexibility to obtain the best data available and to rely on a range of data sources. 
I compiled these textual sources during protest events, online and in archival work 
(Ffm-Archive at Fulda, CGT Archive Paris, GISTI online Archive, Générique online 
Archive, The Voice Online-Archive, O-Platz online Archive, private Archives of 
activists). Indeed, it happened to me many times that during an informal conversation, an 
interview or by participating in an event, I referred to statements made by influential 
actors in the media, movement-produced publications or reports. Often, these more 
extensive reports and self-reflections were of greater value than the face-to face 
conversation – yet, only in its combination both ‘sources’ could be accessed and 
complemented. 
Data Analysis: From a ‘Steaming Mass’31 of Data to a Compelling Narrative 
The flexibility in the phase of data collection and the compilation of vast amounts of data 
poses an enormous challenge for data analysis. In the case of the research under question, 
the ‘steaming mass’ consisted of a total of 40 interview transcripts, more than 50 pages 
of type-written field notes and hundreds of compiled documents. As such an amount of 
rich and diverse data is common to most qualitative and certainly ethnographic research, 
a plethora of strategies has emerged for its analysis. All aim at addressing the challenge 
of both embracing the rich data obtained and structuring it with a view to feeding it into 
compelling analytic narratives. All engage in multiple readings, yet structuring ranges 
from more systematic ‘coding’ to simply ‘indexing’ of texts. Nevertheless, all of these 
approaches share the need for (at least partial) transcription of interviews and successive 
identification of key themes (or concepts) and patterns.  
                                                 
30  For this see Lindekilde, 2014. 
31  Expression borrowed from Katz (2002). 
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 I have transcribed all the interviews in their original language, while avoiding a 
verbatim transcription. Interviews, compiled textual sources and field notes have 
subsequently been imported in the software MaxQDA32. What followed were various 
loops of reading the scripts, highlighting passages, assigning categories. The general 
process and rationale was similar to the one described by Jean-Claude Kaufmann below: 
‘What do I judge to be worthy of interest? Beautiful, creative, expressive phrases; 
interesting, informative situations, intriguing episodes; well-argued indigenous 
thought categories; elements close to the hypotheses in the process of being 
elaborated (Kaufmann, 2009 cited in della Porta 2014a: 251)’.  
Building upon the categories and patterns identified, I have developed analytic narratives 
‘punctuated by illustrative vignettes’ (Bray, 2008: 313). Such vignettes  
‘recount specific events, moments that reveal the issues addressed by the 
researcher. They may be about the behaviour and reactions of individuals to 
specific instances, and their relationships to other people and ideas. In these 
descriptions, the researcher must mention all those details that are revealing. 
Superfluous details must be left out’ (Bray, 2008: p. 313).  
In order to facilitate the reading flow, I have translated all interview passages to English 
and edited at times slightly, for instance, omitting passages not relevant to the argument 
at hand. 
3.4.  Productive Serendipity 
Most accounts of social research document successful results rather than challenges or 
deviations experienced in the process of the fieldwork. Yet, everyone familiar with 
empirical fieldwork has experienced moments of profound discrepancy between initial 
methodological and theoretical ideas and the realities found in the field. Depending on 
the respective epistemological perspectives, deviations are considered as the exception in 
more positivist traditions - e.g. ‘serendipity’ in the words of Philippe Schmitter (2008) – 
and as the rule in the generation of knowledge in interpretive approaches. The latter 
cohort has generated a variety of iterative and adaptive strategies, such as ‘grounded 
theory’ (for an overview see Mattoni, 2014), ‘extended case method’ (Burawoy, 1991) or 
‘situational analysis’ (Clarke, 2005). Particularly ethnographic approaches have strongly 
advocated for ‘expound[ing] with full ingenuity the windings, the doubts and the 
                                                 
32  MaxQDA is a software developed to facilitate qualitative and mixed methods research. It allows for 
generating coding schemes, and includes convenient features to gain an overview related to certain 
categories. It is particularly useful to structure and organize large amounts of (both qualitative and 
quantitative) data. For further information see https://www.maxqda.com/.  
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accidents that mark out the course of the inquiries and render them possible’ (Descola, 
2005; see also the excellent annex in Goffman, 2015).  
Yet, it is still rare to read deviations and failures emerging during qualitative 
empirical research, even though they might have considerable heuristic value. My 
research including its methodological approach was to some degree nurtured by ‘trial and 
error’. In order to illustrate such loops of serendipity, I subsequently recall a process of 
fundamental revision of my methodological approach occurring during my research in 
response to the realities in the field. 
When I started my dissertation in early 2015, already interested in social relations 
among forced migrant activists and with allies, I was intrigued by the relatively recent 
popularity of network approaches in social movement studies. Particularly intuitive 
appeared the method of social network analysis, as various scholars had convincingly 
shown its analytical power – especially in comparative perspective (Caiani, 2014; Caiani, 
della Porta, & Wagemann, 2012; Cinalli, 2007a; Eggert & Pilati, 2014). Given the focus 
on relations in my research design, I intended to explore and compare the relational 
structures of the forced migrant movements in Berlin and Paris and triangulate the 
analysis with qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews, document analysis, 
and participant observation. 
I consequently began to map the movement in Berlin. I reached out to as many 
activists as I could. For the first interviews I had drafted preliminary lists with influential 
activists and groups, and intended to let interviewees tick the names of activists and 
groups on questions such as ‘who do you know?’, ‘with whom have you cooperated?’. I 
indeed received responses in some cases, however, not everyone was interested or willing 
to fill in the list. In some interviews, respondents were unwilling to answer – for various 
reasons reaching from a ‘too personalized’ perspective and sensitivity to mere boredom 
due to the format. Other relevant actors identified through snowballing and document 
analysis did not respond to any interview request. 
Various problems were evident in this approach. Firstly, the set of activists asked 
was not limited. I did not know the boundaries of a whole network of activists, especially 
as I was not only interested in studying the relationships within the self-organized 
movement, but also with the wider solidarity spectrum. I did obtain some valuable 
information e.g. with a view to identifying influential or visible actors. However, beyond 
this explorative purpose, due to the lack of clear boundaries, the non-response of a 
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significant number of important actors and the fluidity and amorphous form of the 
movement, the structural potential of formal Social Network Analysis was from the outset 
close to zero. For formal whole network analysis, comparable, detailed relational data for 
all (or at least the majority of) relevant groups and actors is needed. This aim turned out 
to be illusive. Furthermore, and typical to social network studies, the relational data I 
obtained was limited to the information on the following two questions: ‘which 
group/individual have you heard of?’, ‘which group/ individual have you cooperated 
with/ had direct contact with?’ Some respondents were reluctant to provide information 
regarding even this rather simple question. A third question ‘which group/individual 
would you contact for support or invitation to a protest/campaign/ demo?’ was in most 
cases not answered. The first two questions in turn, alone, do not say anything about the 
current structure of the network and the meaning and current relevance of these ties. 
Particularly in fluid movements such as the forced migrant movement, ‘having heard of’ 
or ‘having had contact with’ someone does not mean that these are contacts that are 
regularly activated, hence embedding important resources. Furthermore, as I figured, the 
support base for self-organized struggles was prevalently not formal groups, but 
decentralized, fluid ‘supporters’, which were evidently not included in my lists. I had to 
realize that formal network analysis is much more powerful if it is not only suited for 
established contexts rather than emerging, volatile, contested contexts such as precarious 
mobilizations by forced migrants. 
In order to understand the dynamics of networks and their meaning, a much more 
profound zooming-in is necessary, at the obvious expense of systematically assessing a 
whole-network structure. Abandoning whole-network analysis, I therefore experimented 
with ego-network analysis. Ego-centred network analysis, which has rarely been used in 
studying social movements, is tailored to unbounded contexts and questions of 
embeddedness within environments of support. It has hence been used extensively in 
research drawing from social support and social capital. Yet, as I figured out, ego-network 
analysis is again both extremely time-intensive and repetitive if conducted with many 
alteri, as ego is supposed to provide information on alter-alter relations and their 
characteristics (20 alteri = 20x19 alter relations). 
This method worked out even worse, as the procedure is highly time-consuming 
and heteronomous. In consequence, I have repeatedly experienced scepticism or 
outspoken opposition to structured, ‘imposed’ forms of exchange. I knew from the outset 
that forced migrant activism is a sensitive issue: the subjects live in highly precarious 
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circumstances (potential deportation, traumas, financial difficulties etc.) – and are in 
general fundamentally sceptical towards outsiders, which I was to witness many times 
despite several personal contacts. Organizing a meeting for an interview took sometimes 
many weeks – and many interviews started with me being interrogated: what is the 
purpose of this research, who profits from it in which way? Many activists have found 
that the multiple interviews given to journalists and researchers alike have not influenced 
their situation positively. 
 I started every interview with open, narrative parts and subsequently moved 
towards more structured questions on social ties and alliances. These parts turned out to 
be of much greater value to generate rich and extensive data on the making and breaking 
of ties in forced migrant activism compared to the standardized relational data. Indeed, 
this qualitative data allowed to identify relevant mechanisms and criteria with which ties 
are sustained or dissolved over time, both within the self-organized (only forced migrants) 
and the wider migrant rights movements. Following these experiences, I discarded 
network analysis and adapted the method to the situation at hand. Departing from my first 
intent of ‘momentary “capture” of prespecified [in my case network] data’, I gradually 
relied, instead, more ‘on the ongoing process of observation, interpretation, and 
engagement’ (Klawiter, 2008), or in Burawoy’s terms, the ‘extension of observations 
over time and space’ (Burawoy, 1998). From this moment on, my approach became truly 
abductive and ethnographic in the sense outlined above. The approach was not chosen ex 
ante, but was developed in response to the research context: it was problem- rather than 
method-driven. 
The experiences outlined above not only led to a revision of the methods applied 
to generate data, but had also implications for the underlying concepts. It turned out that, 
in order to understand the characteristics and dynamics of precarious activism, a dynamic 
approach capable of capturing the making and breaking of relations – what Jasper calls 
‘contentious interactions’ proved to be of much greater relevance than a static network 
approach. This, in turn, led to a revision of the theoretical approach towards a ‘players 
and arenas’ perspective, which is sensitive to both relations and spatialities. 
From the perspective of a positivist research design, the process described above 
would qualify as a failure, as a waste of time. On many occasions, I felt reminded of 
Stefan Malthaner’s and Pamela Nilan’s reflection on their research in volatile and 
precarious contexts:  
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‘orienting oneself towards the standards of “formal” sociological methods, which 
imply control by the researcher over the context and the process of research, can 
induce anxiety and a feeling of failure when realizing that one is unable to exert 
this kind of control’ (quoted from Malthaner, 2014: 178). 
Yet, this detour was paramount for me in generating knowledge on forced migrant 
activism. It shaped my sensitivity to the respective qualities and limitations of network 
analysis and ethnographic approaches, but also on understanding social movements of 
precarious actors more broadly. Looking back at this process, I see it as a gradual 
liberation from a methodological corset from which the research profited considerably.  
3.5.  The Ethics of Conducting Research with Forced Migrants 
Research ethics is crucial to any fieldwork endeavour that includes human subjects, 
particularly with vulnerable populations for which participation in research can be a risk 
to physical and psychological integrity. The study of contentious politics requires a 
particular sensitivity to such processes, as  
‘disclosing its dynamics might expose activists to surveillance as well as 
repression, jeopardizing their activities if not subjecting them to personal threats’ 
(Milan, 2014: 446). 
Similarly, research involving subjects vulnerable due to their precarious legal status and 
biographies of exclusion and violence, such as forced migrants, demands additional 
safeguards. Indeed, Ulrike Krause argues: 
‘Thus, our responsibility as researchers conducting fieldwork [with forced 
migrants] goes beyond methodological rigour in gathering data, and ethical 
questions must be at the centre of this process’ (2017: 1). 
Yet, ethical reflections need to go beyond a mere ‘do no harm’ agreement. Research on 
social movements entail a normative positioning towards the prefiguration of, and 
struggles for, a more equitable society. Research, hence, requires a reflexivity on the 
power position of the researcher and the question of who benefits from the research. 
Research engagements with marginalized populations encounter the additional inherent 
tension of, on the one hand, (academically) ‘speaking for’ someone and on the other hand, 
contributing to emancipatory process. 
The subsequent passages, hence, reflect on a) the fundamental ‘do-no-harm’ 
convention in conducting research with vulnerable populations and, b) power and 
empowerment in research involving postcolonial encounters. 
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Do No Harm 
As sketched out above, my research has involved individuals under risk due to a) their 
precarious status and at times trauma, and b) involvement in contentious actions. Hence, 
my responsibility as a researcher called me to consider how the knowledge produced 
during my research might negatively affect those participating. Indeed, in the words of 
Giulia Borri, this work ‘involves other peoples' lives’ (2016: 62). Most forced migrants 
are aware of their precarious condition and tend to be sceptical towards participation in 
research (Krause, 2017). Every interview required repeated exchange and clarification 
either online, on the phone or during personal encounters to build up basic trust. I 
experienced particular reluctance during my initial attempts to gather standardized 
(network) data (see section 3.3. on serendipity). Migration and particularly asylum is a 
political context in which standardized forms of questionnaires are often negatively 
perceived by the actors involved as they appear similar to registration and identification 
procedures utilized by the state border authorities. For many, questionnaires were 
associated with the governmentality of the migration experienced. In turn, ‘to talk and act 
to heal the trauma’ (Field notes, 20/04/16), was accepted in most occasions, on the 
condition that they somewhat guided the conversation and controlled which information 
was spared. In consequence, a flexible approach to data collection turned out to be both 
a practical need and an ethical obligation.  
 In line with ethical standards in research with vulnerable individuals, all results 
have been anonymized. This entails omitting the names, but also the country of origin 
and other characteristic features to avoid possible identification given the small 
population of forced migrant activists. As will illustrated below, anonymization stands in 
strong tension with the normative ideal to let subalterns speak for themselves. Yet, I have 
privileged the security of the individuals involved and have only used names, when 
quoting from documents published by the actors (which are openly accessible 
independently from my research). 
 ‘Do no harm’, nonetheless needs to be evidently understood as going beyond a 
mere guarantee of physical and psychological integrity. Research has the potential to 
harm a movement. My research is a (particular) empirical description and reading of 
processes of mobilization of forced migrants. The empirical material on practiced and 
perceived social ties presented in some of the subsequent chapters, hence, documents 
various tensions, conflicts and power imbalances. Indeed, these are common to most 
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social movements even though their dubious homogenity is regularly reified and conflicts 
and fractal processes usually downplayed. Hence, social scientific rigour fundamentally 
contradicts any attempt at idealization. Even beyond social scientific research ethics, in 
my conversations, my opinion that most indviduals involved in the movement are well 
aware of the conflicts and tensions was confirmed. Hence, I follow Jeffrey Juris and Alex 
Khasnabish arguing: 
‘Against overly romanticized views of transnational activism, ethnography 
reveals the inevitable, yet productive, “friction” (Tsing 2005) that ensues in 
the encounter between activists from diverse movements, political contexts, 
and cultural backgrounds. (…) For the engaged ethnographer, the goal of 
producing such accounts is never only to uncover internal conflicts and 
tensions; the ethnographer also produces critical understandings that can help 
activists develop strategies to overcome obstacles and barriers to effective 
organizing’ (2013: 4). 
Indeed, it is naïve to expect precarious political mobilizations to be without 
contradictions. They assemble highly diverse actors with regard to both class, race, status, 
gender, hence with tremendous power imbalances. Yet, these ‘frictions’ (Tsing, 2005) 
need to be adequately contextualized but also made transparent to produce productive 
energy, from which these movements can profit in turn. Evidently, I am not interested in 
personal animosities, but rather patterns of interaction in contentious arenas around 
forced migration.  
Power and Empowerment 
When I eventually met X of a highly active self-organization of female (forced) migrants 
in Berlin in a café in Kreuzberg, she was deeply sceptical and noted outspokenly: ‘I would 
feel more comfortable if you were a refugee, too, or at least PoC [Person of Colour]’ 
(Interview B24). A conversation - at the beginning rather confrontative on the part of the 
interlocutor - unfolded on white privilege, academic arrogance and detachment from 
activism. I found myself in similar situations repeatedly during my research. 
 This anecdote made explicit what is inherent (yet often not problematized) in 
every kind of interaction between a researcher and an interlocutor, even more so in social 
movement research (Milan, 2014) and particularly accentuated in research with 
marginalized groups such as forced migrants (Düvell, Triandafyllidou, & Vollmer, 2009; 
Krause, 2017). The vignette also underlines trust as a fundamental condition for 
qualitative research with vulnerable, marginalized or stigmatized groups. 
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As Stefania Milan notes, ‘suspicion towards academics and their endeavours is 
quite diffused amongst movement activists. Often, this does not come out of the blue, but 
is based on direct experience’. In many cases, the relationship is rather asymmetrical 
(researcher and research ‘object’), and indeed many activists have had the experience that 
researchers exploit precious resources such as time and knowledge to advance their own 
careers without clear benefits for the movement (Milan, 2014). Consequently, more and 
more social movement scholars and social scientists more broadly reflect on the ethics of 
concerning themselves, ‘not only with theory development, but also with the promotion 
of social change, movement building, and empowerment broadly conceived’ (Milan, 
2014, p.446). The level of engagement with public debates and social structures can take 
different forms and degrees – as ‘public sociology’ (Burawoy, 2005), ‘engaged research’ 
(Milan, 2014), or ‘participatory action’ or ‘militant research’ (Calhoun, 2010; Carstensen, 
Heimeshoff, Jungehülsing, Kirchhoff, & Trzeciak, 2014; Greenwood & Levin, 2008; 
Hale, 2008). Depending on the approach taken, various types of researcher roles emerge, 
such as the ‘controlled sceptic’, the ‘ardent activist’, the ‘buddy–researcher’, and the 
‘credentialed expert’ (David Snow cited in Milan, 2014). 
 Beyond ethical considerations about symmetry in research endeavours, the 
researcher in many cases has little choice in accepting the conditions of conversation set 
by the interlocutors. Indeed ‘participants in social movements are typically highly 
invested subjects who tend to expect from the researcher, and might even demand, some 
sort of political alignment with the principled ideas they embody. Access to the field 
might occasionally be negotiated on this ground’ (Milan, 2014, p.446).  
 On top of the inherent challenges as researcher in activist environments, my own 
research could be characterized as a ‘postcolonial encounter’ as it entailed even more 
asymmetrical actors with regard to their social position (and hence power). It involved 
me as a white, male, German citizen in his early thirties, from a middle-class background, 
highly educated and multilingual with privileged access to resources. Indeed, I shared 
very little with most of the participants in my research, with precarious legal status, (past) 
trauma, experiences of racism etc. They in contrast have had multiple experiences of 
being muted by authorities, by European activists or NGOs or by academics. Their 
activism was, at the very foundation, an attempt to emancipate, to speak out, to be 
recognized as political subjects and not as ‘perpetrators’ and ‘criminals’ on the one hand 
or ‘victims’ or ‘objects’ on the other hand. Gayatri Spivak asked for good reasons ‘can 
the subaltern speak?’ (Spivak, 1988) and pointed to the reproduction and perpetuation of 
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dominance in any kind of representation, including academia.  
 In consequence, agreements on the terms of participation were not only important 
to me, but also regularly demanded by activists both with and without a history of forced 
migration. One of the key homepages administered by the Berlin based forced migrant 
movement includes the disclaimer: 
‘If you want to interview refugee activists for a research project, please consider 
your position in relation to people categorized as refugees and being active 
politically, and how refugee protests and the activists themselves can benefit 
from your project’.33 
When I informed the activists I engaged with for various months about my visiting 
fellowship at UC Berkeley and my temporary absence, one replied by email, including 
the passage: 
‘I have met some who really cared about the movement of migrants/refugees. But 
how many just interpret the experiences of migrant struggles, be it in the context 
of academia or etc. certainly, I consider you more as a friend, but I do not want to 
live again or get the feeling of an abused solidarity [solidarité abusé] because this 
has often been the case in one way or the other’ (field notes, 17/09/2016). 
The relationships that developed and changed during my research were (re-) negotiated 
during the entire research process (and after). I took on many different roles, namely that 
of the researcher, the translator, the person giving basic legal advice, the buddy. I 
attempted to take reciprocity as a base-line for the research. In some cases, reciprocity 
was achieved more than in others. 
Building and keeping trust also meant, at times, to accept and respect the limits of 
research, similar to what Liisa Malkki recalls from her extensive qualitative fieldwork: 
 [...] the success of the fieldwork hinged not so much on a determination to ferret 
out ‘the facts’ as on a willingness to leave some stones unturned, to listen to what 
my informants deemed important, and to demonstrate my trustworthiness by not 
prying where I was not wanted. It may be precisely by giving up the scientific 
detective’s urge to know ‘everything’ that we gain access to those very partial 
vistas that our informants may desire or think to share with us’ (Malki, 1995: 56).  
Research involving marginalized individuals accordingly requires both flexibility and 
reflexivity for both practical and ethical reasons. Krause therefore notes, with particular 
reference to forced migration studies: 
‘Refugees’ invisibility in research processes is (…) linked to questions of power 
                                                 
33  Accessible via: https://oplatz.net/contact/. 
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and representation, of speaking about or speaking for them, working on or 
working with them (…). And this involves questions not only about an ethical 
code of conduct but also especially about normative reflections’ (Krause, 2017, 
italics in original).  
Social research on the issue will never fully escape this fundamental contradiction of 
speaking ‘on behalf of’ someone who should speak for him or herself. My attempt in this 
research is to make voices heard that are often ignored. I therefore extensively quote 









Situating Contentious Arenas: The Context of Forced 
Migration in France and Germany 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
Contentious arenas around forced migration do not emerge in a vacuum, but are strongly 
shaped by and rooted in social, political and spatial contexts. In this chapter, I outline key 
conditions in which political mobilizations on forced migration are embedded. For this 
purpose, I start out with a cursory overview of key developments in the politicisation of 
forced migration (4.2.) 34, followed by a brief account of the irregularity-asylum nexus in 
both countries (4.3). The last section takes a closer look at the characteristics and 
trajectories of the national migrant rights movements (4.4.). I conclude with an overview 
of the spatial and relational conditions shaping political mobilizations of forced migrants 
in the two countries (4.5.). In resonance with previous comparative work on citizenship 
(Brubaker, 1992) and contentious migration politics (Monforte, 2014; Monforte & 
Dufour, 2011) in Germany and France, I examine in depth key contextual differences. 
4.2.  The Politicisation of Forced Migration in Germany and France 
In most European countries, including France and Germany, forced migration was hardly 
considered a contested issue in the first two decades after World War II (de Wangen, 
2016; Fassin, 2016b). The two relevant groups in this regard – the survivors of the war 
camps and those escaping from Eastern European communist regimes – were both by and 
large welcomed with compassion (the former) and respect (the latter) (Fassin, 2016a). In 
the time of economic upturn in the 1950s and 60s, these positive affects resonated with 
                                                 
34  More detailed and extensive accounts of the politicization of forced migration in Germany can be 
found in Herbert (2001), Oltmer & Bade (2005a, 2005b), and Steinhilper (2016). For the French 
context, see Crépeau (1995), Fassin (2016b), and Noiriel (1999). 
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the thirst of growing national economies for cheap labour (Fassin, 2016b). Due to this 
context of migration political openness, which was not least illustrated by the active 
recruitment of foreign labour, in Germany called ‘guest workers’, many forced migrants 
– who would have formally been eligible for international protection - relinquished the 
asylum application and never appeared in any official statistics. The comparatively low 
numbers of forced migrants from the real-socialist East were furthermore considered as 
welcomed proofs for the Western (i.e. capitalist) superiority (Oltmer & Bade 2005). The 
legal norm regarding asylum was numerically irrelevant and morally appealing (Bade, 
2015). Until 1963, in Germany asylum applications only once surpassed 3,000, notably 
per year. Even in the year of the oil crisis and the consequential end of active foreign 
workforce recruitment, asylum applications remained below 5,000 (Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016). In France, too, numbers of asylum applications 
remained below 3,000 until 1973 and consisted mainly of European migrants (particularly 
from Spain) and from a range of soviet republics. This was mainly due to the fact that the 
scope of the Geneva Convention of 1951 remained limited to those subject to prosecution 
prior to 1951 in Europe until 1971, when France ratified and implemented the additional 
protocol to the Geneva Convention, eliminating the temporal and geographical 
reservation (de Wangen, 2016).  
From the early 1970s onwards, France was confronted with rising unemployment 
due to the restructuring of the industrial sector and increasing automatization (Crépeau, 
1995). The oil crisis of 1973 added to this economic transformation, which had already 
started prior to the external shock. A turning-point was the so-called ‘Circulaire 
Marcellin-Fontanet’ of 1972, a law that fundamentally modified the regulations regarding 
renewal of residence permits. Literally overnight, a large share of migrant workers was 
rendered illegal through legal reform (Abdallah, 2000). From this moment on, after a 
period of laissez-faire due to a growing national economy, a right to stay in France 
became subject to a work contract and proof of ‘decent housing’. Hereafter, irregular 
migration became increasingly problematized and contested (Gisti, 2014). The first 
hunger strikes by undocumented migrants date back to this time (Abdallah, 2000).  
As in Germany, following restrictions on labour migration, numbers of asylum 
applications rose, because other channels of immigration were blocked. Nevertheless, 
asylum immigration remained relatively insignificant and hardly contested throughout 
the 70s. In France, the main groups at the time, (Chilean dissidents escaping the military 
dictatorship of Pinochet from 1973 onwards and the so-called ‘boat people’ from 
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Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, mostly fleeing communist regimes), received widespread 
sympathy both in public and governmental discourse (Fassin, 2016b). Despite increasing 
hostility towards migrants more broadly, asylum immigration kept a positive image 
(Gisti, 2014). Being an exception from a rule of increasing closure, asylum law was 
liberalized. From 1977, asylum-seekers obtained the right to work from the moment the 
asylum claim was filed with the agency in charge, the ‘Office Français Pour les Réfugiés 
et Apatrides’35 (OFPRA) (de Wangen, 2016). 
From Welcoming ‘Refugees’ to Rejecting ‘Bogus Asylum-Seekers’ 
While both the trends in asylum applications and the politicization of the asylum norm 
developed relatively in parallel in the two decades after World War II, particularly from 
the 1990s onwards the trajectories increasingly diverged: 
In Germany, the second half of the 1970s witnessed a rapid rise to more than 
100,000 applications in 1980. Firstly, this was due to restrictive immigration policies 
introduced for the economic recession. In consequence, the asylum procedure had 
become the only remaining bottleneck of legal immigration, including cases of family 
reunification of guest workers. Secondly, changing patterns of migration at the global 
scale – including consequences of decolonization and economic globalizations - 
increased forced migration from the Global South to Europe. Given the rapid rise in 
numbers and an alarming public discourse, asylum became for the first time a highly 
contentious issue during the election campaign to the German Bundestag in 1980. The 
figure of the ‘bogus asylum-seeker’ and the criminalization of migration became 
established in public discourse, followed by increasingly restrictive conditions during the 
asylum process and changes in determining eligibility.36 Many considered ‘pull factors’ 
(e.g. seemingly attractive welfare systems in Europe) to be responsible for oscillating 
numbers in asylum applications rather than the ‘push factors’ such as changing situations 
in conflict and crisis-torn countries in the Global South. From the 1980s, restrictions were 
introduced ‘to avoid the “trickling-in” and integration of asylum-seekers in German 
society until the end of their asylum procedure and by this to serve as a deterrence’ 
(Herbert, 2001: 265). This was achieved through obligatory accommodation in collective 
asylum facilities, restrictions to mobility and a work ban. As a result of the deliberate 
                                                 
35  ‘French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons’. 
36  Torture, for instance, was subsequently only recognized as a legitimate reason to be granted asylum 
if it was also explicitly prohibited by law in the country of origin (Oltmer & Bade, 2005a). 
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separation of asylum-seekers from German society and the high rejection rates (which 
were in part related to the fact that many came from war-torn contexts but did not fall into 
the narrow definition of political asylum), asylum-seekers were increasingly portrayed as 
‘economic asylum-seekers’ and ‘bogus refugees’ (Herbert, 2001: 265). 
Despite these restrictions, numbers further increased, reaching more than 120,000 
applications in 1989, almost 195,000 in 1990 and over 250,000 in 1991 (Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016). The largest share of applications constituted ethnic 
minorities from the Balkans, fleeing the violent implosion of Yugoslavia after the fall of 
the iron curtain. In the meanwhile, nonetheless, forced migrants had lost their symbolic 
relevance in the block confrontation. Generally, it was not the objective situation of 
victims of violence and prosecution that had changed, but rather the ‘affects and values, 
mobilized in the determination of their situation’ (Fassin 2016: 62, author's translation). 
In the early 1990s, public controversies further sharpened. Germany witnessed an 
interplay of xenophobic discourses in both the media and the most established political 
parties, preparing the ground for racist attacks in various parts of the country (Herbert, 
2001: 308 f.). As an illustrative example, the tabloid BILD (the newspaper with the largest 
readership at the time) fuelled the outrage, noting in July 1991: ‘the Germans are neither 
xenophobic nor racist. But if the uncontrolled influx of asylants37 continues, also violence 
against them will necessarily increase, too’ (Bild, 1991, author's translation). Or in 1992: 
‘almost every minute a new asylant [arrives.] The tide is rising, when will the boat sink?’ 
(Bild, 1992).38 Racist violence erupted in various locations: In the Eastern town of 
Hoyerswerda, neo-fascists chased asylum-seekers in the streets and set two facilities on 
fire. The xenophobic riots lasted for several days, were openly supported by parts of the 
local population and not decisively contested by the police. Similar disturbing scenes 
occurred in other parts of Germany such as Rostock-Lichtenhagen, Mölln and Solingen. 
In this political and social context, 13 per cent of the German population qualified the 
racist attacks as ‘legitimate expressions of popular rage [Volkszorn]’ (cited in Herbert, 
2001: 315). A CDU-politician referred to it ‘not as racism but as an entirely legitimate 
expression of dissent to the massive abuse of asylum law’ (cited in Herbert, 2001: 315, 
auhtor's translation).  
After long debates within and between the Social Democrats and the Christian 
Democrats, the two parties agreed on the so-called ‘asylum compromise’, which de facto 
                                                 
37 Pejorative term for the formal terms ‘asylum-seeker’ or ‘asylum applicant’ (Bade, 2015). 
38  For a more extensive overview of the hostile media discourse, compare also (Brosius & Esser, 1995). 
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rendered the right to asylum enshrined in former article 16 of the German constitution 
null and void: by introducing the safe third country, safe country of origin rules and the 
airport procedure, which made it almost impossible to apply for asylum in Germany. 
Racist attacks and the ‘assault on the right to asylum’ triggered also pro-migrant and anti-
racist mass-mobilizations (Herbert, 2001; Monforte, 2014). More than 300,000 people 
demonstrated in Berlin in November 1992 against the constitutional reform (Kubon, 
2012; Monforte, 2014). In Munich, more than 400,000 demonstrated against xenophobia 
(Gaserow, 2012). Furthermore, the first sustained mobilizations of asylum-seekers, the 
‘Voice Africa Forum’, later renamed ‘Voice Refugee Forum’, fall into this period of a 
particularly hostile climate for forced migrants in Germany (Jakob, 2016). 
The constitutional reform had its immediate effect. Numbers of asylum 
applications nosedived from the temporary peak of 438,000 in 1993 to 322,000 in 1994 
and 127,000 in 1995 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016). Despite the drop 
in numbers of asylum applications, the living conditions of those remaining did not 
improve. Furthermore, asylum politics had meanwhile become part of the European 
integration process, which highly prioritized security over human rights. In 1997, the first 
Dublin regulation came into force, delegating the responsibility to process asylum 
application to the states at the European external border – which further contributed to an 
almost linear decrease of applications to just above 28,000 in 2008 (Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016).  
Also in France, from the 1980s onward, the public perception and attitude of 
political elites regarding forced migration changed drastically. Under socialist president 
François Mitterand, elected in 1980, immigration policies first seemed to lead toward a 
more liberal and rights-based approach (Abdallah, 2000: 33 f.). The new government 
legalized around 130,000 undocumented migrants between 1981 and 1982 (Abdallah, 
2000: 17). Furthermore, migrants were given the right to form interest organizations such 
as ‘SOS Racisme’ and ‘Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples’ 
(MRAP), which emerged from this shift in the legal framework (and remained close to 
the socialist party) (Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016: 144 ff.). When the far-right ‘Front 
National’ won in popularity in the early eighties, however, the socialist government soon 
reverted to highly restrictive policies. Following the victory of conservatives in the 
parliamentary elections in 1986 and a subsequent cohabitation39, a set of restrictive laws 
                                                 
39  This French particularity describes the situation when a president of one party is obliged to share power 
with a prime minister from another party. 
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was introduced by the new centre-right Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua. The 
package curtailed the right to asylum, introduced stricter rules for acquiring citizenship 
and facilitating deportations was introduced. Similarly to the German case, asylum 
applications increased from 22,000 in 1982 to a peak of 62,000 in 1989 (OFPRA, 2013) 
and countries of origin diversified. Yet, compared to the peak in asylum applications in 
Germany (more than 430.000 in 1993) (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016), 
the numbers remained relatively low. Nevertheless, due to increasing unemployment and 
the emergence of the far right, immigration became central to an increasingly hostile 
public debate. As Didier Fassin demonstrated, the subsequent nosediving of recognition 
rates was not mainly related to changing ‘derservingness’ or increasing ‘fraud’ but rather 
a new politics of asylum in Europe. Both in public discourse and in administrative 
decisions, African boat people received far less compassion than those from South-East 
Asia less than a decade before (Fassin, 2016b). The figure of the previously ‘welcome 
refugee’ was gradually replaced by the ‘unwanted asylum-seeker’ or the ‘real refugee’ by 
the ‘bogus asylum-seeker’ (Crépeau, 1995; Julien-Laferrière, 2016). In reaction to 
increasing numbers of asylum-applications, the French government introduced policies 
to discourage asylum-seekers from coming to France in the first place, and to prevent 
those already there from integrating in society with a view to rendering their potential 
deportation after rejection easier.  
In 1991, an increasingly anti-migrant social climate culminated in the ‘Circulaire 
Cresson’, a migration law restriction, which explicitly aimed at eliminating a ‘pull-effect’ 
for asylum immigration by inserting far-reaching restrictions. As in the case of Germany, 
many of the restrictions introduced in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped the respective 
asylum system up to this date. Work permits for asylum-seekers were made subject to a 
priority clause for French citizens. Dropping recognition rates and hence, rising rejections 
- in 1991, 100,000 rejected asylum-seekers were estimated in France (Abdallah, 2000: 
40) - triggered the first widespread protest initiated by rejected asylum-seekers in 1991 
throughout the country (Siméant, 1998), involving Kurds, Angolans and Chileans among 
others, who had been in France for years waiting for a decision on their cases (Delahaye, 
1991). Instead of mobilizing against an asylum system considered unjust, they demanded 
regularization outside the asylum system. This trend further accentuated when Pasqua 
announced the aim of ‘zero immigration’ in his second term in office as Minister of the 
Interior (Cohen, 1993). In consequence, and in contrast to Germany, France witnessed a 
tremendous politicisation of undocumented immigration, later termed ‘sans-papiers’, 
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which became an issue of national importance at the latest from 1996 onwards. From the 
early 1990s, hence, the topic of asylum was addressed together with the broader question 
of immigration.40  
From an ‘Ice Age’ of Asylum Politics to the German ‘Summer of Welcome’ 
In Germany, the major asylum law reforms in 1993 initiated an ‘ice age’ of asylum 
politics characterized by few reforms and harsh conditions for asylums seekers (Jakob, 
2016). In 2000 the first Social Democrat-Green government introduced a citizenship 
reform, complementing the restrictive German ius sanguinis citizenship model with 
elements of a birthplace, ius solis. Despite this important novelty in immigration law, 
asylum law in strictu sensu was not touched significantly by the center-left government. 
On the contrary, in the process of Europeanization of asylum politics, it was the German 
Minister of the Interior at the time, Otto Schily (SPD), who pressed for the continuation 
of the Dublin regulation (Dublin II) in 2003 (Baumann, 2008; Lorenz, 2015), attributing 
the responsibility of dealing with asylum applications to the country where asylum-
seekers first enter European territory. In consequence, numbers of asylum applications 
decreased constantly further until 2008, reaching the level of the early 1980s (Bundesamt 
für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016). Asylum-seekers who had been organizing political 
protest since the mid-1990s, in the midst of repression, received close to no public 
attention and solidarity remained limited to an anti-racist (radical left and faith-based) 
niche (see also section 4.4. on the migrant rights movements in Germany and France). A 
liberalizing dynamic in asylum politics set in gradually from 2010 (Jakob, 2016). The 
government of Brandenburg eased up on ‘Residenzpflicht’, allowing asylum-seekers to 
move within the entire ‘Land’ (German regions). Traveling to Berlin remained subject to 
explicit permission by the authorities (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin e.V., 2011). In July 2012, the 
German constitutional court ruled the decade-long practice to pay asylum-seekers 40 per 
cent below the minimum subsistence level to be unconstitutional (BVerfG, 2012).  
As noted above, asylum applications had dropped constantly until 2008, when 
asylum applications reached the lowest level since 1983 (Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge, 2016). From 2009 onwards, numbers first moderately rose (2011: 49,000), 
then from 2012 onwards and due to the escalation of the Libyan and Syrian crises 
accelerated, to roughly 130,000 in 2013 and just above 200,000 in 2014. The rising 
numbers led to a re-politicisation of asylum and an increasingly strict discursive 
                                                 
40 See also section 4.3. on the irregularity-asylum nexus below. 
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differentiation in ‘real refugees’ and allegedly ‘bogus asylum-seekers’. These debates 
culminated as early as the summer of 2014 in another asylum law reform, this time 
involving the Green Party, who voted (together with the governing coalition) in the 
German Bundesrat in favour of adding Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia to the 
list of ‘safe countries of origin’. The package of asylum law reforms, in turn, also included 
the alleviation from key restrictions on asylum-seekers in Germany, such as the peculiar 
mobility restriction ‘Residenzpflicht’ and an extensive work-ban (even though access to 
the job market de facto continued to be strongly restricted). The increasing polarization 
in attitudes towards asylum (Decker, Kiess, & Brähler, 2014) was furthermore illustrated 
by two contradictory, yet interrelated trends accentuating in 2014. On the one hand, the 
xenophobic movement ‘PEGIDA’ (‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the 
Occident’) started marching on a weekly basis in Dresden in October 2014 (Rucht, 2014), 
and rapidly spread to other cities, reaching a peak of around 17,000 participants in 
Dresden in January 2015. From 2014 onwards, furthermore, the originally anti-Euro party 
‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD), increasingly shifted towards an explicit xenophobic, 
anti-immigration profile. On the other hand, volunteering for forced migrants has also 
increased considerably after 2011. According to a survey conducted in 2014 staff 
members of associations involved in assisting forced migrants estimated an increase of 
volunteers by around 70 per cent from 2011 onwards (Karakayali and Kleist, 2015).  
Despite these changes prior to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’41, the summer of 2015 
became a critical juncture (della Porta, 2018b; Hess et al., 2017): Numbers of asylum 
applications in Germany rose due to an escalating war in Syria and shortage of funding 
for refugee camps in neighboring countries. In contrast to the 1990s, rising numbers did 
not provoke a hegemonic rejection of asylum-seekers, but led to a gradual (and 
temporary) mainstreaming of supportive attitudes toward ‘refugees’ (Jakob, 2016). 
Starting from civil society associations, in summer 2015, more and more politicians, trade 
unions, companies and media outlets joined in. On August 29, the traditionally right-
leaning tabloid BILD (with an infamously xenophobic record in reporting on the arrival 
of asylum-seekers in the early 1990s) launched a campaign under the label ‘Refugees 
Welcome’ to connect and inform volunteers. Only two days later, German Chancellor 
Merkel’s quote ‘Wir schaffen das’ (‘We can do this’) prepared a fundamental U-turn in 
                                                 
41  I put the term ‘refugee crisis’ in inverted commas on purpose because we refer to the dominant framing 
of the developments in summer 2015. Yet, we claim that the phenomenon is better depicted as a ‘crisis 
of the European border regime’ (Schwiertz & Ratfisch, 2016), a ‘crisis of refugee protection’ (Scherr, 
2016b), a ‘political crisis’ (Geddes, 2017) or, better, by avoiding the crisis terminology altogether, as 
‘the long summer of migration’ (Kasparek & Speer, 2015). 
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governmental policy. Within a surprisingly short period of time, ‘refugee solidarity’ had 
moved from a niche in society to become (temporarily) hegemonic. On September 5th, 
the German government in a historical moment declared to open the borders and receive 
asylum-seekers who had been stranded in Hungary, which equalled a temporary 
suspension of the Dublin agreement. Following this decision, the already high numbers 
of daily arrivals further increased to various thousands. Pictures of self-organized 
welcome committees cheering at asylum-seekers at railway stations in Munich became 
emblematic for the rapid mainstreaming of supportive attitudes toward forced migrants 
(Fleischmann & Steinhilper, 2017; Steinhilper & Karakayali, 2018). 
However, the social climate continued to be highly polarized. The right-wing 
party AfD subsequently entered numerous regional parliaments;42 2015 witnessed the 
highest number of violent attacks on asylum-seekers and asylum facilities in one year 
ever counted (Pro Asyl, 2016c). Violent riots in the Eastern cities of Heidenau, Tröglitz, 
Clausnitz (among others), recalled the racist attacks in the early 1990s, however, this time 
– both politicians and the media unanimously condemned the violence. Despite the pro-
‘refugee’ position of Chancellor Merkel, the grand coalition of CDU and SPD in autumn 
2015 enacted the most rigid asylum laws since 1993 with the so-called ‘asylum packages’ 
I and II (Bundesregierung, 2016; Pro Asyl, 2016b). 
In France, the developments in the 2000s, including the repercussions of the 
‘summer of migration’, were somewhat different. While the second half of the 1990s 
introduced a wave of contention around undocumented migration (the so-called ‘sans-
papiers question’), the issue of asylum became only occasionally politicised. The public 
debate on the issue mainly circulated around Calais and Sangatte in Northern France, 
where asylum-seekers increasingly gathered, attempting to cross the channel hidden on 
trucks, ships or freight-trains and subsequently to apply for asylum in the United 
Kingdom. At the beginning, most migrants originated from war-torn Kosovo Chechnya, 
later Afghanistan and Iraq and currently Somalia and Sudan. Most refrained from 
applying for asylum in France due to (depending on the country of origin) comparatively 
low recognition rates (Bendel, 2013; Neumayer, 2005a). In response, a camp 
administered by the French Red Cross was opened in 1999 but rapidly proved to be 
undersized (Schwenken, 2014: 175). Given the large numbers of border crossings, the 
UK government blamed France for getting rid of irregular migrants by facilitating the 
                                                 
42  In the 2017 national elections, the party obtained 12,6 per cent and entered the German Bundestag as 
the third strongest party. 
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presence close to the tunnel in the camp and by this increasing the likelihood of successful 
passage. During the French presidential elections in 2002, the issue became one of the 
key controversies during the campaign. Shortly after the entering of office of conservative 
Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy, the centre was closed down despite large protests 
of migrants and anti-racist groups (Schwenken, 2014: 176). Yet, this intervention did not 
stop migrants from arriving in the region and trying to cross to the UK. In consequence, 
precarious makeshift camps and squats popped up in the outskirts of the city of Calais, 
which were referred to as the ‘Jungle of Calais’ by both the media and inhabiting 
migrants. Various thousands of migrants lived in the camp, mostly only for a couple of 
months before managing to cross to the UK. In autumn 2009, after heated controversies 
and repression (destruction of tents, prevention of humanitarian activities by supporting 
associations, raffles etc.) the ‘jungle’ was evicted and burned down (Schwenken, 2014). 
However, the huts and tents were rebuilt shortly after and a spiral of eviction and 
rebuilding unfolded, due to the absence of alternatives offered and accepted by the 
migrants involved (Alexander, 2014; Bulman, 2016; Walker, Weaver, & Pujol-Mazzini, 
2016). The fact that controversies on forced migration centred around Calais was also due 
to relatively low numbers of asylum applications in France, reaching just below 60,000 
in 2015 (OFPRA, 2016) and around 80,000 in 2016. Consequently, the notion of a 
‘summer of migration’ applied to Germany, but far less so in France. Whereas the EU 
witnessed the largest arrival of forced migrants in its history - with 745,000 applications 
in Germany in 2016 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2016), France remained, 
despite an increase, relatively little affected. Nevertheless, intense public debates around 
forced migration emerged around the accommodation of asylum-seekers in Paris (see 
Chapter 7) and continued in the border zones of Ventimiglia/Nice and Calais. 
4.3.  Asylum and Irregularity in France and Germany 
As stated in the terminological note in the introduction, the phenomenon of forced 
migration transcends the neat legal distinction between ‘political’ refugees and 
‘economic’ migrants (Carling, 2015; Scheel & Squire, 2014). In contexts of increasing 
restrictions on legal migration, including asylum, irregular migration is a widespread 
side-effect (Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016; Stobbe, 2004). Indeed, even though for obvious 
reasons, exact numbers are non-existent, the comparative research project ‘Clandestino’ 
has estimated numbers above 200,000 in both France and Germany (Courau, 2009; Cyrus, 
2009; Vogel, 2015). Given the important nexus of irregularity and asylum, I will 
subsequently illustrate how both fields interact and overlap in the two contexts of 
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investigation. 
The Irregularity-Asylum Nexus 
Forced migrants are often irregular migrants in countries in the Global North, because 
their asylum claim was rejected or they never even applied, knowing that their complex 
biography of forced migration would not correspond with the restrictive definition of 
asylum. Despite this factual irregularity-asylum nexus, public discourses, legal 
frameworks and also the living-conditions for undocumented migrants vary widely across 
contexts. Monforte and Dufour have identified highly distinct levels of exclusion of 
undocumented migrants in Germany and France (Monforte & Dufour, 2011). In France, 
vivid public debates around irregular migration date back to the early 1970s. While 
restrictions on irregular migration proliferated, a wide range of newly founded 
associations and established human rights NGOs started to support the rights of 
undocumented migrants. This is partly related to a large share of undocumented migrants 
originating from former French colonies, adding a layer of historic or moral responsibility 
to the debate. Given the linguistic advantage and a large, irregular job market particularly 
in the catering sector, care work, construction and cleaning, many undocumented 
migrants remained de facto relatively well integrated in society, despite their irregular 
status (Abdallah, 2000; Brun, 2006; Courau, 2009; Monforte & Dufour, 2011). Others 
had lived and worked in France for years or even decades and were made irregular by law 
reforms denying an extension of their visa (Abdallah, 2000). Furthermore, as a ‘civic’ 
type of citizenship regime, France had ever since been more open to immigration 
compared to Germany, for instance, which for a long time remained a reluctant 
immigration country. As a result of this particular historical, social, and linguistic context, 
France witnessed various waves of regularisation of undocumented migrants, including 
around 130,000 in 1981 and around 90,000 in 1997/8 (Courau, 2009). Following the vast 
mobilizations of undocumented migrants and supporting associations and citizens in the 
second half of the 1990s, civil society succeeded in pushing for the automatic 
regularization of irregular migrants from 1998 onwards. If an irregular migrant had 
resided in France for more than 10 years, if he was ill or if he had children born in France, 
he would automatically be regularized. This meant annual regularisation of around 25,000 
individuals. The automatic regularization was abolished in May 2006 with the 
implementation of the Sarkozy law on migration (Courau, 2009). 
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In Germany, in turn, undocumented migration ‘remained mainly a topic for 
specialised actors and became only rarely a “hot issue” in the public debate’ (Cyrus, 
2009). Not least due to the German particularity of ‘Duldung’ (roughly translates to 
‘tolerance’), irregular migration is both in public discourse and administration closely 
related to asylum. ‘Duldung’ describes a German legal (non)-status. Technically, it is a 
suspension of deportation, often following a rejection of an asylum application, in cases 
of practical or humanitarian objections to a deportation. The status is usually renewed on 
a monthly basis. However, it expires immediately in the moment when a deportation 
notice is being sent. Neither regularized nor undocumented, individuals with ‘Duldung’ 
are locked into a status of limbo and precariousness. Originally, ‘this legal status was 
understood as an exception, yet, its prevalence has reached an enormous scale. In 2013, 
94,000 (Deustcher Bundestag, 2014: 24) were registered with this status, in 2016, as many 
as 159,678 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017: 29). Individuals with ‘Duldung’ are usually 
accommodated in the same centralized structures as asylum-seekers and are subject to 
even more accentuated restrictions in terms of mobility, working permit and access to 
services. Nevertheless, in Germany, many rejected asylum-seekers tend to stay in this 
restricted condition rather than opting for complete irregularity (Cyrus, 2009). This is 
mainly due to much more regular controls in the public space (particularly for Persons of 
Colour), as well as a largely inaccessible job and housing market for individuals without 
papers (Monforte & Dufour, 2011; Stobbe, 2004). Moreover, the likelihood of escaping 
irregularity through regularization is generally low and limited to those with a status of 
‘Duldung’.  
Given these differences in two ‘borderline citizenship regimes’, the room for 
manoeuvre for individuals with an irregular status is larger in France than in Germany. 
Considerable differences between the countries furthermore exist with regard to how their 
respective asylum systems are designed. 
Key Characteristics of the Asylum Systems in Germany and France 
Despite repeated attempts to harmonize asylum systems in the European Union, the 
respective traditions, legal frameworks and administrative implementations differ 
strongly between countries. In consequence, specific hardships and hence, grievances of 
asylum-seekers are also rooted in national specificities.  
The German asylum system is distinctive from other European countries, 
including France, for its focus on dispersal of asylum-seekers throughout the country, 
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which has historically aimed at both ‘burden sharing’ and deterrence (Boswell, 2003; 
Hinger, 2016; Steinhilper & Hinger, 2017). Unlike in other domains, the 'burden sharing' 
between the different regions does not consist of a financial agreement between the 
‘Länder’43 but of a physical dispersal of asylum-seekers. The latter are distributed on a 
no-choice basis, according to the so-called ‘Königstein quota’ that takes into account the 
tax revenue and number of inhabitants of each Land. The ‘Länder’ are responsible for the 
'first reception' (‘Erstaufnahme’) of asylum-seekers. To this end, the ‘Länder’, in 
cooperation with private companies and/or welfare organizations, run large 'reception 
centers' for hundreds or thousands of people. Asylum-seekers are required to stay there 
up to 6 months before being either deported or transferred to subsequent accommodation 
(‘Anschlussunterbrinung’) organized by the municipalities. For the most part the 
dispersal within the Länder also follows a quota system. The dispersal of asylum-seekers 
was introduced in the late 1970s, along with centralized accommodation. The obligation 
to live in accommodation centers introduced in 1982 was, and still is, part of an asylum 
policy that aims to deter (potential) asylum-seekers. As Lothar Späth, the CDU-governor 
of Baden-Württemberg noted in an interview in 1982 with the newspaper ‘Schwäbisches 
Tagblatt’: ‘The number of asylum-seekers only decreased when the bush drums signalled 
– don't go to Baden-Württemberg, there you have to live in a camp’ (quoted in Müller, 
2010: 197, author's translation). Based on the same rationale, the Bavarian ‘Ordinance on 
the Implementation of Asylum’ (‘Asyldurchführungsverordnung’) until 2013 explicitly 
stated that conditions during the asylum procedure should ‘encourage’ asylum-seekers to 
return to their countries of origin (Bayrische Staatsregierung, 2013). Justified with both 
budgetary constraints and deterrence, centralized accommodation is often highly 
precarious and entails a number of hardships (Johansson, 2016; Wendel, 2014a). The 
allocated living space ranges between four and six square metres per person, the 
number of persons per room from four to six (Wendel 2014: 39 f.).44 Bathrooms and 
kitchens are shared among various rooms. The location of collective accommodation 
also varies; mostly, however, facilities have been built in highly peripheral areas in 
industrial areas of urban regions and dispersed in rural areas (Pieper, 2008; Selders, 
2009). In many cases, remote former military barracks have been repurposed 
(Wendel, 2014b).  
                                                 
43 German term for States in the German federal political system. 
44  This passage refers to ordinary collective accommodations centres. From summer 2015, numerous 
emergency shelters have been opened with much more precarious living conditions. In one of these 
centres, the former airport of ‘Tempelhof’ in Berlin, various thousands of asylum-seekers were hosted 
for months with extremely limited privacy (Berliner Morgenpost, 2015). 
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Despite these general characteristics of asylum accommodation in Germany, 
considerable differences exist. Whereas some municipalities have followed the 
demands of asylum-seekers and support initiatives to decentralize accommodation (that 
is, to make private flats available), others adhere to centralized accommodation. 
Somehow, the German reception and accommodation system is like playing the lottery. 
The lucky ones end up in localities with a decentralized accommodation system, a great 
support infrastructure, as well as training and job opportunities. The not so lucky ones, 
on the other hand, find themselves in an isolated accommodation centre with no support, 
poor job and training prospects. Lately, the German asylum system has increasingly 
turned into a class system with different kinds of accommodation for different 'classes' of 
asylum-seekers, who are distinguished on the basis of their (prospective) legal status, 
their nationality, gender, age and merit. In many municipalities, asylum-seeking persons 
can only move into private flats once they have been granted asylum. This is especially 
true for single men. Women and families, just like other persons deemed 'vulnerable' are 
granted access to private accommodation more easily, even before their status has been 
determined (Steinhilper & Hinger, 2017). Due to the significant increase of asylum-
seekers from 2014 onwards, numerous new emergency shelters have been built or 
municipal buildings reused (such as sport halls, kindergartens etc.). As a result of 
peripheral location, limited private space and many people sharing few kitchens and 
bathrooms, life in collective accommodation has been described as being usually 
highly precarious (Johansson, 2016; Wendel, 2014b).  
 Geographical dispersal and centralized accommodation was complemented in 
Germany by ‘Residenzpflicht’, particularly until 2015, when a legal reform limited its 
applicability, yet did not abolish the law as such. Other than the term implies, this law 
does not only determine the locality of residence of asylum-seekers, but it prohibits 
individuals from leaving certain administrative boundaries. It is therefore the harshest 
mobility restriction for asylum-seekers in Europe (Jakob, 2016). The size of the 
administrative boundaries varies across the regions (‘Länder’) (Selders, 2009). Until 
2012 in most cases mobility was restricted to the administrative area of the 
immigration offices, usually the municipal borders. From 2010 onwards, various 
regions extended the radius of mobility to the regional boundaries. Freedom of 
circulation at a national level was still not allowed. Exemptions had to be requested 
and were decided at the discretion of the respective immigration office. Immigration 
offices regularly demanded fees for issuing permissions (Jakob, 2016). Violations of 
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‘Residenzpflicht’ could be sanctioned with fines of up to 2.500 €. In a major asylum 
law reform in summer 2014, entering into force in January 2015, ‘Residenzpflicht’  
became limited to the first three months of status determination and to cases of 
violations of the law (including minor ones such as using public transport without a 
ticket). While the locality of residence remains determined by the state, asylum-
seekers and those ‘Geduldete’ who cover their living expenses are granted freedom 
of circulation nationwide. However, ‘Residenzpflicht’ has formally not been 
abolished and its re-expansion is regularly discussed. Both centralized accommodation 
and ‘Residenzpflicht’ have served as means to discipline asylum-seekers, to facilitate 
their potential expulsion (Pieper, 2008) and to minimize contact and hence potential 
empathy with asylum-seekers by the German population (Jakob, 2016: 15).  
In short, the reception and accommodation of asylum-seekers in Germany is a 
tightly regulated system. On the upside, it is difficult to get out of this system. Unlike in 
France (see below), asylum-seekers rarely end up in the streets. On the downside, it is 
hard to 'escape' the asylum system, which disperses, accommodates and regulates on a 
no-choice basis, often in precarious conditions and with very little access to society. 
The French asylum system, in turn, was until the late 1980s known to be 
comparatively liberal. Asylum applications are usually processed in the prefecture 
(administration of the region), in which the asylum application was filed. Hence, the 
system does not foresee a systematic dispersal on a no-choice basis as in the German case. 
A mandatory residence or mobility restriction has never been in place. Asylum-seekers 
could furthermore choose to live in accommodation offered by the state or opt for a 
private solution (often facilitated by ethnic or kinship networks). Furthermore, until the 
early 1990s they were entitled to work. The turning point marked the separation of 
accommodation facilities for asylum-seekers and recognized refugees in 1991 
(Kobelinski, 2014). Subsequently, the option of obtaining housing allowances was 
replaced by compulsory and centralized housing offered by the state. Yet, the reception 
centres for asylum-seekers ‘Centre d’Accueil pour Demandeurs d’Asile’ (CADA) were 
from the very beginning insufficient in their capacity. In the 1990s, only 10 per cent of 
asylum-seekers were accommodated in CADAs, mainly women, children and elderly 
people. Those who did not obtain a place in a CADA or subsidiary emergency 
accommodation were entitled to a monetary compensation. Once any accommodation 
was offered, refusal to accept this place not only resulted in no further housing offers, but 
also in a cut of the temporary monetary compensations (Kobelinski, 2014). Hence, the 
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choice was replaced by a rigid system. Young single men were systematically left without 
shelter and monetary compensation for the lack of housing (Julien-Laferrière, 2016). 
Considering itself as mainly a transit country and deliberately intending to avoid a ‘pull 
effect’, the French system of asylum accommodation has ever since been deliberately 
undersized. The degree of this shortage became particularly evident in the course of 2015 
(see also Chapter 7). By the end of 2015, there were 50,000 places in CADA or emergency 
shelters for the entire country (France, 2015; see also Le Parisien Online, 2015b) in spite 
of 80,000 asylum applications in 2015 alone and thousands of cases still pending from 
previous years) (OFPRA, 2016). A report by the French Senate on the accommodation 
published in December 2016 concludes a chronical under-funding and a system ‘at the 
level of asphyxiation’ [about to collapse] (Senate of France, 2016: 5).  
Given the limited number of places in CADA, they are considered as a ‘privilege’ 
(Interview P8) within the French asylum system, compared to the short-term solutions in 
emergency shelters and life in the streets. Consequently, in contrast to Germany, migrant 
rights organizations in France have usually advocated for the establishment of more 
reception centre (Interview P8, Interview P9, Interview P18) rather than for their abolition 
(as in the case of Germany). The limited availability of long-term housing for asylum-
seekers, also discourages from protesting against precarious conditions in CADAs by 
their inhabitants. A former director of a large migrant rights organization in France noted 
in an interview: ‘In a system which leaves the vast majority without any accommodation, 
there is no way for those few who have received accommodation to express dissent. No 
matter how difficult the circumstances in the CADA are’ (Interview P18). 
Yet, various studies have shown that both in France and Germany, the living 
conditions of asylum-seekers entail numerous hardships that are rooted in centralized 
accommodation and the dependence on a highly consequential bureaucratic procedure.  
 Due to its centralized system of accommodation alongside a set of restrictive laws, 
the German dispositive of asylum has been described as ‘organized disintegration’ 
(Täubig, 2009). Borrowing from Erving Goffman, Vicki Täubig conceptualises 
asylum facilities as ‘total institutions’, due to their hermetic nature, the dependence 
on one central authority and the concentration of all aspects of life in one location 
(ibid). In her extensive qualitative analysis of the everyday life experiences of asylum-
seekers in Germany, she scrutinized the temporal, spatial and relational effects of the 
‘total institution of asylum’ (ibid). Most respondents referred to an extension of time 
through seemingly endless waiting, resulting in emotions of boredom and frustration; to 
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a high spatial concentration of their lives in the asylum camp itself due to segregation 
from German society (ibid); and to a constant fear of deportation. Despite the differences 
in its concrete implementation, the accommodation system implies certain structural 
features that have serious negative repercussions for asylum-seeking persons: many 
facilities are located in urban peripheries or in the countryside, which complicates social 
relations with persons outside the facilities. The life in the centres is characterized by a 
lack of privacy and regular conflicts. Forced inactivity during the at times lengthy asylum 
procedures, and the social and spatial concentration in the accommodation centres 
gradually undermines an autonomous conduct of life. Numerous studies on the everyday 
life of asylum-seekers in Germany have documented patterns of social and spatial 
exclusion from the majority population and tremendous emotional and psychological 
strain among asylum-seekers.45 Evidently, the psycho-social effects vary depending on 
the individual disposition and conditions in the different asylum facilities, yet, to a large 
degree, they are inherent in the asylum system.  
 Indeed, research on the French context has traced similar effects (Kobelinski, 
2010, 2014). While most perceive the first days and weeks in a CADA as a relief from 
highly precarious living conditions (e.g. in the streets), the repercussions of semi-closed 
and centralized accommodation become evident gradually. After a while, the everyday 
life of asylum-seekers in centralized accommodation is characterized by an extension of 
time, a condensation of space due to limited mobility, a highly precarious provisionality 
of social relations and emotional states and hence a loss of an autonomous conduct of life 
(Kobelinski, 2014). Due to the peripheral location of most centres, social relations to 
French citizens are structurally complicated. The disciplinary rules in the centres create a 
deep feeling of dependency, control and unease among most inhabitants (Kobelinski, 
2010). 
4.4.  Mobilizations for and by Forced Migrants in Germany and France 
Within these socio-political contexts in France and Germany, which comprise both 
similarities and differences, political mobilizations have taken distinct forms in both 
countries.46 Given the distinct migration histories, as well as legal and social contexts, 
                                                 
45  For a recent overview commissioned by the Robert Bosch Foundation, see Johansson (2016). 
46  This cursory overview is meant to situate the subsequent chapters of this manuscript. Much more 
extensive accounts of the migrant rights movements in Germany and France can be found in Monforte 
(Monforte, 2014) and for the French context (Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016). 
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political mobilizations for rights and recognition of forced migrants have taken distinct 
shapes and trajectories in the two countries. 
In France, a migrant rights movement emerged in the early 1970s during the 
restrictions of immigration law mentioned above, which rendered numerous migrant 
workers illegal and led to a rise in deportations and acts of contestation against them 
(Abdallah, 2000; Gisti, 2014). In this period, established human rights associations such 
as ‘La Ligue des Droits de l’Homme’ (LDH), ‘Cimade’ and ‘Mouvement contre le 
Racisme et l’Amitié entre les Peoples’ (MRAP) worked alongside more recently 
established migrant solidarity groups such as ‘Groupe d’Information et de Soutien des 
Immigrés’ (GISTI) or ‘Fédération des Associations de Solidarité avec tous-t-es les 
Immigré-e-s’ (FASTI). Given the relative irrelevance of asylum until the late 1970s, the 
organizations mainly focused on the human rights of undocumented migrants, migrant 
workers, anti-racism and anti-colonialism (the latter being a highly contentious issue in 
France due to the violent decolonization struggles in Algeria at the time) (Abdallah, 
2000). Due to the high number of migrant workers who had become illegalized following 
immigration law reforms from the mid-1970s onwards, various trade unions had become 
engaged in migrant (worker) solidarity, amongst them also the large unions 
‘Confédération Générale du Travail’ (CGT)47 and ‘Confédération Française 
Démocratique du Travail’ (CFDT)48. In contrast to Germany, the migrant rights 
movement in France has from its emergence been closely related to mobilizations by 
migrants themselves. The illegalization of migrants and their acts of contestation 
including hunger strikes and strikes in the workplaces from the early 1970s onwards has 
strongly influenced the wider migrant rights movement. Not least due to these 
mobilizations, the socialist government, entering office in 1980, legalized around 130,000 
undocumented migrants between 1980 and 1981 (Abdallah, 2000). 
Similarly, in the 1980s, in the context of electoral success of the far-right Front 
National at the local level and the proliferation of racist violence, young migrants (so-
called ‘beurs’) re-dynamized the movement. Their 1983 ‘Marche pour l’Égalité et Contre 
le Racisme’ gathered at its final demonstration around 100,000 participants in Paris, by 
far the largest mobilization concerning the issue of migration in French history at the time 
(Willems, 1999: 185). While internal disputes led to a rapid fragmentation of the protest 
alliance including migrants and supporting associations, these mobilizations had 
                                                 
47 Translates to ‘General Confederation of Labour’. 
48 Translates into ‘French Democratic Confederation of Labour’. 
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important repercussions: one of the highly influential migrant rights NGOs, ‘SOS 
Racisme’, was created in its aftermath, resulting in a subsequent integration of migrant 
dissent into formalized associations, close to the socialist party (Abdallah, 2000; Nicholls 
& Uitermark, 2016).  
The core French pro-beneficiary associations (re)-intensified their cooperation in 
the late 1980s with the creation of the ‘Réseau d’information et de solidarité’ 
(‘Information and Solidarity Network’) to contest deportations of undocumented 
migrants, including rejected asylum-seekers (Monforte, 2014). Due to this legacy of pro-
migrant mobilizations in France since the 1970s, the topic of asylum was from the 
moment of its politicisation addressed within a broader framework of migrant rights. The 
associations involved argued that restrictive laws in both realms (asylum and 
undocumented migration) led to disenfranchised individuals with precarious residence 
status. Consequently, the reform of OFPRA in the early 1990s was collectively criticised 
and the subsequent hunger strikes of rejected asylum-seekers were supported by a broad 
alliance of organizations (human rights associations, anti-racist groups, trade unions) 
involving established actors in the field (Siméant, 1998). These associations also jointly 
mobilized against the immigration law reforms named after the ministers of Interior 
Pasqua in 1993 and Debré in 1996. In the 1990s, hence, the French migrant rights 
movement was highly organized, involving frequent interactions of a wide range of 
associations.  
A major push was given to the migrant rights movement during the self-organized 
mobilizations by undocumented migrants starting in March 1996, which initiated the 
most extensive and sustainable wave of contention concerning immigration in French 
history. Despite multiple lines of fragmentation among the supporting associations and 
between the self-organized sans-papiers and supporters, the events in summer 1996 
represented a symbolic reference point of the movement up to this date (Blin, 2008; 
Marin, 2006; Siméant, 1998; Terray, 2006).  
In March 1996, around 300 undocumented migrants left the shadows and initiated 
a protest wave of occupations and hunger strikes culminating in the occupation of the 
church St Bernard in the 18th district of Paris (see also Chapter 7). Numerous migrant and 
human rights associations, as well as a collective of public intellectuals supported the 
struggles. National and international media reported extensively on what was at the time 
the largest wave of political mobilizations by undocumented migrants in Europe. With 
the eviction of the church in August 1996, the movement did not end. New sans papiers 
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collectives emerged all over France, loosely tied together by a National Coalition of Sans-
Papiers (CNSP) (Abdallah, 2000: 48). The upcoming national elections led to an 
increasing resonance of the issue in the (extra)-parliamentarian French left. By early 
1997, the explosive mix of increasing electoral success of the far-right Front National, 
the passage of the restrictive ‘Debré Law’ and the self-organized protests of sans-papiers 
fueled an unprecedented solidarity, mirrored in a turn-out of more than 100,000 
participants at a demonstration against the law in February 1997 (Libération, 1997). The 
‘sans-papiers question’ also became prominent in artistic circles. In early 1997, 66 young 
directors launched a public call to disobey the restrictive Debry law (Ervine, 2013: 33). 
During the internationally renowned film festival in Cannes the same year, all French 
directors displayed a three-minute short film on the protests in Paris before the screening 
of their festival contributions (Tarr, 2005). While the sans-papiers contributed to a 
national trend of reactivating the left, which eventually resulted in the victory of the 
socialist party on June 1st1997, the visibility and unity of the movement gradually 
diminished. Yet, the mobilizations had pushed the new government to issue the so-called 
‘Circulaire Chevènement’, which led to the regularization of around 90,000 
undocumented migrants, the largest of its kind in French history (Courau, 2009). 
Following this episode of contention, the movements rallying around the asylum issue 
comprised associations who were specifically involved in the asylum question as well as 
associations that addressed migration policies more generally. Accordingly, the 
association involved in pro-asylum and sans-papiers advocacy, were – despite their 
professionalization - far-reaching in their demands: In an open letter to Lionel Jospin in 
July 1997, various groups including Act Up – Paris, FASTI and GISTI demanded a 
French immigration policy based on ‘freedom of movement’ and ‘open borders’ (Act-Up 
Paris et al., 1997). 
As Monforte (2014) traces in his detailed reconstruction of the migrant rights 
movements in France, the following decade was characterized by regular interaction of a 
highly active and centralized migrant rights movement in France, addressing both the 
issue of asylum and immigration more broadly. Among the most important milestones in 
this movement was the 2002 ‘Coordination Française pour le Droit d’Asile’ (French 
Coordination for the Right to Asylum), the 2004 ‘Reseau Educations Sans Frontières’ 
(‘Network Education Without Borders’) and the 2006 network ‘Unies Contre une 
Immigration Jetable’ (‘United Against a Disposable Immigration’). Within these 
campaigns and during regular interactions of various associations, an active and 
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influential movement emerged. Yet, this highly cohesive movement was characterized by 
two less integrated sets of actors: associations with a clear humanitarian focus and a 
concentration on asylum (mainly ‘France Terre d’Asile’ (FTdA) and ‘Forum Refugié’) 
and the self-organized migrant collectives. The latest from the 1990s onwards, FTdA and 
‘Forum Refugié’ opted out from a broader migrant rights movement and limited the work 
to ‘humanitarian’ assistance, an exclusive focus on existing asylum law and with a by and 
large consensual relationship with the French state (Monforte, 2014). In addition, the 
sans-papiers collectives emerging in the second half of the 1990s were only occasionally 
integrated in the movement and remained at its margin (Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016). As 
Uitermark and Nicholls recall, migrant associations including the collectives had a hard 
time finding their place in a predominantly white and professionalized migrant rights 
movement in France (Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016). Despite closer contacts during and in 
the years following the Saint Bernard mobilizations, the role of the collectives was 
gradually diminished in controversies over representation, autonomy and leadership. 
With the increasing arrival of asylum-seekers in the North of France in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, as well as a Europeanization of immigration policies, the activities of the 
French migrant rights movement focused on the situation in the Calais region and 
increasingly Europeanized, establishing networks such as ‘Migreurop’ and joining into 
transnational networks such as the ‘No border’ network (Monforte, 2014). Contrary to 
the German case, which will be illustrated below, the French migrant rights movement 
did not undergo a major shift prior to and during the ‘long summer of migration’. The 
common suspect associations, cooperating since the 1990s, continued their cooperation 
on a regular basis. Yet, migration somewhat disappeared from the public discourse, 
becoming a footnote in the electoral campaigns to the presidential elections in 2016. 
In Germany, small-scale, grassroots solidarity with migrants had existed ever 
since the presence of forced migrants in Germany. Among the early activists were 
volunteers associated with churches, radical left groups and professionals from the 
welfare associations. When asylum became a highly contested issue in Germany for the 
first time in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the first ‘refugee councils’, regional networks 
for the coordination of pro-asylum activities emerged – Berlin being the first ‘refugee 
council’ to be established in 1981. Multiple campaigns were launched against 
deportations, work-bans for asylum-seekers, living conditions in the camps amongst 
others. Following the suicide of Cemal Altun, who jumped out of the window on the 6th 
floor of the administrative court in Berlin, desperate about his pending deportation, the 
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German wide network ‘Asyl in der Kirche’ (‘church asylum’) was founded to protect 
forced migrants in the sacral space of churches (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin e.V., 2011). Three 
years later, a national umbrella organization ‘Pro Asyl’ in 1986 was formed by a broad 
alliance of trade unions, welfare associations, human rights organizations and faith-based 
associations and the regional refugee councils (Pro Asyl, 2016a). Beyond these more 
formalized networks, anti-racist and anti-fascist groups organized decentralized protest 
and direct action in favour of asylum-seekers throughout the republic from the late 1980s 
onwards. Their repertoire of action was as diverse as the radical left by the time: 
Neighbourhood initiatives bought the food vouchers of asylum-seekers and blocked 
supermarkets to push for the introduction of cash transfers. Groups organized legal and 
medical support, German classes and visited the isolated camps (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin 
e.V., 2011). The ‘Revolutionäre Zellen’ (‘revolutionary cells’), a militant-left group, set 
on fire asylum-related administrative facilities in various cities to destroy the files with 
the idea of providing asylum-seekers a space beyond state control (Berliner Bündnis für 
Freilassung, 2000). Autonomous legal and medical collectives were formed in many 
cities to support asylum-seekers and illegalized migrants from the 90s onwards (Mylius, 
Bornschlegl, & Frewer, 2011). Yet, and in strong contrast to France, these mobilizations 
remained highly fragmented and localized (Monforte, 2014: 51). In the early 1990s, 
temporarily, a broad alliance of associations, including both the ‘political’ associations 
as well as the ‘humanitarian’ service providers (‘Diakonie’, ‘Caritas’, 
‘Arbeiterwohlfahrt’) launched campaigns to protest restrictive asylum laws. However, 
the strategy of these organizations was mainly oriented towards lobbying with politicians 
and the judiciary and had limited resonance among the wider public.  
Largely independent from the activities of the large and professionalized 
associations, during the peak of anti-migrant discourse and restrictive legal reforms, a 
grassroots anti-racist movement emerged in Germany in the early 1990s. In this period, 
various influential anti-racist organizations were founded, such as the ‘Antirassistische 
Initiative Berlin’ (‘Antiracist Initiative Berlin’) in 1988, the ‘Antirassismusbüro Bremen’ 
(‘Antiracism Office Bremen’) in 1991, the Berlin-based ‘Forschungsstelle Flucht und 
Migration’ (‘Research Centre Flight and Migration’) in 1994, and the ‘Internationaler 
Menschenrechtsverein Bremen’ (‘International Human Rights Association Bremen’) in 
1996.  
Neither in the professionalised associations nor in the grassroots movement did 
(forced) migrants hold a prominent role (see e.g. Lupus 1995). In consequence, the first 
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self-organized political groups of forced migrants in Germany49 started their protest 
without the support of ‘powerful allies’.50 In the political and discursive ice age of asylum 
politics in Germany, two influential associations emerged. In an isolated asylum facility 
in the Eastern-German region of Thuringia, asylum-seekers founded ‘The Voice Africa 
Forum’ in 1994. Amongst them were Nigerian members of the opposition against the 
military dictatorship of general Abacha (Jakob 2016: 21). After their escape from Nigeria, 
they were confronted with the restrictive asylum system in Germany, which used to be 
particularly harsh in the Eastern regions. From their allocated asylum facilities, the 
group mobilized other asylum-seekers in the region. At the beginning, they were 
received with scepticism and sometimes open opposition – many were afraid that a 
potential political engagement might result in immediate deportation. ‘The Voice 
Africa Forum’, nevertheless grew steadily and eventually the network was renamed 
‘The Voice Refugee Forum’ in order to overcome ethnic boundar ies. Even though 
many of its founding members were granted refugee status, they continued their 
activities. Subsequently, countless campaigns, hunger strikes and rallies against 
encampment, food vouchers, deportations and ‘Residenzpflicht’ were launched  and 
coordinated by the network (The VOICE Refugee Forum, 2014). 
Almost simultaneously, yet, independently from the first sustainable 
mobilizations by mostly African asylum-seekers in Thuringia, forced migrants started 
mobilizing in the city of Bremen in 1995. Tamil asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka organized 
a 36-day non-stop picket in front of a deportation prison (International Human Rights 
Association Bremen, 2001). Shortly after, 250 asylum-seekers accommodated in 
miserable conditions on a ship in the coal harbour of the city, went on hunger strike 
(Gerling, 2015; Siekmeier, 1995). Both protests attracted considerable media attention 
and led to the creation of the association ‘Internationaler Menschenrechtsverein Bremen’, 
which was meant to provide a platform for self-organized asylum-seekers in their 
struggles for rights and recognition. Support remained relatively scarce and mainly 
                                                 
49  Practices of resistance by forced migrants, such as hunger strikes and self-mutilation, can be traced 
throughout the history of forced migration and restrictive politics enacted against asylum-seekers in 
Germany. However, scattered, episodic acts of resistance were not knit together in a sustainable 
network of self-organized forced migrant activists until the mid-90s. 
50  In a retrospective, members of the self-organized movement recalled: ‘The problem was that those 
who had the power, like trade unions or parliamentarians, etc. were not engaged with significant 
force to resist the rapidly escalating attacks on refugees’ (International Human Rights Association 
Bremen, 2001).  
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involved sympathizers of the ‘autonomous left’, at the time organized in the 
‘Antirassismusbüro Bremen’. 
In early 1998, a group of Kurdish asylum-seekers under threat of imminent 
deportation sought protection in churches in the German region of North-Rhine-
Westphalia. Termed as ‘Wanderkirchenasyl’ (‘Moving Church Asylum’), the group 
rapidly expanded to more than 300 individuals, staying and moving between various 
faith-based institutions in the region (Joch-Joisten, 1999; Morgengrauen, 1998). The 
campaign received support from various prominent figures, including the German 
intellectuals Günther Grass and Margarete Mitscherlich, the journalist Günther 
Wallraff (Joch-Joisten, 1999) and spokesperson of the French sans-papiers 
movement Madjigène Cissé (Asyl in der Kirche NRW, 1999). Yet, the mobilizations 
never reached the size, visibility and support of the French counterparts. 
Also in 1998, the International Human Rights Association Bremen and the 
‘Antirassismusbüro Bremen’, were the key organizers of the first ‘Caravan for the 
Rights of Refugees and Migrants’. In this first national campaign of various self-
organized forced migrant groups (involving also The Voice Refugee Forum), 
protesters travelled for five weeks with long distances marches and bus tours through 
44 cities in Germany (Karawane, 1998a). Besides politicising the mobility restriction 
‘Residenzpflicht’ (Goddar, 1998), the campaign linked the situation of asylum-
seekers in Germany to the transnational roots of their forced migrant existence: ‘We 
are outraged by our treatment in Germany and are worried about the destiny of those 
we had to leave behind’ (Karawane, 1998a). Claiming ‘we are here, because you 
destroy our countries’ or ‘we are here because you are there’ (Karawane, 1998a), the 
Caravan politicised and contextualized forced migration beyond a humanitarian 
narrative.  
In the same year, asylum-seekers from various francophone African countries 
founded the ‘Flüchtlingsinitiative Berlin-Brandenburg’ (‘refugee initiative Berlin-
Brandenburg’) with similar claims and protest repertoires (Nsoh, 2008). These early 
mobilizations built the foundation of a protest movement with a prominent role of 
forced migrants therein. Yet, it unveiled also profound dilemmas and challenges for 
political mobilizations by forced migrants in Germany, both in relation to non-
migrant ‘supporters’ and within the heterogeneous migrant community. Firstly, the 
visible involvement of the autonomous left provided indispensable support, yet also 
entailed additional constraints. Particularly with regard to the ‘Caravan’, faith-based 
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and more moderate leftist support remained low because scepticism (or opposition) 
vis-à-vis the ‘autonomous left’ was reproduced in the interactions with the ‘Caravan’ 
(Hesse, 1998). Secondly, the additional fragmentation of the radical left alienated 
parts of the already small support base. Thirdly, tensions between white anti-racists 
and migrant forced migrants. – particularly regarding paternalism and sexism 
(Antirassismusbüro Bremen, 1998; Ökumenisches Büro München, 2000; SAGA 
Freiburg, 1998) left deep ruptures in the emerging movement. Lastly, the movement 
continuously struggled to overcome cleavages of ideology and nationalism. 
Particularly the large groups of Kurdish, Tamil and Iranian origins repeatedly clashed 
(Karawane, 1998b). For these internal reasons, as well as a widespread disregard 
from the side of more professionalized actors, self-organized groups of forced 
migrants remained scarcely integrated into the (fragmented) migrant rights 
movement. Nevertheless, both the Voice and the Caravane continued their 
mobilizations and set the ground for an emerging movement. 
The mobilizations at St Bernard in Paris also strongly resonated in non-migrant 
factions of the German rights movement. In the context of the 1997 edition of the 
internationally-known exhibition ‘documenta X’ in Kassel, a German-wide network of 
migrant rights groups was founded under the slogan ‘Kein Mensch ist illegal’51 [No 
human being is illegal] to bridge a highly diverse spectrum of groups and individuals, 
from private volunteers, to anarchist groups and priests (cross the border, 1999). 
Following the death of a rejected asylum-seeker on board the deportation flight operated 
by Lufthansa, the network launched the ‘deportation.class’ campaign, boycotting 
Lufthansa and its ‘Star Alliance’ partners (cross the border, 1999).  
In 1999, ‘no border network’ was founded in reaction to the Tampere summit of 
the European Union, which foreshadowed increasing cooperation and securitization of 
border politics in Europe (no-border network, 2004). The transnational network of mostly 
anarchist groups organized so-called ‘no border camps’ in various European countries 
from 2000 onwards (Anderson, Sharma, & Wright, 2012). Migrant rights were also 
increasingly represented in broader transnational mobilizations such as the counter-
summit in Genova 2001 or the European Social Forum in Florence 2002 
                                                 
51  The expression goes back to a quote by holocaust survivor and Nobel peace prize winner Ellie Wiesel, 
who was quoted: ‘You who are so-called illegal aliens must know that no human being is ‘illegal’. 
That is a contradiction in terms. Human beings can be beautiful or more beautiful, they can be fat or 
skinny, they can be right or wrong, but illegal? How can a human being be illegal?’(quoted in cross 
the border, 1999). 
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(Apostolova, Fiedler, & Mezzadra, 2013). No-border camps continue to be held almost 
annually – 2015 in Ventimiglia (Italy) and 2016 in Thessaloniki (Greece). The German 
constituency of these loose transnational networks remains strong.  
In Germany, the Caravan network remained the backbone of political 
mobilizations by forced migrants. In 2000 a ‘refugee congress’ gathered around 600 
forced migrant participants, as the first event of its kind in Germany (Schwarzer, 
2000; Watara, 2013). In 2001, the Caravan organized a national ‘Stop 
Residenzpflicht’ campaign, calling on refugees to practice civil disobedience and 
resist the ‘apartheid laws of Germany’ (Koch, 2001; Loschert, 2012; Watara, 2013). 
Parallel to the 2002 national elections, the Caravan launched a second nation-wide 
march (International Human Rights Association Bremen, 2001), however the 
resonance remained limited (Kröger, 2002).  
Most of the first generation of forced migrant groups were highly male-
dominated. In reaction to the lived experiences of intersectional discrimination as forced 
migrant women, a female-only group was founded as ‘Women in Exile’ in 2002 in 
Brandenburg (Women in Exile & Friends, 2014). Beyond joining broader campaigns for 
migrant rights in Germany, Women in Exile pointed to the particular realities of women 
in the asylum process with the constant danger of sexual harassment and violence by 
security personnel and male asylum-seekers in the camps. In 2005, a group of asylum 
seeking minors founded ‘Jugendliche ohne Grenzen’ (‘Youths without borders’) in close 
cooperation with the refugee council Berlin and the BBZ, a counselling office for young 
refugees (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin e.V., 2011). 
Despite this proliferation of migrant solidarity and political protest by forced 
migrants in Germany since the late 1990s, the movement has remained highly fragmented 
and mostly localized (see also Monforte, 2014). Grassroots groups have rarely interacted 
with more professionalized organizations. Self-organized migrant collectives never 
attracted national attention until the 2012 ‘Oranienplatz wave’ (see Chapter 6) (Jakob, 
2016).  
 From the second half of 2014, the situation profoundly changed, when Germany 
witnessed the gradual formation of nationwide ‘movement of voluntary refugee 
assistance’ (Karakayali & Kleist 2015: 19, author's translation), which further picked up 
steam during the ‘long summer of migration’ 2015 (Hess et al., 2017). Media attention as 
well as the de facto challenges of municipalities in the reception of asylum-seekers 
mobilized a large share of Germans who had formerly neither been active in volunteering 
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nor politically engaged (Daphi, 2016; Karakayali & Kleist, 2016; Steinhilper & 
Fleischmann, 2016; Steinhilper & Karakayali, 2018). At a surprising pace, support of 
forced migrants diffused from a marginalized faith-based and radical left niche to the 
mainstream. Hundreds of support initiatives were founded, tens of thousands collected 
and distributed clothes, food and organized German language courses. Many of the new 
volunteers, however, ‘just want to help’ and distance themselves from a political framing 
of their activities (Karakayali & Kleist, 2016; Kreck & Gerbing, 2015). Images of 
cheering crowds of volunteers receiving refugees at the railway station in Munich 
travelled around the globe and became symbols of a German ‘welcome culture’. This is 
not just anecdotal evidence. A representative study commissioned by the institute of 
social sciences of the protestant church in Germany found that in December 2015, refugee 
support was the second most-mentioned category of volunteer work after ‘sports and 
leisure’ (Ahrens, 2015). Another (non-representative) survey of summer 2016 found that 
66 per cent of the volunteers have been mobilized during the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. 
However, only 45 per cent of the respondents agreed to the declaration that they wanted 
to make a political statement with their activities (Karakayali & Kleist 2016: 33).  
While engagement in support of forced migrants has rapidly proliferated in recent 
years in Germany, the anti-racist and highly politicized tone has somewhat vanished. 
Accordingly, many self-organized groups such as ‘The Voice’ and the ‘Caravan’ have 
perceived the mainstreaming of volunteering for forced migrants to be detrimental to their 
attempts to achieve recognition as political agents rather than objects of care (glokal e.V., 
2017; Jakob, 2015; Omwenyeke, 2016; Ulu, Byakuleka, & Arps, 2016).52 
4.5.  Conclusion 
As this cursory overview suggests, the concepts ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum-seeker’ are no 
objective and neutral status describing a state of affairs, but have been transformed in 
both countries over time, depending on public discourses and political interest. Forced 
migration emerged on the scene as a highly contentious issue both in France and Germany 
in the 1970s, with subsequent major migration law restrictions in the 1980s and 90s. Yet, 
the number of asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants, as well as the conditions for 
forced migrants in the countries, beyond the political movements emerging to push for 
rights and recognition of forced migrants, have differed strongly.  
                                                 
52  See also Chapter 8 on forced migrant activism in Berlin from 2015 onwards. 
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 From the late 1970s onwards, numbers of asylum applications diverged strongly 
between the two countries, with Germany reaching a quadruple of applications in the 
early 1990s. While in Germany asylum has remained a heatedly debated issue ever since, 
asylum has held a marginal role in French public debates on forced migration. 
Contentious politics around (forced) migration mainly circled around undocumented 
migration. Indeed, France, since the 1970s and even more so since the 1990s has 
witnessed a strong politicization of undocumented migration. Given the large informal 
economy as well as a historical link to former French colonies on the African continent, 
public perception of undocumented migration and hence regularizations, have been 
perceived more positively in France compared to Germany. Due to existing ethnic 
networks and more open job markets, many forced migrants have opted in France to stay 
outside the asylum system. In Germany, in turn, life in irregularity has been more 
complicated in the light of stricter controls in the public space and on production sites. 
Consequently, the vast majority of migrants opted for the asylum system and many 
remained as ‘Geduldete’ in Germany after a rejected asylum claim.  
Furthermore, the two countries have adopted different strategies to discourage 
potential asylum-seekers from choosing their respective country. France opted from the 
1990s onwards for a system of structural non-accommodation, with often less than 20 per 
cent of asylum-seekers accommodated in shelters provided by the state. Germany 
introduced a highly rigid system of forced dispersal, mobility restrictions and food 
vouchers to which also those with a rejected asylum claim were subject. Consequently, 
in Germany, many asylum-seekers have mobilized against the asylum system with its 
detrimental effect on their (mental) health and social integration. In France, forced 
migrants either remained quiet in order to obtain one of the scarce places in a shelter, 
moved on to Great Britain or mobilized outside the asylum system as undocumented 
migrants to obtain regularization (see the four subsequent empirical chapters on details).  
Not least due to highly distinct administrative and historical contexts, the migrant 
rights movements in the two countries have taken different shapes. Whereas in France an 
increasingly connected migrant rights movement already emerged in the 1970s, involving 
a broad range of actors and addressing both asylum-seeker and migrant rights more 
broadly, the German movement remained for decades decentralized, fragmented and 
largely concentrated on asylum. Throughout the 1990s until 2015, the French and German 
pro-asylum movements showed fundamentally different characteristics (Monforte, 2014: 
34). The French case was distinct due to a much higher density and durability of multi-
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organizational coalitions. Furthermore, migrant rights associations and trade unions held 
a politicized and contextualized view that asylum was just one aspect of broader systems 
of inequality and exclusion that had been rooted in close cooperation since the 1970s. 
With the exception of mass mobilization following the so-called asylum 
compromise in 1993, Germany was characterized by an ‘ice age’ of migration politics 
without any major contestations. The migrant rights movement has for decades remained 
highly localized and fragmented, rarely joining forces for national campaigns. 
Similarly, mobilizations by forced migrants have differed strongly in the two 
countries. Whereas the sans-papiers established themselves as an autonomous political 
voice in the national debate on immigration, the German ‘refugee-movement’ remained 
at the margin of public attention and highly fragmented until 2012. In France, contention 
around forced migration culminated in (and spurred in turn) highly disruptive protests - 
both in 1991 and from 1996 onwards - by undocumented migrants, many of them rejected 
asylum-seekers. Considerable parts of French civil society aligned with the demands of 
undocumented migrants also due to a sense of (post-)colonial responsibility and a so-
called Republican model of citizenships based on loyalty with the ideals of the Republic 
rather than blood-lineage.  
Due to the politicization of undocumented migration (and compared to Germany, 
relatively low numbers of asylum applications), in France asylum remained – with the 
exception of Calais – at the margin of public debate until 2015. In Germany, vast 
mobilizations of asylum-seekers starting in 2012 and the developments during the ‘long 
summer of migration’ (Hess et al., 2017; Steinhilper & Fleischmann, 2016), in contrast 
pushed public debates on forced migration to the top of the public and political debates. 
The contentious arenas that will be described and analysed in detail in the 
subsequent chapters do not unfold in a vacuum but are collocated in these distinct spatial, 
social, legal and political contexts. Existing movements, as well as administrative and 
discursive contexts provide specific relational and spatial opportunities which strongly 














The ‘Bourse du Travail’-Arena: Paris 2008-2010 
Autonomy, Dependence and Fragile Solidarity 
 
 
‘The sans-papiers are in the front row. The sans-papiers are the first victims. The 
supporters and the associations must not leave us aside; this is our struggle. It is 
us who know our difficulties, our situation. The sans-papiers must understand 
that the struggle of the sans-papiers is their struggle’  (quoted in CSP75, 2008b). 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
While Part I of this thesis provided the theoretical, methodological and ethical ground for 
this research, Part II presents and theorizes empirical material on four contentious arenas 
in Berlin and Paris, two in each city. As the sequence of the chapters follows the 
chronological order of the contentious arenas, this part opens with an arena unfolding in 
Paris between 2008 and 2010. 
The chapter outlines the making and breaking of social ties during one of the 
largest waves of contention in the recent history of political mobilizations by forced 
migrants in France: the occupation of the ‘Bourse du Travail’, the headquarter of the 
CGT53 trade union, by an alliance of three autonomous sans-papiers collectives. Despite 
its long duration and numerical strength, the protest wave has received comparatively 
                                                 
53  ‘Conféréderation Général du Travail’. Translates to ‘General Confederation of Labour’. 
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little (academic) attention, not least because it unfolded parallel to a highly visible trade-
union organized strike movement of undocumented workers (Barron, Bory, Chauvin, 
Jounin, & Tourette, 2011).54 This is particularly lamentable as the ‘Bourse du Travail’ 
arena (which later was relocated to ‘Rue Baudelique’) constituted a turning-point and 
fundamental rupture for the mobilizations by forced migrants in France, leaving multiple 
‘bruises’ (Interview P7, Interview P29, Interview P22) and relational memories on the 
actors involved.  
Subsequently, I will be developing the following theoretical argument: the very 
actor constellation, antagonizing a leftist trade union and autonomous sans-papiers 
collectives, provides a compelling starting point for considering forced migrant 
mobilizations as contentious micro-interactions and against reifying the fiction of a 
homogenous ‘migrant rights movement’. In targeting an increasingly influential player 
within the movement, the migrants involved aimed at underlying that their struggle was 
as much a struggle for rights (such as regularization) as it was one for self-representation 
and recognition as political subjects. The chapter hence illustrates how asymmetric 
positions of power between those primarily concerned and pro-beneficiaries, introduced 
sensitive breaking points for sustainable social ties. In following the trajectory of the 
protest wave, I will moreover document the considerable internal resources of (some) 
forced migrant communities and the incubating effect of spatialized repertoires. A close-
up perspective on the interactionist dynamics, yet, also unveils the fragile solidarity 
within forced migrant communities mobilizing within small ‘niche openings’. Such 
needle eyes to regularization or recognition often only allow for the passage of few, at 
the expense of the exclusion of others. This introduced or deepened fissures within the 
migrant community. While the question of autonomy remained the decisive breaking 
point for social ties between undocumented migrants and pro-beneficiaries, the question 
of ‘who practically profits’ led to numerous decisions to defect from collective action. 
Lastly, I argue that contentious interactions in one moment in time entered in the 
collective memories of the actors involved and created dispositions for future 
interactions. 
                                                 
54  For instance, in Kahmann’s article on the strike wave between 2008 and 2010 and the role of the trade 
unions, the question of autonomy in general and the occupation of the ‘Bourse du Travail’ is almost 
entirely ignored (2015). Monforte and Dufour investigate only one specific episode (the march Paris-
Nice) of this arena (2013). This chapter, hence, constitutes a complement by adding a more extensive 
sans-papiers perspective. 
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To unpack and empirically substantiate this argument, the chapter is structured as 
follows: after providing a short contextualization of events (5.2.), I scrutinize the 
contentious interactions in the ‘Bourse du Travail’ arena pointing to the underlying stakes 
and interests of the players involved as well as the unfolding relational dynamics (5.3). 
Section 5.4. investigates how public officials intervene in the relational breaking points 
within the migrant rights movement and among forced migrants and by this, contribute 
to its fragmentation. Finally, I theorize how contentious interactions enter individual and 
public memories and fundamentally shape interactions (or non-interactions) in 
subsequent episodes of mobilization (5.5.).  
Aiming at a detailed reconstruction and theorizing of a protest wave in the past, 
the chapter draws from two types of data: it is based on 10 qualitative interviews 
conducted in Paris in 2017 with actors involved in the arena between 2008 and 2010. 
Furthermore, it is informed by dozens of written texts produced by a wide range of players 
in this contentious arena, including migrant rights associations, trade unions, forced 
migrant activists, public authorities and the media. 
5.2.  Brief Contextualization of Events 
After the highly contentious ‘St Bernard’ protest wave around undocumented migration 
starting in 1996 and lasting roughly until 2002, the visibility of self-organized protest by 
migrants temporarily faded (see section 4.4. and also Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016: 88 ff.). 
The so-called ‘Circulaire Chevènement’ of 1997 had formalized a ‘case-by-case’ 
approach of regularization, which led to increasing fragmentation among the sans-papiers 
collectives as well as between autonomous collectives and pro-beneficiary organisations 
(Freedman, 2008).55 The reforms also left traces on the collectives themselves: numerous 
poorly connected sans-papiers collectives organized protest, but increasingly focused on 
direct (often secret) negotiations with the respective prefect’s office to obtain 
regularization for their members. Furthermore, the groups mobilized often independently 
from a largely professionalized and white migrant rights movement (Nicholls & 
                                                 
55 The ‘Circulaire Chevènement’ ‘specified that the situation of certain categories of foreigners in an 
irregular situation would be re-examined, and thus some were automatically excluded from the 
process as not being within these certain categories, whatever the particular conditions of their 
personal situation. In addition, the proof needed to accompany the dossier requesting regularization 
was often impossible to gather, either because of lack of administrative services in the country of 
origin of the sans-papiers, which did not allow them to have access to birth certificates and so on, or 
as a result of the particular forms of vulnerability that they had encountered while they were in France. 
The obligation to supply eight years’ worth of pay slips, for example, was difficult to meet for workers 
who had spent the last eight years working illegally on the black market’ (Freedman, 2008: 85). 
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Uitermark, 2016: 88 ff.). A retrospective account by one of the leaders of the St Bernard 
movement, Madjigène Cissé, provides a concise summary of the movement’s lines of 
division: 
‘What can be observed today – and this can be qualified as a division – results 
from the behaviour of some organizations and some members of our support. We 
noticed that since November 1997, when some French organizations tried to take 
many more initiatives and to control the fight of the sans-papiers, that is to 
channel it so that it doesn’t overflow. (…) And this is something that we have 
faced since the Left came back to power. (…) French organizations have 
supported the claims that were convenient for them, that is, the claims that were 
not too extremist, those that didn’t demand ‘papers for all’, those that didn’t 
criticize the laws adopted by Chevènement, etc. (Cissé, 1998, italics in original). 
Equally, trust in the institutionalized Left was lastingly damaged: 
‘In particular, the relationship of the sans-papiers with the political Left has been 
problematic, with various attempts by Left-wing parties at instrumentalization of 
the movement, and an eventual disenchantment due to the failure of Left-wing 
governments to proceed to any real or sustainable political actions in support of 
the movement’ (Freedman, 2008: 93). 
In 2006, the second (Conservative) Sarkozy administration introduced a series of 
restrictions on immigration, which were bundled in the CESEDA56 legislation and 
targeted both the right to asylum and paths towards regularization (Freedman, 2008). In 
reaction, a broad range of migrant rights associations created the alliance ‘Unie contre 
une immigration jetable’57 (Carrère, 2009; Teule, 2006). While the French movement in 
defence of migrants gained new momentum in this phase, the collectives of sans-papiers 
held a marginal role therein.  
Within the isolated and internally heterogeneous field of autonomous sans-papiers 
collectives, the ‘Coordination 75 des Sans-Papiers de Paris’ (CSP 75) has held since its 
official creation in 2002 a central role. Claiming the heritage of the St Bernard collective, 
the umbrella organization of four Parisian collectives held something like a ‘monopoly’ 
(Interview P29) in the self-representation of forced migrant claims in the public sphere, 
at least in Paris. Weekly rallies, occasional occupations of public buildings combined 
with regular meetings with the prefect’s office to discuss potential regularizations had 
introduced a mix, almost a routine, of disruptive and non-disruptive actions into forced 
migrant mobilizations. The usual procedure of the collectives has been the following: the 
                                                 
56  ‘Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile’. Translates to ’Law on entry and stay 
of foreigners and on the right to asylum’. 
57  Translates to ‘united against a disposable immigration’. 
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collectives have created files (‘dossiers’) of their members, collecting proof of presence 
on French territory, employment, family ties etc. to be submitted to the prefect’s office. 
The order of submission usually privileged those who were regularly present during 
demonstrations. For this purpose, the members of the collective signed a list after every 
demonstration, which both added proofs to the files and guaranteed a constant presence 
in the public sphere. The demonstrations and particularly the occupations – more than 
thirty between 2002 and 2008 (Laske, 2009b) - were meant to constantly render visible a 
structurally marginalized population and to remind the prefect’s office of the mobilizing 
capacity of a large undocumented population in Paris (Interview P14, Interview P22). As 
one of the organizers of the CSP75 noted during a demonstration I participated in May 
2017:  
.  ‘You, new brothers and sisters, who have left the misery, crossed the desert and 
the Mediterranean and have made it to Paris. You are very welcome with us. We 
march every Friday. Because when we march, we disrupt, if we do not disrupt, no 
one cares about us, we are invisible but always in danger (Field notes 
16/06/2017)’. 
This both disruptive and routinized arena was shaken up profoundly in early 2008, when 
the at the time second largest trade union CGT launched a coordinated strike of sans-
papiers and entered the arena of contention around (forced) migration in Paris. Aiming at 
a regularization of sans-papiers via proofs of employment, the trade union had already 
since 2006 organized scattered strikes to pressure employers into issuing contracts for 
their illegalized work force – mostly in the sectors of catering services, construction and 
cleaning. The 2007 migration law reform ‘Loi Hortefeux’ opened an additional 
opportunity in this regard, as it introduced the employer as a key component in the process 
of case-by-case admissions based on economic utility (Kahmann, 2015: 421). 
Acting upon this opening opportunity, from early 2008 onwards, the CGT and the 
migrant rights association ‘Droits Devant !!’ strategically targeted emblematic locations 
to attract the widest visibility possible (Kahmann, 2015). Amongst them was the luxury 
restaurant ‘La Grande Armée’ in the heart of Paris, which was regularly frequented by 
the political elites, including members of the ruling government (Le Monde Online, 
2008). Most of the traditional migrant rights associations (such as GISTI, LDH, Cimade) 
predominantly welcomed the involvement of the CGT and particularly the new dynamic 
as a ‘turning point’ in mobilizations for the rights of undocumented migrants (Carrère, 
2009, also Interview P8, Interview P21, Interview P29, Interview P30). They had even 
created a working group ‘trade unions and sans-papiers’ (Carrère, 2009, Interview P29) 
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to coordinate cooperation. During the mobilization, the notion of ‘les Onze’58 (the Eleven) 
- a group of actors comprising both migrant rights associations and trade unions - 
proliferated as a new compound player.  
Encouraged by the strong mediatization and positive response received in April 
2008, a coordinated strike movement was initiated by the CGT, particularly its Parisian 
branch, the ‘Union Departementale de Paris’. Rapidly, the strike movement introduced 
the notion of the ‘sans-papier worker’, as a productive and well-integrated part of French 
society, into the public discourse on (forced) migration. This association of labour 
struggles also strengthened the role of trade unions in contentious politics around forced 
migration (for an extensive analysis of the strike movement, see the excellent study of 
Barron, Bory, Chauvin, Jounin, & Tourette, 2011), who had previously mainly operated 
as logistic support for autonomous sans-papiers collectives (Kahmann, 2015). 
Yet, the intervention of the CGT also introduced fundamental ruptures. Firstly, 
the appearance on the scene of a powerful player undermined the previously central role 
of the autonomous collectives of sans-papiers and their struggles for both regularization 
and recognition as political subjects. Secondly, the CGT aimed at targeting a new 
constituency for their trade union and focused on migrant workers, thereby, more or less 
deliberately excluding those not fitting into the category. The autonomous sans-papier 
movement, in turn, had since the 1990s resisted a privileged treatment of those 
undocumented migrants with a higher likelihood of regularization (Interview P22, 
Interview P14). Thirdly, the CGT focused on strikes of illegalized workers at their work 
place. This, again, excluded the so-called ‘isolated workers’, meaning individuals 
scattered across multiple companies without the bargaining power to collectively exert 
pressure on an employer (Carrère, 2009; CSP75, 2008a). 
While the CSP75 as the most influential compound player initially supported the 
CGT in their activities, they eventually felt left aside. The situation escalated when the 
CSP75 (as they had done for years before) deposited their individual cases with the 
prefect’s office, but were refused with the explanation that the prefect was occupied with 
processing the files of the striking migrants submitted by the CGT (Barron et al., 2011: 
9.4/12). Encouraged to join the activities of the CGT, the CSP75 saw not only migrant’s 
                                                 
58  The group consisted of the trade unions CGT, CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique du 
Travail – French Democratic Confederation of Labour), FSU (Fédération Syndicale Unitaire – Unitary 
Trade Union Federation), Solidaires, UNSA (Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes – National 
Union of Autonomous Trade Unions) and the human rights associations Autre Monde, Cimade, Droits 
devant !!, Femmes Égalité, LDH, RESF (Veron, 2011). 
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autonomy and leadership in the migrants’ movement endangered, but also feared losing 
its bargaining power with the state altogether (Interview P22, Interview P30, Interview 
P29).  
In consequence, the CSP75 mobilized secretly and occupied the headquarter of 
the CGT in the so-called ‘Bourse du Travail’ on May 2, 2008. More than a thousand sans-
papiers squatted the building for several months in shifts, pressurizing the CGT to include 
them in their activities or leave the contentious arena of undocumented activism. A highly 
contentious wave unfolded involving sans-papiers collectives, trade unions, the prefect’s 
office and a range of migrant rights associations. 
After more than a year of occupation, countless protest events organized by the 
occupants and a series of failed negotiations, the security services of the trade union 
evicted the squat. The violent removal once more fragmented the movement and led to 
the splitting of multiple players, lastingly restructuring the field of contentious politics 
around forced migration in Paris. Following several weeks on the sidewalk outside the 
trade union building, the CSP75 occupied a large ensemble of abandoned buildings in the 
18th district, called ‘Baudelique’, where they continued their protest. After another year 
of occupation, the CSP75 left the premises voluntarily and as such ended the longest and 
largest protest wave initiated by forced migrants in French history. 
The two occupations and the social relations unfolding and breaking therein shed 
light on key interactionist patterns and dilemmas in forced migrant activism. Firstly, this 
case study offers insights into the contentious dynamics between self-organized groups 
and supporters. Secondly, it traces dynamics within forced migrant communities, in 
which solidarity is fragile and the dependency on the state accentuated. Lastly, the 
dynamics unfolding in this contentious arena entered the ‘movement memory’ and have 
since functioned as powerful interactionist dispositions for subsequent interactions. 
5.3.  Relational Dynamics in the ‘Bourse du Travail’ Arena 
The relational dynamics unfolding in the contentious arena were in the beginning spatially 
concentrated in the premises of the CGT, the ‘Bourse du Travail’, subsequently 
(temporarily) outside the building on the sidewalks and lastly in an occupied building in 
the Parisian North. The arena initially consisted of four main (‘compound’) players: the 
trade union CGT, the ‘associations’ (mostly referred to as a compound player), the 
CSP75, and the French executive, mainly represented by the prefect’s office. Various 
players split in the course of the mobilizations, others entered the arena at a later stage. 
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Autonomy, Strategy and Fragile Solidarity 
With the occupation of the ‘Bourse du Travail’ in the 3rd district of Paris, the CSP75 
targeted and exerted pressure on one of its long-term allies. The CGT and also Droits 
Devant!! had constituted logistical and ideational ‘support’ for the sans-papiers 
collectives the latest since the St Bernard wave in the second half of the 1990s (Cissé, 
2002; CSP75, 2008a; Diop, 1997). Consequently, the CSP75 had initially enthusiastically 
welcomed the initiative by the two organizations and hoped for a concerted pressure for 
the benefit of all sans-papiers (Barron et al., 2011; CSP75, 2008a). The sans-papiers 
collectives, hence, joined the strike pickets of the CGT, yet were encouraged by the trade 
union to organize their own, independent strikes. When they routinely submitted files to 
the prefect’s office, they were rejected on the premise that the prefect’s office was 
prioritarily dealing with CGT files. The CSP felt deliberately side-lined and noted: 
‘They think we are kids. We have understood that there was an agreement to block 
our movement. We were betrayed’ (CSP75, 2008a, authors's translation).  
Outraged, more than 200 sans-papiers deviated from their traditional demonstration route 
on 2nd May 2008 and occupied the court and staircases of the historical labour house 
‘Bourse du Travail’, the headquarter of the Paris branch of the CGT - the labour union’s 
regional section most active in the strikes (Le Monde Online, 2008; Remande, 2008). 
Amongst the occupants were men, women and children from various countries of origin 
and with diverse migration histories. Some had arrived in France as political refugees and 
became undocumented later, others were rejected asylum-seekers or over-stayers of a 
tourist or student visa. They repeatedly pointed to the desperate contexts from which they 
had left and the precarious conditions as undocumented migrants in France (CSP75, 
2008a, 2008f, 2008g). 
During the occupation, immediately, a very tense atmosphere unfolded between 
the sans-papiers and the CGT, resulting in a highly antagonistic rhetoric:  
‘The CGT has taken hostage our movement. We take hostage the Bourse du 
Travail’ (sans-papiers spokesperson cited in Remande, 2008, author's translation). 
In a public statement, the CSP75 further clarified: 
‘Among our conditions is that, once and for all, the orchestrated infantilization of 
an autonomous movement has to stop. We are upright men and women, 
responsible and capable of taking into our own hands our movement, we have our 
dignity’ (CSP75, 2008a, author's translation). 
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For the CSP75, the penetration of the CGT in the contentious arena of forced migration 
was not only a question of leadership, but an assault to their proud tradition of autonomy 
since the St Bernard protest wave.  
 Indeed, the CSP75 was not entirely wrong in their assessment of the situation. 
With the strike movement, the CGT had explicitly aimed at gaining control of the sans-
papiers movement, which they considered dominated by inefficient autonomous 
collectives with a focus on hunger strikes and occupation of public spaces. The organizers 
of the CGT viewed particularly hunger strikes critically as a ‘sordid, individual mode of 
action, based on an apolitical human rights discourse’ (Kahmann, 2015: 420). Instead, in 
accordance with its mandate, the CGT aimed at redirecting the movement towards a focus 
on labour. This also allowed for limiting the engagement to those migrants already present 
on French territory without engaging in highly contested claims on less restrictive access 
policies (ibid). To mark its difference compared to previous mobilizations, the CGT used 
the term ‘sans-papiers’ only in combination with the qualifier ‘worker’ (‘travailleurs sans 
papiers) (ibid). One of the trade union organizers at the time recalled: 
‘The question of work, immediately we perceived it as determinate. For a trade 
union, this question necessarily goes beyond manifestations of solidarity or 
support, things we have done in the past in our relationships with the sans-papiers 
collectives. This means that we enter into a dimension that is completely linked 
up with our traditions as a trade union that is to defend workers’ rights. (...) From 
the very beginning, this was more understood as a trade union thing’ (quoted in 
Kahmann, 2015: 419). 
While the CGT profited from increased visibility and public recognition, also associations 
involved in migrant solidarity welcomed the new momentum introduced by the trade 
union. According to Marcus Kahmann,  
‘the competences that unionists brought to the table [were also] clearly recognized 
and valued by employers and government officials alike. They provided them with 
a clear advantage over other external groups (autonomous sans-papiers groups; 
immigrant rights and nationality groups) operating in the field. The latter lack 
technical and tactical competences to pursue a labour conflict and are considered 
as unreliable by the authorities’ (2015: 420). 
To justify their recognition and newly acquired privileged status in negotiating with the 
state, the CGT pushed for an effective leadership. Unlike preceding movements, migrants 
were gradually excluded from the decisions and the process was steered by a small core 
of white and male trade union organizers (Kahmann, 2015: 420, Interview P29): 
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‘Well, [in the CGT] there are many who are socialised in a political tradition – 
very Marxist, centralist, a bit Stalinist you could say. They really wanted to be in 
control of the strike movement. One of the most influential trade union organizers 
at the time, he did a lot for the emergence of the strike movement, but he comes 
from the ‘Communist Workers Party of France’ (…)’ (Interview P29). 
Kahmann also highlights the socialization of the main organizer, who ‘was an ex-public 
transport mechanic in his 60s with a marked background in revolutionary Communism’ 
(2015: 417). Accordingly, the CGT organized the strikes their way, hierarchically, 
outcome-oriented and with profound scepticism towards self-organized migrant 
collectives and little sensitivity regarding racism, emancipation and the long-time 
struggles fought by sans-papiers for autonomy from French influence: 
‘The CGT organised this movement (…) secret, not open. Hence, it is true that the 
collectives at the time felt left aside. But it was also them who had a bit the 
monopoly in the struggles and I think an actor like the CGT, who enters the 
movement, could be also seen as a rival. That’s how I felt it, in the legitimacy of 
the struggles. I think there is this entire discussion, that unfolded in the movement 
of sans-papiers – the question as to whether the struggles should be totally 
autonomous [from the French supporter community]. And it is true that the fact 
that the trade union entered the movement could be perceived positively by many, 
but regarding the idea of autonomy, it shakes up the idea of autonomy’ (Interview 
P29, see also Kahmann, 2015: 422).  
Accordingly, with the CGT and the CSP75 two compound players with highly distinct 
visions of the movement regarding strategy and leadership entered into a contentious 
interaction. Whereas the CGT had institutional interest in leadership of the movement 
and an output-oriented strategy, the CSP75 viewed their mobilization also as what 
Monforte and Dufour have termed ‘acts of emancipation’ (Monforte & Dufour, 2013) – 
practices aiming at the recognition as political subjects and at modifying the power 
relations vis-à-vis non-migrant pro beneficiaries. Additionally, the CGT’s focus on 
collective strikes at the work places de facto meant the exclusion of large parts of the 
constituency of the CSP75, e.g. all ‘isolated workers’ without the option to pressurize 
collectively, as well as women, the elderly and the sick without a job. When the CSP75 
demanded from the CGT to recognize their role and include also non-working and 
isolated sans-papiers in their negotiations (CSP75, 2008a, 2008b), the CGT responded: 
‘Our job is not to file applications based on family life or medical condition, etc. We are 
a labour union’ (cited in Barron, Bory, Chauvin, Jounin, & Tourette, 2016). While the 
CGT reiterated its strategic focus on the positive category ‘worker’, the CSP75 leadership 
and its members saw their ‘niche’ toward regularization shrinking. The CGT intervention, 
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hence, constituted a broad threat for their communities and identities, but also a direct 
threat to themselves and their personal interests. 
In addition to the trade union and the CSP75, there was a third type of player 
involved: the myriad of ‘associations’ engaged in migrant solidarity (and with a 
historically ambivalent relationship to the collectives). Due to the success of the strike 
movement in terms of visibility and the first successful regularisations, most associations 
reacted with irritation to the occupation, noting that the CSP75 had chosen the ‘wrong 
target’. Instead they recommended to dissolve the non-stop picket (Barron, Bory, 
Chauvin, & Tourette, 2014; CSP75, 2008a) in order to prevent the fragmentation of the 
movement. A representative of the network RESF stated: 
‘They should target the Ministries of Interior or Integration, not the CGT. Those 
really responsible are inside the government, not outside. An occupation is a 
hostile action. While we are dividing ourselves, the government is rubbing their 
hands’ (cited in Fouteau, 2009, author's translation).  
The occupants were highly disappointed by this position and increasingly perceived the 
associations ‘on the side of the trade union’ (CSP75, 2008b, Interview P22). This 
experience strengthened their sense of being dominated by the white French migrant 
rights environment more broadly (Interview P14, Interview P22). Various attempts to 
mediate in the stalemate, involving members of the most influential associations (e.g. 
GISTI, LDH, and RESF), failed due to an increasing scepticism from the side of the 
CSP75 and determination of the CGT leadership to stay in control of the strike movement. 
The longer the occupation lasted, the more the CSP75 became alienated from both the 
‘associations’ and the CGT (Csp75, 2008, Interview P22, Interview P29 ). Their reaction 
nurtured the sans-papiers collectives’ general suspicion towards non-migrant 
organizations and their intuition to ‘speak on behalf’ of sans-papiers: 
‘The sans-papiers are in the front row. The sans-papiers are the first victims. The 
supporters and the associations must not leave us aside; this is our struggle. It is 
us who know our difficulties, our situation. The sans-papiers must understand that 
the struggle of the sans-papiers is their struggle (public statement at a meeting of 
various collectives in the occupied Bourse du Travail CSP75, 2008b, author's 
translation). 
The fragility of ties, between the CSP75 and pro-beneficiaries was not a novelty in this 
arena, but had led into experiences made by sans-papiers collectives already since the 
1990s. Claiming the heritage of the St Bernard collective, the CSP75 has kept a vivid 
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memory of these mobilizations, which were summarized as follows by one of its former 
spokespersons: 
‘The struggle has taught us many, many things. It has taught us first of all to be 
autonomous. That has not always been easy. There were organizations which 
came to support us and which were used to helping immigrants in struggle. They 
were also used to acting as the relay between immigrants in struggle and the 
authorities, and therefore more or less to manage the struggle. They would tell us: 
“Right, we the organizations have made an appointment to explain this or that;” 
and we had to say, “But we can explain it very well ourselves.” Their automatic 
response is not to get people to be autonomous, but to speak for them’ (Cissé, 
2003). 
Given this background, the intervention of the CGT touched upon a highly sensitive point. 
Accordingly, the tone, at times, became extremely hostile: 
‘We have enough of the trade union’s colonialism! (…) The sans-papiers of the 
csp75 have the impression that they have been constantly exploited and did not 
get anything in return. Nowadays in France, with the trade unions we thought of 
as our friends, it is like in Africa by the time of colonialism, it is like what our 
parents have told us’ (CSP75, 2008f, author's translation). 
The longer the occupation and the stalemate lasted, the more the migrant associations felt 
increasingly irritated by the CSP75’s irreconcilability (Fouteau, 2009, Interview P29, 
Interview P21, Interview P7). None of the numerous mediations was successful, as the 
occupants wanted to prove a more fundamental point, an ‘act of emancipation’. One of 
the activists involved by the time, recalled in a personal interview: 
‘The CSP75 has a very proud if not jealous tradition of their autonomy, which was 
also something that produced a lot of conflict. The CSP75 decides to do 
something, if you do not follow, they do it alone. There was not much 
compromise’ (Interview P7). 
Even though many associations rejected the strategy of the CSP75 and criticized its 
perceived unwillingness to find a pragmatic solution (Interview 29, Interview 30), they 
found themselves in an extremely awkward position. While they appreciated the efforts 
by the CGT, they refrained from outspoken criticism against the CSP75 (Interview P21). 
While associations, CGT and the CSP75 blamed each other, the prefect’s office remained 
almost entirely out of focus: 
‘For the prefect’s office, it was a dream. It was the self-destruction of a movement. 
Everyone blaming each other. It was an inferno!’ (Interview P7). 
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In the following weeks and months of the occupation, a paradox dynamic unfolded. While 
the occupants were increasingly isolated from the wider migrant rights movement, the 
occupation and the determination of the sans-papiers protesters grew. 
The ‘Weapons of the (Not So) Weak’59 
In summer 2008, the ‘Bourse du Travail’ squat counted around 1,300 participants, 
including women and children (Bonal, 2008; Ginésy-Galano, 2009). Within, efficient 
structures of self-organization were established. Mattresses and cardboard were used in 
shifts, money de-centrally collected and food prepared for all occupants mostly by the 
women involved in the occupation (CSP75, 2008c; Ginésy-Galano, 2009). As one of the 
organizers at the time noted in an informal conversation, the squatters sustained the 
occupation ‘à la Africaine’ (‘in the African way’) in the absence of external support (Field 
notes, 16/06/2017). Through this expression, he was referring to the experience of 
organizing survival and also political activism under precarious conditions and with 
scarce resources. On the other hand, he also pointed at the existing indigenous resources 
of the sans-papiers, which were embedded in social (migrant) networks, and the cultural 
capital of certain leading figures. 
Firstly, some of the CSP75 organizers had been living in in France for many years. 
One activist was even involved in the St Bernard mobilizations in 1996 and was 
regularized in 2006 (after 13 years in France) but decided to stay in the movement, ‘as 
the relay’ to previous struggles and experiences (Halissat, 2016). Others had spent various 
years in France as legal residents, including as political refugees and had subsequently 
become undocumented through legal reforms. Accordingly, they had accumulated crucial 
knowledge on political activism, legal and administrative processes and social capital. As 
noted above, the memories of disappointments were the other side of the medal in this 
regard. These figures served as ‘entrepreneurs’ or ‘brokers’ for the movement, crucial for 
compensating or buffering the structural obstacles of political mobilization in a condition 
of illegality.60  
Secondly, the occupants could rely on the strong sense of solidarity including 
                                                 
59  The expression is borrowed from an article title by Zepeda-Millán, who investigated the indigenous 
resources (social, economic and cultural capital) in undocumented migrant activism in Florida, USA 
(2016). 
60  See also the chapter by Freedman, who has equally pointed to the role of ‘brokers’ with specific 
resources in undocumented migrant activism in France (Freedman, 2008). Zepeda-Millán traces 
similar patterns in the US (Zepeda-Millán, 2016). 
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strong and weak ties within the (sub-Saharan) migrant community in Paris. These 
networks had ever since buffered some of the hardships of every-day life without papers 
in the French capital (CSP75 organizer quoted in France Inter, 2015). The migrant 
workers ‘foyers’ (social housing complexes mostly located in the Parisian periphery) 
have become important nodes in these social nets - as access points for newcomers, as 
reservoirs of information and social capital but also for the provision of basic needs such 
as precarious shelter and food (France Inter, 2015; Halissat, 2016; Laske, 2009b). Due to 
these indigenous resources, individuals within these networks, and to a certain degree 
also the sans-papiers collectives, have been less dependent on external support. This, 
indeed, has distinguished the West-African migrant community from the newly arriving 
forced migrants coming from other regions who were without established networks (see 
Chapter 7 on the ‘La Chapelle’- arena). Therefore, the ‘foyers’ were important spaces to 
mobilize for the occupation of ‘Bourse du Travail’ and to guarantee its continuation 
(CSP75, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c).  
Thirdly, and related to the two previous types of resources, the occupying sans-
papiers originated from a wide range of countries, yet, were by majority francophone, 
including the spokespersons, which allowed them to directly communicate with the local 
media and supporting citizens. 
Consequently, despite a continuous and at times deepening alienation of the 
CSP75 with both the associations and the CGT (Fouteau, 2009), the protesters succeeded 
in sustaining a high degree of mobilization. This included so-called ‘debats sur matelats’ 
(‘debates on mattresses’), that were regularly organized in one room of the occupied 
building, all covered with mattresses to provide sleeping places for the occupants. These 
debates allowed to internally share experiences of a life in illegality, to discuss the 
strategy of the struggle, but also to meet potential allies. Every Wednesday, a rally was 
organized to the prefect’s office, and every Friday a demonstration in front of the 
occupied ‘Bourse du Travail’ (CSP75, 2008b; Ginésy-Galano, 2009, Interview P15). 
With the ‘exits’ as they called it, they aimed at sustaining visibility and disruption. As the 
organizers noted, ‘if you plant a tree, you have to water it. The demonstrations are our 
water’ (CSP75, 2008d, author's translation).  
Eviction and Fragmentation 
After 14 months of occupation with a constantly high protest activity by the CSP75 and 
no significant rapprochement between the competing players, the CGT ordered the 
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eviction of the squat in June 2009. When the majority of occupants had left for one of 
their regular demonstrations, the security services of the CGT entered the ‘Bourse du 
Travail’ with sticks and tear gas and removed the remaining sans-papiers - according to 
the newspaper ‘Le Monde’ - ‘brutally’ (van Eeckhout, 2009). In a press release, the CGT 
Paris remarked: 
‘The delegates [of the sans-papiers] have cultivated the idea that the occupation 
of the Bourse du Travail might lead to the regularization of isolated undocumented 
workers. Voluntarily, they have led these migrant workers into a deadlock. They 
could have, like others, chosen to organize in the trade unions to engage in 
collective struggles on the work place (…) (CGT Paris, 2009a, author's 
translation). 
The communiqué continued touching upon the fundamental dilemma which had 
characterized the arena from the outset: 
‘Who can understand an occupation motivated by a need for help and at the same 
time the refusal of any kind of proposal? Even more fundamentally: how is it to 
be understood that the CSP75 wants to damage the trade union movement and 
particularly the CGT while at the same time demanding its support? (CGT Paris, 
2009a, author's translation). 
In the media, the CGT reiterated its position, justifying the eviction with a need to re-
establish order and focus on the strike movement ‘in the front row for the regularisation 
of sans-papiers’ (CGT spokes person, cited in Le Monde Online, 2009). While the CGT 
had since the initiation of strikes succeeded in the regularisation of more than 2,000 sans-
papiers (CGT Paris, 2009a), it was exactly its position ‘in the front row’, and the 
authoritarian push for leadership, which caused the protest in the first place. An activist 
involved at the time and now a trade union organizer, recalled in a personal interview: 
‘I think the CGT is not proud of it. But, at a certain point, it was not tenable any 
longer. It is not only us in the building, there are also other trade unions. There is 
work to do. (…) It was a very painful moment for many. And no one really 
understood why no compromise could be found’ (Interview P29).  
The eviction left the migrant rights movement in Paris more fragmented than ever 
(Fouteau, 2009). Hundreds of migrants, including women and children, found themselves 
homeless on the sidewalks of the ‘Rue du Temple’ in central Paris. With plastic tarps and 
mattresses, a makeshift camp took form within sight of the CGT headquarters (CSP75, 
2009).  
By being expelled from the ‘Bourse du Travail’, and hence by disrupting the 
public with an (improvised) protest camp, the former occupants re-emerged as a 
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contentious issue on the agenda of the prefect’s office, which had deliberately kept a low 
profile in the previous months. Moreover, the violent intervention had temporarily re-
attracted widespread media coverage. Troubled by this new politicization, and to avoid 
the perpetuation of the makeshift camp in the streets of Paris, the prefect’s office offered 
the CSP75 to treat 300 cases ‘benevolently’ under the condition that the group dismantled 
the camp (Fouteau, 2009; Laske, 2009a).  
The offer fundamentally deepened internal divisions, which had already started 
within the occupied ‘Bourse du Travail’ (CSP 75, 2016, Interview P29, Interview P7). 
Conflicts emerged on the selection of 300 files out of the roughly 1,300 protesters, all 
exhausted by months of protest in precarious conditions and deeply afraid of ‘missing the 
train’ toward regularization.61 One of the dissidents, criticising the CSP75 leadership, 
noted: 
‘The delegates of the CSP75 have secretly created a list with names and when the 
first meetings at the prefect’s office started, we realized that there were names we 
did not even know, who had never been present during the occupation, the 
demonstrations and now on the side-walk’ (quoted in van Eeckhout, 2009, 
author's translation). 
In addition to those who did not appear on the list, there were also those who knew they 
would never fit into the official criteria of regularization on economic grounds and had 
therefore chosen the occupation as a last resort (CSP75, 2009, 2010). As a result, the 
protesting group experienced its first division, when around 100 protesters rejected the 
offer and decided to stay at ‘Boulevard du Temple’ and re-baptized their group into 
‘Collectif Sans-Papiers Solidaire de Paris’62 (van Eeckhout, 2009).  
Alongside some of the sans-papiers, various individual supporters looked for a 
way out from the impasse (Fouteau, 2009; Laske, 2009a). For many, a rapprochement 
between the sans-papiers collectives, the CGT and the associations, was only possible on 
the condition that the former occupants left the sidewalks just outside the ‘Bourse du 
Travail’. It was believed that the immediate spatial confrontation with the CGT needed 
to be overcome in order to gradually approach the antagonist players (Fouteau, 2009).  
Consequently, in late July 2009 those former occupants willing to leave the 
sidewalks at the ‘Bourse du Travail’, coordinated by the CSP75, occupied together with 
                                                 
61  See also section 5.4. on selective incentives and the ‘governance of social ties’ in forced migrant 
activism. 
62 Translates into ‘Collective of Solidary Sans-Papiers in Paris’. 
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individual supporters of different backgrounds a large empty building complex of the 
former health insurance administration in ‘Rue Baudelique’ in the North of Paris (Laske, 
2009a; NPA, 2009). The supporters included factions of the CGT who had opposed the 
eviction of the ‘Bourse du Travail’ and demanded to  
‘find a place for them, where they can breathe, gather resources and continue to 
make themselves heard, and to exchange with all the others in the same situation’ 
(CGT organizer quoted in van Eeckhout, 2009, author's translation). 
The contentious arena, hence, was complemented with an additional location, which 
gradually led to a reordering of the main players involved, since some split, or left the 
arena while others emerged. During the first moments of the new occupation at 
‘Baudelique’, these factional dynamics became evident. When some of the sans-papiers 
recognized a CGT badge on one of the supporting activists, they inquired: 
‘Are you from the CGT? (...) Is the CGT finally willing to align with us? The 
militant answered: “The CGT is not a block from the basis to Thibault [secretary 
general, at the time], it consists of very different people”’ (cited in Laske, 2009). 
Indeed, while the eviction had fragmented the occupants, it had also deeply affected some 
of the trade unionists and associations themselves, who criticised the CGT’s reaction 
(Interview P29, Interview P7). On the blog ‘Ou va la CGT?’ (where does the CGT go?), 
rank and file members of the trade union who deviated from the CGT position expressed 
fundamental criticism of the CGT leadership and solidarity with the sans-papiers 
collectives (Ou va la CGT?, n.d., 2009a, 2009b): 
‘There is this contempt, coloured with paternalism toward our sans-papiers 
comrades, who demand to organize themselves, to lead themselves their struggle, 
without putting their destiny in the hands of trade union experts, of the CGT or 
whomever’ (Ou va la CGT?, 2009a, author's translation)- 
The official position of the CGT, yet, remained irreconcilable and was reiterated 
repeatedly: 
‘After 14 months of unfriendly occupation to say the least, and an avalanche of 
fierce accusations from the CSP75, it is difficult to re-establish a normal 
relationship with those responsible in this organization until they have recognized 
that the occupation of the Bourse du Travail and the pressure on the trade union 
movement was not a good choice. They have to clarify first their relationship with 





The ‘Ministry for the Regularization of All Sans Papiers’ and the March Paris-Nice 
Directly after squatting the building, the CSP activists baptized it ‘Ministry for the 
Regularization of All Sans-Papiers’, deliberately deviating from the CGT focus on ‘sans-
papiers workers’ (Barron et al., 2016).  
The enormous spatial capacity of the new ‘head quarter’ of sans-papiers activism 
allowed for the extension of the movement, which rapidly counted several thousand 
members. A total of 16 collectives (CSP75, 2010) joined the movement, including 1,300 
members of a collective of Turkish and Kurdish sans-papiers. Most of them had left 
Turkey for political reasons, however, were never granted asylum and ended up 
undocumented (Bell & Dilber, 2009). The weekly demonstrations and ‘debates on 
mattresses’ continued in addition to a wide range of other activities – from political 
organizing to adult literacy programmes and media workshops (Bell & Dilber, 2009, 
Interview P30). During a national sans-papiers demonstration in October 2009, organized 
by the ‘Baudelique’ headquarters, more than 10,000 sans-papiers gathered (Libération 
Online, 2009) and made it the largest demonstration by undocumented migrants in French 
history. 
Yet, despite this protest intensity and positive experiences in organizing 16 
collectives made up of a total of 25 nationalities, the movement received very little public 
attention (Bell & Dilber, 2009; CSP75, 2010). The rupture with the CGT and the network 
of migrant rights associations had left the autonomous movement without their 
amplifiers. While proving their capacity to mobilize various thousands of migrants and 
to organize an occupation without major internal conflicts for extended periods, they were 
eventually missing a leverage vis-à-vis the state.  
Parallel to the largest and longest wave of political protest by sans-papiers, the 
CGT strike movement, in turn, expanded further and eventually succeeded in the 
regularization of several thousand sans-papiers (Barron et al., 2011). Both public 
attention and the priority of the prefect’s office had shifted toward the CGT-led strike 
movement. 
Aware of this impasse, the occupants announced a spectacular protest event in 
order to regain leverage: On May 1st 2010, activists of ‘Baudelique’ departed on a foot 
march from Paris to Nice, where the French-African Summit was to be held by the end 
of the month (Maudet, 2010). In choosing a long-distance march, the protesters 
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symbolically aligned with previous marches by the sans-papiers movement such as the 
march in 1997 from Angoulême to Paris. Furthermore, they intended to capitalize on the 
relational and demonstrative effects of ‘eventful’ protest.63 One of the organizers noted: 
‘Since Saint Bernard, every two or three years, it takes an event of disruption to 
maintain the visibility of our movement’ (CSP75, 2010: 12, author's translation). 
Various migrant rights associations took the opportunity to declare their solidarity with 
the march and by this, also intended to send a signal of reconciliation to the CSP75 
(FTCR, 2010; GISTI, 2010; Médecins du Monde, 2010). Despite its relational effects, the 
march did not result in increasing pressure on the prefect’s office. Some of the 
participants even argued that the direction of the march was strategically wrong, as it 
deviated the attention and pressure from the nucleus of contention in Paris (Interview 
P15).  
5.4.  Dependence on the State, Small ‘Niches’ and Fragmentation 
The tangible ‘outcome’ of the ‘Baudelique’ occupation in terms of regularizations 
remained low, also after the eventful march. Indeed, the subsequent month unveiled the 
fundamental dilemma of sans-papiers activism once more: the prefect’s office had 
blocked the treatment of files by sans-papiers organized in ‘Baudelique’ until they had 
left the building. While protesting against the government, the sans-papiers depended on 
its recognition. In their explanation of the envisaged end of the occupation, the CSP75 
delegates noted: 
‘The prefect’s office told us that they did not want its relationship with the CSP75, 
established in the last 10 years, to suffer from the occupation or to end. They 
assured us that, if the CSP75 leaves on its own, the relationship will be reinforced 
and our files will be treated in a timelier way and benevolently. If not, the 
relationship would end. The CSP75 doesn’t want this, as it would undermine the 
long work of 10 years’ (CSP75, 2010, author's translation). 
Similarly to what Jasper has termed the ‘rules dilemma’, the protesters found themselves 
trapped in rules they had aimed at changing in the first place:  
‘Efforts to change an arena often end up following the rules of that same arena. 
Rather than ignoring it or using a different arena, an insurgent may end up 
embroiled in the arena’s rules for changing the rules’ (Jasper, 2008: 163) 
                                                 
63  For a more extensive analysis of the expressive and relational effects of the march, see the comparative 
research by Monforte and Dufour (Monforte & Dufour, 2013). 
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On the day the ‘Bourse du Travail’ was evicted, the prefect’s office offered the 
examination of 300 files. The CSP75 delegates were well aware that the decision 
regarding whom to include in the list of 300 individuals would once more introduce 
fissures in the movement. Yet – their adherent also demanded tangible outcomes of a long 
and burdensome protest: 
‘… they [the prefect’s office] know in advance what they will obtain: the division, 
and the weakening of the struggle. Because, on the one hand, the sans-papiers 
have been waiting every day for many years now. It is very human, they are not 
able to resist the illusory perspective of regularization; on the other hand, those 
who know they will not fit into ‘the criteria’ [decided by the state] are not willing 
to dissolve the occupation.’ (CSP75, 2010, author's translation). 
As expected, the question led to fierce internal divisions and fragmentations inside the 
occupying group, concerning the question as to whether the offer should be accepted, or 
how to select the 300 files as well as on decision-making procedures within the 
autonomous movement more broadly. Shortly after, more than 700 sans-papiers joined a 
newly established collective with the name ‘Les oubliés de Baudelique’64 (CSP75, 2010, 
Interview P30, Interview P15). Many of the other collectives criticised the unilateral 
decision of the CSP75 to end the occupation (and hence to accept the deal offered by the 
prefect’s office) and once more, the selection of those 300 files to be examined in 
exchange for leaving the building (Interview P15). In the end, the collective player of the 
occupation disintegrated into its constituting sub-players, whose interests became 
fundamentally adversarial in the light of a small niche to regularization, which was 
furthermore about to close. One of those opposing the agreement with the authorities and 
joining the new collective explained: 
‘I don’t prefer the CSP75, nor the new collective. All I want is to know what 
happens with my case. It is important that the prefect’s office knows why others 
like me do not want to leave the building. It is because we do not know what is 
going to happen with our cases’ (quoted in CSP75, 2010, author's translation). 
The very logic of individual cases – the macro structures of the legal system – permeated 
into the micro-interactions within the contentious arena. In the light of a closing niche, 
the CSP75 had an interest to at least secure some success for its own adherents. Others 
suddenly realized their marginal role within the collective and desperately tried to find an 
alternative. The government authorities, well aware of the fragile unity of individuals in 
highly precarious conditions, from which they want to escape from at all cost, skilfully 
                                                 
64  Translates to ‘the forgotten ones of Baudelique’. 
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governed these fragile ties. Even though sans-papiers had for years chanted during 
demonstrations ‘le cas par cas, on n’en veut pas’65, it was exactly this logic, which had 
once more fragmented the movement. Hence, despite opposing the individual logic of 
regularization, the CSP75 (and many other collectives) were repeatedly forced into 
temporary cooperation with the state to obtain concrete results for its adherents. 
On August 7, 2010, eventually all occupants left the building, bringing a two-year 
wave of protest by forced migrants to a ‘painful’ (Interview P15) end (see also CSP75, 
2010; SUD Éducation, 2010). 
5.5.  Contentious Interactions and Interactionist Memories 
The end of the protest at the ‘Bourse du Travail’ and ‘Baudelique’ left a deep mark on 
future mobilizations of forced migrants in Paris. Interviewed seven years later, 
protagonists have referred to it as having ‘left deep bruises’ (Interview P22), as 
‘extremely painful’ (Interview P15), as ‘profoundly damaging’ (Interview P30), or as ‘the 
dirty memory of migrant struggles’ (Interview P7) amongst others. Already directly after 
the eviction of the ‘Bourse du Travail’, the CSP75 had spoken of a ‘black moment in 
migrant rights struggles in France’ (CSP75, 2009). 
These bruises translated into concrete relational effects on political mobilizations 
by forced migrants in Paris. While tensions had been inherent to the migrant rights 
movement and particularly to the relations between migrants and ‘supporters’ since the 
1990s, the ‘Bourse du Travail’ wave left the movement deeply divided (Fouteau, 2009) 
with multiple rifts: between the autonomous collectives in the St Bernard tradition and 
the trade union-organised movement; between those who could claim the identity of 
workers and those who could not; between associations and collectives and within the 
sans-papiers communities. 
One former spokesperson of one of the collectives involved in the ‘Baudelique’ 
occupation noted in a personal interview 2017 - lastingly disillusioned: 
‘The Bourse du Travail episode was like the Paris Commune. There is no 
revolution after such moments. (…) Now, I have more contact with sans-papiers 
in Italy than in Paris’ (Interview P15). 
Disappointed by the role of the wider migrant rights movement, the CSP75 has even 
further internalized a pride of autonomy:  
                                                 
65  Translates to ‘we do not want the “case by case” logic of regularization’. 
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‘We prefer being autonomous. We know that we are deficient, we make mistakes. 
But we prefer this to being dependent’ (Interview P22). Or another delegate: 
‘Cooperation with the CGT? No way, they evicted us! We do not forget easily’ 
(Field notes, 30/05/2017). 
Aware of the counter-productivity of these conflicts, which eventually benefitted their 
common adversary (the state authorities), various attempts of rapprochements were made. 
Yet, the interactionist memories sit deep, as the following account illustrates. 
‘There was a meeting to organize the 20th anniversary of the St Bernard protests 
in summer 2016 (…). There were some, willing to move forward, but the old 
stories of the Bourse du Travail came up again. All these stories of autonomy, of 
the CGT’ (Interview P29). 
Also within the forced migrant community, the contentious interactions had lasting and 
largely detrimental effects. Within the sans-papiers community, mistrust has prevailed, 
leaving the movement highly fragmented. Since the end of ‘Baudelique’, three different 
groups with the same name of CSP75 (CSP75, 2016) have come to exist in Paris. A 
movement of several thousand splintered into different groups with relatively few 
members (several dozens to a few hundred), allowing prefects to continue their successful 
strategy of ‘divide and rule’, cultivating the competition between the different groups 
(Interview P7, Interview P29). 
5.6.  Conclusions 
In this chapter, I focused on one of the largest waves (both in terms of individuals 
involved and duration) of political protest by forced migrants in Paris with a view to 
identifying relational dynamics, both within the migrant community and vis-à-vis non-
migrant pro-beneficiaries. Various conclusions can be drawn, which will be further 
elaborated in the upcoming chapters of this thesis: 
Firstly, the very constellation of actors of the protest wave points to the fact that 
a ‘movement for the rights of forced migrants’, neatly connecting migrant rights 
associations, leftist trade unions and autonomous sans-papiers collectives is more an 
(important) fiction than a reality. Such mobilizations are best understood as contentious 
arenas, in which a wide range of players with highly distinct interests interacted: the 
hierarchic and outcome-oriented tradition of CGT with an interest in placing the trade 
union in the limelight; the conviction by self-organized groups to be the only ones to 
speak for themselves; the unease of many associations with either of the two positions; 
and the prefect’s office, on which, eventually, all actors depended but who governed the 
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fragile ties, predominantly from a distance. In such processes actors emerge, split and 
change sides. As this account documents, the CGT as well as a number of associations - 
considered as an ally of the sans-papiers collectives the latest since the St Bernard 
movement (Cissé, 1998) - lost their credibility and were (temporarily) perceived as key 
opponents.  
Secondly, the analysis suggests that forced migrant mobilizations are often as 
much a struggle for rights (such as regularization) as one for recognition as political 
subjects. While the intervention of the CGT might have favoured the former, it was 
detrimental to the process of emancipation by forced migrants themselves. The wave of 
strikes coordinated by the CGT and Droits Devant! achieved the regularization of several 
thousand sans-papiers (Barron et al., 2011). Yet, de facto, the intervention of the CGT 
introduced a trade union as a powerful intermediary between the state and the sans-
papiers communities. By those sans-papiers with a year-long background in political 
organizing, this was perceived as a fundamental assault and threat to the struggles for 
autonomy coming from non-migrant beneficiaries. Asymmetric positions of power, 
hence, introduced a breaking point in social relations, which have remained highly fragile.  
Thirdly, as also Nicholls has convincingly argued, political activism of precarious 
migrants faces the structural dilemma of mobilizing within small ‘niche openings’, rather 
than opportunities. Such ‘needle eyes’ to regularization or recognition only allow for the 
passage of few, at the expense of the exclusion of others (Nicholls, 2013a, 2014). This 
poses particular challenges for internal unity, as the forced migrant community is highly 
heterogeneous in terms of their potential recognition by the state. Similar dynamics can 
be traced for both undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers (see also Chapter 6 on the 
‘Oranienplatz’-arena). With the CGT focus on ‘sans papiers workers’ and the strategy of 
collective strikes on the work-place, the niche for those falling out of the labour-related 
criteria was about to shrink. This excluded isolated workers without the leverage of 
striking on their work place, as well as women and children, the unemployed, the elderly 
etc. Relations between sans-papiers collectives and pro-beneficiaries have been 
historically fragile and have repeatedly broken due to disputes regarding whom to focus 
on in campaigns. Hence, the ‘Bourse du Travail’ and ‘Baudelique’ arena – in the view of 
the CSP75 - fed into a tradition of widespread distrust (CSP75, 2008a) since the late 1990, 
when various associations had advocated for focussing on the regularizations of those 
with the highest likelihood of acceptance. Additionally, the small ‘niches’ also introduced 
or deepened fissures within the migrant community. Consequently, parts of the protest 
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movement split from the rest on two occasions, arguing that they had been ‘forgotten’ 
and left behind. While the question of autonomy remained the decisive breaking point for 
social ties between undocumented migrants and pro-beneficiaries, the question of ‘who 
practically profits’ led to numerous decisions to defect from the collective action. 
Lastly, the arena is ‘an example of a community in movement using its various 
indigenous assets for its own self-defence and desire to demonstrate its dignity and 
discontent’ (Zepeda-Millán, 2016: 14, italics in original). Significant resources were 
mobilized, largely without and even against the interests of potential allies. Dense ethnic 
networks with strong and weak ties and a long history in organizing constituted the 
‘weapons of the not so weak’ (ibid). These insights point to the important heterogeneity 
of forced migrant populations and particularly at the importance of relational contexts in 
which contentious arenas are embedded. As subsequent chapters will illustrate, the case 
of the West-African sans-papiers differs starkly from both the experiences in Germany 
(see Chapters 6 and 8) and the mobilizations of other communities such as the forced 









The ‘Oranienplatz’-Arena: Berlin 2012-2014 
Contentious Interactions and Spatial Strategies 
 
‘We have to pick-up the non-citizens wherever they are. In every camp, in every 
room. The movement needs to stay in motion’  
(cited in Jakob 2013b, author's translation). 
‘Refugees were isolated and this was the tactic [to break it]. The government 
isolates refugees so that they cannot have ideas to come together, to separate 
them. If you come together you are strong already. The march to Berlin and bus 
tour at the same time was really locating the people.’  (Interview B4) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
From the Parisian context, this chapter shifts the focus to the largest protest wave by 
forced migrants in German history, unfolding from 2012 onwards. Despite countless 
protest events and sustained organizational structures since the 1990s, political 
activism by forced migrants remained at the margins of German society. National 
newspapers rarely reported on the activities and solidarity was limited to the radical 
left and some faith-based associations. This changed fundamentally in early 2012, 
when the suicide of an Iranian asylum-seeker in Wurzburg initiated the most 
disruptive wave of contention around forced migration in German history.  
Scrutinizing the emergence and trajectory of this crucial case, I will develop 
and empirically substantiate a spatial and relational argument. I will document that 
the ‘Oranienplatz’-wave did not react upon opening opportunity structures and 
capitalizing upon pre-existing resources, as traditional social movement theories would 
expect. Rather, resources were generated through spatial strategies and micro-interactions 
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during the mobilization. Forced migrants mobilized fellow asylum-seekers, pro-
beneficiaries and obtained extensive media coverage by moving from socially and 
spatially isolated locations into urban centres. In organizing central protest camps, 
marches and bus tours, they literally left behind their excluded position and articulated a 
claim to urban and social centrality. The relocation from the periphery of the asylum camp 
to the inner city space furthermore broke the routine of forced migrant invisibility through 
extensive media coverage and by this tapped resources needed to sustain political 
mobilizations. The camps generated ‘magnetic fields’, attracting diverse support milieus 
from which forced migrants were previously cut off in a disintegrating asylum system. 
An explicit relational lens, moreover, sheds light on the contentious and fragile nature of 
ties that are made and unmade during political mobilizations of forced migrants. Whereas 
questions of paternalism, strategy and leadership regularly intervened in relations 
between those primarily concerned and pro-beneficiaries, their heterogeneity in terms of 
origin, gender and most importantly (potential) legal status, introduced delicate breaking 
points. Existing lines of division were furthermore deliberately exploited by public 
authorities to undermine contention.  
 In order to unpack this argument in detail, the structure of the chapter is 
threefold: firstly, I provide a brief outline of key events to orientate the unfamiliar 
reader (6.2). Secondly, I demonstrate that the contentious arena was fundamentally 
spatialized as the relational qualities of its different locations, as well as their strategic 
use by activists and policing by the state, had a significant impact on the protest’s 
trajectory (6.3.). Thirdly, I scrutinize the contentious interactions both among forced 
migrant activists and in relation with (temporary) allies and opponents with a view to 
show how these contentious interactions have influenced mobilizations and 
demobilization (6.4.). 
 Regarding data, the analysis is based on more than 30 qualitative interviews 
with actors involved in this wave of protest, including several forced migrant activists 
from various ‘generations’, individual ‘supporters’, representatives of migrant rights 
and humanitarian organizations, as well as (local) authorities and politicians. It also 
draws from dozens of written texts (primary sources) produced by actors during this 
time as well as secondary sources on the protests. 
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6.2. Brief Outline of Key Events 
On January 29, 2012, the Iranian forced migrant Mohammad Rahsepar committed 
suicide in his room in the asylum-seeker camp in Wurzburg in the German region of 
Bavaria. According to fellow asylum-seekers and Rahsepar’s doctor, the miserable 
accommodation, lack of adequate medical assistance, the insecurity and waiting in 
an isolated camp had gradually pushed him into depression (Jungbauer, 2012a). A 
request backed by a medical evaluation to be transferred to the asylum-seeker camp 
in Cologne, where Rahsepar’s sister was registered, had been rejected shortly before 
Rahsepar committed suicide (Jungbauer, 2012b). In reaction to their friend’s death, 
fellow Iranian asylum-seekers in the same facility in Wurzburg started to politicize the 
suicide. First, they boycotted their food packages and demonstrated in front of the city 
hall, demanding the improvement of living conditions during the asylum process, 
accelerated procedures and the end of all deportations. One of their first statements 
read: 
‘Unfortunately, Mohamad Rahsepar is not the first one to succumb to the 
harshness of the treatment many refugees are facing in their homeland which 
drives them to seek asylum in other countries where they encounter confusion, 
lack of health, food, hygiene and inhuman treatment and humiliation; this situation 
is worsened with depression, homesickness and other pressures which ultimately 
drive many of the most vulnerable ones to suicide. How can we prevent that? 
Surely, the answer would not be to swallow our anger and accept the daily 
tyranny; neither could acting as victims help us in any way in order to attract 
attention and/or sporadic humanitarian financial help. Against abuse, regardless 
of the time and place it occurs, we have to stand up for our rights and fight back. 
We have to denounce the tyranny hidden hypocritically in the so-called 
humanitarian authorities and do our best to bring change. The asylum-seeker who 
has to leave his country and take refuge in the countries that are supposed to apply 
and endorse Human Rights and [who] does not get his/her rightful place has to 
take certain steps to gain back his/her dignity’ (Refugees from Wurzburg, 2012). 
To increase the pressure, the protesters left their assigned accommodation, set up very 
basic tents in the city centre, displayed photographs of human rights abuses in Iran 
and declared to go on hunger strike: 
‘We suffer from the extremely long asylum process that sometimes takes even 
years and we hope every day that the torture of uncertainty will change for the 
better as soon as possible. This uncertainty, the fact that no autonomy is allowed 
to us in our daily lives, and that we are treated like prisoners, exhausts us and 
gradually – step by step - pushes us towards death. (…) Now, we are forced to use 
the last of all means available and go on hunger strike on 19.03.2012, to finally 
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make our voices heard and to be allowed a human life’ (Hosinazadeh & Maorattab 
2012, author’s translation). 
The public pressure built up by the Iranian group turned out to be successful. It resulted 
in negotiations which in turn led to an acceleration of their asylum processes. Eventually 
some, though not all, of the protesters were granted refugee status. The activists 
maintained their camp and underlined that their demands went beyond the 
recognition of their individual cases. One of the spokespersons declared: 
‘I am the voice of Mohammed Rahsepar. I am the voice of all asylum-seekers 
who are too afraid to join us here. I am the voice of all the isolated (…) who 
are forced to endure this inhumane situation. But I do not commit suicide. I 
demand that the treatment of asylum-seekers should change!’ (cited in Jakob 
2016: 109, author's translation).  
In the following days and weeks, the protesters pushed for further escalation, some 
sewed their lips publicly to mark their status as voiceless outsiders, others announced a 
dry hunger strike. 
Starting as a spark of protest against the living conditions in one specific asylum 
facility in Southern Germany, the dissent soon spread like wildfire. Tent camps emerged 
in other cities, loosely knit together in the ‘refugee tent action’ campaign (International 
Refugee Center Berlin, 2015). The first phase of camps included the cities of Wurzburg, 
Passau, Trier, Aub, Bamberg, Nurnberg, Regensburg (all in Southern Germany) and 
subsequently also Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Berlin (Lobig, 2013). 
In early August, protesters from the various camps gathered for a coordination 
meeting in Frankfurt and decided to organize a march to Berlin:  
‘We enter a new phase of protest. We walk, in order to break isolation’ (cited in 
Litschko, 2012a, author's translation). 
In September 2012, the different camps joined forces and organized a bus tour as well as 
a 600km protest march to Berlin (Glöde & Böhlo, 2015; Langa, 2015). The activists 
explicitly intended to upscale their protest from the local to the national level and to attract 
further (media) attention to their demands.  
In Berlin, the news of the arrival of the march spread rapidly. Activists from the 
already existing ‘refugee tent action’ camp at ‘Heinrichplatz’ in Kreuzberg had engaged 
in extensive preparations. Through multiple channels, activists and supporters were 
mobilised to welcome the protesters from Wurzburg. The media sphere was galvanised 
by the protests, too. Even the ‘Tagesschau’ 8 pm edition, Germany’s most important TV 
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news outlet, reported on the arrival of forced migrant activists in Berlin (ARD 
Tagesschau, 2012).  
In consequence, thousands of supporters from a wide range of backgrounds – 
radical left groups, migrant associations, neighbours, faith-based groups - either 
welcomed the marchers on their arrival or offered their support over the following days. 
Media coverage was mainly supportive (Guyton, 2012; Lindner, 2012; Markus, 2012). 
Kreuzberg’s district mayor from the Green party, Franz Schulz, who had been informed 
about the camp beforehand, publicly articulated his support of the protest (Rogalla, 2012). 
Within a couple of days, the ‘Oranienplatz’-camp became a vibrant hub of political 
migrant activity. More and more people from asylum camps in and around Berlin joined 
the protest camp at the heart of the German capital.  
A second camp emerged in Berlin shortly after, when the Iranian core group 
initiating the March, went on a 14-day hunger strike at ‘Brandenburger Tor’, one of 
Berlin’s most iconic sites (Schreiter, 2012). Despite the strike resulting in negotiations 
with high-rank politicians and a meeting in the German parliament, no agreement was 
reached (Litschko, 2012b; Spiegel Online, 2012). Disappointed by the outcome, some 
went back to Bavaria, others to ‘Oranienplatz’. At the same time, in the midst of an icy 
Berlin winter, migrants and supporters from the second protest camp at ‘Oranienplatz’ 
squatted an abandoned school building (‘Gerhard Hauptmann Schule’) at walking 
distance from the tent camp (Litschko, 2012c).  
In the upcoming months – until its dissolution (by some referred to as ‘eviction’ 
– see section on fragmentation below) – the camp constituted the center of the forced 
migrant movement in Germany. The number of activists living in the camp fluctuated 
between 70 in the beginning to up to 200 individuals. Countless protest events such as 
demonstrations, hunger strikes, petitions, bus tours etc. were organized from or supported 
by this activist headquarter (for a detailed overview see Jakob, 2016). 
From spring 2013 onwards, both the protest camp at ‘Oranienplatz’ and the 
occupied school witnessed the arrival of a new type of forced migrants, who eventually 
called themselves ‘Lampedusa in Berlin’ - mostly Sub-Saharan migrants from a wide 
range of countries who had worked in Libya for several years until the civil war erupted 
after the fall of Muammar Gadhafi in 2011. Many escaped by ship to the most Southern 
island of Italy, Lampedusa (Borri & Fontanari, 2014). After being granted humanitarian 
protection status in the context of Italy’s ‘Emergenza Nordafrica’ program, many found 
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themselves impoverished and homeless in the streets of Italian urban centers. Some 
eventually decided to move North to Germany and got stuck with neither a work permit 
nor entitlement to any kind of social benefits. The ‘Oranienplatz’ camp subsequently 
hosted two groups of forced migrants: those with humanitarian protection in Italy and 
those registered within the German asylum system.  
From summer 2013, controversies around both the school and the camp multiplied 
due to deteriorating conditions, an accentuation of internal conflicts and an increasingly 
adversary role of both senate (regional government) and district (local government)66. 
Following various attempts by local authorities to evict the camp and lengthy 
negotiations, an agreement was achieved between the Senate and the majority of those 
living in the tent camp. A certain number of the latter were offered temporary housing 
and a ‘benevolent’ individual (re)-assessment of their (legal) situation. The camp was 
hence dismantled against the strong resistance of another group of the activists in April 
2014 (Kopietz & Zivanovic, 2014). Pressures on the occupied school equally increased, 
which was also partly evicted, while a core of forced migrant activists resisted their 
transferal on the roof and were subsequently tolerated (though strictly controlled) in one 
section of the building until early 2018 (Maxwill & Witte, 2018) .  
Protests by forced migrants continued throughout the summer and autumn of 2014 
at various locations in and around Berlin, particularly when those evacuated from the 
camp and school were ordered to leave the temporary shelters and return to their allocated 
district, where their asylum claim got registered, or to go back to Italy for those with 
humanitarian protection status (Berliner Zeitung, 2014; Kögel, Menzemer, Hummel, & 
Straub, 2014).  
In early 2015, the protest wave that had started three years before, faded out. Yet, 
the forced migrant movement has not disappeared ever since but rather entered a phase 
of ‘abeyance’ (Taylor, 1989). In such periods of disadvantageous contexts, nodes in an 
increasingly pluri-central movement continue to exist, sustaining networks and collective 
identity, while (temporarily) adopting a less radical repertoire of contention (Taylor & 
Crossley, 2013). In Berlin, activists involved in the protest wave starting in 2012 have 
remained engaged in various anti-racist groups until today, regularly participating at 
protest events and confidently ‘making place’ for migrant political subjectivity in the 
local migrant rights movement and the society at large. The mobilizations have hence not 
                                                 
66  See also the section on contentious interactions below. 
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only resulted in a momentary rupture of exclusive routines but have provided relational, 
material and symbolic resources for future mobilizations of forced migrants in Germany 
(see also Chapter 8). 
6.3.  Geographies of Control and Contestation: a Spatial Perspective 
While the first section provided a brief overview of events to orientate the reader, this 
section specifically adopts a spatial perspective in analyzing the emergence and trajectory 
of the ‘Oranienplatz’-wave that points to particular spatial underpinnings. It indicates 
both the geographies of control exerted by the state on asylum-seekers in Germany, as 
well as a spatialized repertoire that the latter have developed in response. 
The Iranian group of asylum-seekers from Wurzburg attributed the death of their 
friend to the structural isolation, disintegration, lack of autonomy and limited mobility in 
the German asylum system, which has been sketched out in Chapter 4. Consequently, one 
of their first statements read:  
‘In the morning, when asylum-seekers wake up, they are scared of being deported. 
If they want to meet friends, the Residenzpflicht [mandatory residence & mobility 
restriction] prevents them from doing so. Everywhere in their life hurdles exist, 
built by the state, because we are not meant to be part of society’ (cited in Jakob, 
2013, authors' translation). 
An investigation following the highly politicised suicide of Rahsepar in 2012 found that 
four out of five asylum-seekers in Wurzburg suffered from heavy psychological 
problems, which were partly a result of their individual biographies of forced migration 
and reinforced by the asylum system in place (Jeske, 2012; Staffen-Quandt). The 
principle investigator concluded ‘the fact that someone commits suicide does not say 
anything. However, it is a system, exercising structural violence’ (cited in Jakob 2016: 
108, author’s translation). Commenting on the early phases of protest, one of the 
protagonists recalled: 
‘In Germany, there are many refugee camps. All are part of an isolation system. 
Most of the camps are too far away from the urban centres. The refugees do not 
have contact with society. After the suicide of Mohamed Rahsepars we said: we 
do not want to continue living in isolation’ (Source B37). 
The respective collective accommodation centre in Wurzburg was, as many others at 
the time (Wendel, 2014b), located in an industrial area at the outskirts of the city, 
surrounded by highways and production sites, separated from ordinary social life. 
While the spark of protest emerged within this restrictive and isolated environment, 
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its continuation was strongly shaped by a relocation of the protest from the urban 
periphery to the city center. The protesters left their assigned accommodation and set 
up very basic tents in the city center, in front of the city hall. Due to its central location 
and the radical tactic of hunger striking, the protest immediately attracted the 
attention of the local population, the media and asylum-seekers from other cities in 
the region (Jungbauer, 2012a; Litschko, 2012b; Przybilla, 2012a). Set up in one of 
the central streets in Wurzburg, the very presence of the asylum-seekers in the public 
space constituted a rupture of the exclusive routine, leading to both open opposition 
of the protest and expressions of solidarity (Grünberg, 2013). While the then 
Bavarian minister of social affairs Haderthauer, refused to meet the protesters – 
arguing that the state could not be ‘blackmailed’ (Main Post, 2012a) – the deputy 
director of the ‘German Agency for Refugees and Migrants’ (BAMF) met the 
protesting forced migrants (ibid). The public exposure and contestations mobilized 
visibility and resources for the continuation of the protest. Aware of this empowering 
effect, the municipality of Wurzburg employed various tactics to get rid of the camp, 
which had transcended both expectations and previous experiences with short-termed 
acts of resistances by asylum-seekers, often hidden in the remote asylum facilities, 
away from the public eye. First the administration limited the amounts of chairs and 
beds allowed in the camp (Jakob 2016: 109). Later it prohibited the presence of 
activists with sewed lips, arguing that these images were overly shocking and that the 
public had to be protected from them (Przybilla, 2012c). The administrative court 
annulated this prohibition shortly after (ibid). Furthermore, the municipality 
increased the control of those forced migrants who joined the camp in Wurzburg but 
who were officially registered in other districts and thereby subject to the mobility 
restriction of ‘Residenzpflicht’ (Refugee Tent Action, 2012). 
When the protest had spread in the loosely connected ‘tent action campaign’ 
but temporarily appeared to stagnate, the core group employed another spatial 
strategy to revitalize the emerging movement: a march and a bus tour to Berlin. Re-
locating their dissent from geographical and social margins of society to the German 
capital constituted a claim to centrality:  
‘we go to the centre where everything is close, the authorities, the parliament, we 
go and make the action there. If it is in other places, they can say, ah, this is 
Bavaria, this is, local but we have to bring it to the centre’ (Interview B4). 
By dislocating the protest to Berlin, the protesters could moreover access place-based 
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opportunities in Kreuzberg, a neighbourhood which has - despite rapid gentrification 
(Holm & Kuhn, 2010) – kept its ‘myth’ as a diverse, progressive, multicultural and 
subversive epicentre, which indeed is still home to a large immigrant community and a 
dense network of activist groups, serving as brokers to access resources necessary for 
political mobilization. 
‘We came to O-Platz because of the connection. We don't know Oranienplatz, we 
don' know anything, but we say, we have activists (…) in Berlin and they knew 
which place is good.’ (Interview B4) 
This location was not coincidental but activists strategically used the public image as 
subversive stronghold and the de facto density of progressive social movement 
organizations in this part of the city (Lang, 1998; Stehle, 2006).  
Moreover, the march and the bus tours had the important relational function of 
connecting a highly dispersed population of asylum-seekers in the German province and 
mobilizing new protesters. Both the march and the bus tours were planned to pass by 
numerous asylum camps. The logic was retrospectively explained by two of the 
protagonists of both bus tour and march: 
‘We have to pick-up the non-citizens wherever they are. In every camp, in every 
room. The movement needs to stay in motion’ (Houmer Hedayatzadeh, cited in 
Jakob 2013b, author's translation). 
‘Refugees were isolated and this was the tactics [to break it]. The government 
isolates refugees so that they cannot have ideas to come together, to separate them. 
If you come together you are strong already. The march to Berlin and bus tour at 
the same time it was really locating the people’ (Interview B4). 
Every stop during the one-month march added nodes in a growing contentious network 
and hence contributed to the accumulation of weak ties.  
Finally, the mobile repertoire had an expressive dimension. The activists 
intended to prefiguratively practice freedom of movement by deliberately violating 
‘Residenzpflicht’. Indeed, the march was symbolically and practically conceived as an 
appropriation and enactment of rights – an ‘act of emancipation’ (Monforte & Dufour, 
2013). Literally moving forward disrupted the sense of ‘being stuck’, forcefully 
immobilized by an in many cases lengthy and burdensome administrative procedure:  
‘We did not ask for rights; we did our rights’ (Interview B4).  
Underlining their determination to resist forced immobility during the asylum 
procedures in Germany, on the march from Wurzburg to Berlin, the activists tore up 
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their ‘Aufenthaltsgestattung’, the identity document for asylum-seekers, at the former 
inner-German border (Guyton 2012), symbolically relating to a continuity of borders 
within Germany for those considered unwanted. The internal effect of this spectacular 
protest was a deepening of strong and emotional ties among forced migrants and between 
migrants and European supporters.  
 The expectations of the activists with regard to support in Berlin-Kreuzberg were 
at the beginning more than met. When the marchers arrived and set up tents at 
‘Oranienplatz’, the group was enthusiastically welcomed and supported. Even more than 
in Wurzburg, the central location and visibility of the protest resulted in a magnetic effect, 
attracting hundreds of individual supporters and groups as well as forced migrants from 
isolated asylum camps to join the protest. 
During the first months of the camp at ‘Oranienplatz’, the support from the local 
population was immense. Tens of thousands of euros were donated, but also food, clothes 
and tents; local residents and shop owners in the neighbourhood of the camp offered their 
sanitary facilities. In most cases, it was enough to post an item on the ‘we need’-billboard 
at the entrance of the camp and it was organized shortly after. 
‘When we arrived in Berlin, we first said we have to let the people know. There 
was a lot of attention because 600 kilometres marching is something special. 
And when they come, we say it is good that you are here, and we need this and 
that’ (Interview B4). 
Resources that were needed to sustain the protest could be mobilized on the spot, as 
multiple weak ties could be accessed. The camp served as a reservoir of weak ties to civil 
society organizations, individual supporters and the media. In relocating the protest, the 
refugees had rapidly transformed themselves from ‘weakly-resourced’, isolated and 
dispersed communities into an emerging movement with astonishing resources and 
means to organize and sustain protest. The forced migrants did not need to beg for scarce 
support but could even choose among various kinds of assistance offered by a multitude 
of actors.  
Due to this magnetic effect and the shift in power relations between forced 
migrants and supporters, at the beginning little energy was needed to reproduce the protest 
itself. In consequence, countless protest actions such as demonstrations, occupations of 
embassies etc. could be organized from the protest centres in both Wurzburg and Berlin. 
As the camp constituted a combination of living space and political space, it mitigated 
the obstacle of mobilizing dispersed and financially precarious communities to participate 
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in the protest.  
Via online communication and word of mouth, many refugees living in camps 
outside the urban centres learned of the existence of the autonomous space and left their 
assigned location in asylum camps (Interview B12, Interview B4). Several of my 
interlocutors had experienced the sheer existence of ‘O-Platz’ as a motivation to leave 
their asylum facilities in different parts of Germany and join the movement in Berlin or 
to engage in local refugee activism (Interview B12, Interview B24, Interview B3). It was 
a docking-station to meet other politically engaged people, to tap resources and to develop 
new ideas for political opposition.  
‘There was something that was organized by Women in Exile (…) it was like a 
panel discussion that there was an opportunity for people to say exactly what was 
happening to them in the lager. And I thought yes, I have to say exactly what is 
happening in the lagers, and this is how it kicked off. And then from there, I knew 
there was Oranienplatz, at least there is something to do, and this is when I joined, 
and this is how I started’ (Interview B24). 
While many of the founders of the movement had previous experiences in political 
activism in their countries of origin (such as the Iranian core group in the 2009 so-called 
‘Green Revolution’), the existence of the camp also attracted many for whom the camp 
was a space of politicization and socialization into activism. Indeed, the protesters 
actively encouraged asylum-seekers from all over the country to join the protest: 
‘We ask all of you, refugees and asylum-seekers, around Germany to break the 
isolation and to break the silence and join your brothers and sisters at the protest 
camp at Oranienplatz to take what is your right’ (Refugee Revolution, 2013). 
From ‘Oranienplatz’, the protesters also organized further bus tours, to keep reaching out 
to the isolated forced migrant population. One of their announcements read: 
‘To exchange experiences, put aside our common fears and start fighting 
together, we are heading for a ‘Refugee Revolution Bus Tour’ (…). For three 
weeks, we will visit Lagers [camps] in different federal states of Germany in 
order to spread information about the protest. (…) You can also join along the 
route. To spend time together, share information and be at the side of the 
refugees and asylum-seekers in the Lagers, we will stay near the Lagers for at 
least one night’ (Refugee Revolution, 2013). 
Given the (initially) supportive environment, the camps became a safe space of encounter 
for an extremely heterogeneous group of forced migrants and supporters with a plethora 
of legal status, social backgrounds, ideologies etc. While ‘safe spaces’ beyond crippling 
control by the state have been considered key for all kinds of movements (Sewell 2001: 
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69), asylum-seekers are situated in an even more restrained system of control, from which 
autonomous camps can provide (temporary) relief. For the specific context of forced 
migration, Katharyne Mitchell and Matthew Sparke have recently suggested six 
dimensions of ‘safe spaces’: 
‘These are: i) physical safety: through the provision of basic conditions for 
survival and social reproduction in areas of housing, clothing, food, and health; ii) 
personal dignity: through mutual relations of respect and human connection; iii) 
organizational autonomy: through initiating and sustaining the sites and their 
quotidian practices; iv) radical democracy: through organizing heterogeneous ties 
of political networking both locally and transnationally; v) spatial liberty: through 
asserting rights of mobility, especially free movement in and out of the sites; and 
vi) social community: through working together in solidarity across differences 
and with neighbours to sustain the sites’ (Mitchell & Sparke, 2017: 22). 
Many accounts of forced migrants living in the camp mirror a combination of these 
dimensions: 
‘When we came here, it was reducing and healing the trauma. Because I got to 
know people here not by force, not like ‘get to know these people’, in our lagers 
it is ‘get to know these people, whether you like or not’. You have to be in this 
place if you like or not, you are not allowed to move. But here we can move freely, 
nobody can say ‘do not go there’ (Interview B35). 
This experience of autonomy and emerging imaginaries of hope led various activists to 
(re)-develop a sense of agency, which had gradually been replaced by apathy and despair 
during the asylum process. Asked by journalists why the protesters did not accept the deal 
offered by the local administration of Kreuzberg, to move back into asylum camps and 
get individual reviews of their asylum claims, an activist answered: 
‘We are alone there; we cannot fight together. The authorities can take and 
deport us easily’ (cited in International Refugee Center 2015: 77).  
Assemblies were organized translating all interventions into multiple languages and 
indeed, the process of developing and negotiating a collective identity did not evolve 
without fundamental frictions. Nevertheless, both camps created the very basis for 
developing ‘strong ties’ among migrants and between migrants and supporters. The 
‘eventful’ character of the camp and the collective actions deepened a sense of collectivity 
and solidarity despite diversity. 
Both in Wurzburg and Berlin, the inner-city space functioned as an open stage 
where refugees could articulate their claims and make sure their voices were heard 
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‘They want to put us out of the city where nobody knows that we are existing 
(…). Right here where we are is the right place (…)’ (refugee activist, cited in 
International Refugee Center 2015: 8). 
The advantageous relational qualities of the tent camp characterizing the first phase of 
the protest, however, eroded over time. As will be further discussed in the section on 
contentious interactions below, the highly diverse and fragmented political left-wing 
scene left its mark on the movement. One of the veterans of migrant self-organization 
noted:  
‘There was already a conflict during the march to Berlin. Berlin was the wrong 
place for the march to end. Too many actions, too many groups, too many private 
agendas, this was the problem when they got to Berlin’ (Interview B22). 
‘Berlin is a difficult city for activism, it is a market, everyone wants his or her 
share. At the beginning it was good to be in Berlin, in the end, it was maybe not a 
good idea’ (Interview B17, similar comment Interview B15). 
The combination of subsistence and political activism in the same location was potentially 
of even greater importance for the trajectory of the movement. At the outset, it encouraged 
many to join. Yet, the longer the protest lasted, the more difficult and precarious the daily 
life in the tent camp became. While remaining a permanent rupture of routine and drawing 
visibility to the realities of forced migrants in Germany, the tent camp exhausted its 
inhabitants. This exhaustion was one of the reasons, which contributed to the 
‘Oranienplatz agreement’67 (Senate of Berlin, 2014) and the dismantling of the camp 
(Interview B4, Interview B12, Interview B21).  
Similar developments can be traced in the occupied school. At its moment of 
initiation, the Gerhard-Hauptmann School was squatted because it was an urgently 
needed safe space during the winter particularly for women, families and elderly people. 
It allowed a retreat from the exposed ‘war zone’ (Interview B4) at ‘O-Platz’. 
Consequently, one floor of the building was transformed into an ‘International Women’s 
Space’ – a self-organized political space for forced migrant women (Interview B4, 
Interview B24). The activists also intended to extend the advantageous relational qualities 
established in the occupied square. However, the place soon became predominantly a 
shelter, i.e. living space rather than a political space as the availability of a roof also 
                                                 
67  This agreement was the result of lengthy negotiation with Senator Dilek Kolat (SPD) and the 
occupants of the square. In the end, one faction of the camp was offered a ‘benevolent’ re-assessment 
of their individual cases on the condition that the camp was voluntarily dissolved. While some factions 
of the camp signed the agreement, others fiercly opposed the process and result of the negotiations 
(see e.g. Flüchtlingsrat Berlin e.V., 2014). 
 126 
attracted hundreds of individuals who were in need and only partially affiliated to the 
political struggle for rights and recognition. With an increasing population and unclear 
rules, conflicts multiplied soon. While this was also the case at ‘O-Platz’ (Ünsal, 2015), 
the closed occupied building posed specific challenges with regard to assuring the 
security and basic functioning of the place, including internal debates on access 
restrictions. One of the persons involved in the protest movement at the time recalled: 
‘To squat the school was maybe our biggest mistake. We built our own Lager 
[camp]. We locked ourselves in again. With less visibility than in the public space 
and more controversies’ (Interview B34). 
Over time, the place became overcrowded and increasingly contested, receiving 
predominantly negative media coverage following outbursts of violence and opposition 
by the initially supportive district government (Der Tagesspiegel; rbb-online, 2013; Soos, 
2014). Shortly after the dismantling of ‘Oranienplatz’, the vast majority of the inhabitants 
in the school agreed to move out, both because of exhaustion and anticipation of the 
potential consequences of a violent eviction. 
The end of the tent camp was - in addition to internal dynamics - also rooted in a 
strategic governance of space employed by public authorities at various levels in Berlin. 
Indeed, from the very beginning, the incubating effect of the occupied ‘Oranienplatz’ and 
the school provoked unease and opposition by the regional government of Berlin, 
particularly the conservative Senator of the Interior. Hence repeated attempts were made 
to disperse and discourage the movement by eliminating the two occupied centres of the 
protest. Over time, opposition against the camp and the school extended to parts of the 
neighbourhood and the newly elected district mayor from the Green party. In the 
following months, both district and senate engaged in a governance of social ties and 
space largely avoiding open repression. Selective incentives were offered to many, yet 
not all migrants involved, which further fragmented the movement along lines of status 
and origin and led to an eventual dissolution. As part of the so-called ‘deal’, forced 
migrants from the camp were offered temporary accommodation in various shelters 
dispersed throughout the entire city.  
The dissolution of the camp wiped out the material and symbolic centre of the 
movement with its magnetic effect. Indeed, in its absence, the spatial importance of 
the camp for the movement became even more evident. Difficulties for refugees to 
meet and organize grew substantially: 
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‘Now that there is no Oranienplatz anymore it is difficult to meet, we all live 
in different places now. I live far away, far, far away, I tell you! Bus and train 
maybe one hour before I get to the[occupied] school. I can’t go by bicycle; I 
would get lost as I don’t know the road! Now maybe it can be one months or 
two months that we do not meet each other, because now we are separate. But 
before, when we were living in Oranienplatz you went there and there were 
many of us, every time! We could sit together, talk’ (activist quoted in Borri 
2016). 
The forced dispersal reintroduced the dependence on the favour of supporting 
structures to occasionally use their facilities: 
‘Imagine. If you have a house and the house burns. This means that you have 
to spread. So, you have to say, "please, in solidarity, can you take some" in 
this case the people cannot see you as a group like before. And maybe you are 
far away from your sister, from your mother, this can make connection 
difficult.” (…) I always say we do not have the main place where we can gather 
like before, because we were scattered’ (Interview B4). 
Two months after the dismantling of the protest camp at ‘Oranienplatz’, the district 
intended to proceed similarly with the occupied school. Due to the symbolic value the 
school had additionally obtained after the end of the ‘O-Platz’ camp, as well as the 
resistance of some of its inhabitants on the roof, thousands of political activists and 
neighbours prevented an eviction of the place in summer 2014 (Danielzik & Bendix, 
2016). Despite this highly mediatized dissent of around two dozen activists, the 
majority accepted the offer, also most of the women who had been settled in the 
‘International Women’s Space’. Particularly for the Women’s Space, which was in the 
end one of the few groups with an explicit activist focus in the school, the loss of this 
site was a hard blow. 
‘It was a very difficult moment. After the eviction, everyone was displaced, 
virtually everybody (…). Now we changed situations from having a place to 
work and sleep to not even having a place to meet, just something very basic. 
So, we started looking around for women’s organizations, which already have 
establishments (…) but we still did not enjoy the sense of freedom, the sense of 
everything that we enjoyed in the school’ (Interview B24). 
The alternative accommodation which was offered in exchange for leaving the 
autonomous protest spaces, were provided for six months. As it turned out, by the time 
the forced migrants were sent out of the reception centres and became homeless, also the 
supporters network had been notably weakened. Many had abandoned the movement 
because they did not want the ‘Oranienplatz agreement’. Those few who remained, now 
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struggled to secure the basic needs and support the ongoing precarious protests, which 
had by now fragmented into many protests across the city. Public interest in the migrants 
and their claims had in the meanwhile diminished. The dissolution and dispersal of the 
protesters had effectively fragmented the protest movement. The lack of a central 
culmination point with favourable conditions for building weak and strong ties was 
decisive in the fragmentation and retrospectively underlined its importance for the 
movement. 
6.4.  Contentious Interactions in the ‘O-Platz’ Arena 
The contentious arena of ‘Oranienplatz’ was fundamentally spatialized as the relational 
qualities of its different locations, as well as their strategic use and policing by activists 
and the state, had a significant impact on the protest wave’s trajectory. 
Yet, the arena was also strongly shaped by the contentious interactions unfolding 
within it, involving a range of actors with at times overlapping, at times opposed interests. 
In the course of the wave, various actors or ‘players’ entered and left the arena, compound 
players split and players changed their preferences. In order to outline the key 
interactionist patterns, I will scrutinize both the internal (among different fractions of the 
forced migrant activists) and external dynamics involving different kinds of ‘supporters’, 
NGOs and public authorities. 
 This section builds upon the broad debate on the role of networked relationships for 
migrant activism. In general, some degree of involvement of native allies is considered 
indispensable, given the structural lack of resources. Indeed, this was acknowledged by 
many interlocutors. 
‘No doubt, there is “Herrschaftswissen” [roughly translates to hegemonic 
knowledge] and this needs to be made available to us, because we do not have it, 
because often we cannot have it, because some doors are closed to us. And I expect 
that it is shared with us’ (Interview B19). 
In a society with accentuated asymmetrical access to rights and resources, this is quite 
logical. It is therefore of limited value to study the existence of such relations, but rather 
how they play out and how they develop over time. In most cases it is exactly the 
ambivalence and sensitivity inherent in relationships between forced migrants, directly 
affected by exclusion and repression and altruistic pro-beneficiaries. As these relations 
are dynamic and fragile, it is instructive to think of them as contentious interactions rather 
than seemingly stable ‘relations’. 
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 I will once more start from the triggering factors of the wave in Wurzburg. While 
the spark of protest emerged only within the asylum facility and among asylum-
seekers, from the moment of public exposure, the protesters found themselves 
embedded in a contentious arena, involving fragmented pro-immigration scene, the 
institutionalized political sphere and the media. The early involvement of anti-fascist 
and communist support groups and the participation of a prominent Iranian atheist at 
the first demonstration outside the facility irritated some asylum-seekers, but more 
importantly some groups of civil society considering themselves as moderate 
(Jungbauer, 2012a). 
The subsequent establishment of a protest tent in the city centre attracted a 
highly diverse mix of actors supporting the protesters, ranging from members of the 
regional and national parliament from the Greens and the Left, anarchist and communist 
groups, the Iranian diaspora in Germany and local anti-racist and faith-based associations 
(Grünberg, 2013). The involvement of a radical supporting milieu from the outset in 
addition to the local migrant rights scene was not coincidental, given the background 
of several members of the core group of Iranians. Many had been engaged as students 
in the ‘Green Revolution’ against authoritarian president Ahmadinejad in 2009 and 
were prosecuted subsequently. Due to this background, they had some links to the 
Iranian exile community and as Marxist students an affinity to radical left-wing 
groups (Interview B11, Interview B22, Interview B26). 
 Their socialization in an authoritarian regime became soon a force in their 
determination, and an irritation to some of those acting in solidarity. At the outset, many 
actors, including local politicians, supported both the means and the demands of the 
protesters. Yet, this changed in early summer 2012, when the protesters pushed for 
further escalation of the conflict. In an open letter, they reiterated their demands and 
ended with the line ‘there is nothing more to say, everything has been said’ (cited 
Grünberg 2013: 166). Thereafter, two protesters sewed their lips to underline their 
voicelessness and determination. Five other Iranian asylum-seekers followed their 
example during the upcoming week. This radical repertoire of contention had an 
ambivalent effect. On the one hand, the images of sewed mouths were diffused 
heavily in the German media, visibility of the protests exploded even further and on 
a national scale (Augsburger Allgemeine, 2012; Die Welt, 2012; Przybilla, 2012b, 
2012c). On the other hand, the self-destructive means alienated parts of the pro-
refugee milieu.  
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The vice-director of the largest asylum–related NGO in Germany, ‘Pro Asyl’, 
criticized the timing of the escalation of protest and furthermore noted that his 
organization had ‘large problems with any kind of protest, which is directed against 
one’s health’ (cited Die Welt, 2012, author's translation). Also the ‘Refugee Council of 
Bavaria’, usually strongly supportive of the group, criticized these actions (Przybilla, 
2012c). Mathias Grünberg, local politician for the Greens who had supported the 
protests for weeks, remarked in an open letter: 
‘The sewing of your mouth is unacceptable! From this moment, I cannot come 
any longer to your info point. I – and it is not only me – cannot do anything 
politically. The implementation of your, our just demands will take months, 
indeed years. I do not consider this action [lip sewing] to be appropriate to 
advance your, our demands, no, it only damages your health, indeed your life’ 
(Grünberg 2013: 102, author's translation). 
Simone Tolle, member of the regional parliament for the Green party, also distanced 
herself from this kind of protest, noting that the protest repertoire had not only alienated 
her but ‘a lot of persons have contacted me and said they have problems with this kind of 
protest’ (Grünberg 2013: 106, author's translation). Indeed, the main local newspaper 
commented: 
‘Like this, you do not make friends. No matter how good and just the cause is for 
which the Iranian refugees are protesting. With this “new rigidity” [quote from 
the protesters], it will backfire on them. Until now, they have built their protest on 
the sympathies in parts of the society and politics. But in this way, needy refugees 
become quickly incalculable radicals’ (Main Post, 2012b, author's tranlation). 
One of the supporters responded in a published letter to the editor:  
‘What kind of protest do you expect? Knitting socks for the winter? A concert by 
an Iranian strike-choir, combined with collecting money for asylum-seekers? 
Once more a day of sympathy from the population, which ends the next day when 
a demonstration disrupts the routine of Saturday shopping? No, here, human 
beings fight for their rights. It is not about who likes whom and who does not. It 
is not about friends and sympathy. It is about humanity’ (Neuert, 2012, author's 
translation). 
This change in repertoire marked a critical shift as it restructured the supporting milieu. 
Whereas the more institutionalized actors (most party representatives, NGOs) became 
somehow alienated after a strong initial support, decentralized anti-racist groups stepped 
in:  
‘We declare our unconditional solidarity with the demands of the refugees. With 
consternation, however, we have realized that some groups and individuals 
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defame their protest. (…) The questions is: Are those expressing criticism 
overwhelmed by this freely chosen form of protest or do they feel threatened in 
their role as paternalistic pro-beneficiaries?” (cited in Grünberg 2013: 165, 
author's translation). 
What started as a debate about ‘adequate’ repertoires of contention eventually broadened 
into a general debate about the role of non-refugees in commenting on self-organized 
practices: 
‘The radicalized hunger strike of the Iranian refugees with sewed lips is without 
doubt a last, desperate attempt to make self-determined claims and to prove their 
ability to act. No one, particularly no one living in Germany, who enjoys all 
political and liberal rights, can presume to be in a position to judge, which means 
refugees are allowed to take’ (Möller, 2012, author's translation). 
The protesting migrants in turn disqualified criticism as ‘de-solidarization’ (Refugee Tent 
Action, 2012).  
By the end of June, one of the protesters pushed even further and stopped 
drinking water. That time, 10 out of 13 protesters were granted a right to stay and the 
other claims were reconsidered. The protesters ended their hunger strike and removed 
the threads in their mouths (Przybilla, 2012a, 2012c). Due to their determination, the 
Iranians quickly earned a reputation as being extremely determined and less inclined 
to engage in lengthy debates with supporting environments (Interview B11, Interview 
B15, Interview B22, Interview B34). Not only were German support milieus 
alienated but also the interaction with the veterans of ‘refugee’ self-organization such 
as the ‘The Voice’ and the ‘Caravan Network’ was fragile from the beginning. Even 
though the ‘Caravan’ had supported the tent actions, offered their bank account for 
donations and had visited the camp in Wurzburg repeatedly (Grünberg 2013: 246), the 
interactions with the ‘Caravan’ network were from the beginning highly precarious 
due to struggles over representation and strategy (Interview 25, Interview 34). Firstly, 
there was an unease with the perceived authoritarianism of the new generation. One 
of the old generation of activists recalls his view of the developments: 
‘These Iranians, these guys who were involved in the protest in Iran were very 
seriously anti-government at the time. You have to remember, this was an 
authoritarian government, it still is. This bunch of students was born there, got 
acculturated - so if you are born and you grow up under such a dictatorship, the 
likelihood is that you also have internalized some of their nonsense, this is what 
happened with the Iranians. Because when these guys came here, they did their 
protest, they were opposed to the situations they were living here just in the way 
they were opposed to the situations they experienced at home under the 
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dictatorship. But, here is a problem. The majority acted against the background of 
people being acculturated in a dictatorship. In other words: there is no 
compromise, there is nothing like democracy, there is nothing like differences of 
opinion. This was a big point because if you analyse it, I can say, they escalated 
the protest very much, beyond what the caravan was doing at the time and they 
had political opportunities open to them (...). But these political opportunities (...) 
could not be properly utilized, because of the mode in which they operated’ 
(Interview B11). 
Secondly, the first generation missed credit for their share in the new generations’ 
success - the knitting of networks, mobilisation in camps and the gradual establishment 
of a refugee subjectivity within the German left. 
‘The dynamics of 2012 was not just something that just fell from heaven. The 
solidarity, the power of 2012 has been built up for 20 years. Because even when I 
came to Germany, the relationship between the anti-racist movement and the self-
organization was different, they ignore you. If the old activist, not even me, had 
not started to put this into question that refugees should be actors, very special 
actors in their own struggle, the protest march would have been crushed. 
Otherwise you would have seen a refugee behind a white activist at the front’ 
(Interview B22). 
Thirdly, the sensitive relationship was furthermore rooted in partly antagonistic 
supporting milieus and ideologies: among the early supporters of the Iranian core 
group were also adherents of the so-called ‘Anti-German’68 fraction in the German 
radical left (Interview B34), whose members deduce a strongly pro-Israel and pro-US 
American (as the main guarantor of the state of Israel) position from the German fascist 
past and a fear of rising German nationalism since the early 1990s. As opponents to the 
strongly anti-Semite former Iranian president Ahmadinejad, the Iranians who were 
involved in the 2009 so-called ‘Green Revolution’, were considered natural allies. Yet, 
other support milieus and particularly the ‘Caravan’ is rooted in an anti-imperialist and 
pro-Palestinian tradition. Conflicts accentuated when in late August, the new generation 
of protesters, still predominantly led by the Iranian core group from Wurzburg, was 
invited to the ‘Break Isolation Summer Camp’ in Erfurt, organized by the ‘Caravan’ and 
‘The Voice’ (The Voice Refugee Forum, 2012).  
‘In October 2011, when we started organizing the summer camp of August 2012, 
we thought it would be the first and only refugee camp in Germany of that year. 
But when the Iranian refugees started their protest tent in March and the hunger 
strike of refugees spread to other cities and towns, we had to realize that many 
                                                 
68  For an analysis of this ideological current, see Ullrich, 2013. 
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camps were on the way to the refugee summer camp in Erfurt’ (The Voice 
Refugee Forum, 2012, author’s translation). 
Questions over representation and leadership and the role of the former asylum-seekers, 
who had gained a regularized status in the meanwhile, were fought out rigorously. This 
interaction left deep traces for many individuals involved and was even four years after 
referred to as ‘the bruises from Erfurt’ (Interview 25, similarly Interview 34, Interview 
B17).  
Despite the multiple seeds of conflict planted in Wurzburg and Erfurt that had 
lasting effects on the movement, the ‘Caravan’ and many other groups supported the 
march to Berlin logistically. First and foremost, the Iranians had an important argument 
on their side: their strategy of escalation seemed to be successful, at least in the short run 
and had politicized the topic of asylum in Germany in an unprecedented way.  
The decentralized activist nodes of the ‘Caravan’ organized accommodation and 
food on the stops of both march and bus tour, building upon local pro-immigrant 
structures included associations as diverse as radical-left social centres, sports clubs and 
faith-based youth organizations (Loschert, 2012, Interview B15, Interview B34). As one 
participant of the bus tour recalled: 
‘We went back to the “Caravan”, to “The Voice” [and said] you have been here 
for a long time: we need connections. First of all, we need a place to meet people. 
We connected to antifa[scist] and antiracist the first thing because they are 
everywhere, they have also contact to the refugees, they know where the refugees 
are, we do not know’ (Interview B4). 
Similarly, while criticising the timing of escalation by the Wurzburg group, also ‘Pro 
Asyl’ and the ‘Refugee Councils’ of Bavaria and Berlin raised money and public attention 
for the march (Flüchtlingsrat Berlin e.V., Flüchtlingsrat Bayern e.V., & Pro Asyl, 2013; 
Landesflüchtlingsräte & Pro Asyl, 2012; Pro Asyl, 2012; Pro Asyl & Flüchtlingsrat 
Berlin e.V., 2012). 
‘The regional refugee councils (‘Landesfluechtingsraete’) and Pro Asyl align with 
the demands of the refugees and call for support of the protest march. The refugees 
urgently depend on donations for food, logistics and publicity materials’ 
(Landesflüchtlingsräte & Pro Asyl, 2012, author's translation). 
Without this support, the march and the bus tour to Berlin could not have been organized 
in such a short time. After four weeks and 600 kilometres on foot, the protesters reached 
Berlin. The march, involving the key players in the wave of contention, relocated the 
physical arena to Berlin. This shift involved a continuity of some players (the migrant 
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activists, the ‘Refugee Council’, the ‘Caravan’ and some media/ reporters), the fade-out 
of the local involvement by groups and institutionalized politics in Wurzburg and most 
importantly the addition of multiple new players in a much more complex, multi-layered 
and heavily mediatized arena in Berlin. 
This account of the trajectory of the first phase of protest furthermore clearly 
shows that the protesters did not react upon opening opportunity structures, as the 
traditional social movement theories would expect. Rather, their protest, emerging in the 
most restrictive regional context for asylum-seekers in Bavaria, actively opened 
opportunities. With regard to supporting milieus, the centrally located protest camps 
developed a magnetic field which turned the established power relations upside down. 
Pro-beneficiaries were attracted to the prominent protesters, who had hence, a degree of 
choice in deciding with whom to work and whom to ignore. With regard to institutional 
politics, through both the public visibility (also through mediatization) and the inherent 
pressure of hunger-strikes as a form of action, the protesters forced high level politicians 
and institutions to (temporarily) open up for marginalized actors. 
The Making and Breaking of Ties at ‘Oranienplatz’ 
As noted above, the arrival in Berlin galvanised the neighbourhood and the migrant rights 
movement more broadly. The activists were treated like ‘popstars’ (Interview B15, 
Interview B22), the media reported mainly positively (Guyton, 2012; Lindner, 2012; 
Markus, 2012), a dominant atmosphere of euphoria took over the neighbourhood of 
Kreuzberg. One veteran activist in Kreuzberg remembered: 
‘During the [tent action camp] at Heinrichplatz, we, from Kotti & Co, were in 
close contact, we also did some night shifts, if support was needed. But when the 
march arrived in Berlin, it was first the case that on one refugee, there were five 
supporters. Everyone who wasn’t out of the way in three seconds had a lot of 
supporters around him’ (Interview B8). 
The incubating effects on protest activity and the magnetic effect on resources and new 
activists has been described above. In this section, I focus rather on the contentious 
interactions which led to the making and breaking of social ties at ‘Oranienplatz’, both 
related to the pro-beneficiary activists and among forced migrants. 
With the tremendous popularity, also the traditional supporting milieu partly 
changed compared both to Wurzburg and previous episodes of migrant activism. Whereas 
the migrant solidarity movement was a very small circle, in which most of the activists 
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and groups knew each other personally (Interview B19, Interview B26), a new type of 
solidarity network became highly visible and contested under the slippery term of 
‘supporters’ in the context of ‘Oranienplatz’: a diverse set of individuals from different 
backgrounds supporting self-organized struggles in some way or the other.  
 For the protesting activists, this was a convenient situation at the outset as 
negotiations or compromises with established groups with explicit agendas were simply 
not necessary. 
‘These groups we are connecting to they provide some support, which means kind 
of humanitarian support, but it is still ok. That's why we say it is self-organized 
because we ourselves will not connect to any big organizations, we don't want 
money from big organization, we get money from the population we get support 
from the population’ (Interview B4). 
Accordingly, very few of the forced migrant activists involved at the time, mentioned 
professionalized NGOs on the question of whom they consider to be an ally of the self-
organization. The more professionalized organizations pulled back either because they 
felt superfluous in light of the widespread individual support, and/or were alienated by 
the spontaneous and action-oriented protest: 
‘We advertised the arrival of the march. And then, we were present at the beginning 
and then – I do not really know why, we somehow made a step back. In fact, it was 
not really the case that we were very much needed, there were so many supporters. 
We just said, we are there, you can contact us. That’s it’ (Interview B21). 
The increasing alienation of established groups from the forced migrant activists was in 
most cases a mutual feeling. One of the ‘supporters’, who remained in the ‘inner supporter 
circle’ throughout the protest, recalled: 
‘I would say, the organized antiracist groups found it difficult to engage, because it 
was difficult to get into the structures, because the structures were made during 
presence at the square, the plenaries lasted for hours and hours and many things 
were discussed and decided on the square. This did not really fit with the working 
habits of the groups in Berlin who meet once a week and plan campaigns. But at 
the same time, there were many, many people, also many people who had not been 
organized previously’ (Interview B25). 
A migrant rights activist, involved in the movement for decades, perceived it similarly, 
from the ‘other’ side: 
‘I think that the activist spectrum in Berlin was surprised – by the timing, but even 
more so by the duration and by the unfolding actionism. Sometimes it was 
overwhelming to occupy an embassy, having a demo or being on a hunger strike 
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every day, solidarity with the struggles in Vienna and so on. In some moments, 
there was a lot of actionism and little coordination. I think those who conceived 
themselves to be more settled both in terms of age and in organizational terms, were 
overwhelmed by the spontaneity’ (Interview B9). 
Many established groups and activists, hence, left the arena altogether or kept some 
distance from the unfolding processes. What prevailed in the first phase of the protest was 
a dedicated activist core, which had an affinity with a particular reading of ‘critical 
whiteness’, as outlined in the context chapter: 
‘Myself, I was not in Cologne, but here in Berlin, it has definitely led to a change 
of perspective, how racism is addressed, whose voice should be considered more 
important given racism, and has pointed to the problems of politics of 
representation. (…) I had the position, for instance in the plenary, I stay in the 
background, I really do not want to take a lot of space, as a white guy with long 
experience in activism’ (Interview B25). 
One member of the ‘Caravan’, active in self organized movements of forced migrants for 
more than a decade, articulated his criticism of this type of supporter: 
‘Then German activist became messengers. This is how it developed. The refugees 
should make decisions, the non-refugee activist can build the tent, clean the tent, 
cook, collect money, but no discussion. (...) we have a false idea of what solidarity 
means, this is why we see ourselves more as supporters and do not go beyond this 
distinction. This stigma came also out of the no border camp [in Cologne]. It made 
them feel: do not speak’ (Interview B22). 
The conflicts between the older generation organized in the ‘Caravan’ and the new 
generation accentuated after the arrival in Berlin. In the atmosphere of collective 
euphoria, when both asylum-seekers and supporters arrived on a daily basis, conflicts on 
power and leadership of the movement deepened further. Instead of contributing in 
lengthy plenary debates and negotiating positions and strategies in an increasingly 
diversified movement, the Iranian core group wanted to use the momentum and proceed 
with their way of doing things – escalation and radical self-determination. The result was 
a split of the emerging movement and a second protest including hunger strikes at 
‘Brandenburger Tor’. Once more, their strategy seemed to be successful. The photos of 
hunger strikers in front of the famous landmark became iconic. Warned by the 
developments in Wurzburg, the conservative Senator of Interior Henkel, consequently 
tried everything to avoid the establishment of a protest camp in the political heart of the 
city and ordered harsh policing, including the confiscation of sleeping bags, sleeping pads 
and tents. This, however, drew further attention to the protesters. Negotiations were set 
up involving the ombudsperson for migration and integration at the federal level Boehmer 
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(CDU) and the Senator for Migration and Integration in Berlin, Kolat (SPD). The result 
was several meetings between protesters, members of the human rights committee and 
the committee of interior of the German Parliament, the ‘Bundestag’. Boehmer later 
called the meeting ‘the most moving experience of my term in office’ (Spiegel Online, 
2012).  
The almost collective sympathy did not last long as the slow political processes 
and diplomatic moves collided quickly with the demands and determination of the 
protesters. After a first meeting with a delegation of the ‘Bundestag’, the asylum-seekers 
went on hunger strike again, however without solving the conflict (Litschko, 2012b). 
Disappointed by the lack of immediate results of their protests, the group at 
‘Brandenburger Tor’ ended their protest. Instead of joining the camp at ‘Oranienplatz’ or 
the school, the Iranian core group opted to leave the city for Bavaria, and somehow, to 
leave the local contentious ‘arena’. Others joined the ‘Oranienplatz’ camp. The Iranian 
core group’s legacy was a tremendous visibility of the issue. In a very short period of 
time, the protesters had with their choice of sites and protest repertoires both literally and 
metaphorically moved from the German periphery to the very centre. Both previous self-
organized protests and the German pro-immigrant movement had failed to centralize the 
marginalized voice of refugees and to politicise the everyday life conditions within the 
German asylum system. Yet, they also planted the seed of a lasting division between the 
new generation and the established self-organization of forced migrants in Germany. 
Taken over by some factions in the school and the ‘Oranienplatz’, the divisions remained 
even after the Iranians had left. 
 The Iranian core group had explicitly introduced the concept of ‘non-citizens’ 
distinguishing firstly between those with a lived experience of exclusion as asylum-
seekers and those privileged with formal citizenship in a country in the Global North. 
Besides, it was used to distinguish further between those in a current situation of 
exclusion and those with a regularized status (such as recognized refugees). To underline 
their argument, they noted: 
‘The existing refugee self-organizations are partly run by persons who have got 
papers in the meantime. This is something entirely different to our struggle’ (cited 
in Jakob 2013b, author's translation). 
‘Of course we make a difference between ourselves and recognized asylum-
seekers, even if those recognized fight at our side. The recognized refugees can go 
home after the protest, we cannot, we do not have a home. On the contrary, we can 
be deported’ (Jakob, 2013, author's translation). 
 138 
This led to a fundamental alienation of the ‘Caravan’ activists, who considered this first 
and foremost as a strategy to silence opposition and secure their leadership in the 
emerging movement. 
‘You cannot build trust like this, because you are suspicious. With these ‘non-
citizens’ who were the leadership you were taken to the point that you were 
automatically excluded when you had obtained papers. Why are you discriminating 
against people who have been living the same shit here, it does not work like this. 
The point was not as much the willingness to learn, it is more the question of how 
much they were influenced by their mind-set of where they come from (...). At the 
end the caravan decided to pull out and let them do how they want to do. This is the 
reason why there was not deep interaction or cooperation with the caravan or similar 
other groups because it just does not work’ (Interview B11). 
It is worth recalling, that the ‘O-Platz’ arena was arranged along ideological and strategic 
positions in a context of an overall positive contextual climate. The media reported 
positively, the district mayor from the Green party, Schulz, explicitly articulated 
toleration of the protest camp and even the occupation of the school. No external factors 
or opportunities shaped the first phase of the protest, but rather the internal dynamics 
within the movement, which was not a monolithic block, but consisted of various players.  
 Despite its early fragmentation, the protest camp at ‘Oranienplatz’ and the school 
managed to sustain a high level of visibility and protest activity throughout the winter and 
spring (Refugee Protest Camp Berlin, 2013; Refugee Strike Berlin, 2012a, 2012b). In a 
New Year’s message, the protesters recalled their achievements and noted: 
‘Today we look back with pride on what we have achieved so far. We want to 
thank our fellow refugees and supporters and congratulate everybody for this 
incredible success! The future lies in our very hands! Yes, we know as well: much 
lies ahead of us!’ (Refugee Protest Camp Berlin, 2013) 
In spring 2013, the situation changed gradually, but fundamentally, for various reasons: 
 Firstly, a new compound player entered the arena: a growing number of mostly 
Sub-Saharan forced migrants, who had escaped the Libyan civil war via the Italian island 
of Lampedusa. Amongst them there were many who had a temporary humanitarian 
protection status in Italy, without the right to work or social entitlements in Germany. 
Due to a lack of alternatives, many joined the school and the occupied square, 
contributing to an increasing degradation of the places caused by overpopulation 
(Interview B2, Interview B15, Interview B25). Many had never even filed an asylum 
claim in Germany and did not plan to do so. In consequence, the different legal status of 
forced migrants in the square led to a further fragmentation (Interview B15, Interview 
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B21, Interview B25) as it entailed fundamentally different political priorities: 
‘The claims definitively changed. From the claims that were related to the situation 
of the first generation, such as no camps, no deportation, no Residenzpflicht and for 
those with Italian papers, who wanted access to the labour market – this was in fact 
the only claim. They did align with the other claims and did at the beginning support 
also demonstrations, but it was obvious that they were not directly affected. Many 
did not even know what a refugee camp was, because they had never lived in one. 
And deportation was also not a big issue for them, so they did support the protest 
against deportations of others but still, it did not affect them personally. They also 
did not know Residenzpflicht with their Italian papers. Hence, it was simply a 
totally different group. At the beginning it worked out well in parallel but then there 
was a cut’ (Interview B21). 
Whereas the initiators of the march and the camp had strong claims against the German 
asylum system and some had been politically active in their country of origin prior to 
arriving in Germany, the ‘second generation’ found themselves in an entirely different 
legal situation, with an Italian humanitarian protection status, exhausted by long 
transmigration and a life on the streets in Italy and Germany. The first generation wanted 
to keep the square due to its relational qualities. The second generation rather longed to 
put an end to their precarious life. 
‘Because those who did not have any other place to stay were those with Italian 
papers and many of the first generation with more political demands [against the 
asylum system] already had shared flats, girlfriends or whatever and did come to 
the square for political fights and could leave in the evening to sleep in their warm 
beds’ (Interview B21). 
This not only introduced ruptures among the ‘generations’ of forced migrants occupying 
the square, but also, with the support base of the early days: 
‘And then another problem emerged, the differences in what the supporters wanted 
and what those living in the square wanted. I think that was much stronger in the 
second generation. Because, I would say, those from the second generation wanted 
to become part of the system against which the supporters where fighting. Maybe 
that sounds strange but they did have sometimes this kind of fancy clothes, big 
watches, you know, status symbols, they wanted to achieve and this is somehow 
against what many supporters fight, who want to abolish the system, capitalism. 
And the people in the square in fact wanted to become part of this capitalism, of 
course this does not apply to all of them, but many did indeed ask why the 
supporters thought the system was so crap, they believed it was not that crap, they 
just had to get into it’ (Interview B21). 
These internal fragmentations translated into fierce debates on how to spend the donations 
(for subsistence or political activity) and coincided with a general decrease of visibility 
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of protest, it had become a routine.  
 The fragmentation resulted even in a spatial separation in the camp. Increasingly, 
differentiation between countries of origin became more important and led to a 
fragmentation of the movement. During the negotiations on the dismantling of the protest 
camp at ‘Oranienplatz’, national subgroups competed for the limited number of 
individuals to be included in the deal (see section on the governance of precarious ties 
below).  
‘And then again, there was the issue of nationalities, this was new in the second 
generation – there was a Niger tent, a Nigerian tent and so on, this was not the 
case in the first phase of the protests. There was no Iranian tent or Afghan tent. 
Thinking along lines of nationality was much stronger in the second generation, 
which went of course totally against the ideas of the support scene and their 
criticism of nationalism (…)’ (Interview B21). 
Overall, time played against the movement and in favour of those who wanted to 
dismantle the disruptive sites of protest. In consequence, the gradual exhaustion of those 
living in the camp increased the inclination to accept even minor concessions.  
In this phase the volatile and decentralized support base, which at the outset had 
contributed to its dynamic, showed its downside. The lack of cultivated ties with 
established groups and organizations backfired, when the ‘hype’ (Interview B2, Interview 
B4) around the camp faded and only a small and increasingly exhausted support base 
remained. In consequence, with the new generation of the Lampedusa group, also a new 
generation of supporters emerged on the scene. Given the core interest of the group in 
eventually settling and improving their living conditions, some of the new supporters did 
not necessarily prioritize the political fight against the German asylum system. The first 
generation of the march and bus tour observed these developments with suspicion: 
‘The support structure also had its own setback. Because (…) most of the people 
who came there, they did not have a real fight, they were coming there to pass some 
time, some had sexual adventures, some were experimenting (…). That is the only 
place where they could meet black people. So their interest was not the political 
movement, it was their own interest. (…) There was something happening, with the 
support structure, because it was not really a support structure but something else, 
it also pulled out, people did different things, it had an effect. And that's even up to 
these days that many people are still not comfortable with these support structures’ 
(Interview B24).  
Governing Social Ties 
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The multiple lines of fragmentation within different groups of forced migrants and 
support milieus, combined with the increasingly precarious conditions in both school and 
square, accentuated in summer 2013. Internal conflicts regarding sexism and 
homophobia, acknowledged by the protesters themselves (Refugee Strike Berlin, 2013; 
Ünsal, 2015) as well as conflicts involving neighbours (Kubsova, 2013) were rapidly 
taken up by the media (Biewald, Köbker, & Wehmeyer, 2013; Litschko, 2013a). A forced 
migrant from the camp was stabbed by a Turkish migrant (Kopietz, 2013). In this highly 
chaotic and contentious climate, a delegate for the Green party in the district assembly 
decided to move into the tent camp to appease and moderate (see also Beyerlein, 2013): 
‘And then there was this day in June, when H. almost died, when this knife attack 
happened. I live in the neighbourhood and I am that kind of person, I feel the mood 
of the neighbourhood. The Turks at the corner were upset, there was also 
disappointment. This is often the case here in Kreuzberg, it is densely populated, 
and we live with very scarce resources that need to be shared. Particularly for the 
poorer parts of society it was also a loss that half of the square was simply gone 
(…). And in my role as local representative I have also experiences that more and 
more neighbours came, saying it is too loud, we cannot work, we cannot sleep etc. 
and said they were just shouted at by supporters, saying, ‘why do you complain, 
these are refugees, they have real problems’, so people got upset’ (Interview B8).  
While relations with the neighbourhood improved subsequently, the delegate was 
fundamentally rejected by the first generation and its surrounding supporters, who saw 
this intervention firstly as a return of paternalism with a white person representing the 
forced migrants and secondly as a clear move of co-optation by the district administration 
(Interview B4, Interview B25). 
‘I definitely had the feeling that I was not welcome by some. Some people did not 
speak to me even once. It seems like some people did not like the idea at all that I 
moved into the camp. I did not even think about the possibility that someone might 
be against this. I thought they were happy!’ (Interview B8) 
From summer onwards, a twofold dynamic developed. On the one side there was the 
regional level of government, which had for a long time delegated the responsibility to 
the Green district administration (van Bebber, 2013) but started to agitate fiercely against 
the camp. The district in turn remained supportive of the camp throughout the summer 
(Litschko, 2013b) and against the criticism of the regional government. Yet, the newly 
elected mayor of Kreuzberg departed from her predecessor’s laissez-faire approach 
regarding the camp (Interview B7) and aimed at a dissolution with other means. She 
recalled her initial impression in summer 2013: 
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‘My impression was that this was not really self-organized. There were, unlike at 
the beginning almost 100 per cent men. Yes, some of them from the Lampedusa 
group were also political, but the rest was not. They were first and foremost 
politically active with a view to leaving the camp and to getting a residence permit 
in Germany. But most of the protest originated from activists, or supporters, or 
however you want to call them. (…) A lot was projected on these struggles (…)’ 
(Interview B7).  
For Herrmann, member of the Kreuzberg Greens, one of the most grassroots and left-
wing factions of the party, a violent eviction was out of question, as she also supported 
the main demands of the protesters.  
 In the view of the first generation of protesters, the district opted instead for a softer 
version of governing ties and fragmenting the movement with selective incentives to the 
Lampedusa group to leave the camp.  
‘But then this is where they used other techniques. Then someone came and 
knew everybody and she said, you are Lampedusa, you are different you can 
have more than the other people. You have to talk to these people because this 
is better. Until they believe they are special. So we started quarrelling together, 
you are demanding other things’ (Interview B4). 
The presence of the green local delegate, to them, was part of this strategy. Actually, the 
division in the camp and movement further deepened as the Lampedusa group supported 
a housing solution for its members, whereas the first generation of forced migrant activists 
wanted to keep the camp as a space of political subjectivity to further pressure for the 
improvement of living conditions for forced migrants in Germany (Interview B4, 
Interview B2, see also Loy, Buntrock, & Dassler, 2013). The fragmentation was even 
spatialized with the tents of the Lampedusa group and the first generation being separated 
within the camp (Doppler & Vorwergk, 2014). A migrant rights activist, (himself 
recognized refugee) who did neither belong to the camp, nor to the immediate support 
circle, recalled: 
‘Towards the end of the Oranienplatz, the movement was easy to attack, because it 
was easy to divide – this is what the Senator used in the end. Inviting only some 
factions of the camp, offering incentives and selling it as a solution for the entire 
Oranienplatz’ (Interview B19).  
Within the first generation and some of the supporters, the expression ‘divide and rule’ 
(Interview B4, Interview B24, Interview B25) became the standard description of the 
final phase of the camp. Herrmann and the ‘Greens’ lost their credibility and from being 
an ally turned into one of their key opponents (see also Flüchtlingsrat Berlin e.V., 2014).  
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 In this climate and following lengthy negotiations between protesters, the Senate 
and various observing associations, the so-called ‘Oranienplatz-Agreement’ was signed 
in April by some of the protesters (Amjahid, 2014). The agreement included a list of 
reportedly 462 (Amjahid, 2014) individuals in the school and in the square, who agreed 
to dismantle the protest camp themselves in exchange for an individual assessment of 
their cases, making use of ‘all legal possibilities’ (Senate of Berlin, 2014). Some of the 
protesting forced migrants and supporters, however, fiercely opposed the agreement. On 
the day of dissolution, an absurd scene unfolded, captured by Marcus Staiger’s video 
documentary and reportage for the Vice Magazine (Staiger, 2014): Forced migrants were 
tearing down tents and huts, at times shouted at by protesters of the first generation and 
supporters. The supporters on the scene found themselves in the strange situation that 
they did not confront the police, as expected, but the very individuals they had been 
supporting. While episodes of violence erupted between the two groups, representatives 
of the police, the Senate and the district were on the scene, but remained in the 
background.  
 In retrospect, the strategy of governing space and activism by governing social ties 
had been successful from a governmental point of view. The desperate attempts by some 
members of the first generation of protesters to keep the square, including a five-day 
hunger strike up a tree (Zöllner, 2014) was unsuccessful. The media had already produced 
the images of a ‘peaceful’ and voluntary dissolution. The detrimental effects for the 
forced migrants involved in the agreement – not a single residence permit was issued – 
and the movement became clear gradually. Yet, the fragmentation of social ties and 
spatial dispersion made re-convergence impossible. After various protests during the 
summer at various occasions, the movement entered a phase of abeyance, the protest 
faded. 
6.5.  Conclusion 
Adopting an arena perspective for analysing the ‘Oranienplatz’ protest wave enables us 
to shed light on the making and breaking of ties within specific spatial and relational 
configurations. This chapter, hence, contributes to the understanding of both the 
challenges for forced migrant activists to organize political protests and the (temporary) 
strategies to overcome them. 
The spatial analysis of the ‘Oranienplatz’ arena suggests that the protesters raised 
public attention and were able to mobilize asylum-seekers and the media by moving from 
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socially and spatially isolated locations into urban centers. In organizing central protest 
camps, marches and bus tours, they literally left behind their excluded position and 
articulated a claim to urban and social centrality. The relocation from the periphery of the 
asylum camp to the inner-city space furthermore broke the routine of forced migrant 
invisibility through extensive media coverage and by this tapped the resources needed to 
sustain political mobilizations. The camps generated ‘magnetic fields’, attracting diverse 
support milieus from which forced migrants had been previously cut off in a 
disintegrating asylum system. Forced migrants gradually succeeded in compensating the 
lack of resources and even in altering established power relations between migrants and 
pro-beneficiaries. The latter were attracted to the prominent protesters, who had, hence, 
a degree of choice in deciding with whom to work and whom to ignore. In addition to 
constituting reservoirs for weak ties, the protest camps served also as spaces of encounter 
and trust-building among a previously scattered forced migrant community in which 
stories and opinions could be shared and a collective identity be developed - despite 
tremendous heterogeneity of the actors involved. Plenary assemblies were organized on 
a daily basis – as extensively deliberative fora, translated into various languages. In 
consequence, individuals from a wide range of social and geographical backgrounds 
joined the movement and organized for an extensive period of time dozens of protest 
events and constituted themselves as political subjects in a contentious arena around 
forced migration. This account clearly shows that the protesters did not react upon 
opening opportunity structures, as the traditional social movement theories would expect. 
Rather, their protest, emerging in the most restrictive regional context for asylum-seekers 
in Bavaria, actively opened opportunities which were subsequently incubated in the 
German capital. 
The second part scrutinizes further the making and breaking of social ties in forced 
migrant activism. In resonance with previous work on migrant activism, it documented 
the crucial role of pro-beneficiary actors or movements in providing resources for 
marginalized communities. At the same time, the in-depth focusing on the micro-
interactions unveils the contentious and precarious nature of such interactions, 
particularly along notions of strategy, autonomy and ‘critical whiteness’. Scrutinizing the 
trajectory of the protest through micro-interactions also points to the difficulties of uniting 
a highly heterogeneous compound actor. Individuals are situated within (immigration) 
categories determining their legal status and hence the eligibility for services, and the 
likelihood of detention and deportation. Such practices negotiate not only the status of 
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the individuals in question but also their relationships within the migrant community, 
civil-society organizations and the state. Macro-institutions such as (potential) legal status 
intervene in the making and breaking of social ties – not least in collective action – as 
they provide multiple incentives to defect from collective political campaigning and opt 
for individual niche openings. Such individual solutions are particularly appealing when 
individuals find themselves in extremely precarious conditions for an extensive period of 
time. 
Forced migrant activism is, therefore, characterized by multiple fault lines, which 
can be temporarily overcome under certain conditions, yet which also constitute an 
Achilles’ heel for the policing of activism. As the second part of the analysis shows, 
various administrative actors skilfully used the differences in status and claims to deepen 
already existing divisions within the movement. While representing a ‘movement’, an 
arena perspective avoids to reifying and romanticizing these activities with a view to 
understanding the practical challenges to build up and sustain forced migrant subjectivity 












The ‘La Chapelle’-Arena: Paris 2015-2016 
‘Bare Life’ & Political Subjectivity 
 
 
‘I made my way to have a better future and now we are stuck here. We 
have rights, too! It is not much what we demand but we are stuck. We 
are grateful to those who show solidarity today. Today is a first day of 
hope since I arrived in France. Today at this demonstration, I feel 
human again.’ 
 (Field notes, 10/06/2017) 
 
7.1.  Introduction 
In this chapter, I re-shift the focus from the contentious arena at ‘Oranienplatz’ in Berlin 
to the French capital. In summer 2015 a protest arena unfolded in the North-East of Paris, 
referred to as ‘the wave of tent camps’, or given its neighbourhood of emergence, the ‘La 
Chapelle’-arena. The protest erupted in the context of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, when 
forced migrants, mainly from the Horn of Africa and Asia arrived in the city and sought, 
in absence of governmental assistance, protection underneath an aerial metro line. Dozens 
of tents, cardboard boxes and matrasses precariously accommodated eventually several 
hundreds of forced migrants. Initially considered as a ‘humanitarian emergency’, those 
living in the camp mainly received support from neighbours and professional care-
workers. From the moment of evacuation by the police, the situation, previously 
perceived in humanitarian parameters, became increasingly contentious. A protest arena 
unfolded around the reception of forced migrants in Paris, involving highly distinct 
actors, such as the city of Paris, the police, grassroots neighbourhood collectives, political 
parties, forced migrants and various kinds of non-governmental organizations.  
Compared to the other arenas scrutinized in this thesis so far, the ‘La Chapelle’ 
wave of contention differs greatly with regard to the particularly precarious conditions in 
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which these forced migrants found themselves: homeless in the streets of Paris, 
abandoned by the state and dependent on the empathy and solidarity of civil society 
actors. Against this background, the chapter scrutinizes processes of political 
mobilization in the most disadvantageous contexts.  
The main argument I will be developing with regard to the spatial and relational 
patterns during this protest arena is the following: Building upon Giorgo Agamben’s 
work on states of exception I argue that the forced migrants at ‘La Chapelle’ were stuck 
in a condition of ‘bare life’, in which the satisfaction of fundamental needs and survival 
constituted the main priority. Despite these fundamental obstacles for political activism, 
a closer scrutiny of the spatial and interactive patterns during the ‘La Chapelle’ arena 
sheds light on a range of ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ practices of political mobilization. The 
contradictory spatialities of makeshift camps and squats unfolded (precariously) 
protective, relational and disruptive qualities, which contributed to transforming 
widespread feelings of indignation among forced migrants into sparks of political 
mobilization. Through interactions with established players in the social movement 
environment in Paris, forced migrants repeatedly appropriated spaces and resources to 
appear as political subjects in the public sphere. The case, hence, suggests that even the 
condition of ‘bare life’ is not static and, indeed, inherently ambivalent, as it dialectically 
entails its own contestation. I will also document that political mobilizations by forced 
migrants, and even more so by forced migrants in highly precarious conditions, are 
fundamentally shaped by the concrete micro-interactions with other players in 
contentious arenas. Concrete interactions with the police as well as relationships of trust 
built during repeated interaction with ‘supporters’ constituted the foundation for political 
mobilization. Yet, the social ties with pro-beneficiaries and within diverse migrant 
communities were also highly ambivalent, fragile and prone to fragmentation. 
To empirically unpack this argument, the chapter is structured as follows: I begin 
with a brief contextualization of the arena (7.2.), followed by an investigation of processes 
from precarious ‘bare life’ in the streets of Paris to performances of political subjectivity, 
or as Isin would claim, to ‘acts of citizenship’ (7.3.). In this regard, section 7.4. scrutinizes 
the contradictory spatial and relational effects of street camps and squats, which serve, 
despite their precariousness, as spaces of encounter and incubators for the expression of 
marginalized voices. Finally, section 7.5. creates the link to Chapter 5 by investigating 
why mobilizations of sans-papiers and asylum-seekers remained by and large detached 
throughout the ‘La Chapelle’ arena. 
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In terms of data, the chapter triangulates the analysis of written texts with 
ethnographic research conducted in spring 2017 in Paris. The methodological approach 
could be described as a ‘retrospective immersion’: It draws from 25 qualitative 
interviews, dozens of informal conversations and participant observation in assemblies, 
protest events and ‘direct social actions’ (Bosi & Zamponi, 2015) organized by 
protagonists of the protest wave. It furthermore draws from numerous texts produced by 
the actors involved, the media and the (very few and exclusively Francophone) secondary 
sources69 on the events. In combination, these sources aim at a reconstruction of the 
contentious processes through engagement with actors, texts and sites of a wave of 
contention. 
7.2.  Brief Contextualization of the Arena 
For the French capital, the ‘La Chapelle’ arena constitutes a novelty: contention around 
asylum beforehand was virtually absent. As an important transit country for asylum-
seekers on their way to Great Britain, Paris used to be an important crossroads, where 
forced migrants rested for some days or weeks, but rarely settled for long.70 Most 
eventually headed further north towards Calais, trying to cross the Canal, hidden in, 
underneath or on top of lorries and trains. Political mobilizations in support of and by 
forced migrants, hence, largely concentrated at French (internal) borders, including the 
Calais region (see e.g. Schwenken, 2014), Nice/Ventimiglia at the border with Italy 
(Projet Babels, 2017), and deportation facilities in various parts of the country (Clochard, 
2016). Similarly to that found by Lorenzo Zamponi in his research on migrant solidarity 
activism in Italy (Zamponi, 2018), forced migrants and their supporters often mobilized 
in reaction to obstacles blocking the continuation of their journey, rather than demanding 
inclusion in France. Many forced migrants, hence, opted for ‘exit’ instead of ‘voice’, 
which is still a political act, yet rarely captured in traditional notions of mobilization (see 
also Ataç, Rygiel, & Stierl, 2016). 
Structural Deficit in Forced Migrant Accommodation 
                                                 
69  These are most notably the section on Paris in the booklet published by the research collective ‘Babels’ 
(Projet Babels, 2017) and the (still unpublished) manuscript by Isabelle Coutant on one of the squats, 
forthcoming in March with the publisher ‘Seuil’ (2017a). 
70  Despite this general pattern, forced migrants got also occasionally stranded in Paris for extended 
periods of time – particularly after the closure of the ‘Sangatte’ humanitarian camp (Kassa, 2011) and 
following the turmoil after the so-called Arab spring (Allen, 2011). 
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The situation fundamentally changed from summer 2014 onwards (Interview P10, 
Interview P11, Interview P7), when first dozens, later more than a hundred forced 
migrants - mostly from Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, and Sudan - sought refuge under a 
metro bridge at La Chapelle station in the North of Paris (La Chapelle En Lutte, 2015a). 
A makeshift camp, referred to as ‘Mini-Sangatte’ (Pouliquen, 2015) or ‘Jungle of Paris’ 
(Baumard, 2015)71 emerged, consisting of over a hundred camping tents, neatly lined-up 
under the aerial metro line number 2. From spring 2015, when the camp further grew, 
neighbours and humanitarian organizations intervened to compensate for the vacuum left 
by an absent state and provided the basic needs such as shelter (tents), clothes and food 
(Interview P10, Interview P2). 
As asylum-seekers, the vast majority of those gathering under the metro bridge 
was formally entitled to accommodation and basic assistance provided by the French 
state. Yet, the situation starting in autumn 2014 unveiled a structural deficit (Interview 
P8). Considering itself mainly as a transit country for asylums-seekers and deliberately 
intending to avoid a ‘pull effect’, France has been known for its undersized system of 
accommodation since the introduction of the reception centers for asylum-seekers, the 
so-called ‘Centre d’Acceuil des Demandeurs d’Asile’ (CADA)72 in the early 1990s. 
Without going into detail, some numbers help to illustrate the structural outline: By the 
end of 2015, 50,000 places in CADA existed in the entire country (Senate of France, 
2015; see also Le Parisien Online, 2015b) compared to 80,000 asylum applications in 
2015 alone and thousands of pending cases from previous years (OFPRA, 2016). Similar 
to other European capitals, the region around Paris (‘Ile de France’) has for many years 
been the hotspot for arrivals and asylum applications (40 per cent of all applications in 
France in 2016) (Projet Babels, 2017: 116). Nevertheless, in 2016, the entire ‘Ile de 
France’ held a capacity of 8,255 places in both CADA and emergency shelters. Just 483 
places existed in CADA in the city of Paris (Préfécture de Police Ile de France, 2016b). 
Given the limited amount of places in CADA, asylum-seekers from countries with 
established networks in the French capital have thus been precariously taken care of by 
                                                 
71  These terms have circulated for over a decade in the French public sphere to describe the makeshift 
camps in the Calais region and have, since 2015, been applied to the situation in the North-East of 
Paris. 
72  Generally, the French system distinguishes between ‘CADA’, accommodation facilities allocated for 
the entire asylum procedure including some degree of social work to support migrants during the 
process, and ‘emergency shelters’, which provide only short-term housing without asylum-related 
advice. See also Chapter 4 for further details. 
 150 
migrant communities or squats outside the official asylum system, moderating the 
structural shortage (Aguilera, 2013; Blanc-Chaléard, 2006; Interview P8). 
In addition to the systematic deficits of accommodation provisions in France, the 
street camps unveiled the failure of the European asylum system, or more concretely, of 
the so-called Dublin regulation:73 due to the incapacity and increasing unwillingness to 
unilaterally cope with a European problem – asylum-seekers arriving in Italy were pushed 
out of reception facilities without social benefits. Abandoned by the Italian state, and 
unsuccessful in finding employment in the crisis-affected local economy, many decided 
to travel North. Yet, due to the Dublin regulation, their finger prints were registered in 
Italy, which fundamentally complicated an asylum application elsewhere. In 
consequence, they found themselves in a ‘hyper-precarious situation of bureaucratic 
entrapment’ (Davies, Isakjee, & Dhesi, 2017: 11):  
‘they are denied provision in one country (Italy), and simultaneously coerced to 
move into other EU states where they would no longer be eligible for either 
asylum or provision’ (Davies et al., 2017). 
Despite the structural causes of the emerging makeshift migrant camps in the French 
capital from summer 2014 onwards, the situation was at the beginning mainly perceived 
as a ‘humanitarian emergency’. The actors involved were predominantly neighbours 
mobilized by the highly precarious conditions of forced migrants (including women and 
children) settling in front of their doorsteps and humanitarian professionals involved in 
care work. The traditional players in migrant rights activism were (still) largely absent. 
Notwithstanding these increasingly visible challenges of forced migrant reception 
in Paris, political debates around forced migration, by the time, focused on other cases: 
Firstly, 18 hairdressers and stylists from various Sub-Saharan African countries had 
started a strike in July 2014 with the support of the trade union CGT to protest against 
their employers, who had taken advantage of their irregular status (France 24, 2015 see 
also Interview P7, Interview P27). The media, the CGT and the protesters called 
themselves ‘sans-papiers workers’, even though many of the mostly female protagonists 
were caught up in an ongoing asylum procedure and were ‘undocumented’ only with 
regard to the lack of a valid work permit, given the work ban for asylum-seekers in France 
(Interview P27). Furthermore, and despite their relatively recent arrival in France and 
                                                 
73  The Dublin regulation foresees that the country of first arrival of an asylum-seeker in Europe is in 
charge of processing the asylum claim. This rule has delegated disproportional responsibility to 
member states at the European periphery, some of them in an accentuated economic crisis (Picozza, 
2017).  
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biographies of forced migration through Libya and Lampedusa, these mobilizations were 
framed as ‘sans-papiers’ struggles, rather than mobilizations by ‘asylum-seekers’ or 
‘refugees’. In April 2015, after a 10-month occupation of their workplace, the majority 
of the strikers was regularized, on the condition of a proof of employment issued by their 
employers (France 24, 2015). 
Secondly, in addition to the activities coordinated by the CGT, various 
autonomous collectives of sans-papiers organized regular, yet scattered protest events: 
The CSP7574 marched on a weekly basis, the 9th collective, the CSP75/ Strasbourg, the 
CSP9475 and CSP93 and the ‘Collectif Baras’ organized occasional protest events 
(Interview P22, Interview P10, Interview P7). The majority of the autonomous 
collectives’ members originate from (often francophone) Western- and Central African 
countries, and are usually (albeit precariously) integrated in existing ethnic communities 
in the city. Many have found jobs in the cleaning, construction and catering sectors – yet 
are at risk of extreme exploitation due to their irregular status. The collectives hence focus 
on the regularization of their constituents through proofs of employment, family ties or 
long-term presence in the territory in direct negotiation with the respective prefect’s office 
(Interview P22, Interview P27, Interview P30, Interview P3, Interview P21). Most 
members of the ‘Collectif Baras’, for instance, originate from Western and Central 
African countries, yet, had worked for various years in Libya until the outbreak of the 
civil war in 2011. Escaping the turmoil, they arrived in Italy and decided to move on to 
France to benefit from existing social networks (Le Parisien Online, 2015a; Interview 
P10; Interview P14; Field notes, 28/06/2017). Given the established (West-)African 
ethnic communities in the French capital, the long history of sans-papiers struggles and 
the extremely low likelihood of being granted asylum in France, the members of the 
collective did not apply for asylum and instead opted to autonomously obtain shelter (e.g. 
by squatting abandoned buildings) and regularization of their status outside the asylum 
system (Idrissa, Camara and Michel cited in Csp75, 2014). Their mobilizations were, 
                                                 
74  See also Chapter 5 for additional background on the CSP75 and its contentious interactions with the 
CGT trade union. 
75  Given that the respective prefect’s office is responsible for dealing with cases of regularization, the 
collectives are organized according to the place of residency of their members. The CSP94 coordinates 
sans-papiers in Vitry-sur-Seine, the CSP93 sans-papiers in Saint Denis. The CSP75/Strasbourg, in 
turn, is a result of the fractal process the CSP75 underwent during the ‘Bourse du Travail’ arena (see 
Chapter 5).  
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hence, also framed as ‘sans-papiers’ rather than ‘refugees’ despite a widespread 
biography of forced migration.76 
In spring 2015, contention around forced migration in the French capital was thus 
characterized by two features: firstly, migrants identifying as asylum-seekers or refugees 
were largely not engaged in contentious politics and were mainly conceived as victims of 
a humanitarian emergency by the wider public. Secondly, an established, yet fragmented 
sans-papiers movement consisting of various autonomous collectives organized protests 
on a regular basis with a focus on regularization, yet were largely detached from the 
question of asylum. 
From Humanitarian Emergency to Contentious Arena 
The situation changed profoundly in early summer 2015. With increasing arrivals of 
asylum-seekers, the makeshift camp at La Chapelle grew further. Starting with mere 
cardboard boxes on the concrete, neighbours and associations subsequently assisted them 
with tents, blankets and mattresses, served food and donated basic necessities (Interview 
P10, Interview P2, Interview P13). Despite widespread support from the neighbourhood 
with its long tradition of immigration and dense associative networks, the conditions in 
the camp deteriorated – due to a lack of sanitary facilities and more generally, 
overpopulation in a strongly limited space, squeezed in between two busy streets. After a 
month-long absence, and following increasing media coverage, public authorities 
intervened on June 2, 2015 with an ‘evacuation’ (alternatively referred to as ‘eviction’) 
of the makeshift camp (Sabot, 2015), which had been justified by the prefect with both 
risks to public health and public order (Préfécture de Police Ile de France, 2015). 
 The first coordinated police intervention retrospectively constituted a ‘critical 
juncture’, which led to a shift of a purely humanitarian issue to a highly contentious arena, 
in which a plethora of players interacted with increasing frequency and intensity.77 These 
actors included various national communities of forced migrants, neighbours, solidarity 
collectives, humanitarian organizations, politicians at various levels of government, 
journalists and the police. 
                                                 
76  Interestingly, forced migrants with highly similar biographies of forced migration were in Germany 
part of the ‘refugee movement’ during the ‘Oranienplatz’-arena (see Chapter 6) and also thereafter 
(see Chapter 8). 
77  A more exhaustive descriptive account of the developments can be found in the section on Paris 
included in the booklet published by the research project Babels (Projet Babels, 2017). 
 153 
During the dismantling of the camp, police forces blocked the area and transferred 
all migrants that were present at that moment with buses to temporary emergency shelters 
throughout the entire region of ‘Ile de France’. Two humanitarian organizations, involved 
in service provision for the government (‘France Terre d’Asile’ and ‘Emmaüs 
Solidarité’), co-coordinated the process.78 Over 300 migrants were relocated and the area 
subsequently cleaned and secured to avoid a reinstallation (Sabot, 2015). More than half 
of the migrants involved were officially registered as asylum-seekers in France, some had 
been already recognized as refugees under international law (ibid). 
Numerous neighbours and activists who had been supporting the migrants during 
their precarious life in the camp observed the police intervention with suspicion, some 
tried to prevent the buses from departing (Association des Travailleurs Maghrebins de 
France, 2015; Sabot, 2015). Particularly the strategy of dispersal applied by the public 
authorities without offering a sustainable solution for those in need spurred increasing 
resistance. Only a few hours after the buses had departed, several dozens of forced 
migrants gathered again, because they had not been present at the moment of transfer. 
Yet others returned after some days because the emergency shelters had been located in 
remote areas without access to support networks, which most of the individuals 
desperately needed during their asylum procedure (Interview P9, Interview P10, 
Interview P2, Interview P20). Again others returned because the accommodation was 
offered to them only for a couple of days. For many of those assisting the migrants for 
months, the intervention by the state had only aimed at hiding a structural problem of 
reception systems for forced migrants from the public eye. 
On the evening of the first eviction, several dozens of migrants and a handful of 
migrant solidarity activists wandered around the 18th district of Paris, with mattresses and 
plastic bags containing their few belongings, in search for a place to spend the night. Very 
basic food for several dozens was collected through donations from the various ‘ethnic’ 
restaurants and local grocery shops in the area (Interview P7). After two days, when the 
group had grown again to around one hundred persons, they attempted to occupy the St 
Bernard church, with a view to symbolically relating to the birth of the sans-papiers 
movement in the late 1990s. Yet, the migrants and a handful of supporters were forcefully 
removed by the police from the square outside the church and eventually settled down 
                                                 
78  While a cleavage between ‘humanitarian’ and ‘political’ organizations was already latent in the 
migrant rights movement in France prior to the ‘La Chapelle’ arena (see notably Monforte, 2014), the 
involvement in the evacuations by the state further (mutually) alienated those two organizations from 
the emerging grassroots movement. 
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around the corner at ‘Esplanade Pajol’ until another eviction by the police took place on 
June 8, 2015 (Interview P7, Interview P2). 
This third eviction, during which a large crowd of neighbours and local politicians 
was present and which was described as particularly violent (Association des Travailleurs 
Maghrebins de France, 2015; Interview P13, Interview P2, Interview P7), triggered the 
emergence of a migrant solidarity movement, which perceived the precarious living 
conditions as a concrete failure of state response. In the aftermath of the eviction, a 
petition on migrant reception and police violence was published, signed by numerous 
public intellectuals, including Étienne Balibar, Michel Agier, Eric Fassin and Achille 
Mbembe (La Chapelle En Lutte, 2015a). The text finished with the lines: 
‘We affirm our engagement and our profound solidarity with migrants. We will 
fight for them, but also we fight for defending our society against this aggression 
from the side of public authorities. We are determined to demand that this injustice 
against our migrant sisters and brothers will be repaired and that right to asylum 
and human dignity are respected in our country’ (ibid, author’s translation). 
Equally in response to the third eviction, the collective ‘La Chapelle en Lutte’79 was 
founded, involving a diverse mix of academics, radical-left activists and newly politicized 
neighbours (Jaoul & Makaremi, 2015; La Chapelle En Lutte, 2015a). Members of the 
collective noted in an op-ed in the daily newspaper ‘Le Monde’: 
‘The refugees evicted from La Chapelle, evacuated from St. Bernard, who had 
been sleeping in front of Halle Pajol since June 5th, were arrested en masse three 
days later: more than 40 of them have been transferred to an immigrant detention 
centre [‘centre de retention administrative’]. The raid at Rue Pajol was of an 
unprecedented violence, but the most shocking thing is that they have sent CRS 
units [French riot police] against around hundred refugees in the streets, who are 
in a total survival economy [‘économie de survie totale’] who even need to 
understand where they are, what rights they have and how an asylum application 
works’ (Jaoul & Makaremi, 2015, author's translation). 
With the collective ‘La Chapelle En Lutte’, an influential player emerged on the scene. 
In the following months, a ‘cat-and-mouse-game’ (Interview P10) unfolded between the 
police, forced migrants and solidarity activists. The events followed always the same 
sequence: a critical number of migrants gathered in the absence of alternative 
accommodation, sleeping at times on layers of cardboard on the asphalt, at times on 
mattresses, at times in camping tents provided by neighbours and solidarity collectives. 
As soon as a camp became large enough to attract (media) visibility, and disrupt the ‘order 
                                                 
79  Translates into ‘La Chapelle fighting’ 
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of things’, government authorities, in collaboration with FTdA and Emmaüs Solidarité 
intervened, providing a temporary solution for the migrants in the camp through transfer 
to emergency shelters. Many of these interventions, termed depending on the political 
couleur alternatively as ‘evacuations’, ‘evictions’ or ‘raids’, were conducted with 
considerable amount of force by the police and a subsequent confiscation and destruction 
of its constituting infrastructure (tents, mattresses etc.) (Projet Babels, 2017: 116 f., 
Interview P2, Interview P7, Interview P10). The use of force against peaceful migrants 
and supporting citizens, combined with insufficient measures taken by the city of Paris 
and the central government to provide decent and long-term housing for forced migrants, 
in turn, fuelled contestation by migrants and citizens. Through contentious interactions 
with the state, the emerging movement in the Parisian North-East rapidly expanded 
(Interviews P2, Interview P7, Interview P10, see also La Chapelle En Lutte, 2015a). 
Forced migrants, solidarity activist and public authorities subsequently held 
diametrically opposed interests with regard to the emergence of camps. The city of Paris 
and the police fundamentally opposed the establishment of makeshift camps as they 
publicly raised the question of governmental non-response. Thus, in order not to 
encourage their perpetuation, the municipal authorities refused to provide sanitary 
facilities or other basic infrastructure such as mattresses, blankets and the like. The result, 
in turn, was a neighbourhood solidarity movement, increasingly physically exhausted and 
outraged by the authorities’ inactivity (Interview P9, Interview P2, Interview P13). For 
the migrants involved, the grouping in camps constituted a strategy of precarious 
protection and survival but increasingly also a strategy to pressure the government to take 
action (see also section 7.5.). Lastly, the increasingly contentious arena also attracted 
experienced antiracist and anti-fascist activist who had up to this moment been largely 
absent from the previously ‘humanitarian’ terrain. 
7.3.  ‘Bare Life’ and Political Subjectivity 
The North-East of Paris has a long history of immigration, economic precariousness, and 
social engagement. Particularly ‘La Chapelle’ and the 18th district more broadly used to 
be well known for its inclusive capacity despite limited means. Yet, the second half of 
2014 foreshadowed important changes. Not only did numbers of asylum-seekers increase 
in France (and Paris), but equally importantly, ‘new’ migrant communities, previously 
numerically irrelevant in Paris, arrived: from the horn of Africa, mainly Somalia, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, as well as from Sudan, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. In the absence of 
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alternatives, these individuals found themselves in an extremely precarious situation and 
dependent on local assistance upon arrival in Paris. Other (forced) migrant communities 
instead, from Bangladesh, the Maghreb region, as well as Central, and Western African 
countries, continued to arrive, but were temporarily taken care of by existing social 
networks (Interview P3, Interview P11, Interview P5, Interview P25). The latter were 
hence less visible in the emerging makeshift camps (CSP75, 2014a, Interview P3, 
Interview P11). 
The individual stories and backgrounds of the forced migrants living in the camps 
were highly diverse. Yet, many had spent long and tiresome periods of (trans)migration, 
some through the Balkan corridor, some through Libya and Italy before arriving in Paris. 
Most referred to widespread human rights violations, insecurity and war as the main 
reasons for leaving their country of origin (Baumard, 2015; Derveaux, 2015; Fofana, 
2016; Merhaba No.1, 2015; Merhaba No.2, 2015; Merhaba No.3, 2015; Mouillard & 
Durupt, 2015). 
One of those living in the camps was Hamid80, a Sudanese student of business 
administration, who had in the context of the so-called Arab spring organized dissent 
against the dictator Omar al-Bashir (sentenced by the International Criminal Court for 
crimes against humanity) and who eventually had to leave the country. He passed through 
Sudan, Libya, and finally made his way to Greece and took the Balkan route. In Calais, 
he paid 1,000 € to get smuggled across the Channel in a lorry as he expected better 
chances of integration given his fluency in English. However, he was detected and with 
all his money gone, he had to stay at the French-British border. He lived for months in 
the makeshift ‘jungle’ of Calais, fell sick and needed medicine. He came to the French 
capital in summer 2015 and ended up living in the streets. When I meet him, he concluded 
his story by saying: ‘France was not my destination, but it became my destiny’ (Field 
notes, 21/06/2016). Another person I met is Omar, from Darfur in Sudan, who crossed 
the Mediterranean in one of the overcrowded rubber dinghies. When he arrived in Italy, 
the reception system was miserable. He was, as he told me, even given money to continue 
travelling North. At the border between Italy and France, in Ventimiglia, he got stranded 
for a while as he was repeatedly detected during his attempts to cross the border. 
Eventually, he reached Nice and continued to Paris by train. Directly after his arrival in 
the French capital, he ended up in one of the street camps (Field notes, 19/06/2017). I 
                                                 
80  All names are changed to guarantee anonymity.  
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also met a young philosophy student from Eritrea who escaped the undetermined military 
service in his country (transcript from public talk81). There were also many young 
Afghans, who had escaped organized crime, ‘mafias’ as they call it, and the Taliban 
militias. Some had spent more than a year in Germany and continued to France when 
their asylum application was rejected and deportations to Afghanistan were increasing 
(Field notes, 08/06/2017). 
As diverse as the individual stories prior to the arrival in Europe are, they are all 
alike from the moment of arrival in Paris. Most were stranded in the North-East of the 
city, for various reasons: firstly, with the two railway stations ‘Gare de L’Est’ and ‘Gare 
du Nord’, the North-East of Paris has ever since been the main logistical ‘gate to Paris’ 
(Interview P11) and exit point for those heading North towards Calais. Secondly, the main 
access point to the asylum system in Paris is located in this part of the city. In France, 
asylum-seekers are required to go to a so-called ‘Plateforme d’Acceuil des Demandeurs 
d’Asile’ (PADA)82, run by the non-governmental organization FTdA, in order to make 
an appointment with the prefect’s office, where their asylum claim is officially processed. 
The PADA of Paris is located close to the metro station Jaurès, where the 10th, 19th and 
18th districts meet (Interview P11). Thirdly, the neighbourhood has become well-known 
for the particular density of civil society organizations and a practical solidarity in 
providing basic needs. The names of the metro stations ‘La Chapelle’, ‘Stalingrad’, and 
‘Jaurès’, hence, soon circulated within forced migrant communities (Interview P11, 
Interview P26, Field notes 22/06/2017). For logistic reasons, but also for its particular 
relational qualities, the contentious arena remained spatially concentrated in the North-
East of the city, even though its centres moved within this area during the wave of 
mobilization. 
 Due to the undersized administration, from spring 2015 onwards, many asylum-
seekers waited several weeks to be registered in the PADA and sometimes months for an 
appointment at the prefect’s office.83 Others had already filed their asylum claim but were 
                                                 
81 Available at: https://vimeo.com/159607077.  
82 Translates into ‘reception platform’. 
83 The spokesperson for social issues in the 18th district, acknowledged in a personal interview the 
structural shortcomings: ‘The main problem is a lot of people arrive in Paris and the administrative 
system was completely full. (…) Before you go to the accommodation, you have to make an 
appointment at the prefect’s office to file your asylum application. The number of appointments per 
week was less than 50. But in 2015, there were at least 20 refugees arriving per day... At a certain 
point, people gathered and a camp started’ (Interview P11). 
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not provided with accommodation given the structural shortage outlined above. Some 
were even recognized as refugees but were not able to find housing given the lack of 
language competence and limited revenues. 
‘Bare Life’ in the Streets of Paris 
In the absence of shelters provided by the state, forced migrants organized protection and 
survival in groups. Many gathered – often clustering in homogenous ethnic or linguistic 
communities - in the few public spaces providing minimal protection from both sun and 
rain (bridges, tunnels, but also parks.). With very scarce financial means, lack of 
information and minimal linguistic skills, the daily life for those (several thousands) 
living in the streets turned out to be extremely burdensome. Hundreds had to rely 
completely on charity soup kitchens or the goodwill of passers-by to provide them with 
food or money (Biseau, Maurice, & Le Gohébel, 2015). The shops and restaurants in the 
area, often run by migrants, contributed too (Interview P5, Interview P7). Many migrants 
I spoke to during my field work in spring 2017 who have been living in camps expressed 
the hardship, and frustration of living in extremely precarious circumstances: 
‘After I came back from Calais, I was tired of the long journey. I decided to stay. 
And I ended up in the streets. I had nothing to lose. You have lost everything. You 
lose your basic human dignity’ (Interview P20). 
Testimonies in newspaper and magazine articles reporting on the time of street camps are 
full of similar remarks, linking the experience of extreme precariousness with feelings of 
disappointment and dehumanization: 
‘The people think we are homeless [‘clochards’], but this is not the case. Some 
stop with their cars to stare at us. I have studied, I have a degree. As soon as I have 
a work permit, I would like to learn a profession, to become a baker or 
confectioner’ (migrant cited in TV5 Monde, 2015, author's translation). 
‘I took the train towards the country I’d dreamt of visiting ever since my 
childhood. But in reality it was a real shock to find myself utterly dispossessed in 
the rain, cold and hungry in the heart of the so-called “city of lights”. I’m sick and 
my health is not compatible with the suffering and the misery of the street camps’ 
(quoted in Merhaba 5). 
These accounts resonate with the research of Thom Davies et al, who have argued that 
thousands of forced migrants have been pushed into makeshift camps by ‘violent 
inaction’, in Calais, Paris and elsewhere (Davies et al., 2017). 
 Due to the extremely precarious condition in the streets of Paris, for thousands of 
asylum-seekers from spring 2015 onwards, basic survival and a roof became the main 
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priorities. Reduced to being ‘human as such’, these forced migrants became what 
Agamben has referred to as a condition of ‘bare life’ in his seminal book ‘homo sacer’ 
(Agamben, 1998): stripped (or without access to rights) and in a state of exception, in 
which violence against them is rarely sanctioned. Numerous migration scholars have 
since built upon Agamben’s work in their analyses of forced migrant camps and the 
condition of asylum-seekers more broadly (Diken, 2004; Dines, Montagna, & Ruggiero, 
2015; Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2005; D. Martin, 2015; Sanyal, 2014).  
 Findings from my field work illustrate the sense of reduction to biological needs. 
One of those forced migrants living in a makeshift camp in Paris noted: 
‘In the streets you lose your basic human dignity; you lose the ability to express 
yourself’ (Interview P20). 
In a follow-up interview, the same person reflected on his and his fellow migrants’ 
existence after arrival in the French capital: 
‘These are the incredible real-life challenges, to leave the home land, to get stranded 
in the streets. To understand. ok - this is me now. I do not have a home. I do not 
have anywhere to go. What the hell? Many of us were thinking, ok - to commit 
suicide is also an attractive solution because it is not a life of a human being. No 
refugee centre to go and to occupy places by force to have a place to stay. So many 
questions are still pending or suspended. The only thing that saves our life is that 
you find supporters. French people, people who tell you: you are a human being, 
you have a right’ (Interview P30). 
In spring 2017, during my field work in Paris, I not only had the opportunity to talk to 
many who had lived in or supported the camps and listen to their retrospective accounts. 
I also personally witnessed the precariousness of hundreds of asylum-seekers, still living 
in the streets of Paris. Occasionally, I assisted a local organization in serving breakfast. I 
quote here some impressions from my field notes to further illustrate the manifestation of 
‘bare life’: 
‘Upon our arrival at nine o’clock in the morning, immediately a long queue of 
several dozens of migrants emerges, despite Ramadan. Some quarrels in the line. 
The available food for the breakfast is bread (baguette) with jam. Many migrants 
articulate, some totally exhausted, some angry, that they are not used to bread and 
jam every day. Most take tea with countless pieces of sugar to satisfy the basic need 
of carbohydrates. Some volunteers from a humanitarian organization with 
professional vests indicating their affiliation, help out as the grass-roots 
neighbourhood initiative had not found enough persons to assist. I am irritated by 
the bossy reaction of some of the volunteers, slapping on the hands in case someone 
wants to grab a sandwich on his own. Some migrants react angrily in return. 
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According to the organizer of the shift, yet, it is an extremely relaxed day. Usually, 
conflicts over the scarce resources are much harsher’ (Field notes, 08/06/2017). 
Another day, I encounter the following scene: 
‘When I arrive at ‘Porte de la Chapelle’, I see countless people sleeping on 
cardboards in the exceptional heat of an afternoon in late May. All of a sudden, an 
impressive and dehumanizing scene unfolds. A car arrives and parks. Immediately, 
dozens of migrants jump up and queue within seconds, fighting for a good position. 
The volunteers of an association, apparently a faith-based association yell at them 
to keep in order while food packages are distributed. Amir, an undocumented 
migrant I had met various times before, who is now involved in one of the solidarity 
associations comments on the scene: “I was there [in such lines] too. Something 
happens to you when you are treated like that. The expected gratitude. You are 
educated as a slave”’ (Field notes, 02/06/2017). 
These personal observations resonate with the retrospective accounts of individuals living 
in the street camps and those providing assistance from summer 2015 onwards (Interview 
P7, Interview P13, Interview P2, Interview P10, Interview P30; Interview P26). On 
various occasions, conflicts among forced migrants, mostly between different 
communities of origin, erupted in the street camps, in the lines for food distribution, and 
at times at the office hours for legal and social counsel offered by civil society 
organizations (Interview P11, Interview P2, Interview P7).  
Political Subjectivity despite ‘Bare Life’? 
As these brief excerpts illustrate, forced migrants living in the streets of Paris found and 
continue to find themselves in extremely harsh conditions. Nevertheless, the majority 
have remained quiet instead of protesting against their blatant exclusion and 
precariousness. Evidently, and in these terms social movement studies have provided 
important insights, grievances do not mechanically produce political mobilization. Those 
I have spoken to referred to the contradictory situation they encountered. On the one side, 
many felt outraged by the non-response of the state (Interview P10, Interview P7). At the 
same time, they were well aware of the ultimate dependence on the state with a view to 
obtaining shelter, assistance and ideally a regularized status: 
‘[The life in the streets] means a lot of stress, but you do not have a choice. People 
say: stay calm, there are many like you in France. Keep quiet, eventually it will 
work out, be patient’ (Interview P26). 
During my field work, I also met a former political refugee, now a French citizen, who 
has worked in various organizations in support of migrants for more than a decade. On 
the relationship between ‘bare life’ and political mobilization, he noted: 
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‘I have been a refugee two times in my life. Asylum-seekers are in a fragile 
situation, often it is your very skin that is in danger. (…). You are not a political 
subject; you are a political object. I was active before I came here and then here, 
there was this sense of not wanting to give a bad impression. This sense of: “I 
demanded protection from this state and I have to respect the state.” That is why 
it needs extremely severe circumstances until there is a claims-making movement. 
Evidently, this shows the gravity of the current situation.’ (Interview P18). 
As these findings suggest, the particular condition of ‘bare life’, in which many forced 
migrants found themselves, living in the streets of the French capital, poses tremendous 
obstacles to ‘visible’ political mobilization. In the absence of established ethnic networks 
from the countries of predominant origin (Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Afghanistan), forced 
migrants were de facto fully dependent on the care work of neighbours and humanitarian 
professionals. As many previous studies have shown, and as some of my ethnographic 
vignettes suggest, humanitarianism has contradictory effects, as it both alleviates 
suffering and risks reproducing patterns of dependency, subordination, passivity and 
apathy (Barnett, 2016; Fassin, 2012; Ticktin, 2011). Furthermore, asylum-seekers depend 
fundamentally on state action, both in providing them access to the asylum system and 
eventually, granting a right to stay. 
 It could hence be argued, that ‘bare life’ and political mobilization might be 
mutually exclusive concepts. Yet, more recent scholarship has expanded Agamben’s 
theory to capturing migrant agency despite a condition of ‘bare life’ (Huysmans, 2008; 
Ramadan, 2013; Rygiel, 2012; Sanyal, 2014; Sigona, 2015). Jef Huysman, for instance, 
has argued that the ‘jargon of exception’, key in Agamben’s conceptualization of the 
political, downplays ‘the societal as a realm of multi-faceted, historically structured 
political mediations and mobilisations’ (2008: 180). Critical migration studies have 
therefore urged to widen the perspective of the migrant’s political subjectivity to the 
every-day and ‘invisible’ acts of resistance, which form part of a specific repertoire of 
action in highly precarious contexts (Ataç et al., 2015). Milena Chimienti hence argues: 
‘In such a precarious context, their claims are necessarily existential, by which we 
mean aspirations and actions that tend to be of an immediate, instrumental and 
individualistic nature (…). As long as refugees are in a situation of vulnerability, 
they will not be able to afford less-instrumental behaviour, and ambivalence will 
be part of the way in which they act and mobilize. (…). It is not a claim for 
structural changes but only an existential claim and yet it is subversive only by 
the presence of people who were not entitled to be there’ (2017: 5). 
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In the following sections, I will argue that a combination of the attention to ‘invisible’ 
acts of resistance, and the (fragile) role of incubating autonomous spaces, such as tent 
camps and squats, contributes to an understanding of political subjectivity and political 
mobilization in seemingly highly disadvantageous contexts. In line with the insights from 
critical migration studies, the forms of action presented are more instrumental and aim at 
alleviating immediate suffering. They resemble what Lorenzo Bosi and Lorenzo Zamponi 
have termed ‘direct social actions’ (2015). In most cases, visible mobilization in 
precarious contexts emerges when certain locations allow for a combination of place of 
survival and space of political articulation. Processes of claim-making by marginalized 
actors ‘may be messy and incomplete’ and the spaces in which they unfold contradictory, 
‘but they mark the sites within which voice and agency can be recovered’ (Sanyal, 2014: 
570). 
7.4.  Relational and Spatial Effects of Camps and Squats 
Indeed, despite being exposed to highly precarious conditions of everyday life, sparks of 
resistance and political subjectivity by forced migrants have emerged during the protest 
wave, which have taken a plethora of forms. As I will elaborate below, street camps and 
squats have adopted a particular role in this process, as they served at times, despite their 
precariousness, as incubators where forced migrants could access resources and attract 
visibility to make claims in the public sphere. 
The Ambivalent Effects of Migrant ‘Camps’ 
Research on migrant ‘camps’84 has pointed to these inherent ambivalences. Nando 
Sigona, for instance, criticised that Agamben’s understanding of the camp as a space of 
exception  
‘does not provide a satisfactory analytical tool neither to grasp the complexity of 
social relations within the camp, and between the camp and the city, nor to 
appreciate the strategies and tactics that those inhabiting such spaces adopt in their 
everyday lives to claim rights and membership’ (Sigona, 2015: 1). 
                                                 
84  In his seminal book ‘Managing the Undesirables’, Michel Agier has suggested various types of 
‘camps’ ranging from closed deportation prisons or official asylum-seeker facilities to more open and 
improvised versions. The tent camps emerging in Paris belong to the type of camps ‘that are self-
installed and self-organized. These represent the very basis of refuge, the shelter that we create in a 
hostile environment without a politics of welcome; these are established in the absence of hospitality. 
(…) Nevertheless, they remain under surveillance, either under the gaze of humanitarian organizations 
which help them occasionally, or under the control of territorial, international, or police organizations, 
which either monitor, destroy, or transfer these populations to other types of camps’ (Agier, 2010:36). 
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In order to illustrate these specific qualities, I recall the emergence of the series of street 
camps in summer 2015, particularly the phase after the third eviction, which gave rise to 
the ‘La Chapelle En Lutte’ collective. On the evening of the eviction, the community 
garden ‘Bois Dormoy’ around the corner from the previous street camp at ‘Esplanade 
Pajol’ opened its door to those migrants from the camp who had neither been evacuated, 
nor been taken to a deportation facility - and to a growing circle of supporters (Derveaux, 
2015). Even though the association in charge of the garden asked the group to stay not 
longer than three or four nights, it provided temporary protection from the constant 
policing of the previous days (Interview P7). The garden quickly served as a space of 
encounter for forced migrants and supporters but also allowed some degree of political 
self-organization. First assemblies were held in which the different communities of 
migrants expressed their demands (Interview P7, Interview P2). In an interview, one of 
those activists supporting the migrants from the moment of the eviction recalled the 
(ambivalent) relational effects of these encounters: 
‘Something emerged [there], links, legitimacy. We asked, ‘what do you want to 
achieve, shall we occupy a space? We are at your disposal, but it is not us who 
decide.’ They were super reluctant, strangely they did not want to do anything 
illegal. I told them: your very existence in France is illegal, all you do is illegal’ 
(Interview P7). 
Outraged by the police intervention and the existence of a clearly identifiable location 
also rapidly expanded and diversified the supporting environment, attracting besides 
neighbours and those few activists who had accompanied the forced migrants since the 
first eviction also local political activists and politicians from radical left parties and the 
greens (Derveaux, 2015; Mouillard & Durupt, 2015). The heterogeneity of those in 
solidarity gave an initial strength, but soon led to conflict on the role of forced migrants 
in collective decisions and the repertoire of action. 
Nevertheless, the members of the collective ‘La Chapelle en Lutte’, which was 
created at roughly the same time, pointed in their op-ed in ‘Le Monde’ to the empowering 
and incubating effect of these early experiences and autonomous spaces beyond the 
precarious life of the streets and the governmentality of the state: 
‘These fights have shown the necessity of spaces, where migrants have access to 
associations and to the solidarity of the neighbours (…). It is paramount to get out 
of the miserable situation [‘galère’] in the streets on the one hand and the cold of 
an administrative governance, which categorises often arbitrarily and relegates the 
migrants out of our streets, out of our cities, out of our lives’ (Jaoul & Makaremi, 
2015, author's translation). 
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As agreed with those running the garden, the migrants and their support eventually left 
the premises. On June 11, forced migrants and supporters occupied the abandoned fire 
fighter’s barracks ‘Château Landon’ (Le Monde Online, 2015a), in close proximity to the 
previous sites of contention. According to the accounts of various persons involved, the 
situation was highly chaotic, with profound conflicts among the solidarity activists, 
particularly between those with an autonomous tradition and those affiliated with parties 
(Interview Godard, filed notes Blaise, J. Lamothe & Fischer, 2015). While some of the 
activists were first line in the occupation, others attempted to discourage forced migrants 
from participating in order not to take risks. This in turn, spurred fierce resistance by other 
fractions, who qualified such interventions as paternalistic and against the deliberate 
decisions taken by the migrants themselves (Interview P7). 
Controversies over repertoires, the role of migrants, leadership and organizational 
priorities introduced deep trenches already in a very early phase of a movement ‘in 
becoming’ (Interview P7, Interview P28). Shortly after entering the barrack, riot police 
blocked the building. Subsequently, in negotiations between the occupants and the town 
hall of Paris, an agreement was made, which resulted in the transfer of 110 migrants to 
emergency shelters (Le Figaro Online, 2015a), where they were allowed to stay for a 
maximum of one week. Despite (and for some, because of) this agreement, the arena 
became further politicised thereafter. In a common press release, the Minister of the 
Interior Bernard Cazeneuve and the Mayor of Paris Anne Hidalgo (both from the ruling 
Socialist Party), accused solidarity activists of 
‘cynically exploiting the dramatic situation in which the migrants find themselves 
for purely political reasons’ (Le Figaro Online, 2015a, author's translation). 
Within a very short period of time, the camps and the presence of forced migrants had 
been transformed from a humanitarian emergency into a visible rupture of the political 
life in Paris. After the occupation of ‘Château-Landon’ 
‘there was a lot of pressure on the camps, they lasted two, three weeks and then 
there was an evacuation. And the conflicts in the solidarity movement started. I 
tell you this, because such moments do something [‘ça crée des trucs’], after that 
it is very difficult to work together again’ (Interview P7). 
The specific interactions within this contentious arena, hence, were highly influential for 
the trajectory of the protest wave. During these interactions, the camps were transformed 
from being predominantly a space of survival to precarious sites for ‘acts of citizenship’ 
(Isin, 2008). 
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Immediately following the occupation, forced migrants started gathering again in 
the neighbourhood: individuals who had just arrived in the capital, those who had not 
been included in the agreement with the city hall and after a week, also some of those 
who had to leave the temporary shelter again. Due to the increased mediatization and 
social media channels recently established to coordinate the scattered solidarity scene, the 
subsequent street camps attracted a wide range of individuals and associations offering 
all kinds of services from food and tents, to language courses, legal assistance and rooms 
for political exchange (Interview P10, Interview P2). The initial self-help arrangements 
of makeshift camps, hence, started to become also pools for resources. Similarly to what 
Sigona has identified in his analysis of Roma camps, the tent camps 
‘offered to newcomers who had limited resources and no rights, (…) access to 
(some kind of) protection and recognition, as well as some practical benefits’ 
(Sigona, 2015: 12). 
The involvement of a wide range of actors criticising the governmental non-response and 
providing resources, altered the options for those forced migrants, which were pushed 
towards a highly precarious life in the streets. While being influenced by all actors 
involved in the arena, those individuals inhabiting the camps were never purely objects 
of care, political exploitation or governmental administration, as they were often 
presented. They were also agents, and regularly emerged as political subjects in the arena 
– at times more visible than in others. The makeshift camps served as important, yet, 
ambivalent spaces in this regard. As noted above, the conditions in makeshift camps 
importantly served as stigmatizing markers and reproduction of ‘bare life’. Many, I have 
spoken to, experienced a loss of dignity and a widespread sense of pity shown towards 
them by neighbours and often also the media (Interview P30, Field notes 06/06/2017, 
Field notes 10/06/2017). Furthermore, the tent camps also entailed regular exposure to 
the police (Fofana, 2016). Yet, the camps also opened niches for agency, by what I call 
protective, relational, strategic and disruptive qualities.85 
 For most, the initial rational for gathering in makeshift camps was a temporary 
means for basic protection, to stay in groups and to share scarce resources. Indeed, 
individuals had all kinds of reasons for joining a makeshift camp, and even to avoid an 
evacuation. One illustration is Ahmed, who decided to not get on one of the buses 
evacuating a tent camp because he wanted to make sure not to miss the appointment with 
‘France Terre d’Asile’ in Paris that he had awaited so long. To him, it appeared preferable 
                                                 
85  For a similar argument, see also Rygiel (2012). 
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to wait some more time in the makeshift camp, rather than being sent to one of the remote 
emergency shelters in the countryside, where he might be stuck and not be able to find 
the means to reach central Paris in time. Another case is Bilal - tired from walking three 
days to cross the border between Italy and France through the mountains – who simply 
needed some rest before continuing his travels to Calais and, hopefully, Great Britain 
(Baumard, 2016b).  
 Yet, the increasing politicization and visibility of the make shift camps gradually 
added a strategic element. Publicly displaying a social problem, the camps served as a 
disruption, which became bothersome for the authorities and forced them to concede 
places in emergency shelters. Hence, the gathering of migrants, the presence of forced 
migrant bodies in the streets, attracted attention to the issue itself, it was – similar to Judith 
Butler’s ideas on the performativity of assemblies (Butler, 2015), fundamentally political. 
In this vein, Agier has argued, a forced migrant, ‘who will not play his assigned role, who 
no longer stays in his place, who does not keep silent’ (Agier, 2010: 42) creates a rupture 
in the established order and provokes questions of belonging and hence in Isin’s terms 
performances of a ‘right to have rights’ (Isin, 2017).86 Many migrants certainly were not 
interested in the symbolic dimension of the disrupting effect of the camps, but were aware 
and willing to exploit it instrumentally: 
 ‘The priority was to get a roof, so when the camp helps to achieve this, great – we 
do it!’ (Interview P24, similarly Interview P30, Interview P26). 
Looking at the total number of those obtaining shelter through camps and evacuations, 
the strategy appears highly successful in hindsight: Between June 2015 and November 
2016, the North of Paris witnessed the emergence of dozens of makeshift camps ranging 
in size from around a hundred to several thousands of ‘inhabitants’. According to official 
sources, 21,728 (often temporary) places in emergency shelters were offered following 
more than 30 ‘evacuations’ of makeshift camps (Préfécture de Police Ile de France, 
2016a).  
In addition to providing protection and exerting pressure on the government, the 
camps at times had relational effects, generating trust within the migrant communities 
and mobilizing resources through social ties with individuals and associations. At many 
street camps, language courses and legal advice was organized on the spot, providing in 
this regard more advantageous conditions than in most of the isolated emergency shelters 
                                                 
86  Isin argues: ‘Performative citizenship signifies both a struggle (making rights claims) and what that 
struggle performatively brings into being (the right to claim rights)’ (2017: 506). 
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offered by the state with usually poor access to advice (Field notes 19/06/2017, Interview 
P30). Many returned either regularly from remote shelters to the street camps to access 
these crucial resources or eventually opted to move back for good (Field notes 
19/06/2017, Interview P30, Interview P26). Beyond providing resources, the camps 
became sites of encounter for various distinct actors, citizens and non-citizens, from 
which relations of solidarity and trust emerged. 
Lastly, and for the reasons outlined above, the street camps also served as sparks 
and nuclei for public articulation of dissent by forced migrants. All instances in which 
forced migrants made claims in the public sphere using traditional means of protest during 
this wave of contention emanated from the street camps (or squats as will be discussed 
below). The camps as combinations of every-day survival and access to resources 
provided a space of potential incubation. For this purpose, in most street camps, 
assemblies translated into different languages were organized (Interview P10, Interview 
P7, Interview P30). Depending on the respective camps and their inhabitants, it was 
decided if patience or pressure was the preferred strategy to obtain (sustainable) shelter 
and access to rights more broadly: 
‘Of course every camp was different, as heterogeneous as the migrant population. 
In some camps, the migrants wanted to do something politically. They are there 
and wait, and some want to use this time to do something. In fact, there is also the 
moment to discuss and organize’ (Interview P10). 
In some camps, the inhabitants chose to use their ‘voice’, organizing rallies and sit-ins, 
drafting flyers, or putting up banners with claims around the camps. During these 
‘traditional’ protest events, both general dissent and specific demands were articulated: 
Signs showed ‘we want human rights’, ‘there are no human rights in France’, ‘humans, 
not beast’, ‘stop Dublin’, ‘we demand asylum’, ‘we want dignity’, (Association des 
Travailleurs Maghrebins de France, 2015; Degeorges, 2016; La Chapelle En Lutte, 
2015b; NPA, 2015; Paris Luttes, 2015). Public articulation of forced migrant voices took 
also another shape. Emanating from the camps and the exchange with activists who gave 
a hand in translating and printing, forced migrants regularly published claims online or 
distributed them in printed copies. One of these communiqués read: 
‘We are a group of migrants and refugees. We demand our rights as they are 
provided by the law. We camp in a square, at the moment, we are on a sidewalk. 
This Friday, 4 September, at 6:30, an evacuation at square Jessaint (metro La 
Chapelle) took place. A selection has been made. Those who were in the square 
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in this very moment have been taken care of, the others had to remain there. We 
are now at Jules Joffrin Square in front of the town hall of the 18th District.  
- We demand an acceleration and facilitation of the asylum process. 
- That a sustainable and decent accommodation is found for refugees. 
We stay here until a solution is found.’ 
(Un groupe de migrants et de réfugiés, 2015, author's translation). 
Numerous such testimonies and claims of this kind were also printed in the movement 
magazine ‘Merhaba’, produced by forced migrants and solidarity activists, who met and 
built social ties during the street camps: 
‘We are refugees in the city of Paris. We have left our numerous and different 
countries where catastrophic situations are taking place (wars, political conflicts, 
civil war …), situations which have caused countless casualties and material 
losses. We have been pushed out, forced to migrate, to flee the horror of these 
conflicts’ (quoted in Merhaba No.1, 2016; see also Merhaba No.2, 2015; Merhaba 
No.3, 2015). 
Indeed, the step from silence to voice was usually made while taking advantage of the 
relational qualities of the street camps. Cooperation in general and even more so in high-
risk activities presupposed a relationship of at least basic trust. In the context of heavy 
policing, many forced migrants considered public articulation of dissent as an additional 
risk in an on-going or up-coming asylum procedure, or for those so-called ‘Dublin 
cases’87 the danger of imminent deportation within the European Union. These social ties 
were created during repeated interactions in the camps, which usually combined care 
work, sharing of stories with discussions of potential ways ahead (Interview P23, 
Interview P10, Interview P7). The forced migrants living in the camps did by no means 
always welcome the diverse mix of pro-beneficiaries with open arms. One of the regular 
individual ‘supporters’ during the street camps recalled in a personal interview: 
‘[t]o go to a camp, means also to be confronted with persons who tell you: ‘but 
why do you come here, if you cannot do anything for me’? And you are also 
confronted with the police and so on. It is really not comfortable to go to the 
camps. They [the people living in the camps] see so many people, the police, the 
OFI [foreigners’ office], FTdA [France Terre d’Asile], they do not know anymore, 
who is who, who does what. Some associations help us, others put us on a bus and 
take us to the middle of nowhere. Trust is difficult. In fact, it is only with a regular 
presence on the ground that you gain the trust of the people. If you do not come 
                                                 
87  The Dublin regulation attributes the responsibility for processing asylum claims to the country through 
which an asylum-seeker has first entered EU territory. Given the geographical location of France (and 
also Germany), most asylum-seekers are registered in countries at the European periphery, and hence, 
their cases can be immediately rejected for formal reasons in case the finger prints of an individual 
have been registered. 
 169 
regularly, you do not have the trust, that’s evident. It helped us also that we have 
a lot of migrants in our counselling sessions, who have been living in the camps, 
who work with us now, this is how trust is built faster’ (Interview P10). 
While in some camps, the inhabitants opted for ‘voice’, in others, they explicitly asked 
supporters to remain patient and quiet (Interview P10, Interview P13, Interview P23). 
Sometimes it depended on the subjective assessment of the advantages and risks of the 
respective strategy (Interview P10, Interview P24). One of the forced migrants living in 
the camp who joined various protest activities recalls: 
‘[P]eople [referring to fellow migrants] attacked me a lot saying, stop A., you will 
not get your case approved – they never give you papers if you are in an 
association or active, because in Europe they want people not to understand, they 
want people stupid. And if they meet me now, they say, “still no answer from 
OFPRA? We told you, it is because you are involved. If you are not involved, you 
will be accepted”’ (Interview P24). 
As soon as the contentious arena had emerged, both remaining silent and expressing voice 
were deliberated decisions, upon which forced migrants had a (novel) degree of choice.  
These findings echo Adam Ramadan, who has argued that migrant camps are 
inherently ambivalent, ranging from being spaces of insecurity and violence to spaces of 
identity formation and precarious hospitality (Ramadan, 2013: 74). Most importantly, 
they are ‘spaces of agency and struggle, not complete disempowerment and bare life’ 
(ibid). Rygiel notes in a similar vein: 
‘Conditions of inequality and exploitation do not prevent people forced into these 
conditions from engaging as political subjects. On the contrary, as the numerous 
examples of political activism emerging in sporadic moments in and around 
camps illustrate, camps are places of survival, conflict, atrocities and continuance 
as well as places of resistance and of new forms of engagements, community and 
subjectivity, through which articulations of injustices and demands for recognition 
and rights are made’ (Rygiel, 2012: 814 f.). 
As my fieldwork suggests, these ‘moments of being political’ have at times lasting 
transformative effects for the persons involved. All asylum-seekers or recognized 
refugees I have met during my fieldwork in 2017, who were engaged in political activism, 
had started their political engagement in France in the camps and through the contacts 
they had established there. For some, the continuous engagement was initially a matter 
of solidarity with those still living in the camps and suffering the same situation they had 
been going through (Interview P26, Interview P30). For others, it was a way to stay in 
touch with the French contacts they had established during the time in the streets, with a 
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view to accelerating the acquisition of language skills and ‘integration’ in the French 
society more broadly (Field notes 19/06/2017, Interview P20). Some of those I met 
continued to travel almost on a daily basis from their shelter in the Parisian outskirts to 
the places where people were still living in the streets, to assist there or help out as 
translators during the office hours organized by a wide range of associations, which have 
either emerged in reaction to the camps or adapted their activities to the necessities of 
individuals living in the streets (TV5 Monde, 2015). 
The Contested Squat (and Back to the Streets) 
Despite numerous tent camps and evacuations, the general situation remained unchanged. 
Only when larger camps emerged and attracted visibility, the administration reacted with 
the provision of (often temporary) accommodation. Due to the constant arrival of new 
forced migrants in the city and the return of those who had only obtained a temporary 
shelter, no sustainable solution appeared in sight (Interview P23). With a view to 
increasing the pressure, activists from the collective ‘La Chapelle En Lutte’, who had 
already advocated for squatting the fire fighter’s barracks ‘Château-Landon’, together 
with several dozen forced migrants from Afghanistan and Sudan decided to occupy an 
abandoned school building (‘Lycée Jean-Quarré’) in the 19th district (Interview P28, 
Interview P23, Interview P27, Interview P30). Besides providing shelter for migrants 
living in the streets, the squat was explicitly understood as a prefiguration of alternative 
accommodation schemes for forced migrants – self-organized and centrally located 
(Coutant, 2017: 5). The squat as a form of action to politicize (migrant) marginalization 
has a long tradition in France (Aguilera, 2013; Bouillon, 2003, 2017, Péchu, 1999, 
2010).88 According to Bouillon, 
‘[s]quatting is a way of proclaiming one’s very existence directly, physically, and 
materially in order to become visible and gain a hearing, i.e., to take part in the 
life of the city’ (Bouillon, 2017: 72). 
Immediately after the forced migrants and activists had occupied the school building of 
‘Jean Quarré’, they re-baptized it to ‘Maison des Réfugiés’ (‘House of Refugees’). 
Accommodating around 150 individuals (all migrants) at the outset, the squat received 
initially overall supportive media coverage (J. Lamothe, 2015; J. L. Lamothe & Le 
                                                 
88  To underline the link of precarious migration and squatting, the non-representative research on the 
issue conducted between 2004 and 2008 by Florence Bouillon and Pascale Dietrich-Ragon in the ‘Îles 
de France’ region is indicative: they found that less than 5% of the occupants in the squats they 
analysed were born in France, and 83% originated from a sub-Saharan African country (2012: IV). 
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Gohébel, 2015; Le Figaro Online, 2015b; Le Journal du Dimanche Online, 2015). Also 
the city of Paris decided to grant a temporary tolerance of the squat (Le Figaro Online, 
2015b).  
Due to its visibility, the squat unfolded a tremendous incubating effect at the 
beginning. Given the lack of alternative housing options for forced migrants in Paris, the 
occupation grew rapidly in size. Initially, also the inflow of donations was immense. 
Usually, a simple post in social media channels or an information on the board displayed 
at the entrance sufficed to attract the material resources needed to sustain the place. The 
accumulation of resources, ranging from clothes to language courses, medical support 
and legal advice in addition to a solid roof in turn further increased its appeal for those 
forced migrants still living in the streets of Paris. Assembling a diverse mix of actors, 
similarly to the street camps, but initially with more advantageous spatial characteristics 
(large building, a courtyard), the squat turned into a vibrant hub of social encounters and 
at times political activity (Interview P28, Interview P30).  
On the other hand, after a while, the building was bursting at the seams. Neither 
the built environment nor the internal organizational structures could ensure effective 
self-organization of the eventually more than a thousand migrants living in the place. 
Conflicts erupted repeatedly among its inhabitants when the building became 
increasingly overpopulated, the sanitary facilities overburdened and communal spaces 
scarce (Interview P23, Interview P30, Coutant, 2017). Both media reports and the public 
authorities at the local and regional level subsequently pointed to the degradation of the 
place and suspected its exploitation by the radical left. Its inhabitants, more than a 
thousand forced migrants, were largely portrayed as either victims of leftist activism or 
as a troubling mass. 
Yet, for those inhabiting the squat, the situation was less clear-cut. Indeed, the 
occupation unveiled highly contradictory relational and spatial qualities for the 
emergence of political subjectivity.89 I will subsequently outline both the dynamics of 
political mobilization and relational fragmentation that unfolded in the occupied building: 
The very fact that the squat constantly grew in terms of numbers from the point 
of its establishment to the time it was evicted, illustrated - despite dominant negative 
media coverage - that many forced migrants considered it still as the best among very 
                                                 
89  Indeed, the trajectory of the squat resembled that of the Gerhard-Hauptmann School in Berlin (see 
Chapter 6). 
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poor alternatives. Even many forced migrants who had obtained accommodation in 
emergency shelters, spent the day in the squat, as they could access resources they could 
not find elsewhere – including French classes, basic medical care, legal support, company 
etc., which were strongly limited in most of the remotely located emergency shelters 
(Interview P30). Similarly to what Bouillon found in other squats involving migrants and 
native activists, many migrants became increasingly politicized: 
‘[M]igrants who know little about the French political context, and even less about 
the practices of autonomy/liberation/direct democracy, often undergo politically 
socializing processes in joining meetings, debates and discussions. [Equally] these 
encounters bring militants face to face with harsh realities which they have rarely 
experienced themselves: the extreme poverty and exile which are the constant lot 
of these migrants, many of whom have recently fled the horrors of armed violence 
in Sudan, Syria and Eritrea’ (Bouillon, 2017: 74). 
Accordingly, the space of the squat allowed for an intensified organizing compared to the 
tent camps. General assemblies were held with delegates from the various migrant 
communities. Two large demonstrations were organized from the squat. Inhabitants 
worked on a movement journal ‘Merhaba’, published in French, English, Arabic and Dari 
to share testimonies, experiences and demands (see Merhaba 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, also Interview 
P10). One of the migrants who became increasingly engaged during the occupation 
recalled the collective political spirit in the ‘House of Refugees’, despite the difficult 
living conditions: 
‘The people I talked to in the squat about how to get together to take a stance or to 
do something to change the situation they were really enthusiastic to buy banners 
or write slogans. They were very responsive to the idea. They were eventually 
aware of their rights and wanted to take collective action to let people know that 
their rights were being abused’ (Interview P30). 
Equally in the squat, the idea was born to create self-organized associations by forced 
migrants to ensure sustainability and self-representation (Interview P20, Interview P23): 
‘When we started organizing in Jean Quarré, many wanted to build an association 
to participate but [after the evacuation] when they moved to the emergency shelters 
and they were separated, a lot of this spirit was gone. So it is more difficult. Now 
the first step is to find the activist. To speak to the people. You need the credibility. 
In the squat it was easier because everyone was on the same spot (Interview P23, 
similarly Interview P30). 
Hence, the spatial configuration of the squat facilitated personal interaction, exchange 
and political organizing. It also led to the creation of trust among parts of its inhabitants 
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and to supporting activists. Some of these ties were even sustained after the evacuation 
of the place: 
‘Afterwards it was difficult because only ten per cent were in Paris, the rest was 
sent out of Paris. Because we got their phone numbers and Facebook profiles, we 
succeeded in staying in touch with some of them, the Sudanese at least. When we 
organized a demonstration after the eviction people travelled from their little 
villages to Paris in order to participate in this demonstration (...). It was a 
demonstration against both the Sudanese government and the situation of migrants 
in France’ (Interview P30). 
Given the heterogeneity of the squat, by far not all the migrants were interested in any 
kind of demonstrative activities. Similarly to the tent camps, given the condition of ‘bare 
life’, many regarded the precarious squat as an instrument for finding solutions for very 
concrete problems: a roof, access to the asylum system and legal and social support. 
Indeed, many inhabitants of the squat nurtured profound scepticism toward the politicised 
activists of the ‘La Chapelle Collective’ (Coutant, 2017a; J. Lamothe & Fischer, 2015). 
Some Afghans, for instance, thought that it was not in their interest to enter in 
confrontation with the state, as their chance to be granted asylum appeared (at that time) 
reasonably high. Once more, the delicate position of confronting the state while at the 
same time expecting (asylum) from the state, became evident, and was not always in line 
with the confrontational agenda of parts of some of the supporters (Coutant, 2017a).  
 As noted above, the relational effects of the squat were highly contradictory, 
leading to incubation and political activity on the one hand, and deep divisions on the 
other. Whereas the first phase of the squat was predominantly characterized by an 
incubating dynamics, towards the end, mutual alienation and exhaustion due to the 
precarious conditions dominated. With a growing number of migrants in the building, 
degradation and conflicts multiplied, which, in turn, accentuated divisions within the 
solidarity movement, among the migrant communities and between public authorities and 
(parts) of the solidarity movement. When the donations for the squat ebbed due to 
increasingly critical media coverage (see for instance the TV reportage FranceInfo, 2015; 
or Simon, 2015), the competition for increasingly scarce resources ever more frequently 
escalated in physical conflicts: 
 ‘People were grouped according to nationalities. Rooms were divided and some 
did not let others enter. There was the Afghani room, the Eritrean room, the Syrian 
room, the Sudanese room, the Iraqi room - they were afraid of each other. It is true 
that there was no confidence. (…) It was not only the social background, but the 
situation there was also very stressful. People started to feel disgusted and they 
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could not take it anymore, that was the main reason. People were very violent. 
They fought with each other because there was not enough space to sleep, people 
started taking the belongings of others etc.’ (Interview P30). 
Furthermore, the relations with the neighbourhood of the squat increasingly worsened 
over time. As Isabelle Coutant pointed out in her detailed analysis of the squat and its 
resonance in the neighbourhood, the arrival of a large number of migrants added to the 
already existing challenges in one of the most underprivileged areas of the French capital 
(Coutant, 2017a, 2017b). Indeed, the transformation of the abandoned school into a self-
organized migrant shelter collided with plans to open a media lab for the local population 
in the facilities (Coutant, 2017a). Many neighbours considered it unfair, that precisely 
their area of the city was forced to carry additional burdens. The visible overpopulation 
and degradation of the place fuelled the opposition in the neighbourhood but also among 
the local administration and the city of Paris. 
Less than one month after its establishment, the squat had become predominantly 
portrayed as the emblematic result of ill-guided migrant solidarity activism. Also the 
traditionally left-leaning newspaper ‘Libération’ published a highly critical article on the 
squat, mainly criticising the collective ‘La Chapelle En Lutte’ for its dominant role and 
its counterproductive self-isolation from both public authorities and the professional 
humanitarian organizations (J. Lamothe & Fischer, 2015). Many activists organized in 
the collective rejected professional care work in the squat in order to avoid a ‘dynamic of 
dominating-dominated’ (quoted in J. Lamothe & Fischer, 2015). In line with their general 
ambition to empower forced migrants, they fiercely rejected people ‘with uniforms (…) 
to serve food like in a charity situation. These are subjects, no objects’ (ibid). Not least 
due to their exposure to the horrendous deprivation of many forced migrants inhabiting 
the place, the supporters in the squat had become increasingly critical towards the 
‘placebo’ response of the government and their role in creating the situation in the first 
place. In their view, media reports exclusively highlighting the existing and yet 
problematic conditions in the squat were merely reproducing governmental discourses 
aiming at discrediting migrant solidarity and hiding the underlying systematic failure of 
government response (Jaoul, 2015). Indeed, the absence of shelters had pushed more and 
more migrants into the squat, which contributed to a rapid degeneration of its conditions. 
Yet, while the street camps exposed a social problem and the failure of the state to a wider 
public, the spatiality of the precarious squat sealed-in the problems and allowed to shift 
the responsibility to the migrant solidarity movement.  
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Soon, the situation reached a stalemate. Relationships between the collective and 
the state were cut. Yet in the light of the proliferation of problems in the occupation, the 
migrant inhabitants increasingly demanded a sustainable solution. In reaction to the 
deadlock in negotiating the future of the squat, a new collective of neighbours emerged 
taking neither the side of the public authorities nor that of ‘La Chapelle En Lutte’. The 
new collective ‘Solidarité Migrants Place des Fêtes’90 was mainly preoccupied with the 
social cohesion in the neighbourhood, but also expressed its solidarity with the migrants 
living in the squat (Coutant, 2017: 48). Various attempts at mediation involving 
representatives of the largest migrant communities in the squat and the local 
administration failed. Eventually, the city of Paris issued an evacuation warrant. Almost 
three months after its establishment, on October 23, the police evacuated the building, 
transferring more than 1,300 forced migrants to emergency shelters (Le Monde Online, 
2015b). Eventually, for many migrants living in the squat but also most supporters, the 
evacuation was a relief. The conditions in the squat had become unbearable, external 
support had eroded and the external pressure on the squat had led to an internal 
fragmentation of the heterogeneous collective ‘La Chapelle En Lutte’ (Interview P23, 
Interview P30). One of those migrants involved in the occupation expressed his 
ambivalence regarding the squat in a retrospective reflection:  
‘It was great that we occupied this place. We did not have an alternative. And we 
organized many things there (…). But I was really happy, when it was evacuated 
because it had become unbearable’ (Interview P30). 
In the aftermath of the eviction, ‘La Chapelle En Lutte’ fell apart, fragmenting into 
various groups and associations, amongst them ‘United Migrants’, with the idea of 
establishing an asylum-seeker self-organization, ‘La Chapelle Débout’91 the most 
anarchist fraction advocating for a confrontational approach (Interview P27, Interview 
P28, Interview P23, Interview P2) and the ‘Bureau d’Acceuil et d’Accompagnement des 
Migrants’ (BAAM), which set up a solidary, yet pragmatic support association (Coutant, 
2017a). 
 
                                                 
90 Translates into ‘Migrant Solidarity Place des Fêtes’. 
91  The local branch of the broader ‘Nuit Débout’ movement unfolding in France in spring 2016 heavily 
drew from the resources and links established during the mobilizations around migration. Many 
members of the collective ‘La Chapelle Débout’ previously involved in the camps and the squat stand 
for this personal continuity (Interview P23, Interview P28). 
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Back to the Streets 
The end of the squat meant by no means the end of the protest wave. As in previous 
evacuations, some forced migrants living in the occupied building had ‘missed the train’ 
and were not allocated a place in an emergency shelter. Others came back to Paris after a 
few days. Consequently, the ‘cat-and-mouse-game’ of tent camps picked up steam again, 
involving both former inhabitants of the squat and parts of the solidarity activists. To 
avoid the fragmentation of the group as a result of dispersal in scattered emergency 
shelters, a meeting point was displayed on a board during the evacuation and also 
published in the Merhaba journal: 
‘So as not to become isolated and to continue to fight for papers and housing after 
the evacuation of the school (Lycée), our meeting point in the evening of the 
evacuation and on the following evenings is at 6pm, at Metro La Chapelle (line 2).’ 
(Merhaba No.2, 2015). 
Building upon common memories of ‘eventful protest’, claims were even more loudly 
articulated during demonstrations and in the Merhaba journal (Degeorges, 2016; 
Demandeurs d’asile du campement Stalingrad, 2016; Merhaba No.3, 2015; Merhaba 
No.4, 2016; Merhaba No.5, 2016): 
‘The Mayor’s office said it would accommodate us but it was a lie, some were taken 
but other refugees were left in the street. We need housing and documents. We’re 
here [in front of City Hall] to get it and to find a solution to our situation today. Our 
priority is to have a roof over our heads. This morning, some of us had 
appointments, others had procedures to attend, when we returned they told us there 
were no more places. They evacuated the others from the high school and as for us, 
we’re still outside. The Mayor’s office lied to us and broke its promise’ (Merhaba 
No.3, 2015). 
After a series of tent camps, ‘La Chapelle Débout’ together with over three hundred 
forced migrants living in street camps, occupied another abandoned school building 
(‘Lycée Jean Jaurès’) (Baumard, 2016a; Pouliquen, 2016). Drawing from the lessons 
learned during ‘Jean Quarré’ and its undoubted mistakes (Interview P23, Interview P27), 
the rules in Jean Jaurès were much stricter: more self-organized involvement by the 
inhabitants was demanded, no alcohol, drugs or unaccompanied women were allowed in 
the place. And, the La Chapelle Débout intended to bridge the neat division between 
‘refugees’ and ‘economic migrants’, which characterized the previous mobilizations (see 
section 7.5. below). Instead, undocumented migrants and their experienced collectives 
(such as the CSP75) were explicitly invited to join (Interview P28, Interview P27). This 
time, despite a much better organization, the squat was evicted by the police two weeks 
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after its establishment (Baumard, 2016a). In contrast to previous experiences during the 
wave, none of the inhabitants was transferred to emergency shelters, many were instead 
directly taken to deportation facilities. Jean-Jaurès remained the last squat of the protest 
wave. 
In response to the increased visibility of migrants in central Paris and strong 
mobilisation in the camps, the public authorities adopted various means of intervening in 
the formation of social relations. In order to prevent new camps, the police confiscated 
tents, matrasses and cardboard boxes. From summer 2015, the police started gradually 
intervening in the built environment by setting up material obstacles: Open (public) 
spaces underneath the metro line 2 and various parks got fenced. One of the migrants 
observed: 
‘They are about to set up barriers everywhere in the neighbourhood (...). Afraid 
of camps being set up again, they have closed the space under the aerial metro line 
at Stalingrad, they have fenced the Jardin d’Eole. They built a landscape of walls, 
like at the borders’ (cited in Baumard, 2016, author's translation). 
During my fieldwork in spring 2017, the traces of spatial governance were visible 
throughout the Parisian North-East. Even large boulders had been placed at ‘Porte de La 
Chapelle’ to prevent migrants from setting up tents. In the absence of alternatives, 
migrants have since slept scattered on the walkways and parks (Interview P10, Interview 
P2, Interview P8, Interview P5). Even the established humanitarian organization 
‘Medecins Sans Frontières’ publicly denounced the ‘systematic police violence targeted 
against migrants wandering through the city’ (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2016). Despite 
the increasing intervention by the police to undermine the incubating effect of the street 
camps, forced migrants continued to gather. In many cases, the repeated contentious 
interaction with the police planted seeds of protest and encouraged forced migrants living 
in the camps to adopt a confrontational approach instead of remaining patient: 
‘I arrived on September 16 in Paris, for two weeks I have been sleeping on pieces 
of cardboard. Very soon, the police arrived, at six o’clock in the morning, and 
confiscated my cardboard and my stuff. They do the same with our tents. I have 
enough of losing everything all the time. Today I will resist’ (cited in Fofana, 
2016, author's translation). 
In the light of the tightened policing, forced migrants and the fragmented solidarity scene 
encountered increasing difficulties to establish and maintain the street camps: 
‘We are migrants, we are homeless. We are in Place de la République. We cannot 
sleep. It's raining. Every time we put up tents or even only baches [‘French word 
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for tarps’] the police push us and take these by force. So we are staying in the rain 
and the cold without cover all night. But it's still not enough for the authorities. 
Every early morning, the police attacks us and they take our staff by force. We are 
no criminals. We want respect. We want rights. We want humanity. We want 
homes today. We will never give up until you accept our requests. We call on the 
people to help the refugees. We are in Place de la République to articulate our 
demands. The authorities can't let us stay in the rain and the cold. They can't 
provide nothing and attack us whenever we try to have tents or baches. We call 
on the people to help the refugees. We need food. We need tents. So we need 
sleeping bags. We need blankets and clothes. We call on you to gather with us 
again on Friday evening at 20.00 o'clock to resist with us to put up the tents and 
[tarps] and to support our demands.’ (Facebook page Merhaba).92 
Nevertheless, the street camps continued until November 2016, when the city of Paris co-
financed by the central government, opened an emergency shelter at ‘Porte de La 
Chapelle’ (Couvelaire, 2016; Interview P11, Interview P6). From this moment, the tent 
camps almost disappeared from the landscape. Most migrants started settling around the 
newly established center, hoping to get one of the 400 places. At the same time, the police 
even more fiercely controlled the outskirts of Paris, confiscating tents and putting massive 
boulders on the sides of the highway driveway. Subsequently, political associations 
withdrew from active engagement, due to exhaustion but also in order not to legitimize 
the center. The wave of contention cooled off in winter 2016, even though hundreds of 
forced migrants remained in the streets, and even though numerous initiatives continued 
providing legal advice and language courses. 
7.5.  One Issue, Two Struggles? 
In the introduction of this chapter, I referred to an accentuated division of political 
mobilizations by sans-papiers and asylum-seekers. And indeed, during the series of 
camps, there was close to no interaction between the established self-organized structures 
of sans-papiers collectives and the mobilizations in and around the camps. This is at first 
sight surprising as most members of sans-papiers collectives regularly referred to being 
forced out of their countries of origin due to war, widespread human rights abuses or 
extreme poverty (Voix des Sans Papiers, CISPM, 2014). During a sans-papiers 
                                                 
92  Another person referred to the broader landscape of obstacles: ‘They are about to set up barriers 
everywhere in the neighbourhood (...). Afraid of camps being set up again, they have closed the space 
under the aerial metro line at Stalingrad, have fenced the Jardins d’Eole. They build a landscape of 
walls, like at the borders’ (cited in Baumard, 2016). 
 
 179 
demonstration I participated in, one of the undocumented organizers welcomed the 
newcomers with the words: 
‘You, new brothers and sisters, who have left the misery, crossed the desert and 
the Mediterranean and have made it to Paris. You are very welcome here with us. 
We march every Friday. Because when we march, we disrupt, if we do not disrupt, 
no one cares about us, we are invisible but in danger’ (Field notes 16/06/2017). 
To a considerable degree, the cleavage between sans-papier and asylum-seekers was 
rooted in previous interactions and laws intervening in the relations among migrants. 
When I asked a representative of one of the large sans-papiers collectives in Paris, he 
replied: 
‘We were there at the beginning, but the supporters did not want us there. They 
said: “this is not your struggle. These are asylum-seekers and you are sans-papiers. 
This is something different”. I said: “but half of them will be rejected and they 
will become sans-papiers.” (…) [And] they said to the people there [forced 
migrants at La Chapelle]: “your situation is different; you have much better 
chances to get a residence permit!” (…) Anyhow. The thing is, we do not forget’ 
(Interview P14).  
Indeed, many members of the sans-papiers collectives are rejected asylum-seekers, the 
very foundation of the movement in the early 1990s was strongly shaped by rejected 
asylum-seekers. Yet, the neat distinction was not only made by some of the supporters, 
but also by many forced migrants in the camps themselves. Those in or aiming at the 
asylum procedure hoped for this privileged access to protection. Mingling with the sans-
papiers meant mingling with those who ‘failed’ (Interview P29, Interview P27, similarly 
Interview P22). The ‘Collectif Baras’ made similar experiences of how legal categories 
intervened in the social relations within contentious arenas around forced migration. 
Themselves in parts equipped with a humanitarian protection status from Italy, they had 
come to some of the demonstrations in support of the ‘refugees’ at ‘La Chapelle’ but 
realized that they were not ‘meant’ by the mobilizations (Interview P10). 
The dynamics unfolding in Paris during the ‘La Chapelle’ arena, hence, mirror 
patterns I have already traced in Chapter 5. In exclusive migration regimes such as in 
France, rights and potential rights are stratified. Thus alliances are often made on 
similarities in terms of rights. The history of political mobilizations of undocumented 
migrants in France and the US shows that precarious migrants mobilize in niches. 
Students or families are more likely to be regularized than single males etc. Similarly, 
most of the forced migrants at ‘La Chapelle’ mobilized to get into the relatively privileged 
category. Indeed, the rights connected to asylum are superior to those guaranteed in 
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foreigner’s law (Interview Maillary): The dispositive of accommodation related to the 
asylum system exists for some, but not for others. The same is true for all kinds of support 
services, public and private, which are much more developed for asylum-seekers. 
Whereas some of the forced migrants intended to get into the asylum system as asylum-
seekers, the sans-papiers never had a chance or were expelled from this very system.  
 In the light of the precarious living conditions and scarce resources, the established 
sans-papiers collectives observed with suspicion a concentration of resources around the 
‘refugees’ at ‘La Chapelle’ at the expense of a visibility and support of ‘their’ struggles 
(Interview P22, Interview P14). One activist involved in the tent camps and the two 
occupations recalled: 
‘We have good relations with the sans-papiers. We invited them to one of the 
occupations. But they were also a bit jealous, in the sense of: “We have been here 
for years and now they come and everyone gets mobilized all of a sudden”’ 
(Interview P28). 
This added to a deeply rooted suspicion of sans-papiers collectives seeing a tendency in 
both humanitarian actors and radical left activists to patronize and co-opt migrant 
mobilizations. In various occasions, representatives of the sans-papiers collectives 
expressed their astonishment of the widespread solidarity toward ‘refugees’ and very little 
support of undocumented collectives (Field notes 16/06/2017). In their analysis, this was 
related to the dominant role French ‘supporters’ obtain with-a-view to the precarious 
migrants and their unease with the emancipatory and autonomy-oriented struggles of the 
sans-papiers (Interview P14, Interview P7, Interview P29, Interview P10). The ‘we do 
not forget’ – indeed, did not only refer to the experience at ‘La Chapelle’. Instead, the 
precarious (non-)relationship dated back much farther and was rooted in histories and 
memories of contentious interactions with French individual supporters, associations and 
trade unions (see e.g. Chapter 5). Such fragmented ties, that also the sans-papiers were 
well aware of, entailed specific drawbacks: 
‘Of course, with the migrants at La Chapelle there is also the language barrier. We 
only speak French, but no English and rarely Arabic. If we need translation, we 
again need the support of the French. We prefer being deficient but autonomous’. 
(Interview P14). 
Beyond these interactionist dispositions, the sans-papiers found themselves at a strategic 
disadvantage: a public discourse increasingly differentiating between ‘real refugees’ and 
‘unwanted sans-papiers’ reduced the niche for their mobilizations, which were based on 
a much more fundamental notion of ‘freedom of movement’.  
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 As a result of the cleavages introduced into the population of forced migrants by 
different categories of migrants as well as previous interactions with ‘supporters’ and 
sans-papiers collectives, the mobilizations remained by and large disconnected. 
7.6.  Conclusions 
In this chapter scrutinizing the contentious arena at ‘La Chapelle’, I have mapped out the 
emergence and trajectory of sparks of protest by forced migrants emanating from a 
condition of ‘bare life’. On the one hand, the case documents the countless obstacles for 
forced migrants to publicly voice dissent and become visible as political subjects rather 
than objects of migration governance and care. Indeed, the multiple objective grievances 
for various reasons do not necessarily translate into acts of resistance and dissent. 
Particularly asylum-seekers find themselves in a delicate role of demanding rights while 
at the same time depending on an open bureaucratic process. Besides, mobilizations by 
asylum-seekers in Paris have few precedents and hence, contentious networks to build 
upon. Due to a perceived competition within exclusive migration regimes as well as 
memories of contentious interactions with French pro-beneficiaries, the experienced self-
organized sans-papiers collectives have largely mobilized outside the asylum system and 
abstained from the arena. 
 Despite these odds, a closer scrutiny of the spatial and interactive patterns during 
the ‘La Chapelle’ arena sheds light on the visible and invisible practices of political 
mobilization. Paradoxically, it is the highly precarious street camps, in which sparks of 
resistance emerge and incubate. The very visibilization of governmental neglect through 
gathering in groups, attracted a wide range of resources, from humanitarian subsistence 
to information, logistics and access to contentious networks, which in turn, facilitated the 
occasional public articulation of dissent. Through interactions with established players in 
the social movement environment in Paris, forced migrants repeatedly appropriated 
spaces and resources to appear as political subjects in the public sphere. 
 The case, hence, suggests that political mobilizations by forced migrants are 
fundamentally shaped by the concrete micro-interactions with other players in 
contentious arenas, rather than by broad opportunity structures or internal resources. 
Concrete interactions with the police as well as relationships of trust built during repeated 
interaction with ‘supporters’ constituted the foundation for political mobilization. Yet, 
the social ties with pro-beneficiaries were also highly ambivalent and fragile. Those 
migrants who wanted to express dissent and pressure for rights through engaging in 
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confrontation with public authorities found allies in the solidarity movement, including a 
wide range of activists from the libertarian and radical left. The latter, however, were 
engaged in their broader conflict with specific parties, or the state as such (also 
independently from the migrant’s situation), which at times diverted the attention to 
























A ‘Transnational Arena’: Berlin 2015-2016 
Local Roots & Transnational Bonds 
 
‘We are living the same pain, the same difficulties, we understand each 
other better, because we share the same experience, the same suffering. If 
you interact with a European, this is always indirect, because he has never 
lived this and even if the European tries hard to imagine the suffering, it 
remains different from how it feels if you have lived it. This is this intuitive 
understanding.’  (Interview B28) 
 
8.1.  Introduction 
In this last empirical chapter, I re-shift the focus back to Berlin and scrutinize contentious 
interactions around forced migration in Berlin between 2015 and 2016. While covering 
the same time frame as the previous chapter on the ‘La Chapelle’ arena in Paris, the 
relational and spatial context was highly distinct in the German capital at the time. Even 
though the ‘O-Platz’ wave had faded out by the end of 2014, a wide range of forced 
migrant groups self-identifying as ‘refugees’ mobilized on a regular basis. Yet, compared 
to previous periods, they were scarcely connected to each other and attracted limited 
visibility in the larger public. Due to the fragmentation and heterogeneity of the 
movement during the phase of investigation in Berlin, and, hence, no identifiable ‘24/7’ 
protest activity that could be compared to the ‘La Chapelle’ arena in Paris, the chapter 
focuses on the contentious practices of one forced migrant activist group. As the 
subsequent empirical illustrations will document, the group was characterized by an 
intense mobilization and a strong transnational orientation. Against this background, the 
chapter and the ‘protest arena’ differ somewhat from those investigated previously. With 
a view to keeping the focus both on relational and spatial dynamics, the chapter is not 
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only interested in investigating how the group made and unmade social ties in micro-
interactions during mobilization, but also inquires why and how the protest group 
sustained an accentuated transnational orientation. 
 The central argument that I shall develop through analysis of the transnational 
dimension of the arena is the following: I suggest that the forced migrants in the group 
mobilized within two (interwoven) spaces: a transnational space connecting forced 
migrants with grievances rooted in similar migration histories at different locations in 
Europe and Africa, as well as the particular relational and spatial qualities in the place of 
arrival. Shared emotions of experienced inequality, exclusion and violence during the 
migration process have served as the basis of articulating grievances. In order to transform 
these grievances into (transnational) mobilization, the group had to gain access to social 
spaces breaking the isolation in the German asylum system in order to create and access 
common spaces for groups of forced migrants to draw upon local-level resources (advice, 
money, information, etc.). Once these local resources could be mobilized, the activist 
could reconnect to networks of forced migrants in different locations in Europe, which 
were knit during the migration process. These ties to individuals from the same region 
with similar experiences during (trans)migration could be ideal-typically described as 
‘strong ties,’ whereas the support networks represented predominantly ‘weak ties’ that 
refugees nonetheless used deliberately in the mobilization process. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section (8.2.) provides a contextualization of 
the case study, a brief description of the group and their contentious protest practices. 
Subsequently, I reconstruct the relational patterns leading to this particular form of 
mobilization, being rooted in the transnational life worlds of the individuals (8.3.) and the 
relational and spatial configurations in Berlin (8.4.). Thereafter, I conclude the chapter by 
arguing how a dialogue between social movement studies and transnational migration 
studies contributes to the understanding of this particular kind of transnational activism 
by forced migrants (8.5).  
In terms of data, the chapter draws from 11 months of ethnographic fieldwork in 
Berlin conducted between January 2016 and March 2017. I spent more than 100 hours 
with members of the group in assemblies, protest events, asylum shelters, in the 
administration and in private settings. During this time, I took extensive field notes and 
in addition conducted more than 20 interviews with members of the group and pro-
beneficiary activists, who have been working with the group in solidarity. Lastly, the 
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chapter draws from dozens of written documents produced by or on the group, as well as 
messages exchanged in email-lists.93 
8.2.  Brief Contextualization of the Arena 
After two years of high visibility, the longest and largest wave of contention around 
forced migration in German history, the ‘O-Platz-movement’ (see Chapter 6), gradually 
‘faded out’ (Jakob, 2016: 154 f.) from autumn 2014 onwards. For various reasons, the 
protest groups remained deeply divided after the dissolution of the ‘Oranienplatz’-camp 
and the occupied school. Nevertheless, the wave of contention had created new actors, 
awareness, contacts and resources, upon which various small groups of forced migrants 
continued to mobilize (Steinhilper & Ataç, 2018). Other activists involved in the ‘O-
Platz’ wave alternatively or complementarily immersed themselves in mixed anti-racist 
groups (Danielzik & Bendix, 2016; Jakob, 2016). 
Fragmented Activism and the Syria-Effect 
The following sketches intend to map the fragmented movement terrain in Berlin at the 
time of investigation: in February 2015, forced migrant activists from the group ‘Voix 
des Migrants’94 organized a sit-in and conference in commemoration of the border deaths 
in the Mediterranean, involving several hundred asylum-seekers and undocumented 
migrants from various European countries (AEI, 2015, Interview B6, Interview B26). In 
April, activists previously involved in the ‘Oranienplatz’-camp mobilized for a ‘refugee 
bus tour’ to re-connect the scattered nodes of the movement in Germany and access 
isolated asylum-seekers in accommodation centres (Refugee Movement Berlin, 2015). 
The ‘International Women Space’, a group of female ‘migrants and refugees’ founded in 
the occupied Gerhard-Hauptmann-school, continued meeting and working on the 
publication of the book ‘In Our Own Words’, which was published a few months 
afterwards (International Women Space, 2015). Another faction of the ‘O-Platz’ camp 
worked on a ‘public memory’ of the protest wave, published a chronicle of events in a 
‘Movement Magazine’ (International Refugee Center Berlin, 2015) and planned an 
exhibition which was eventually inaugurated in summer 2015 (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 
2015). The group ‘Lampedusa in Berlin’ continued to meet and politicize their precarious 
                                                 
93  The members of the group were informed of my role as a researcher at the beginning of the field work 
and on various occasions thereafter. During my participation I also actively contributed to the 
activities of the group, offering translation, administrative advice and the like. 
94 Translates into ‘The Voice of Migrants’. 
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living conditions after the dissolution of the camp and the squatted school (Fontanari, 
2016). 
As this outline suggests, in early 2015, the forced migrant movement in Berlin 
had not disappeared. However, while migrant activists mobilized politically on a regular 
basis, the groups were rarely connected as the ‘bruises’ of the previous contentious  
interactions had a lasting atomizing effect. These illustrations of the protest movement 
also point to key differences compared to Paris: firstly, even in a phase of decreasing 
mobilization by forced migrants in Berlin, asylum-seekers had appropriated an 
independent place both in the public sphere and in the broader migrant rights movement. 
Secondly, all actors mobilized under the collective identity of ‘refugees’. This included 
asylum-seekers, rejected asylum-seekers and those of the ‘Lampedusa’ group, who had 
obtained temporary humanitarian protection status in Italy, without a work permit in 
Germany. In fact, the latter group was – in terms of status and migration history - similar 
to the members of the ‘Collectif Baras’ in Paris, who mobilized as ‘sans-papiers’. 
Despite this continuing protest activity of forced migrants in the German capital, 
public attention shifted in the first half of 2015 within the field of forced migration politics 
to the new generation of asylum-seekers, mostly from Syria. In a very short period of 
time, ‘refugee solidarity’ left its previous antiracist and faith-based niche and 
(temporarily) became a mass movement in Germany: Countless so-called ‘welcome 
initiatives’ emerged, providing all kinds of immediate assistance such as clothes, food 
and housing. In summer 2015, more and more politicians, trade unions, companies and 
media outlets joined in. On August 29, the traditionally right-leaning tabloid ‘BILD’ 
(with an infamously xenophobic record in reporting on the arrival of asylum-seekers in 
the early 1990s) launched a campaign under the label ‘Refugees Welcome’ to connect 
and inform volunteers (Die Bild, 2015). Only two days later, German Chancellor 
Merkel’s quote ‘Wir schaffen das’ (‘We can do this’) prepared a fundamental U-turn in 
governmental policy (Mushaben, 2017). On September 5th, the German government in a 
historical moment declared to open the borders and receive asylum-seekers that had been 
stranded in Hungary, which equalled a temporary suspension of the Dublin agreement. 
Following this decision, the already high numbers of daily arrivals further increased to 
several thousands (ibid). Pictures of self-organized welcome committees cheering at 
asylum-seekers at railway stations in Munich became emblematic for the rapid 
mainstreaming of supportive attitudes towards forced migrants in Germany during the so-
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called ‘summer of welcome’ (Fleischmann & Steinhilper, 2017; Steinhilper & 
Karakayali, 2018). 
While forced migration became the dominant political issue in summer 2015, both 
visibility of and support for forced migrant activists decreased substantially. The more 
predominantly German actors populated the contentious arena and spoke about ‘the 
refugees’, the more forced migrants were conceived as mute victims or indistinctive mass. 
Many activists from the ‘Oranienplatz’-movement observed that other actors had taken 
over the role of representing forced migrants (Interview B1, Interview B4, Interview 
B11). Due to the dominant framing of the ‘crisis’ as a humanitarian emergency, and the 
factual incapability of the state to provide services, the solidarity movement increasingly 
focused on ‘direct social actions’ (Bosi & Zamponi, 2015) and more broadly, a 
‘dispositive of helping’ (Steinhilper & Fleischmann, 2016). Autonomous forced migrant 
activists repeatedly criticized the shift towards humanitarianism and the de-politicization 
of forced migration (glokal e.V., 2017; Omwenyeke, 2016; Painemal & Bahar, 2017; Ulu 
et al., 2016). 
In the light of the fragmented terrain of political mobilizations by forced migrants 
at the time of investigation and an increasing involvement of pro-beneficiaries since the 
‘long summer of migration’ (Kasparek & Speer, 2015), the case study does not conceive 
‘Berlin’ as the contentious arena to be studied, but homes in on micro-interactions of one 
specific group. Indeed, as the accounts will document, the protest group operated in a 
niche of the migrant movement field in Berlin and often reached beyond the capital (and 
Germany) in its activities. This points to the fundamental constructionist nature of 
‘contentious arenas’. They are not pre-defined entities, but emerge in collective action 
and can thus take diverse sizes and shapes. In the following sections, I will first introduce 
the group and outline its activities. Subsequently, I will home in on the (transnational) 
relational and spatial patterns underlying their contentious practices.  
Transnational Contention by Forced Migrants in Berlin 
The activist group I focus on in this chapter consisted of forced migrants from various 
Western and Central African countries, all male in their mid-20s to mid-40s. All members 
spoke a common (colonial) language and multiple different local languages. While the 
size of the group was liable to change – the group involved around ten core members and 
another two dozen individuals joining concrete protest events. Their legal status was 
diverse, including ‘Geduldete’, asylum-seekers in an on-going procedure and legal 
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residents. Yet, all started their activism as asylum-seekers and the group referred to its 
activities as ‘refugee self-organization’ (Interview B1, Interview B27, Interview B30). 
Most of the group’s members arrived in Germany between 2013 and 2015. While their 
individual biographies of forced migration differed considerably, most shared a long 
phase of transmigration and the experience of exploitation and violence on their way to 
and within Europe (Interview B27, Interview B30, Interview B35). All described their 
decision to leave their country of origin to be rooted in violations of human rights, poverty 
and a fundamental lack of perspectives (Interview B27, Interview B30, Interview B35). 
As I will argue below, these specific migration histories are an important component in 
understanding the social relations these individuals developed and the form of political 
activism they practiced. 
Not least with a view to illustrating the fundamentally different scale of activism 
by asylum-seekers in Berlin compared to the precarious sparks of protest sketched out in 
the context of the Parisian ‘La Chapelle’-arena (Chapter 7), I start with an empirical 
vignette: 
‘It is one of the frequent grey and cold Berlin winter days in early February 2016. 
At an iconic former border post, once separating US-American and Soviet tanks, 
around 50 refugee and non-refugee activists gather for a sit-in. Banners read “Stop 
war on migrants”, and “Freedom not Frontex”. Photographs of dead bodies and 
mourning crowds at a sea shore are displayed on the sidewalk. It is a 
commemoration of the 6th of February 2014, when 9 migrants died in their attempt 
to reach Ceuta from Morocco swimming, the Spanish ‘Guardia Civil’ shooting at 
them with rubber bullets. The flyers distributed announce simultaneous events for 
the same day in Morocco, Spain and Berlin. Mamadou, a charismatic and 
experienced speaker weaves his own biography of forced migration through 
Morocco and Spain into a general narrative of migrants’ experience of violence 
and structural exclusion both at the external borders and after their arrival in 
Germany’ (Field notes, 06/02/2016). 
The vignette above describes a protest event organized by forced migrants, which was 
inherently transnational: both in its framing and action in two national settings 
simultaneously. German solidarity activists were present, assisted with logistical support 
in the organization of the event, yet the clear protagonists and only speakers were forced 
migrants. My participant observation, interviews and document analyses in the upcoming 
months unveiled that this event was by no means an exceptional case of their activism. 
On the contrary, the frequency, intensity and transnationality of their political activism 
was striking: From 2014 to 2016, members of the group (co-)organized two international 
refugee conferences with a total of more than 2,000 participants in Berlin and Hamburg; 
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they participated in dozens of conferences and workshops all over Germany; they 
organized countless demonstrations, visits to asylum facilities to mobilize new activists 
and engaged in concrete acts of resistance against deportations (Interview B1, Interview 
B27, Interview B29, Interview B30). Among these activities, many occurred either 
outside Germany (including a protest March to Brussels, a protest against Frontex at its 
headquarters in Warsaw and numerous transnational networking events among forced 
migrants), involved participants from more than one European country, or explicitly 
targeted actors beyond the locality of reception. Group members were among the 
founders of three transnational migrant rights networks (yet no longer as active in all of 
them). During the time of my ethnographic research, members of the group organized a 
conference on migrant rights in two African cities, a transnational protest event against 
deportations in Brussels and participated in transnational protest events in the framework 
of various networks in which they were members. 
This cursory overview demonstrates the frequency and transnationality of the 
group’s protest activities. At first sight, this type of mobilization is puzzling in the light 
of the structural difficulties described in previous parts of this thesis, but also given the 
additional challenges of transnational mobilization (Mathers, 2007). In multiple 
conversations and participations in events, I scrutinized which relational and spatial 
dynamics contributed to their mobilization in the first place and the sustained organization 
of (transnational) protest against all odds. 
8.3.  Transnational Spaces of Exclusion and Solidarity 
In contrast to many other cases of political mobilizations of (forced) migrants (Pulido, 
2006), including in Berlin (Ataç et al., 2015; Jakob, 2016), only one of the protest group’s 
members had an explicit background as political activist in the country of origin. Most 
members became politicized in a long (up to 10 years) and burdensome process of 
transmigration in Africa and Europe. Through personal experiences and accounts of 
others, the members of the group developed a deep feeling of injustice with regard to 
European border politics and a sense of responsibility toward those who were left behind 
in the country of origin and at multiple locations in transit (Interview B1, Interview B27, 
Interview B30, Field notes 25/01/2017). Individual emotions of grief and indignation 
were deeply inscribed in their migration project. The biography of Mamadou gives an 
idea of these processes of migrating into grievances: he left his city of origin in 2003, 
forced away by widespread poverty, human rights violations, authoritarian government 
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and the expectations of his family. He took the common track through Mali to Algeria, 
towards the Mediterranean shores. It became a burdensome passage of exploitation, 
forced labour, deprivation and violence lasting for several years. During this time, he 
migrated within fragile networks of self-help. At various nodes, he had to rely on 
precarious solidarity structures, in which scarce resources and information were shared. 
The longer the transmigration lasted, the more personal experiences and stories of fellow 
migrants accumulated: all entailing imprisonment, deportation, exploitation, sexual abuse 
and death (Interview B3, Interview B6, Interview B30).  
In many regards, up to this point, Mamadou’s story is not exceptional. On the 
contrary, it resembles many illegalized African migrants’ trajectories zigzagging the 
African continent to the Mediterranean shores (Andersson, 2016; Carling, 2007; Crawley, 
Düvell, Jones, McMahon, & Sigona, 2016). Other members of the activist group in Berlin 
had similar experiences on their way to Europe (Interview B27, Interview B28, Field 
notes, 26/07/2016). Consequently, all shared a collective memory of exclusion and 
violence and the sense of responsibility toward those left behind. Also, all group members 
were connected to other individuals in other locations in Europe and Africa, who had 
experienced or continued to experience similar deprivations. Indeed, even those group 
members who had found a route to Germany with fewer privations were politicised by 
the accounts of fellow forced migrants. 
Accordingly, the members of the group were embedded in transnational social 
spaces connecting individuals with shared emotions, grief and grievances in various 
places in Europe and Africa. These ties were facilitated by cultural and linguistic 
proximity on the one side, but equally importantly by shared experiences and memories 
of violence and exclusion in transmigration and the locality of reception. The quote of 
one refugee activist I interviewed stands representative for a common sentiment I 
encountered multiple times during my research: 
‘We are living the same pain, the same difficulties, we understand each other 
better, because we share the same experience, the same suffering. If you interact 
with a European, this is always indirect, because he has never lived this and even 
if the European tries hard to imagine the suffering, it remains different from how 
it feels if you have lived it. This is this intuitive understanding’ (Interview B28). 
These findings echo and specify multiple contributions in transnational migration, which 
have amply demonstrated that individuals with a migration history are usually embedded 
in transnational social spaces (Vertovec 2009; Faist et al. 2013; Pries 2001). Through 
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shared memories, mobile individuals and communication technologies, resources and 
emotions circulate across borders, resulting – next to kinship networks – also in 
‘transnational communities’ (Faist, 1998, 2006). The latter are 
‘dense and continuous sets of social and symbolic ties, characterised by a high 
degree of intimacy, emotional depth, moral obligation and sometimes even social 
cohesion’ (Faist 2006: 5). 
Such communities are often (but not necessarily) characterized by a common religion or 
country of origin (diaspora), however, most importantly by reservoirs of common 
experiences. At times, such social configurations can bring about 
‘mechanisms creating this sense of moral responsibility, social cohesion, despite 
a lack of long patterns of personal interaction or kinship’ (Faist, 2006). 
I argue that the members of the activist group in Berlin were embedded in a particular 
type of political community, which was not primarily rooted in a common homeland 
(diaspora) or kinship, but in shared experiences of exclusion. This specific kind of social 
space can be understood as ‘latent transnational contentious space’, which can be 
activated for political mobilizations in the case of advantageous relational qualities in the 
places of arrival.95 I will argue subsequently that transnational practices in general, and 
contentious practices in particular, require a firm grounding at the local level, offering 
resources to politicize these transnational communities. Before discussing the relational 
and spatial patterns in which the activist group was embedded in Berlin, and which 
allowed to access the ‘latent transnational contentious spaces’ illustrated above, I add here 
another element of Mamadou’s experience of migrating into political activism. 
According to his accounts, Mamadou’s awareness as a political activist starts with 
what he called an ‘epiphany’ (Interview B1, Interview B6) in an Algerian prison 
sometime in 2010. He had been arrested with many other illegalized migrants, without 
really understanding why at the time. After months of imprisonment, he was deported to 
the Malian desert, where he luckily met representatives of a self- organization of West 
African deportees to Mali, providing temporary shelter, food and contacts for those in 
need. The endless months in the Algerian prison after years of burdensome transmigration 
                                                 
95  Thomas Faist prepared a similar argument over a decade ago, however, without developing it further – 
neither theoretically nor empirically. He suggested: ‘It is plausible to argue that transnational political 
activists, for example, are not merely internationally oriented cosmopolitans, but rather need a firm 
grounding in local contexts. In other words, transnationalization is situated between a “space of flows” 
and a “space of places”’ (Faist 2006: 7). 
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had planted a seed of dissent. When he met various activists and journalists in Mali, he 
became increasingly politicized (Interview B3, Interview B6, Interview B30). 
 When he recalled his politicization on an extremely hot summer day during an 
African cultural event in central Berlin, he took out a piece of paper from his backpack 
and began to draw a detailed timeline of his activism, naming crucial persons and 
organizations he met. It started with the prison in Algeria. From the moment of encounter 
with Malian and European activists in Bamako, he continued his attempt to Europe once 
more alone, but he started collecting contacts to humanitarian organizations, fellow 
migrants and activists. Some he met repeatedly during his repeatedly intercepted paths 
North (Interview B6). Stuck for an extensive period of time in the makeshift camps 
outside the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, he eventually succeeded in crossing 
to Spain in a rubber dinghy and continued to Germany, where he applied for asylum 
(Interview B30).  
8.4.  Spatial Patterns and Fragile Solidarity in Berlin 
The multiple grievances accumulated on the way to Europe and through exchange with 
fellow migrants did not translate mechanically into political mobilization after their 
arrival in Europe. On the contrary, by filing an asylum claim, all members of the group 
entered the highly restrictive and disintegrating German asylum system, aptly described 
in Chapter 4. All members of the group had hoped that with entering the German asylum 
system, their exhausting journeys and experiences of exclusion were about to end. Yet – 
they encountered a different situation: 
‘When I arrived in Germany it was a shock. The asylum camp. You are stuck 
there; you do not have the control of yourself anymore. It is a system that controls 
you. You cannot leave when you want, there are hours at which you have to be 
back, hours at which you have to eat, you cannot prepare your own food. (…) You 
do not know anyone; you do not understand the language; (…) for me it was a 
shock’ (Interview B30). 
After the first reception, the members were transferred to various municipalities in 
Brandenburg, none of them located in an urban centre. While they had expected the 
German asylum to be a space of protection and tranquillity, they perceived the tightly 
regulated and at the same time uncertain life in the German asylum system as 
fundamentally ‘stressful’ (Field notes 24/07/2016, Interview B27). They repeatedly 
referred to the lack of privacy, uncertainty about the future, a lack of autonomy, a 
disintegration from society and felt lost in the complex bureaucratic procedure. The 
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members reported regular incidences of (auto-)aggression in the centres and remembered 
their own feelings of apathy, disillusion and isolation. In sum, life in the German asylum 
system was perceived as a fundamental injustice with highly negative emotional and 
physical effects. In these regards, the activist’s experiences echoed the numerous reports 
and social scientific studies on the everyday life and emotional experiences of asylum-
seekers in Germany (Dilger, Dohrn, & International Women Space, 2016; Johansson, 
2016; Pieper, 2008; Täubig, 2009).  
 Accordingly, the members of the group found themselves in a highly 
disadvantageous context for political mobilization after arriving in Germany. Moreover, 
the asylum system provided also unfavourable conditions for sustaining the transnational 
social spaces they had established through their migration project. For these reasons, 
Janine Dahinden considers asylum-seekers as ‘transnational outsiders’ (Dahinden, 2010: 
57): 
‘Typically, in Europe, asylum-seekers, recently arrived migrants from non-EU 
countries and sometimes even legal refugees represent this type. These migrants 
do not circulate between their country of origin and the immigration country, often 
because circulation is cut off due to persecution in the home country and, more 
generally, because they do not have the right to travel due to their legal status as 
asylum-seekers. Simultaneously – and again because of their legal status – their 
often limited access to jobs or other resources in the immigration country forms 
an obstacle to local embeddedness’ (ibid). 
Indeed, even though further experiences of exclusion and injustice added in the German 
asylum system to those grievances accumulated by the group members on the way to 
Europe (Interview B3, Interview B6, Interview B27), it required access to social networks 
in Berlin to translate grief, anger and feelings of injustice into political mobilization.  
Given the disadvantageous relational qualities of asylum facilities in general, and 
particularly in their German variant, almost all group members’ biographies of explicit 
political activism started with mechanisms breaking the disintegration in the centres. In 
this regard, the centralization of asylum-seekers in collective facilities proved to be 
paradoxically as an advantage, as it allowed for a targeted outreach of activists in 
solidarity. Various members of the activist group in Berlin found the way out of the rigid 
control in the asylum centres via an activist practice called ‘camp visits’, explicitly 
tailored to the specific context of isolation in the asylum system: Anti-racist and 
particularly self-organized forced migrant groups developed the strategy to visit asylum 
camps on a regular basis, with a view to sharing information on legal support, political 
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activities and inviting asylum-seekers to (temporarily) leave the facilities. Over many 
years, such visits have become a ‘fundamental element of the work of self-organized 
refugee groups to visit camps as often as possible’ (Watara, 2013). 
The story of Saïd, one of the core members of the activist group, exemplifies this 
mechanism of engagement. It was told to me by another activist of the group: 
‘We have this element of camp visits. One Sunday [we go] to one camp, then to 
another one. And this day it was the camp of Saïd. I did not know him, he was in 
his room, sleeping. He had severe problems, loss of memory, trauma. I spoke with 
him and invited him to an activist meeting. He did not have a place to sleep so he 
slept at my place. It was not only him, also many others became active in this way’ 
(Interview B28).  
Saïd confirmed this first visit as the crucial moment in which he understood that there 
was hope and a way to transform indignation and grief into something productive 
(Interview B27). From that moment on, he gradually became involved in various activist 
groups and eventually started co-organizing himself camp visits on a regular basis in 
order to reach out to asylum-seekers in a similar state of apathy and despair as he had 
been. 
A second example is the story of Eric. He arrived in Europe through the Balkan 
route in early 2015 and was transferred to a first reception centre, infamous for its 
conditions, located at the periphery of Brandenburg. Anxious about his future, he felt also 
stuck, abandoned and isolated due to the very little access to German society for spatial 
and linguistic reasons:  
‘After a while, I met Aboubakar, a refugee who has become regularized. He works 
with refugees and explains how refugees have the capacity to fight for themselves. 
He invited me to one of his conferences. There, it was the first time I met refugee 
activists from Berlin. I was really motivated, I was galvanised. Now I am in 8 
groups, but it started with the visit of Aboubakar’ (Interview B28). 
These visits were for many the sine qua non for their political mobilization. Both Eric 
and Saïd described two aspects which were essential for them in order to get engaged. 
Firstly, the exchange (in a familiar language) with fellow migrants with similar 
biographies of forced migration, of suffering and feelings of exclusion; and secondly, an 
exchange with individuals who had managed to overcome the state of apathy and despair 
and had successfully left the asylum centres behind. The combination of these two 
elements constituted the basis for trust and the gradual establishment of ‘strong ties’, 
which were crucial for taking the risk and stepping out of the regulated routine in the 
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centres. 
While being important mechanisms for breaking with the isolation, the ‘camp 
visits’ were not the only mechanisms through which trust could be built and eventually, 
local support structures accessed. Two members of the group, including Mamadou whose 
story has been described above, had a comparative advantage. They had come to know 
and then lost each other repeatedly during their long transmigration to Europe. In 2013 
they met again in in a first reception centre in Brandenburg after a long time of separation. 
Even though they were sent to different facilities subsequently, they were able to keep in 
touch and share information. Furthermore, both of them had kept the contacts of activists 
from various European countries they had met during their long transmigration. These 
contacts scattered all over Europe reconnected them to the ‘Oranienplatz’-camp in Berlin, 
which still existed at the time (see Chapter 6). Through the camp and the other contacts, 
they had built up while on the move, they were able to gain access to local support milieus, 
without being personally reached by a ‘camp visit’ (Interview B30, Field notes 
05/04/2016). Another member of the group was one of those, who had left his asylum 
facility and joined the protest camp at ‘Oranienplatz’ shortly after its establishment in 
2012. He joined the group after the ‘Oranienplatz’-community had fallen apart (Field 
notes 06/06/2016).  
 Following the first encounters with self-organized groups, individual forced 
migrant activists and support groups, the members of the group rapidly immersed in anti-
racist and migrant rights movements in the city of Berlin. These alternative political 
milieus have for a long time been concentrated in the neighbourhoods of Kreuzberg and 
Neukölln with a long history of counterhegemonic movements and large migrant 
communities (Lang, 1998; Stehle, 2006), offering numerous initiatives and safe spaces 
for personal exchange and political organizing. Since the ‘Oranienplatz’-movement, 
however, additional meeting points, information platforms (such as oplatz.net) and 
networks have emerged from which the activists could benefit (Field notes 05/04/2016, 
30/05/2017, Interview B6). 
These networks embedded resources which were paramount for the group’s and 
individual activist’s political activity. Asked which individuals and associations they 
considered important for their work, all respondents referred to the membership in various 
antiracist groups (involving persons with and without migration history), as well as 
contacts to NGOs and foundations with access to money, legal advice, logistics and 
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information. All members of the group acknowledged that such external resources were 
indispensable for compensating the resources lacking within the forced migrant 
community. One of the group members noted in an interview: 
‘In the self-organization, we have limited means with regard to everything, in 
logistics, finance, even to understanding how the system works, not to speak about 
the language. We need them [the non-migrant supporters], it is impossible without 
them’ (Interview B28). 
Indeed, during all meetings and protest events I participated in, the group had to a 
significant degree to rely on translation, the provision of rooms, and the know-how and 
associative status of German NGOs to tap funds. Most resources were mobilized ad hoc, 
using the multiple ties to supporting environments that the group members had 
accumulated. These relations were often of a relatively pragmatic, yet indispensable 
nature, and often dissolved due (amongst other reasons) to shifting priorities of the 
supporting actors or perceived lack of recognition. Given the often short-termed ties and 
the focus on (logistic) support, I consider these ties to be largely ‘weak ties’, with a limited 
degree of emotional depth. While small-scale protest events could be mobilized using the 
network of decentralized individual resources, larger campaigns or events, including 
those with transnational components, required the cooperation with associations 
recognized by German law as brokers to apply for funds. 
It is of no surprise that marginalized actors are often forced to rely on the support 
of more individuals and groups, with more privileged access to resources and rights. Yet, 
both the access to such networks and their perpetuation was confronted with considerable 
obstacles. Accessing support networks came for the activists of the group with 
considerable investments. Even when basic trust was created, activism required for most 
a constant back-and-forth between their designated and strongly disciplined official 
residence and the meeting points and autonomous spaces of the anti-racist movements in 
the city of Berlin, predominantly in the neighbourhoods of Kreuzberg and Neukölln. Only 
two of the group members lived in central Berlin. Many others were registered in asylum 
camps in Brandenburg, travelling for several hours a day to participate in assemblies or 
meetings. According to the members of the group, these costs, and the risks of being 
involved in activism during an administrative procedure as well as strong dependence on 
the state discouraged many asylum-seekers from becoming involved. During the camp 
visit organized by the group in which I participated, many fellow asylum-seekers 
expressed gratitude for the visits and shared the demands, yet either preferred to remain 
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silent as a strategy or simply were not willing or capable to make the indispensable 
investments. Accordingly, one of the activists reflected in a personal interview: 
‘We have a problem of distance and mobility. How can you be political activists 
without the possibility to be mobile? Some camps are very far away, the ticket is 
expensive and at night there are no buses to go back after a meeting for example. 
So you need a place to sleep in the city if you want to leave the camp. This is 
complicated’ (Interview B28). 
In many cases, those (few) forced migrants living in the urban centres offered sleeping 
places for the others who could not get back home to their remote asylum centres after 
political meetings in the evening.  
Even though the access to non-migrant support networks provided crucial 
resources for the organization of political protest, the resulting interactions between 
individuals with and without history of forced migration were characterized by breaking 
points, which were often – but not exclusively (Ünsal, 2015) rooted in asymmetrical 
power positions. The de facto and perceived dependence on domestic so-called ‘support’ 
constituted a constant challenge for cooperation throughout the period of my 
participation.96 Whereas forced migrant supporters were mostly warmly and explicitly 
welcomed, many viewed the arrival of unknown supporters or representatives of groups 
with deep suspicion. During my participation, regularly irritation and open conflicts arose 
with supporters. Whereas representatives of established associations felt the need to 
clarify the scope and terms of cooperation, many members of the group suspected that 
paternalistic behaviour undermined autonomous organizing by forced migrants (e.g. Field 
notes 17/07/2016, 31/08/2016, 24/07/2017). In a personal interview one of the members, 
visibly outraged, explained: 
‘We [self-organized refugees] have been exploited, we have been working for 
others and their projects. There is no need to set up projects for us or to take our 
ideas and develop them further! We believe there is a system of paternalism in the 
movement. We can work together, on the same level. But do not come to help us’ 
(Interview B30). 
All members of the group considered their activities to be, as Monforte and Dufour have 
termed them, ‘acts of emancipation’ (2013). Beyond criticizing specificities of the asylum 
system, the members of the group constantly struggled to abandon their ascribed role as 
subalterns. Questioning deeply rooted and unequal power-relations, unmasking racism, 
                                                 
96  Similar experiences were encountered during the ‘refugee protest camp’ at ‘Oranienplatz’ in Berlin 
(Jakob, 2016; Ünsal, 2015) as well as in other regional contexts (for the USA see Nicholls, 2013; for 
Italy see Cappiali, 2016b). 
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and by this ‘decolonizing Europe’ (Interview B1), were hence considered explicitly as an 
inherent element of their activism. Due to this sensitivity, many ties with non-migrant 
supporters broke along the lines of alleged paternalism and racism (and resentful denial 
of such accusations) (Field notes, 17/17/2016, 24/07/2016). The fear of being patronized 
was deeply rooted and cooperation with native support viewed with scepticism and often 
preventively avoided if negative experiences had been encountered. In consequence, the 
range of allies was rather limited. Most of the so-called ‘welcome initiatives’, which had 
mushroomed in Berlin since 2015, were considered counterproductive to forced migrant 
organizing. Hence, only those actors with an explicit post-colonial and anti-racist identity 
were considered as potential allies.  
Not least due to structural power asymmetries and the resulting tensions, most of 
the relations between forced migrants and pro-beneficiaries took the shape of ‘weak ties’, 
meaning ties providing access to social capital which was otherwise blocked and which 
were often characterized by pragmatism rather than emotional depth and intuitive 
understanding. Asked about the role of pro-beneficiary antiracist groups, one of the forced 
migrant activists responded: ‘No, no, this is not real solidarity, it is more networking’ 
(Field notes, 30/05/2017, similarly also Interview B1). In some cases, certainly, 
interactions with ‘supporters’ resulted in emotionally deep relationships. Without 
intending to provide a mechanical account, the qualitative difference between weak ties 
with the support scene and strong, empathetic, ties within the forced migrant community, 
was repeatedly stressed. Also in practice, crucial decisions and sensitive questions were 
discussed predominantly within the core group, without the involvement of supporters. 
This distinction of transparency and openness within the core group and scepticism and 
secrecy towards non-migrant outsiders, in turn, alienated numerous supporters, who 
subsequently withdrew from assisting the group. Certainly, the relations among the 
members of the group also were not without tension (see below). Yet, the breaking points 
were different. Perceived dependency, paternalism or racism were never the breaking 
points in these interactions. 
8.5. Transnational Political Communities: Cohesion and Cleavages 
Referring to the different qualities of ties among supporters and forced migrants - which 
are to be understood as ideal types rather than neat distinctions in practice - does not mean 
in turn, that the forced migrant community is to be understood as a monolithic entity. On 
the contrary, and similar to the patterns of internal division identified in the previous 
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chapters, questions of (potential) legal status, origin and race played an important 
fragmenting role. Indeed, the group remained throughout the time of my participation 
limited to Sub-Saharan-African members. While originating from different countries, 
they shared a colonial language, specific migration histories and experiences of racism as 
Black persons in Germany. Even though attempts were made repeatedly to reach out to 
the large Syrian and Afghan forced migrant communities – often in response to explicit 
suggestions by supporters - the efforts systematically failed. At times, linguistic obstacles 
hindered a sustainable interaction. At times, however, cleavages between different 
migrant groups became evident. The members of the group felt structurally disadvantaged 
as Black Africans, not only by government authorities, but also by supporters (Interview 
B3, Interview B35) in comparison to ‘the Syrians’ (Interview B1, Interview B3, Interview 
B35). Given the specific experiences of racism, very low recognition rates and histories 
of European colonialism made an interaction with other African forced migrants that were 
more intuitive, and sustainable in practice. Thus, the transnational social spaces in which 
the activists were embedded, were not particularly multi-ethnic. Rather, they connected 
individuals in Berlin to others elsewhere in Germany, Europe and Africa with similarities 
in language, region of origin and experiences of exclusion.  
With the resources mobilized through local support networks in Berlin, the activist 
group managed to activate the ‘latent transnational contentious spaces’ outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter. Accordingly, the group’s local protest events took on a specific 
shape: the events were heavily diffused transnationally through diverse email-lists and 
various social media channels. Activists from the same region of origin living in other 
cities in Germany (or even abroad) were invited to join. Parallel events in various 
countries were almost always considered or organized. Scarce resources (both in terms 
of money and time) were invested to foster these bonds, sometimes at the expense of 
mobilizing more intensely at the local level. The contacts used to organize transnational 
events were established on the move and during previous protest events. Through regular 
exchange via social media channels, the networks could be sustained even without regular 
face-to-face interaction. While many activists of the group travelled regularly within 
Germany and Europe, participation in protest events in Africa, were, for obvious reasons, 
limited to those with an official residence permit in Germany. However, others were 
constantly integrated in the activities via videos, what’s-app groups etc. And even without 
personal mobility, information and expressions of solidarity were regularly exchanged 
across borders. 
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The importance of the local embeddedness for accessing resources for political 
activism was also key in activating the ‘latent transnational contentious spaces’. As 
Dahinden has argued, ‘transnational practices and formations cannot develop separately 
but are linked to the constraints and opportunities imposed by specific contexts’ 
(Dahinden, 2010: 69). In the light of specific opportunities (resources mobilized in Berlin) 
and constraints (e.g. cleavages with other migrant communities), the transnational 
contentious practices of the group took this particular shape. 
During my fieldwork, consequently, I witnessed a transnational contentious space 
around forced migration spanning various locations in Europe and connecting forced 
migrants with similar backgrounds. Interestingly, the counterparts in other European 
countries mobilized under the label ‘sans-papiers’ rather than ‘refugees’ as the group in 
Berlin. The transnational allies also included the CSP75 group in Paris (see Chapter 5), 
with which the activists in Berlin regularly interacted. This points to the fact that protest 
arenas, particularly in contentious migration politics are not separate entities, but 
embedded in transnational social spaces. 
8.6.  Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have investigated an inherently transnational arena of forced migrant 
activism between 2015 and 2016 in Berlin. As this close-up immersion with one group 
of forced migrant activists underlined, contentious arenas are, in Massey’s terms, ‘place-
based’ (in Berlin), but not necessarily ‘place-bound’ (Massey, 1991: 279). The arena, in 
which the activist group engaged, involved local supporters, other forced migrant 
communities in Berlin, but also fellow migrant activists in other places in Europe and 
Africa. 
 Substantially, the case study reveals certain characteristics of forced migrant 
activism, which are partly related to the migration histories of the individuals involved, 
but which also point to the spatial and relational underpinnings of political activism by 
asylum-seekers in Germany. I argue that this group of forced migrants mobilized within 
two (connected) spaces: a transnational space connecting migrants with grievances rooted 
in similar migration histories at different locations in Europe and Africa as well as the 
particular relational and spatial qualities of the local space in Berlin. 
The transnational orientation of the activist group is owed to their firm rootedness 
in transnational life worlds. These transnational social spaces, which connect almost all 
(forced) migrants to individuals with similar experiences in different locations on the 
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globe – even more so in a networked society – are also mirrored in practices of political 
activism. In the case of the group in Berlin, they have established social networks with a 
sense of solidarity based on shared reservoirs of experiences of suffering and exclusion 
as African migrants.  
These transnational social spaces of migration can be politicized if resources, or 
‘mobilizing capital’, is accessed through support networks at the locality of destination. 
In this regard, the chapter echoes key findings in Chapter 6 on specific geographies of 
exclusion (and contestation) in the German asylum system: engaging in political 
mobilizations as asylum-seekers in Germany presupposes overcoming specific spatial 
and relational obstacles which are inherent to the system of accommodation. Without 
specific mechanisms to break the exclusion in most of the asylum facilities, asylum-
seekers were unable to access the resources needed to organize and sustain political 
protest and to activate the ‘latent transnational contentious spaces’ established during the 
migration project. Hence, a particular repertoire of contention including ‘camp visits’ has 
been tailored to overcome the specific obstacles of migrant agency in the German context. 
Often it is the stepping out of their allocated place, that allows asylum-seekers to access 
local support structures embedded in social movement milieus, which usually concentrate 
in urban areas.  
The case study furthermore suggests qualitatively different (ideal-)types of social 
ties: strong ties are often built based on linguistic and cultural proximity, but also on 
similar reservoirs of experiences of exclusion in restrictive migration regimes. 
Relationships between forced migrants and non-migrants often unfold under the shadow 
of highly unequal positions of power and often result in highly fragile ties prone to 
breaking as a result of questions of paternalism, racism or allegations of these. In 
consequence, such ties often focus on accessing resources the individual would otherwise 
not have; they, thus, could be understood predominantly as ‘weak ties’. On the other hand, 
shared experiences of discrimination, violence and subordination facilitate the creation of 
‘strong ties’ of trust and mutual understanding. Such relations are often paramount for 
forced migrants to dare to take the step out of the isolated asylum facilities and join 
contentious activities.  
This ‘intuitive’ understanding based on shared experience, does, however, often 
not translate into sustainable cooperation among migrant communities from different 
regional origins. Similarly to the illustrations in other chapters of this thesis, differences 
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in (potential) legal status, recognition and rates and public discourses distinguishing ‘real 
refugees’ from ‘bogus asylum-seekers’, but also questions of leadership, introduced 
considerable obstacles to common organizing efforts. While being well connected within 
the local ‘refugee movement’ in Berlin, these ties were rarely translated into sustainable 
collective action with members of different origin and background. Transnational 
organization within communities interwoven on the move and drawing from similar 
experiences of forced migration, was, indeed, more intuitive (and successful) than 
bridging the multiple divides of diverse refugee communities (in terms of language, 
religion etc.) at the local level. 
Once the group had accessed local resources, the transnational social spaces most 
migrants inhabit, were able to be transformed into particular transnational social 
formations – for which I suggest the term ‘transnational contentious communities’. 
Within such formations, marginalized migrants are able to organize and sustain 
transnational political protest against all evident odds. These transnational communities, 
which draw from shared experiences, link individuals in various countries in Europe, 
despite the fact that different legal attributes are given to the persons involved in different 
European countries. As a result, ‘refugees’ in Germany have mobilized alongside ‘sans-
papiers’ in France. 
In many regards, the transnational patterns described in this chapter are not 
exceptional. Even though the focus was placed more on local configurations, 
transnational patterns were also present in the other arenas under investigation: The 
CSP75 in Paris, has been likewise involved in transnational activism for many years. 
These included protest events at various EU-Africa summits, a transnational march in the 
context of the World Social Forum 2011 (Andersson, 2016: 245 ff.; Jakob, 2011) as well 
as the co-organization of two European marches in 2012 and 2014 (Swerts, 2017). The 
‘Oranienplatz’-movement in turn, was key in organizing a transnational march to 
Brussels in 2014 (Langa, 2015; Mauer, 2014). Eventually, particularly the Sudanese 
forced migrants at ‘La Chapelle’ aimed at connecting a scattered transnational community 
to politicize both exclusion in various countries in Europe and the root causes of their 
forced migration. Given the conditions of ‘bare life’ and limited rootedness in Paris, 
however, these efforts did not reach the same degree of organization as in the case of the 
protest group in Berlin. 
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Broadly, the argument presented in this chapter points to the heuristic value of 
bridging insights from social movements and transnational migration literature with a 
view to understanding political protest of migrants. It urges to adapt established toolkits 
for the analysis of political mobilizations in the specific contexts and transnational life 
















Part III: Patterns and Specificities 
 
Chapter 9 
Comparing Contentious Arenas around Forced Migration 
Patterns of Interaction & the Relational Qualities of Space 
 
9.1.  Introduction 
In her seminal study on the sans-papiers movement in France up to the 1990s, Siméant 
has pointed to an ‘almost typical characteristic and evolution of the protest by irregular 
migrants in terms of claims and repertoires of contention’ (1998: 17, author's translation 
from French), particularly with regard to the specific function of hunger strikes (see also 
Jasper, Siméant, & Traini, 2016). In this synthesizing chapter, I intend to follow her 
example. While the empirical chapters in Part II of this manuscript focused on specific 
arenas and constellations of players, Part III uses a macro lens to derive patterns from the 
four cases. In doing so, I intend to capitalize on the productive tension of ‘political 
ethnography’ (Schatz, 2009a), which combines focusing in on and moving away from 
single cases in order to capture both the specific and the systematic. The investigation of 
four arenas unfolding in two locations in different moments in time allows for a tentative 
identification of key characteristics of forced migrant activism. Such patterns shed light 
on the obstacles, ‘niche openings’ (Nicholls, 2014), and trajectories of these contentious 
practices. Eventually, they contribute to the existing knowledge of how marginalized 
individuals and groups become visible as political subjects and how they organize 
political protest against all the odds of exclusive migration regimes. 
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The chapter is structured as follows: it starts by highlighting the advantages of 
using an ‘arenas’ approach to the study of forced migrant mobilizations (9.2.), followed 
by a synthesis of the ‘relational qualities of space’, pointing to both spaces of exclusion 
and spaces of contestation (9.3.). The subsequent sections derive patterns of interactions 
and strategic dilemmas in forced migrant activism from the empirical cases. Whereas 9.4. 
points to the fragile relations between forced migrants and pro-beneficiaries, 9.5. focuses 
on the internal heterogeneity of forced migrant activists, mobilizing in highly narrow 
legal and socio-political ‘niches’. In addition to the common dynamics identified in all 
the arenas, this chapter also highlights facets of forced migrant mobilizations, which were 
not equally strong in all the arenas studied, yet which add to a more nuanced 
understanding of the phenomenon. These are, for instance, the obstacles of political 
mobilization in a condition of ‘bare life’, and the transnationality of forced migrant 
mobilizations (9.6).  
9.2.  The Merits of a ‘Contentious Arenas’ Approach 
Applying a ‘contentious arenas’ lens to the study of political mobilizations by forced 
migrants unveils the relational dynamics of incubation and fragmentation, which are 
crucial to understanding precarious activism. All four arenas underlined that  
‘the main constraints on what protestors can accomplish are not determined 
directly by economic and political structures so much as they are imposed by other 
players with different goals and interests’ (Jasper 2014: 9).  
The diverse contentious subjects scrutinized in these chapters were engaged in arenas in 
which a myriad of actors competed for influence and recognition. In consequence, the 
social relations developing during these waves of mobilization were characterized by 
volatility and fragility, rather than by a stable network structure. The players’ interests 
and options were shaped in the process rather than pre-given. Players emerged, split and 
changed sides during the mobilizations; some, conceived as part of the same compound 
player in one moment in time, were at a later point considered key opponents. In some 
occasions and spatial configurations, micro-interactions incubated sparks of dissent into 
larger mobilizations, often involving both forced migrants and pro-beneficiaries. In other 
spatial settings, diversity and precariousness favoured fragmentation and demobilization. 
Stressing the role of micro-interactions in contentious arenas does not mean that 
macro institutions such as social, administrative and legal contexts do not matter. On the 
contrary, an arena approach precisely illustrates how, in the case of migrant mobilizations 
in Berlin and Paris, different legal status, accommodation systems and social movement 
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traditions intervene in concrete interactions. Indeed, in most of the cases studied, they 
proved to be important breaking points for the establishment or maintenance of social 
ties. Arenas are, thus, fundamentally ‘situated’ in spatial and temporal contexts. As an 
illustration, forced migrants mobilized in Paris and Berlin in distinct ‘borderline 
citizenship regimes’ (Monforte & Dufour, 2011) and relational contexts which made 
them mobilize mainly as ‘sans-papiers’ in France and as ‘refugees’ in Germany, despite 
at times equivalent biographical features. Yet institutional opportunities and constraints 
were not essential as such, but rather in their concrete effect on the making and breaking 
of social ties, which underlie all processes of political mobilization. Indeed, the accounts 
of the four arenas illustrate that the protesters did not react upon opening opportunity 
structures, and relied exclusively on ‘internal’ resources as traditional social movement 
theories would expect. Rather, resources were mobilized in spaces with specific relational 
qualities and through contentious interactions with other players. Demobilization, 
similarly, was shaped importantly by direct exchanges leading to alienations and 
fragmentations rather than fundamental changes at the macro level. 
 While being nested in specific locations and moments in time, the different arenas 
studied in Part II are also connected in various ways. Activists in Berlin are embedded in 
transnational social spaces, which also involve players in Paris and vice-versa. Thus an 
arena approach seems to open also paths to address the pitfalls of ‘methodological 
nationalism’ (see also section 9.6. below). Furthermore, the interactions unfolding in 
contentious arenas are often rooted in and relate to memories of previous interactions 
made during the migration project. This becomes particularly evident in the chapter on 
the CSP75 and the subsequent mobilizations from 2015 onwards in the Parisian North. 
 For these reasons, an arena approach, particularly in a comparative perspective, 
allows to grasp the complexity, volatility and fragility of political mobilizations of 
marginalized actors, which are incompatible with more structural models of contention 
(see also Chabanet & Royall, 2014). 
9.3.  The ‘Relational Qualities of Space’ 
A spatial lens on forced migrant mobilizations unveils both spatial structures of exclusion 
and repertoires of contention to overcome them. Combined with an arena perspective, a 
spatial sensitivity facilitates the identification of the ‘relational qualities of space’ 
(Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016); hence the scrutiny of the mobilizing and demobilizing 
effects of certain spatialities. This sensitivity is of particular pertinence, given the 
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disintegrating nature of spaces many migrants are forced into during the different stages 
of reception in the destination countries. As ‘non-places’ many asylum facilities in both 
Germany and France are located in peripheral areas, deliberately complicating mobility 
and access to social networks outside the centres. They are often ‘characterized by a 
sterilized, mono-functional enclosure: contact with the outer world is physically 
minimized behind the fences’ (Diken, 2004: 91), which signals exclusion and fosters 
feelings of isolation. In addition to formal migrant accommodation centres, makeshift 
camps of migrants have proliferated in Europe (Agier, 2011; Projet Babels, 2017) due to 
governmental ‘violent inaction’ (Davies et al., 2017). Such camps, in turn, are spaces 
which inherently engender feelings of dehumanization and existential physical 
deprivation. 
According to Scott (1990), ‘the practices and discourses of resistance’ cultivated 
by the marginalized cannot exist ‘without tacit or acknowledged coordination and 
communication within the subordinate group.’ Therefore, ‘the subordinate group must 
carve out for itself social spaces insulated from control and surveillance from above’ 
(Scott, 1990: 118). Grasping mobilizations of marginalized individuals and groups 
requires specific attention to these geographies of exclusion, which constitute important 
obstacles and require specific strategies to overcome them.  
Applying a spatial perspective, all the chapters of this thesis suggest that 
marginalized protesters raised public attention and mobilized resources by moving from 
socially and spatially isolated locations into urban centres. In setting up camps, and 
organizing marches (in the case of Berlin and the CSP75), they literally left behind their 
excluded position and articulated a claim to urban and social centrality. Indeed, ‘due to 
their vulnerable status, refugees employ[ed] spatial strategies to create visibility against 
the exclusionary nature of policies’ (Ataç, 2016: 632). 
The relocation from the periphery of the asylum camp (Germany), the migrant 
worker foyer (Paris) or the individualized life in the streets (Paris) to the inner city space 
broke the routine of forced migrant invisibility. Regrouping in central locations attracted 
media coverage, tapped resources that were needed in order to be recognized as political 
subjects, to perform ‘acts of citizenship’ and to organize political protest. While tent 
camps in both Berlin and Paris attracted resources, they differed fundamentally. Whereas 
in Paris, migrants gathered in a situation of ‘bare life’ as a combination of subsistence 
and strategy of visibility, the tent camps in Germany were deliberate autonomous spaces, 
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with comparatively less precarious living conditions. Despite these important differences, 
as autonomous spaces in contrast to regulated asylum facilities, the camps generated 
resources, attracting diverse support milieus from which forced migrants had been 
previously cut off. These insights resonate with a growing body of literature on the 
contradictory effects of migrant camps, reproducing both at times conditions of ‘bare life’ 
and constituting sites for encounter and resistance (Agier, 2011; D. Martin, 2015; Sanyal, 
2014; Turner, 2016). 
In Berlin, forced migrants gradually succeeded in compensating for the lack of 
resources and even in altering established power relations between migrants and pro-
beneficiaries. The latter were attracted to the increasingly prominent protesters, who had 
thus a degree of choice in deciding with whom to work and whom to ignore. In addition 
to constituting ‘reservoirs for weak ties’, the protest camps served also as spaces of 
encounter and gradual trust-building among previously scattered forced migrant 
communities, in which stories and opinions could be shared and a collective identity 
developed – despite the tremendous heterogeneity of the actors involved. The condition 
of ‘bare life’ with extremely scarce resources in the tent camps and squats of Paris added 
obstacles to such rapprochements. Nevertheless, also in the ‘La Chapelle’-arena, almost 
all sparks of political mobilization emerged from the camps and the squats and their 
incubating qualities. 
In both Berlin and Paris, the squats appropriated by forced migrants together with 
solidarity activists had highly ambivalent relational effects. At ‘Jean Quarré’ and 
‘Gerhard-Hauptmann Schule’, particularly in their initial phases, these autonomous 
spaces provided a less precarious environment for interaction compared to the exposed 
street camps. Through the encounter of highly diverse actors, a wide range of political 
initiatives was able to develop, which also partly survived the eviction or evacuation of 
the places. This potential, however, increasingly faded when the spaces became 
overpopulated, conflicts proliferated and increasingly alienated the inhabitants from each 
other. Given the built-up environment, the proliferating tensions were sealed-in and, thus, 
accentuated in the building. Eventually, the spaces became projections of opposition to 
migrant solidarity movements as problems could be attributed to the occupants 
themselves and their internal organization, rather than serving as empowering catalysts 
of migrant visibility and political subjectivity. The squats organized by the forced 
migrants mobilizing as ‘sans-papiers’ in Paris constitute exceptions in this regard. Due to 
their comparative strength, given the large existing ethnic communities and established 
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structures of political organization, they succeeded in sustaining and effectively self-
organizing the occupations at ‘Bourse du Travail’ and ‘Baudelique’ for extended periods 
of time with much fewer internal disputes. As a result, the autonomous squats in Paris 
could unfold more of their advantageous relational effects - attracting resources and 
facilitating exchange and encounter - compared to the other two cases of ‘Jean Quarré’ in 
Paris and ‘Gerhard-Hauptmann-Schule’ in Berlin. 
9.4.  Interactionist Patterns I: Fragile Solidarity & Autonomy 
As various scholars have rightly pointed out, migrant mobilizations typically involve both 
migrants and a number of pro-beneficiary actors such as individual supporters and 
associations (Giugni & Passy, 2001; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016; Siméant, 1998). Such 
‘post-colonial encounters’ of marginalized ‘subalterns’ and relatively privileged citizens 
often result in contentious interactions, in which questions of racism, paternalism and 
autonomy occupy a prominent place. 
In all the cases presented in the empirical part of this thesis, forced migrants were 
very soon surrounded by a wide range of actors with highly diverse institutional agendas 
and modi operandi, including individual supporters without previous experience in 
activism, anarchist groups with radical repertories of action and professionalized NGOs 
with established channels to the government. Conflicts arose regularly regarding the 
respective roles of migrants and non-migrants, both among pro-beneficiaries and between 
supporters and forced migrants.  
While all the non-migrant associations and individuals involved in principle 
supported the cause of migrant rights, questions of leadership and strategies were heatedly 
contested. Many associations and individuals reacted with irritation to forced migrants 
actively claiming a position in the front row, or to their choice of strategies. They were 
profoundly uneasy about their role being limited to mere logistic support. Ties to 
established associations working on the issue of migration proved to be particularly 
fragile. Their traditional organizational identity of representing migrants and a focus on 
long-term ‘strategies’ regularly collided with the forced migrants’ radical protest 
repertoire and their attempts to emancipate from a predominantly white migrant rights 
movement (and the society at large). These disputes could be in Jasper’s terms understood 
as manifestations of the ‘radicalism dilemma’ and the ‘universalism dilemma’ combined. 
‘Radicalism Dilemma: In pushing ideas and actions to their extreme, radicals can 
gain publicity, recognition for a team, and often concessions. The moderate flank 
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might then present itself as a reasonable compromise partner, so that other players 
give it power in order to undercut the radicals (although the moderates must 
distance themselves from the radicals to garner these benefits)’ (Jasper, 2008: 
153). 
‘Universalism Dilemma: You are special in some way, different from other 
individuals or groups, and thus you deserve unusual protections, powers, 
authority, or respect’ (Jasper, 2008: 126). 
In the resulting interactions, activist forced migrants, in turn, felt their suspicion of 
ubiquitous paternalism and instrumentalization of their exclusion and suffering to be 
proven. In this context, it is key to recall that the sparks of protest at ‘St. Ambroise’ in 
1996, at ‘Bourse du Travail’ in 2008 as well as in Wurzburg 2012 were ignited without 
the knowledge and initial support, and sometimes even despite the opposition, of a 
number of pro-migrant associations. At the same time, without the amplifying potential 
of a wider migrant rights movement, the episodes would have most likely remained 
scattered sparks. 
Indeed, the forced migrant protesters found themselves repeatedly in a ‘strategic 
dilemma’: On the one hand, the migrant associations and individual supporters offered 
fundamental logistic support, as well as symbolic and social capital without which the 
mobilizations could have hardly been sustained. At the same time, they had to re-
negotiate their autonomy constantly - in ‘acts of emancipation’ also within the migrant 
rights movement. To outspokenly protect the autonomy vis-à-vis native associations at 
times came at the expense of losing important access to resources. The dependence on 
external resources, in turn, entailed being caught between opposing support interests. In 
numerous instances, associations, trade unions and grass-roots groups engaged in their 
own skirmishes accusing each other of exploiting forced migrants. Due to the structural 
asymmetry in terms of power, risks, and rights distinguishing those primarily concerned 
from those acting in solidarity, such social ties were characterized by a widespread and 
accentuated fragility. Certainly with important exceptions, but generally, relations kept a 
pragmatic, resource-oriented ‘weak tie’ nature, rather than being emotionally deep 
‘strong ties’ of trust based on shared experiences of exclusion. 
Yet, the arenas also showed that unequal power relations between migrants and 
native supporters were not necessarily static. Indeed, the relocation of protest to visible 
and autonomous public spaces (such as the tent camps in Wurzburg and Berlin, but also 
initially the squat ‘Jean Quarré’) developed at times a ‘magnetic effect’, attracting 
considerable resources from a broad range of individuals and groups, among which the 
 211 
protesters could choose to a certain degree. While the forced migrants had to rely on 
external support in most cases (in terms of information, tents, rooms, donations, 
protection etc.), the protest itself and the contentious localities where it evolved, expanded 
their room of manoeuvre. Thus, in some spatial configurations, marginalized and weakly-
resourced challengers could compensate an objective lack of internal resources without 
becoming dependent on specific actors. 
In resonance with the ‘players and arenas’ approach, interactions do not unfold in 
a vacuum, but involve actors with certain dispositions. These dispositions, I argue, are 
deeply rooted in histories of mobilizations and hence in memories of previous contentious 
interactions. During my fieldwork in both Berlin and in Paris, actors referred to past 
interactions with certain players or types of players in previous waves of contention 
around forced migration. In Berlin, the ‘Oranienplatz’ arena left deep traces in the 
relations between supporters and forced migrants but also between different generations 
and ‘types’ of forced migrants. In Paris, the interactions around the occupation of the 
‘Bourse du Travail’ lastingly alienated the most influential ‘sans papiers’ collectives from 
both trade unions and migrant rights associations, which partly explained their absence 
during the ‘La Chapelle’ arena. In other words, contentious interactions in previous arenas 
have proven to feed into dispositions for future interactions. 
9.5.  Interactionist Patterns II: Niches & Internal Heterogeneity 
Walter Nicholls has convincingly argued that even among undocumented migrants, 
chances for legal recognition and social inclusion are highly diverse. Given the absence 
of large political opportunities, illegalized migrants mobilize in small ‘niches’, which can 
only accommodate some at the expense of the exclusion of many others (Nicholls, 2014). 
The boundaries of inclusion, usually set by the state, introduce breaking points into the 
social relations among undocumented migrant protesters. As the empirical chapters in 
this manuscript suggest, these findings can be extended to forced migrants more broadly, 
including asylum-seekers. 
The contentious subjects in the four arenas assembled a highly diverse group of 
individuals - in terms of origin, age, gender and most importantly, in terms of (potential) 
legal status. While in Berlin asylum-seekers mobilized mostly alongside rejected asylum-
seekers and individuals with a regular status in Italy under the label ‘refugees’, the 
Parisian cases documented a focus on ‘sans papiers’ activism, including rejected asylum-
seekers and political refugees turned undocumented migrants. The ‘La Chapelle’ arena 
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furthermore underlined an accentuated separation between mobilizations by and for 
asylum-seekers in an ongoing procedure and those self-identifying as ‘sans papiers’.  
In all arenas, heterogeneity and different propensities of recognition introduced 
sensitive breaking points during these mobilizations – even in groups which had started 
mobilizing as a ‘compound player’. In the case of the ‘Bourse du Travail’ arena, different 
groups of forced migrants eventually competed for a limited number of regularizations 
dictated by the state, which eventually led to internal fragmentation and demobilization. 
At ‘Oranienplatz’, asylum-seekers and ‘Lampedusas’ were increasingly alienated and 
focused on their specific group interests. Within the movement, players repeatedly split 
along lines of origin and (perceived) chances to be granted rights and recognition in 
relation to others. For similar reasons, the activist group of African migrants in Berlin 
mobilizing from 2015 onwards failed to bridge to the large Syrian community, for 
linguistic reasons, but also because of a perceived (and in fact real) relative disadvantage 
in obtaining a regular status. At ‘La Chapelle’, the ‘sans-papiers’ largely abstained from 
the mobilizations of those referred to as ‘refugees’ because of negative memories of 
previous interactions with French supporters, but also because of a perceived competition 
with comparatively more privileged asylum-seekers. Also at ‘La Chapelle’, in the light 
of a heterogeneous set of asylum-seekers, conflicts regularly erupted between different 
(national) groups, about scarce resources and competition to find a place in the ‘niche’, 
be it a place in an accommodation centre or the support of associations. 
As a matter of fact, particularly in Paris, associations with specific mandates often 
involuntarily contributed to deepening cleavages within the migrant communities. With 
their focus on either ‘asylum-seekers’ or ‘vulnerable populations’, many staff members 
found themselves in a fundamental dilemma of pragmatically exploiting a niche while at 
the same time reproducing or accentuating the systematic exclusion of others. This 
dilemma, in fact, dates back to the early phases of ‘sans-papiers’ mobilizations in the 
1990s and has been aggravated in France since the ‘Circulaire Chèvenement’, which 
institutionalized specific (and hence exclusionary) criteria. Similarly to Jasper’s ‘rules 
dilemma’, dependent actors were trapped in the very rules they wanted to change in the 
first place: 
‘The Rules Dilemma: Efforts to change an arena often end up following the rules 
of that same arena. Rather than ignoring it or using a different arena, an insurgent 
may end up embroiled in the arena’s rules for changing the rules’ (Jasper, 2008: 
163). 
 213 
Knowing the disruptive effects of certain spaces as well as the fragility of social ties, 
government officials have in all four arenas at times deliberately governed space and 
social relations, often combining the two.  
In a structural variant, the German asylum system is deliberately designed to 
complicate the establishment of social relations between asylum-seekers and German 
citizens, with a view to minimizing empathy, and facilitating deportation in cases of 
rejected asylum claims. Both ‘Residenzpflicht’ and forced geographic dispersal in 
collective accommodation centers have been used as a tool by government officials 
during waves of political mobilization in order to discourage and sanction migrant 
participants. At ‘La Chapelle’, public authorities intervened in the built environment by 
fencing entire parks and public spaces under aerial metro lines, as well as by placing 
massive boulders in order to prevent forced migrants from regrouping and hence, from 
drawing attention to their condition of fundamental rights violation.  
 In both the ‘Oranienplatz’ arena and the occupations of the ‘Bourse du Travail’ 
and ‘Baudelique’ in Paris, the public authorities offered selective incentives which 
combined spatial and relational strategies. A limited number of individuals involved in 
the mobilizations was offered an exit option (reassessment of cases), on the condition that 
the disruptive camps and occupations were voluntarily dismantled. With such means, the 
state could avoid open repression against marginalized protesters, which had produced 
negative media coverage and also increased empathy and support for the actors involved. 
The heterogeneity of (potential) legal status among forced migrants and the dependency 
on the state introduced fissures within the mobilizing groups upon which the respective 
state officials could act.  
Indeed, many forced migrants accepted in both Paris and Berlin selective 
incentives offered by the state at the expense of the collective long-term struggle. This is 
not least rooted in the specific context of mobilization. In contrast to many other 
mobilizations, forced migrants (both asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants) hold a 
massive individual stake in the conflict, with a lot to win and a lot to lose. This inherent 
characteristic of forced migrant mobilizations adds additional motivations for individuals 
to defect from collective action and for the state to intervene. 
9.6.  Every-Day Experiences, Transnationality and ‘Invisible’ Protest 
The practices of political mobilization portrayed in the four empirical chapters are deeply 
rooted in the concrete experiences and memories of the individuals involved. Sparks of 
 214 
protest emanated often from tangible threats, while the subsequent trajectory of protest 
was fundamentally shaped by concrete interactions. In the ‘Bourse du Travail’ protest 
wave, the intervention of the CGT trade union posed a broad threat against their 
communities and identities, but also a direct threat to themselves and their personal 
interests. In the ‘La Chapelle’ wave, the highly precarious life in the streets posed a 
fundamental threat to physical integrity. The sparks of the ‘Oranienplatz’ wave arose 
from a suicide, which, for those joining the protest, was a direct effect of a highly 
burdensome life in uncertainty, forced immobility and isolation. Those engaging in 
political protest in Berlin since 2015 were mobilized by existential threats to their lives 
and those of friends and relatives on their way to Europe. Commemorations of border 
deaths scandalizing the externalization of European migration politics, have, hence, 
constituted a fundamental element of their activities.  
The condition of ‘bare life’ in the ‘La Chapelle’ arena made the individuals 
involved instrumentally press for immediate alleviation of suffering rather than structural 
changes. In most cases, access to a roof, food and basic medical care was the first priority, 
even though also claims for recognition and dignity were present. Accordingly, direct 
social actions such as tent camps proliferated, which combined precarious subsistence 
with a strategy of visibility. At ‘La Chapelle’, asylum-seekers predominantly mobilized 
to get into the asylum system. In Germany, instead, with its rigid reception system, 
asylum-seekers in most cases stepped out of the asylum system in order to mobilize 
resources and expose the living conditions of asylum-seekers, which remained largely 
hidden and removed from the public eye. 
 Subsequently, the scrutiny of weakly resourced and less organized forms of 
protest thus profited from a ‘microscopic analysis’ (Lahusen, 2014) of the constituencies, 
their experiences, emotions and every-day practices. Such attention to detail of the 
concrete practices by forced migrants in exclusive migration regimes furthermore unveils 
that instead of (or at times in addition to) disruptive collective action, many forced 
migrants chose less ‘visible’ forms of dissent. Many opted for ‘exit’ instead of ‘voice’, 
trying to gain inclusion in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. Others stayed and focused 
on survival in illegality or engaged in legal struggles for a right to stay. Precarious 
conditions brought about a myriad of more instrumental, at times short-term and at times 
‘invisible’ forms of resistance (see also Agier, 2010). 
Importantly, targeting the diverse micro processes of political mobilizations of 
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forced migrants sheds light on the heterogeneity of the actors involved. It unveils the 
widespread dependence of individuals in a situation of ‘bare life’ but also the ‘weapons 
of the (not so) weak’.97 Those mobilizing as ‘sans-papiers’ in Paris had the comparative 
advantage of established ethnic networks, in which various resources were embedded. 
These did not only contribute to partly buffering the precariousness of a life in illegality 
in Paris, but also allowed the self-constitution as an autonomous political subject with 
less dependence on pro-beneficiaries than those asylum-seekers from origins without 
established ethnic networks. Political mobilizations of forced migrants in Berlin from 
2015 onwards in turn illustrate how individual (transnational) biographies shape protest 
by marginalized actors. Members of the group had accumulated social and emotional ties 
‘on the move’, which they managed to translate into ‘transnational contentious 
communities’.  
Indeed, forced migrants in all cases were embedded in transnational social spaces, 
which resulted in a dual target of protest. Protesters in both Paris and Berlin considered 
their activism as a struggle for rights and recognition in the locality of destination but also 
aimed at pushing for changes in the locality of origin or transit. They demanded both a 
‘right to remain’, hence, life-worthy conditions at ‘home’, and ‘a right to leave’, meaning 
rights and recognition in Europe. Even though not all arenas mirrored the same degree of 
transnationality, references to the region of origin and a responsibility to mobilize also 
for those left behind was expressed regularly. Sudanese asylum-seekers at ‘La Chapelle’ 
mobilized against the regime of Omar al Bashir; many of those who entered Europe 
through Libya pointed to the horrific cases of human rights abuse in the country; the 
‘sans-papiers’ protested against authoritarianism in Mali. 
As these extracted patterns suggest, political mobilizations by forced migrants 
show a number of relational and spatial characteristics across time and space. Comparing 
contentious arenas in distinct locations and moments in time thus adds a more 
‘macroscopic’ complement to the detailed descriptions with a focus on the important 
specificities of each arena. In the subsequent conclusive chapter, I will recall the main 
ambitions and achievements of this thesis, point to its remaining limitations and outline 
areas for future research. 
  
                                                 









From Silence to Voice: Concluding Remarks & Outlook 
 
‘You, new brothers and sisters, who have left the misery, crossed the desert 
and the Mediterranean and have made it to Paris. You are very welcome with 
us. We march every Friday. Because when we march, we disrupt, if we do not 
disrupt, no one cares about us, we are invisible but always in danger.’ 
 (Field notes 16/06/2017) 
 
10.1.  Introduction 
Numbers of forced migration have reached a historic peak (UNHCR, 2017), and are 
unlikely to decrease significantly any time soon. In the light of proliferating conflicts, the 
detrimental effects of climate change and materially speaking, ‘one of the most unequal 
worlds in all of human history, ever since the recording of income and wealth data’ (Faist, 
2017: 19), large-scale migration will remain one of the key social questions in the decades 
to come. Therefore, according to Alessandro Monsutti,  
‘the people knocking at the door of Europe tell something that needs to be listened 
to, they tell their moral fatigue towards the growing gap between the wealthiest 
and poorest segments of humanity. They are active participants in the global moral 
polity in showing how immoral it is’ (2017: 454). 
In recent years, forced migrants have increasingly politicized their presence and exclusion 
in various locations in Europe. They have refused to remain silent and have decided to 
speak out. Agier has noted: ‘In order for injustice to exist, it must be able to be spoken’ 
(2010: 42). This thesis has scrutinized processes of political subjectivation and 
mobilization by forced migrants in two European capitals since 2008 – both with a view 
to contributing to the public debate on the complex and contested topic of migration, and 
to addressing a number of important gaps within the academic reflection on the issue. 
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In this final chapter, I intend to wind up the manuscript by recalling the ambition 
of the project, providing brief conclusions of the main substantive findings and pointing 
to the thesis’ key contributions to both academic and public debates. For this purpose, the 
structure of the chapter’s remainder is threefold: Section (10.2.) recalls the ambition and 
potential academic achievements of this research project, followed by a critical 
assessment of its limitations and starting points for further research (10.3). Finally, the 
thesis ends with an epilogue, linking the project back to broader public debates on 
(forced) migration, human rights, and ‘subalternity’ in the 21st century (10.4.). 
10.2.  Ambition and Achievements 
Despite their quantitative proliferation and social relevance, political mobilizations by 
forced migrants have only recently received growing academic attention, particularly in 
critical migration and citizenship studies, and far less so in social movement studies (Ataç 
et al., 2016; Eggert & Giugni, 2015). The latter strand of literature has not engaged 
extensively with the phenomenon due to a widespread bias:  
‘While protest has been defined as a resource of the powerless, researchers have 
given the most attention to those movements endowed with endogenous 
organisational resources and exogenous political opportunities, which were 
considered in explaining their emergence, strength, forms, and outcomes’ (della 
Porta, 2018a: 1).  
In this vein, forced migrants as up-rooted, often weakly-resourced and ‘deportable’ actors 
have been considered unlikely candidates for political mobilization. In addition to 
theoretical objections, migrant mobilizations as elusive and volatile phenomena pose 
particular methodological challenges. Not least for these reasons, migration has been 
rarely studied from a social movement perspective. If the topic of migration was 
addressed at all, focus was mainly put on practices of solidarity with migrants, rather than 
precarious ‘acts of emancipation’ (Monforte & Dufour, 2013) by migrants. The recently 
published volume ‘Solidarity Mobilizations in the ‘Refugee Crisis’. Contentious Moves’, 
edited by Donatella della Porta (2018), constitutes a major step forward as it provides one 
of the first systematic analyses of migrant solidarity from a social movement perspective. 
Yet, also in this contribution, the role of migrant agency remains rather marginal. 
In the light of these empirical and theoretical lacunae, this thesis has explored 
diverse processes of political subjectivation and mobilization by forced migrants with a 
view to providing both theoretical innovations and refinements as well as empirical 
complements to the body of literature in social movement studies. The former, I argue, 
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are needed in order to grasp contentious politics around forced migration, and 
particularly, forced migrant agency therein. To this end, I suggest bridging insights from 
critical migration studies with social movement studies. From migration studies, I have 
drawn from the notion of ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin & Nielsen, 2008), which conceives 
citizenship as a performative process. Such a perspective has proven to be more sensitive 
in capturing the political nature of the fragmented, volatile and at times even ‘invisible’ 
practices of resistance by migrants (Ataç et al., 2015). From social movement studies, in 
which this thesis is located, I share the general empirical focus and interest in the 
conditions, dynamics and forms of political mobilization (see also della Porta, 2018: 2). 
Specifically, I build upon recent innovations in the discipline, adopting a ‘microscopic’ 
(Lahusen, 2014) perspective, with particular attention to ‘contentious interactions’ 
(Jasper & Duyvendak, 2014) and spatial configurations (Nicholls et al., 2013b; Nicholls 
& Uitermark, 2016).  
Against this background, I have scrutinized four contentious arenas in two local 
settings (Berlin and Paris) at different moments in time, with a view to both capturing 
specific processes and to deriving relational and spatial patterns. Throughout the thesis I 
have asked how protest by forced migrants emerges and unfolds through interactions 
among players in specific arenas. Focusing on the making and breaking of ties, and the 
spatial underpinning of such processes, I have analysed the specific dynamics of 
contention under highly precarious conditions. Specifically, in the empirical chapters, I 
have explored the relations forced migrants establish, as well as the spaces they enact and 
embody. With such acts of ‘radical place-making’ (Mitchell & Sparke, 2017), forced 
migrants contest the processes which lead to their marginalization and the denial of their 
political subjectivity. 
The contentious practices portrayed unveil both the multiple obstacles to 
mobilization in highly disadvantageous contexts and the empowering effects of 
spatialized repertoires of action. As an abductive endeavour, this research has been 
importantly informed by previous seminal contributions on the issue (Monforte & 
Dufour, 2011, 2013, Nicholls, 2013a, 2014; Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016). While echoing 
and reinforcing some of their findings, the manuscript offers important complements, 
both theoretically and empirically. Without replicating the relational and spatial ‘essence’ 
of the four case studies synthesized in Chapter 9, I will subsequently point to some of the 
main contributions obtained through this research: 
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Empirical Complements 
Firstly, the scarce literature on migrant activism concentrates heavily on the specific 
context of irregularity. None of the existing contributions in social movement studies 
have scrutinized explicitly political activism by asylum-seekers. In addressing the 
phenomenon of forced migrant activism more broadly, my research thus sheds light on 
the particularities of asylum regimes and their impact on political activism, as well as the 
overlap (and at times non-overlap) with undocumented migrants’ struggles.  
Secondly, in contrast to Nicholls and Uitermark, my research is not so much 
interested in the historical perspective of developments of migrant rights movements, as 
rather in the contentious interactions unfolding within specific arenas. By homing in on 
shorter time frames, I believe to have added more nuanced insights into the spatial and 
relational patterns at play.  
Lastly, my research scrutinized episodes of contention in time frames that have 
not been captured so far. Uitermark and Nicholls’ (2016) section on migrant rights 
activism in France fades out in the mid-2000s and thereby misses two highly influential 
waves of contention – the occupation of the ‘Bourse du Travail’ 2008-2010 and the ‘La 
Chapelle’ arena unfolding from 2015 onwards. These two arenas introduced a new type 
of actor in migrant activism in France (asylum-seekers in an ongoing procedure) and 
contributed to highly consequential processes of fragmentation in the Parisian migrant 
rights movement. Monforte and Dufour’s (2013) comparison of marches by 
undocumented migrants in Germany and France largely builds on document analysis 
without extensive fieldwork with the actors involved and does not cover the most 
disruptive and visible wave of contention in Germany, the ‘Oranienplatz-movement’. In 
the light of these differences, my research serves as a significant empirical complement 
to previous contributions on (forced) migrant activism in the two countries. Moreover, 
and based on original empirical fieldwork, the research project echoes and refines theories 
on processes of political mobilization by marginalized actors in general and forced 
migrants in particular: 
Grievances, Threats and Marginality 
Firstly, the empirical findings derived from the four protest arenas I investigated suggest 
the need for social movement studies to re-focus on everyday experiences of exclusion, 
when studying political mobilizations of marginalized actors. Rather than by opening 
opportunities, and pre-given resources, forced migrants have predominantly reacted to 
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existential threats to their own physical and psychological integrity and that of friends 
and acquaintances. Social movement studies have ‘tended to disregard the origins of 
discontent’ (della Porta, 2018: 1). Yet, it is these ‘embodied grievances’ that pushed most 
of the protagonists of this research to organize political protest against all odds. Indeed, 
as forced migrants, many individuals in this research are  
‘both victims of human rights abuses because of being political subjects, as well 
as being political subjects because of having experienced grave violations of 
human dignity’ (Horst, 2018: 6). 
In extremely hostile contexts and mostly with very few internal resources, individuals 
have resisted their marginalization, degradation to bureaucratic cases and at times their 
perceived ‘disposability’. Given the condition of marginality, the repertoire of action has 
taken a particular shape. In a condition of ‘bare life’ in Paris, protest took an instrumental 
form with a focus on immediate solutions to existential hardship, rather than structural 
change. Precarious camps and squats were both ‘direct social actions’ and means to 
pressurize the government into allocating places in public accommodation centres. In 
Berlin, in turn, forced migrants usually mobilized against the isolation in the restrictive 
accommodation centre and attracted visibility by leaving their allocated places. 
Resources, Relations & Space 
Secondly, thus, the research suggests the value of a specific scrutiny of the relationship 
between the making and breaking of social ties and the respective spatial context in the 
study of marginalized actors (this strongly echoes the main argument by Nicholls & 
Uitermark, 2016). In most cases, protesters mobilized resources during action. This was 
usually only successful when they managed to leave behind their spatial isolation and 
politicized their presence by physically relocating to urban centres. In regrouping 
themselves and leaving behind their attributed places at the social and geographical 
margins of society, forced migrants broke the routine of invisibility. Through an active 
disruption, forced migrants constituted themselves as political subjects, claiming a ‘right 
to have rights’, independently from an authorization to do so. This in turn, repeatedly 
attracted media coverage and developed ‘magnetic effects’, through which essential 
external resources provided by local neighbours and politicised social movement milieus 
could be tapped. Camps and squats were important spaces of encounter for highly 
heterogeneous actors, which contributed regularly to the transformation of feelings of 
indignation rooted in everyday experiences into public articulation of dissent. At times, 
it was this exchange with others which triggered a change in consciousness and repertoire 
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from silence and patience to voice. Hence, all arenas furthermore underline that the 
interaction with powerful supporting actors at times incubates sparks of resistance, 
nurturing them into sustained mobilizations. At the same time, they remained highly 
fragile due to fundamentally asymmetrical power positions. Illustrating the fragility of 
social ties (strong and weak), which are made and unmade in concrete interactions, 
underlines that the analysis of protest (and particularly protest by weakly-resourced 
actors) profits, due to its volatility, from a relationally and spatially sensitive micro-lens. 
Given the heterogeneity of the actors involved, the initial empowering and incubating 
effect was usually followed by processes of fragmentation, in which key lines of 
fragmentation became apparent. These included not only the division between those 
primarily concerned and pro-beneficiaries, but also among forced migrants with different 
(potential) legal status. Aware of the incubating effects of certain spaces and the fragility 
of ties in such settings, government authorities have repeatedly intervened in the built 
environment with physical obstacles to regrouping and in social ties by offering selective 
incentives along latent lines of fragmentation.  
Arenas, Locations & Comparisons 
Thirdly, the research has shown the heuristic value of combining a ‘microscopic’ ‘arenas 
perspective’ with a comparative element. Homing in on specific arenas allows to identify 
also precarious forms of agency in highly disadvantageous contexts. The scrutiny of 
micro-interactions, hence, buffers the tendency of more structural accounts to ignore 
sparks or protest, ‘invisible’ manifestations of dissent and their interaction with visible 
protest. Furthermore, the arena framework introduces a prism, in which the artificial 
antagonism of agency and structure is mediated. Indeed, as my research suggests, macro-
structures or ‘opportunities’ such as legal status, (‘borderline’) citizenship regimes, 
accommodation systems etc. penetrate in micro-interactions, and hence can be captured 
in an arena perspective. Adding a comparative element to such a perspective further 
sharpens the attention to differences across space. While showing important spatial and 
relational patterns (see Chapter 9 for details), the mobilizations in Berlin and Paris have 
also brought to light important differences, which are related to the distinct ‘borderline 
citizenship regimes’ (Monforte & Dufour, 2011), in which they are embedded. In Berlin, 
mobilizations by forced migrants have brought together rejected asylum-seekers, asylum-
seekers in an ongoing procedure and recognized refugees. In Paris, in turn, the 
opportunities outside the asylum, the existence of a large Francophone (forced) migrant 
 222 
community, as well as a historically grown distinction of irregularity and asylum, have 
introduced accentuated trenches. Furthermore, while asylum-seekers mobilized 
predominantly to get into a structurally undersized official accommodation system, their 
counterparts in Germany protested against rigid ‘encampment’ on a no-choice basis and 
claimed access to decentralized (even privately organized) alternatives. The comparison 
of arenas in Berlin and Paris unveils, moreover, that protest is in Doreen Massey’s terms 
‘place-based’ but not ‘place-bound’ (Massey, 1991b: 279). In the light of Europeanized 
asylum politics (including the restrictive Dublin regulation) and transnational 
biographies, contentious arenas in both locations were in various ways related. Activists 
in Berlin, mobilizing as ‘refugees’ were embedded in a ‘transnational contentious 
community’, which also included ‘sans-papiers’ activists in Paris. This underlines an 
additional strength of multi-cited research in transnational settings, of which migrant 
mobilizations are a typical example (see also Sassen, 2001). Lastly, a diachronic 
perspective, comparing arenas in one location in two moments in time, furthermore shows 
that arenas importantly draw from memories and interactionist dispositions which are 
rooted in previous contentious interactions.  
Fostering Interdisciplinary Dialogue  
Accordingly, the project complements the body of social movement studies both 
empirically and theoretically. In addition, the research also points to the potential for 
dialogue with the burgeoning literatures on critical migration studies (Garelli & Tazzioli, 
2013; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013), (critical) citizenship (Isin, 2008, 2012; Schachar, 
Bauböck, Bloemraad, & Vink, 2017), radical and post-national conceptions of democracy 
(Benhabib, 2004, 2009, Rancière, 1999, 2004), and transnationalism (Faist et al., 2013; 
Vertovec, 2009; Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2003). Beyond constituting concrete 
appropriations of the ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 1996), the invisible and visible 
practices of resistance employed by forced migrants as ‘outsiders’ in nationally defined 
polities constitute ‘acts of citizenship’ (Isin & Nielsen, 2008) through which the 
established orders of belonging and rights are challenged from the margins in a 
transnational ‘age of migration’ (Castles et al., 2014).  
Critical citizenship with its focus on transformative practices indeed opens fruitful 
perspectives for an intensified dialogue with social movement studies’ attention to the 
contexts, repertoires and trajectories of such ‘acts of citizenship’. Without explicitly 
referring to social movements, Isin highlights important similarities: 
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‘Crucially, what makes citizenship performative in this sense is not only that it 
involves iterating or exceeding conventions about what people may and may not 
do but also that people often resist these conventions and transform them by 
applying principles such as equality, justice, liberty, emancipation, and solidarity. 
These principles enable or motivate people to struggle over rights by traversing 
the boundaries of social groups and borders of polities. By so doing, citizens and 
non-citizens, with or without rights, assume responsibilities towards each other, 
across boundaries and borders’ (2017: 507). 
Bridging social movement studies to insights from critical and transnational migration 
studies, is of value for both literatures. As far as social movement studies are concerned, 
I urged to (re)-stress the focus on grievances, on transnational life-worlds and everyday 
(often invisible) practices of subverting exclusive migration regimes. With regard to 
critical migration and citizenship studies, I have added an explicitly empirical micro-
perspective on concrete moments of mobilization and demobilization. Such an approach 
has so far received less attention compared to the numerous contributions on the 
transformation of macro-institutions (e.g. notions of citizenship) and the ‘autonomy’ 
inherent in the very phenomenon of migration (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013). 
10.3.  Limitations & Future Research 
Despite these achievements, the study exhibits a number of both empirical and theoretical 
limitations that should be addressed in future research. A first limitation is inherent to the 
highly demanding ‘arenas approach’, and even more so in its application in a comparative 
design. To immerse in and reconstruct four contentious arenas in two local settings 
involving also vulnerable actors is a highly demanding and time-consuming task. While 
including the perspective of as many players as possible, I did not always succeed in 
equally acknowledging the interests and dilemmas of all the players involved. Given the 
limited time and resources of my study, and due to the explicit heuristic interest in forced 
migrant subjectivity, I decided to stress particularly the marginalized perspective, while 
still situating it in a relational context. Future research would thus require additional 
fieldwork in both settings to further enrich the thick descriptions of all players, strategies 
and dilemmas in the four arenas. 
Secondly, as an abductive, theory-generating and -refining study, the research 
project does not allow for broad and definitive generalizations. While hypothesizing the 
existence of certain spatial and relational patterns in forced migrant activism, these ought 
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to be investigated in additional case studies including arenas in distinct ‘borderline 
citizenship regimes’.  
 Thirdly, I have focused my research on urban centres, in line with the research 
intersecting urban studies and social movements (Nicholls & Uitermark, 2016). While 
the specific relational qualities of cities have proven to be advantageous for progressive 
movements of many kinds, political mobilizations of forced migrants – for obvious 
reasons – also unfold increasingly in border-zones, where practices of externalization and 
securitization of migration policies visibly manifest. Thus, future work on the issue would 
profit much from including border locations (such as Idomeni, Lampedusa, Calais, 
Ventimiglia, Brenner) in the analysis scrutinizing the distinct spatialities and players 
involved in such settings and furthermore, pointing to protests to continue the journey, 
rather than claiming rights, recognition and inclusion on the respective site (Zamponi, 
2018). 
10.4.  Epilogue 
(Forced) migration has structural roots, and thus is not likely to decrease in scale any time 
soon. In 2015, with the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, a decade-old reality of mass 
displacement became a European ‘problem’ and spurred both acts of compassion and 
resistance (della Porta, 2018b; Hess et al., 2016; Jäckle & König, 2016). In most public 
portrayals, forced migrants have been either represented as an indistinctive mass, as a 
threat to the ‘occidental order’ or as vulnerable and powerless victims. In some circles, 
idealized perceptions of a new revolutionary avant-garde have circulated. The 
protagonists in this manuscript are first and foremost human beings striving for 
recognition and rights. They emerge as contentious political subjects, breaking their 
silence and invisibility and raising their voices. Many of the resulting practices are 
precarious and contradictory. The fragmented nature and multiple internal conflicts 
indeed illustrate the difficulties of challenging established orders. Thus, following these 
‘contentious subjects’ in greater depth sheds light on the obstacles of the most excluded 
to claim dignity and the ‘right to have rights’. Such radical and often irreconcilable ‘acts 
of emancipation’ and of ‘performative citizenship’ (Isin, 2017) highlight that (forced) 
migration is a highly contentious field in which fundamental rights and interests are (re-
)distributed. As Bauman noted, ‘mobility has become the most powerful and most 
coveted stratifying factor’ (Bauman, 1998: 9, 74). Moreover, and in contrast to optimistic 
expectations,  
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‘the global expansion of capitalist modernity (intertwined with questions of race) 
did not produce a homogenisation or a levelling of world economy and labour, 
but rather a ceaseless proliferation of differences, heterogeneities and hierarchies’ 
(Mellino, 2016: 100).  
Against this background, Faist has recently raised the important question: ‘How can we 
(de)construct political perceptions around forced migration which lead to categorizations 
that exclude migrants from living in safety?’ (2017: 2). He subsequently noted that most 
claims made by forced migrants and pro-beneficiaries are not transformative or 
subversive, as they merely ‘appeal to states and international organizations to live up to 
the norms they have declared themselves’ (ibid: 10) without demanding a change in 
norms. I would argue, instead, that the ‘acts of citizenship’ by forced migrants presented 
in this thesis constitute such impulses, which urge to reflect on the complex, structural 
questions necessary to achieve change towards a more ‘moral’ polity at the global scale 
in the long run. In this vein, I conclude with a quote by one of the leaders of the ‘sans-
papiers’ movement in the 1990s in Paris, Ababacar Diop, who noted and asked almost 
two decades ago: 
‘We are only just starting (...). The struggle of the sans-papiers has to go beyond 
obtaining our papers and must address the underlying questions, not only in 
France but also, especially, in our countries of origin (...). What is the purpose of 
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Annex A: List of Interviews 
 
A1:  Berlin 
ID Date Location Actor Type Language Documentation 
B1 12.03.16 Berlin Forced Migrant  French Notes 
B2 19.04.16 Berlin Forced Migrant  English Notes 
B3 20.04.16 Berlin Forced Migrant French Notes 
B4 31.05.16 Berlin Forced Migrant  English Transcript 
B5 02.06.16 Berlin Supporter German Notes 
B6 05.06.16 Berlin Forced Migrant  French Notes 
B7 08.06.16 Berlin Local Mayor German Transcript 
B8 19.06.16 Berlin Supporter, Local Politician German Transcript 
B9 21.06.16 Berlin NGO staff, supporter German Transcript 
B10 22.06.16 Berlin Forced Migrant English Transcript 
B11 01.07.16 Bremen Forced Migrant English Transcript 




B13 08.07.16 Berlin Politician German Notes 
B14 17.07.16 Berlin Meeting  French Notes 
B15 21.07.16 Berlin Forced Migrant German Transcript 




B17 26.07.16 Jena Forced Migrant  English Notes 
B18 27.07.16 Potsdam Forced Migrant German Transcript 
B19 28.07.16 Berlin Forced Migrant German Transcript 
B20 29.07.16 Berlin Supporter German Transcript 
B21 24.08.16 Berlin Supporter/ NGO German Transcript 
B22 29.08.16 Berlin  Forced Migrant English Transcript 
B23 31.08.16 Berlin  Supporter/ NGO German Notes, 
B24 01.09.16 Berlin Forced Migrant  English Transcript 
B25 05.09.16 Berlin Supporter German Transcript 
B26 06.09.16 Berlin Supporter/ NGO German Transcript 
B27 23.01.17 Berlin Forced Migrant French Transcript 
B28 25.01.17 Berlin Forced Migrant French Transcript 
B29 27.01.17 Berlin Forced Migrant French Transcript 
B30 29.01.17 Berlin Forced Migrant French Transcript 
B31 08.02.17 Berlin Forced Migrant German Notes 
B32 23.02.17 Berlin NGO German Transcript 
B33 23.03.17 Berlin NGO German Transcript 
B34 26.03.17 Berlin Supporter German Transcript, Notes 
B35   Online Forced Migrant English Public Interview 
B36   Online Forced Migrant  German Public Interview 





ID Date Location Actor Type Language Documentation 
P1 16.05.17 Paris NGO French Notes 
P2 17.05.17 Paris Supporter French Notes 
P3 30.05.17 Paris Supporter French Transcript 
P4 30.05.17 Brussels Forced Migrant  French Notes 
P5 01.06.17 Paris Forced Migrant, NGO French Transcript 
P6 05.06.17 Paris Supporter, NGO French Transcript 
P7 08.06.17 Paris Supporter French Transcript 
P8 12.06.17 Paris NGO French Transcript, Notes 
P9 12.06.17 Paris  NGO, Supporter French Transcript, Notes 
P10 13.06.17 Paris NGO, Supporter French Transcript 
P11 14.06.17 Paris Local Administrator English Transcript 
P12 14.06.17 Paris NGO French Transcript 
P13 15.06.17 Paris Supporter French Notes 
P14 16.06.17 Paris Forced Migrant  French Notes 
P15 18.06.17 Paris Forced Migrant French Notes 
P16 19.06.17 Paris Trade Union French Transcript 
P17 19.06.17 Paris Forced Migrant  English Notes 
P18 20.06.17 Paris Forced Migrant, NGO French Transcript 
P19 20.06.17 Paris Supporter, NGO French Notes 
P20 22.06.17 Paris Forced Migrant English Notes 
P21 23.06.17 Paris Supporter French Transcript 
P22 25.06.17 Paris Forced Migrant French Notes 
P23 25.06.17 Paris Supporter English Transcript 
P24 25.06.17 Paris Forced Migrant  English Transcript 
P25 26.06.17 Paris NGO French Transcript 
P26 26.06.17 Paris Forced Migrant  French Notes 
P27 26.06.17 Paris Supporter French Notes 
P28 27.06.17 Paris Supporter French Notes 




P30 28.06.17 Paris Supporter French Transcript 





Annex B: Graphs on Asylum and Irregularity in Germany and France  
 
 
Figure 1. Asylum Applications in Germany and France, 1985-2016. Source: EUROSTAT. 
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